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Abstract
Carl Schmitt has something of a semi-detached relationship to IR Theory. Largely 
treated as an outsider or a source of critical interventions with which to unpick the 
dominant traditions, rather than a theorist of IR in his own right. This thesis takes a 
different approach. The first section outlines a broad interpretation of Carl Schmitt’s 
main works, with a mind to discovering and examining what unites each of his 
theoretical interventions, insofar as they pertain to IR Theory.
The next part of the thesis lays out some organising principles through which to frame a 
Schmittian critique of each of the main traditions of IR Theory. This commences by 
examining the idea of IR theory as united by a common curiosity -  rather than divided 
by warring methodologies -  revolving around questions concerning collective 
identification and legitimate violence. The critiques substantiate a meta-theoretical 
reformulation of IR theory by reference to two underlying divisions; philosophical 
realism against philosophical idealism on the one hand, and historical progressivism 
against a more static or cyclical view on the other.
With this in mind, Schmitt cannot be classed as a Liberal, Marxist, or indeed a Realist, 
but he does clear space for a consideration of the English School as a tradition in its 
own right, organised around a suspicion of the idea of progress in history, and the 
interpretive focus of philosophical idealism. Finally, IR theory is schematised as a 
polemical playing field, and the recent bifurcation of IR between the ‘tired old 
traditions’ and the endless and multiplying ‘critical turns’ -  usually informed by an 
individual theorist, Carl Schmitt among them -  can be re-examined. Carl Schmitt thus 
emerges as a theorist who has much to contribute to IR Theory, not because of any 
particular critical insights, but because he forces a re-examination of what it means to 
theorise IR.
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Thesis Introduction
The name Carl Schmitt inevitably excites a multitude of different responses, few of 
them positive, but he consequently remains relatively enigmatic. He wrote a number of 
important texts on questions of legal and political theory that are widely understood in 
respect of a few choice quotes; his main texts have been translated into English over a 
relatively long period of time, leading to a somewhat skewed introduction into the 
discipline of International Relations1 -  a predominantly Anglophone discipline -  and 
most importantly, he pursued an active career in politics which led to the one decision 
that everyone is fully familiar with -  that of joining the Nazi Party. This simple act, in 
1933, some months after they had come to power -  and on the same day as fellow 
academic Martin Heidegger -  has ensured that Schmitt’s writings have been treated 
with extreme caution, if not outright hostility for most of the last seventy six years. This 
has led to considerable emphasis being placed on certain of his works, as opposed to 
others, but it has also led to the donning of a protective disposition when writing about 
his works, as if they must be kept at arms length to prevent conceptual contamination.2
Unfortunately this has had a number of problematic implications for International 
Relations. On the one hand, Carl Schmitt has emerged into International Relations in 
several guises, derivatively through the writings of Political Theorists and Philosophers 
whose principal objects of inquiry are removed from the key concerns of International 
Relations, and on the other hand as a sort of negative parameter, inscribing the limits of 
certain rather dangerous ways of thinking. Both of these approaches are encountered 
within this thesis, along with the opening suggestion that preconceptions about 
Schmitt’s works are left behind at the outset. There is obviously something important 
that needs explaining about Schmitt’s decision to join the Nazi party, but the contention 
upon which this thesis is built is that one would gain a better perspective on Schmitt’s 
decision in the light of a full appreciation of his ideas and their exposition, than by the
1A point made by Ellen Kennedy, along with a brief genealogy of English translations of his Weimar 
texts in Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar, (London: Duke University Press, 2004).
2 There are many examples of this throughout the literature on Schmitt. Kennedy refers to this aspect of 
the literature in Constitutional Failure, p 18. Ernst-Wolfgang BOckenf&rde also deals with this point in a 
lecture he delivered in 1997, translated and published as ‘Carl Schmitt Revisited’ in Telos, 109, 1996. 
Among the many recently published texts on Schmitt, Kam Shapiro suggests that ‘Carl Schmitt has gone 
from obscurity to cliche before declaring that ‘it is no longer necessary to justify a serious appraisal of 
his contributions to political theoiy’ in Carl Schmitt and the Intensification o f Politics (Plymouth:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), p xvii.
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reverse process of viewing the ideas in the light of the fateful decision. Therefore the 
thesis does not open with a warning that we must be careful when considering the 
theories of Carl Schmitt -  lest we forget he was a Nazi -  but instead seeks to defer 
consideration of his decision to join the Nazi party until after a period of reflection 
following a fuller examination of his ideas and how they evolved over the course of his 
life. This thesis only aspires to offer the fuller examination of his works from within a 
conceptual context of IR Theory, and leaves judgment of his career choices to the 
reader, not as an attempt to rehabilitate Carl Schmitt, but in order to avoid his character 
becoming the principal subject under discussion. It is a work of theory, makes no claims 
concerning Schmitt’s soul, and trusts the reader to know his own. Instead the central 
effort is to establish terms upon which to approach an assessment of Schmitt’s career, 
poised as it was midway between reflection and action, then to extrapolate an 
evolutionary account of his ideas insofar as they revolve around problems ordinarily 
dealt with by scholars of International Relations, and finally it allows consideration of 
what contribution Schmitt’s lucubrative speculations make to contemporary 
interpretations both of the discipline of IR and the theoretically challenging business of 
international relations that are emerging and mutating every day.
The first section of the thesis concentrates on the important works of Carl Schmitt and 
attempts to explain them in their own terms. It acts as both a literature review and an 
interpretive companion in that it organises his thoughts twofold. In the first chapter he is 
treated as a conceptual theorist, who was attempting to theorise irreducible constants of 
social theory, which he took to be the primordial character of political expression 
through the oppositional and constitutive ‘friend / enemy’ distinction. This is expanded 
to discuss his theoretical propositions on the related concepts of ‘the decision’, 
‘sovereignty’ and his speculations concerning the relationship between legitimacy and 
legality. This way of thinking about Schmitt has the longest pedigree, and is the least 
controversial, as most of his writing on these matters was done in the 1920’s during the 
period of the Weimar Republic. It can easily be argued that his texts served as a warning 
for the inevitable collapse of the Weimar Republic unless -  as he advocated -  President 
Hindenburg became more robust in utilising article 48 of the constitution authorising
3 Throughout this thesis I follow the convention of using ‘IR’ to denote the academic discipline of 
International Relations, and ‘ir’ to refer to what has become understood as the practice of international 
relations
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the assumption of emergency powers.4 Thus Schmitt is often presented as possessing 
some credibility as a political theorist because he argued against the emerging Fascists 
and warned his political allies on the right of the German political spectrum against 
cooperating with them.5 However, to suggest that certain of his texts are untainted by 
Nazism because he was against them in practical terms is little different to steering clear 
of his later texts because he had joined them earlier in his career. Both are prior 
qualifications on the value of certain arguments, before the arguments have been made, 
and according to terms which have no bearing on the argument. There has been some 
more recent literature concerning his later work in The Nomos o f the Earth in the 
International Law o f the Jus Publicum Europaeum6 and Theory o f the Partisan: 
Intermediate Comment on the Concept o f the Political, which relies on an assumed
o
rehabilitation of Schmitt’s political theoretical credentials. Interestingly, but 
predictably, his least prominent texts were written during the time of his Nazi 
collaboration, particularly an essay on Hobbes’ Leviathan,9 and a historical essay 
entitled Land and Sea.10 Nevertheless, the notion that theories are produced by minds 
that are somehow dispositionally tainted in respect of particular political associations is 
another way of not engaging seriously with the ideas. It merely ranks ideas in relation to 
the acceptability of the theorist, rather than the coherence and persuasiveness of the 
ideas themselves, irrespective of whether the ideas were formulated before or after 
Schmitt’s decision to join the Nazi party.
The second approach to theorising Schmitt, outlined in the first section moves away 
from thinking about him in purely conceptual terms and instead suggests that at all
4 Paul Hirst, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Decisionism’, Telos Volume 72.
5 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait o f Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000)
6 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos o f the Earth in the International Law o f the Jus Publicum Europaeum, (New 
York: Telos Press, 2003 [1974, 1st Edition 1950]), translated by Gary Ulmen. From hereon usually 
shortened to Nomos.
7 Carl Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan: Intermediate Comment on the Concept o f the Political (New 
York: Telos Press, 2007 [1962]), translated by Gary Ulmen. From hereon shortened to Theory o f the 
Partisan.
8 Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Pettito (eds), The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt: Terror, 
Liberal War and the Crisis o f Global Order (London: Routledge, 2007): Andreas Behnke, ‘Terrorising 
the Political: 9/11 Within the Context of the Globalisation of Violence’, Millennium: Journal o f 
International Studies, Volume 33, Issue 2, p 279-312.
9 Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory o f Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure o f a Political 
Symbol, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996 [1938]), translated by George Schwab and Ema 
Hilfstein.
10 Carl Schmitt, Land and Sea, (Washington D.C.: Plutarch Press, 1997 [1954, 1st Edition 1942]), 
translated by Simona Draghici.
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times Schmitt was commenting on particular problems within particular academic
parameters, much more in line with the approach taken by what has become known as
Conceptual History.11 This allows an appreciation of the continuities in his work by
acknowledging the shifting contours of his historical perspective. It permits conclusions
to be drawn concerning Schmitt’s awareness of the historical specificity of his work,
and indeed his implied endorsement of theoretical approaches that do not lead to
conclusions in terms of universal conceptual absolutes. His conceptual work is thus
reinterpreted in respect of this awareness and he is presented as a post-Nietzschean anti-
foundationalist attempting to deal with a set of problems concerning the web of
relationships between authority and order outside of the relatively stable context of
tradition, prevalent institutional forms, or assumptions concerning universally valid 
10norms. He is, in short, a theorist of historical crisis, constantly scraping away at the 
idea of certain foundations for political institutions, all the way from the Weimar 
Republic, to the whole edificial idea of International Society. Then the thesis comes 
fully into view with the observation that it is these problems, these questions that lie at 
the heart of what has emerged as the ‘discipline’ of IR, that also animated Schmitt’s 
curiosity. Therefore it is through apprehending the sense and context of Schmitt’s 
curiosity, rather than the truth of his conceptual formulations, that he becomes 
interesting for contemporary IR theory, for in attempting to resolve the particular 
dilemmas at the heart of questions of order he was recognisably engaged in exactly the 
sort of theorising that IR scholars have been attempting from the post World War I 
origins of the discipline.
The next section of the thesis builds upon the approach outlined in the first section and 
presents a meta-theoretical critique of the three the main paradigms or approaches
11 The most prominent theorists ordinarily included within the category of ‘Conceptual Historians’ are 
Quentin Skinner and Rheinhart Koselleck, although from the field of IR, Herbert Butterfield receives an 
honourable mention.
12 Nietzsche’s influence on Schmitt’s work is not easy to establish directly, as he rarely mentions him 
except in passing. However, his existential formulations show a clear conceptual lineage to Nietzsche’s 
anti-foundationalism. Ellen Kennedy suggests that Schmitt’s primary philosophical influence was 
actually Soren Kierkegaard, but that he referred to Nietzsche as one of the ‘three high priests’ of this 
‘private priesthood’ in her chapter on the intellectual firmament of Schmitt’s early years. In this revealing 
analysis, Kennedy examines Schmitt’s early literary work and shows him deeply influenced by the post- 
Nietzschean milieu of pre-war Berlin, in which Expressionism was of the moment, and paramount was 
‘the sovereignty of ideas’, Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, p 41-43, going so far as to point out that 
‘Unlike his jurisprudence, Schmitt’s literary work assumes a world in which there are no definitions, 
where everything is possible’. Furthermore, David Dyzenhaus refers to Schmitt as ‘[asserting] that God is 
dead in that different gods ... now compete for our attention’ in ‘Now the Machine Runs Itself: Carl 
Schmitt on Hobbes and Kelsen’ in Cardozo Law Review, Volume 16, Issue 1, p 5.
10
within IR, informed by a Schmittian perspective. It follows the outline of the ‘animating 
curiosity’ at the heart of IR -  established in the first section -  and notes points of 
comparison and differentiation between Schmitt’s particular arguments and those of the 
three main traditions of IR -  Liberalism, Realism and Marxism -  all broadly construed. 
This leads inevitably towards a consideration of the limits of the three main traditions as 
coherent frameworks of interpretation and establishes the theoretical coordinates for the 
last part of the thesis.
The third and final section makes a comparison between Schmitt’s thought and the 
English School, working up a Schmittian critique of the ES that leaves in place a 
remarkably cogent reworking of the relationality of English School terminology by 
which we can both make sense of Carl Schmitt, and equip ourselves with a robust set of 
conceptual tools with which to understand problems of international relations today. 
The final chapter paints a wide angle landscape composition of the discipline of IR 
insofar as this thesis can be used to make sense of it. This is not attempted as an 
authoritative comment on the entire discipline, but instead simply as a way of drawing 
together the meta-theoretical threads contained within this thesis into a coherent and 
holistic critique. The thesis then offers a few suggestions on the common features of the 
main traditions as contextualised expressions of an underlying confrontation between 
idealism and materialism -  the eternal battle for supremacy between concept and object, 
or epistemology and ontology -  further divided by a disposition towards history as 
either progressive and teleological, or static and repetitive.
Following this, the frame of argument -  if not the methodology -  utilised in the thesis is 
posited as an example of how IR should examine political and philosophical thinkers in 
terms of their direct contribution to IR rather than their derivative interpretation through 
political theory or philosophy, particularly in respect of those theorists most often 
thought of as providing ‘critical’ insights into the tradition. Thus the thesis has five 
basic aims;
• To provide the reader with a concise understanding of Schmitt’s conceptual 
vocabulary and the context in which it was developed;
11
• To posit a set of approximate questions concerning the constitutive curiosity of 
IR, comparable to the pre-occupations that unite Schmitt’s work.
• To suggest a conceptual architecture for the inter-relationships between the main 
theoretical traditions or frameworks if IR theory;
• To argue for the value of the English School as a distinctive and fully formed 
‘4th tradition’ -  within which coherent resolutions and formulations of problems 
of contemporary international relations become possible, and demonstrate the 
clarifying potential of Schmitt’s theoretical precision for improving the 
coherence of the ES and enriching a contextual understanding of its place within 
the discipline;
• And lastly to offer an implicit template by which to apprehend the value of any 
political or philosophical thinker as a theorist of IR ab initio without the 
disciplinary mediation of political theory or philosophy. Permitting an 
appreciation of theorists like Carl Schmitt -  and other ‘critical’ voices -  as 
directly involved in a process of active contestation on the playing field of IR 
Theory, rather than merely ‘critical’ thereof.
Schmitt’s principle defence when placed under interrogation was that he ‘drank the
11Nazi bacillus, but was not infected’. It is to be hoped that this thesis is read in the 
same spirit, that the only way to conduct a conceptual exegesis of Carl Schmitt, is to 
take him seriously and rely on one’s own capacity for judgment both as a guide through 
the hazardous terrain of Schmitt’s peculiar brand of authoritarian politics, and as 
protection from one’s own fears. Where Nietzsche remarked of Schopenhauer, ‘the 
errors of great men are more fruitful that the truths of little men’;14 this thesis proceeds 
on the basis that Schmitt’s errors of judgment needn’t be excused before consideration 
of the value of his work more generally.
13 Mark Lilia, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics, (New York: New York Review, 2001), p 52. It 
should be noted that Lilia had little time for Schmitt’s exculpatory appeals, hence the title.
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Fragment of a Critique of Schopenhauer’, in The Portable Nietzsche, (London: 
Penguin, 1976), p 30.
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Section I: Carl Schmitt on his own terms
Introduction
The first section of this thesis attempts to explain some of Schmitt’s key ideas in their 
own terms. This serves to draw out the particular aspects of his thought that directly 
pertain to IR theory, but also to present a critical summary of his underlying curiosity. 
He was after all, interested in resolving certain problems that emerged at certain times, 
and his thinking clearly evolved over the course of his life. The first chapter deals with 
the conceptual vocabulary he developed in the 1920s and 1930s and with which he is 
most commonly associated, and the second chapter seeks both to contextualise this and 
explore his more historically informed commentaries, or indeed his commentaries on 
history -  which have only been properly available to an English speaking readership 
since 2004.1 The two chapters are organised in this way because of the two 
fundamentally distinct processes of inquiry at play throughout Schmitt’s work. On the 
one hand much of his early work sought to articulate conceptual formulations 
concerning particular political problems, and on the other hand, much of his later work 
consists of historical commentary concerning the development of these concepts, along 
with further refinements to these earlier conceptual formulations.
In effect, this leads one to think seriously about the relationship between theory and 
history and provides a starting point from which to examine International Relations as a 
discipline. Schmitt himself remained an ambiguous and incomplete thinker -  even 
perhaps contradictory2 -  in many respects, but once his reflections are properly 
contextualised one can move away from considering him as a purely conceptual thinker 
and instead see him as a perceptive analyst of historical processes who utilised a 
conceptual language while remaining sensitive to its limits, both historically and in 
terms of what he attempted to theorise.3
1 This marks the date of publication of Nomos, but precedes publication of Theory o f the Partisan.
2 A point clarified by Ellen Kennedy in Constitutional Failure, p 5.
3 Accords with Derrida’s characterisation of Schmitt as ‘lucid’, ‘fearful’ and a ‘besieged watchman’, 
Jacques Derrida, The Politics o f Friendship, (London: Verso, 1997), p 107, n 4.
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Each of these treatments of Schmitt -  as a conceptual theorist and a historical 
commentator -  is accompanied by some thinking on what concepts ‘are’ and what 
approach to history accommodates concepts most easily, so that the reader will be 
familiar with the manner in which this relationship is consistently navigated throughout 
the thesis as a whole. This in turn will outline the methodological premise of the thesis, 
which considers Schmitt as a theorist from the perspective of conceptual history,4 but 
nevertheless situates itself in the world of IR through assuming a common curiosity that 
unites IR as a discipline. This is important simply because conceptual history provides a 
coherent way to examine both thinkers and the evolution of their thought in context, yet 
provides no tools or insights that can be directly appropriated for IR as a process of 
contemporary theorising, except if IR itself is presumed to have historical origins and 
treated as an evolving progression of ideas united around specific, persistent and 
ongoing political dilemmas.
Conceptual history is therefore methodologically distinct from IR. However, if the 
conceptual history approach instructs sensitivity to the context in which ideas find their 
origin and the terms of their mutation, it also demands that one confronts the origin of 
one’s own curiosity. That answers depend upon questions is an overlooked truism, but 
if one wishes to explain the relevance of one particular thinker for IR theory, one needs 
to have a clear idea of what is meant by IR theory. Against this background it becomes 
possible to take a conceptual historical approach to the analysis of Carl Schmitt as a 
theorist -  explaining both the context in which he formulated his ideas, and the limited 
utility of taking those ideas out of their original context -  while simultaneously 
observing the parallels between the problems he was trying to address and the 
constitutive web of problems that animate the discipline of IR.
In the end, the thesis will attempt to demonstrate that Schmitt should be thought of as a 
fully fledged theorist of International Relations in his own right -  by virtue of the 
commonalities shared by his own curiosity and the animating curiosity that unites the 
discipline of IR -  rather than simply a store of useful conceptual formulations that can
4 Borrowing principles of interpretation from Rheinhart Koselleck and Quentin Skinner, whose work 
largely focuses on studying ideas in context and in terms of their relationship both to the historical 
exigencies of the moment and to the extant conceptual inheritance of their times. Quentin Skinner, 
‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ in History and Theory, Volume 8, Issue 1,1969, 
and Rheinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis o f Modern Society, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988 [1959]).
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be used within IR. Furthermore it attempts to outline the manner in which a Schmittian 
rendering of IR can be most appropriately incorporated within IR. In doing this, as will 
become clear, Schmitt emerges as someone whose continual and prolonged obsession 
with the problems of order and community were addressed from a position where there 
was no possibility of taking anything for granted. Furthermore, Schmitt appears as 
rather more than merely a ‘critical voice’ -  among many -  for IR, and instead is deeply 
implicated in the polemical contestation, and therefore the conceptual reproduction, of 
IR theory. This in turn has left an endowment of sharply written texts that make a 
frontal assault on some of the most difficult questions upon which IR theorists often 
founder -  a meta-theoretical exploration of which will form the main content of Section 
II.
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Chapter 1: Carl Schmitt as a Conceptual Theorist
I  against my brother
land  my brother against our cousin
I, my brother and our cousin against the neighbours
All o f us against the foreigner
Bedouin Proverb, quoted from The Songlines, by Bruce Chatwin.
Introduction: The Concept of a Concept
A concept is most simply understood as a generalised idea of a thing. It is an abstract 
postulation that attempts to capture particular characteristics of an idea or a class of 
objects. Justice, for instance, can be thought of as a concept, as can legitimacy, the 
political, etc.. From a Platonic perspective, concepts correspond to divine forms, in that 
they are shadowy silhouettes, imperfectly representative of the specific divine form that 
they represent.1 Certain types of theorising rely on sets of ontological assumptions -  
concerning actors or theorised objects, to which are added further conceptual 
formulations concerning theorised relationships and the further interaction of those 
starting assumptions and concepts. By this means certain statements can be isolated and 
complex scenarios reduced to simple formulae, and thereby hypotheses postulated. For 
example; the existence of a man standing in the path of a car travelling at 30mph 
towards him can be assumed. If nothing changes, then the mere passage of time will 
ensure the car will strike the man who will suffer a very high likelihood of injury. The 
theory suggests that the man either jump out of the way, or the driver slow down or 
change direction, both of which would be intervening factors produced by a generalised 
and assumed desire that the car not hit the man. If the driver wishes to hit the man, then 
the onus would be on the man to jump out of the way. If the man wished the car to hit 
him, then the onus would be on the driver to brake or swerve. Either way the language 
is that of assumption, cause and effect. Actors and units are assumed and 
conceptualised, then held to be robust enough to sustain interpretation within a network 
of postulated causes and effects.
1 Plato’s famous theory of forms, in The Republic, (London: Pan Books, 1981 [380BC]), translated by 
G.M.A. Grube.
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An elegant theory seeks parsimony by reducing assumption to the barest minimum and 
suggesting inevitable outcomes as a way of modelling the ‘real world’ and exploring 
effective strategies of intervention in ‘real world’ processes; in other words, to 
understand the consequences of specific actions. And to this extent, a great deal of 
history and International Relations is framed in the language of cause and effect. E.H. 
Carr baldly stated that ‘the study of history is the study of causes’.2 The historian or the 
IR theorist who seeks an explanation, makes certain assumptions concerning dependent 
and independent variables, and postulates the manner of their interactions. Furthermore, 
the language of cause and effect inevitably survives criticism of the observability of 
causation. Even if David Hume and Bishop Berkley’s absolute idealism undermines the 
certainty with which causes can be assumed or inferred as anything other than 
subjective associations, the dominant language of a discipline such as IR inevitably 
perseveres with the assumption that whatever doubts exist concerning one’s access to 
the ‘real world’, there are things and activities taking place that need to be understood in 
terms of their durability and persistent interrelations. It could be considered something 
like an ontological axiom, which is different from an ontology. The presumption of an 
ontology is to say nothing necessarily ontological, that is to say, to assume that things 
exist, is not the same as making direct claims concerning their nature.
Invoking causation or causality inevitably involves one in heated philosophical and 
methodological debates in IR, neatly and richly summarised by Milja Kurki in 
Causation in International Relations? However, I wish to side-step these arguments 
until Chapter 3 when their salience can be put in better relation to the aspiration of the 
thesis as a whole. Suffice for now to say that the position I adopt is one in which the 
language of causation is not restricted to a positivist theoretical framework. Even the 
most recondite interpretive or hermeneutical IR texts are concerned with the conceptual 
conditions under which causal relations are theorised and acted upon. The deeper 
question concerns whether causation can be spoken of in ontological terms; i.e. as a 
component of a mind independent reality. Nevertheless, these philosophical debates 
have such a long pedigree that many different terms exist which refer to similar things 
or concepts. And at this point in the argument it is merely necessary to assert the
2 E.H. Carr, What is History?, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1986), p 81.
3 Milja Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis, (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2008).
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difference between an object and a concept. That particular objects exist is an 
ontological claim, but the mind -  in order to know and recognise an object -  must have 
a concept, or a little piece of mental architecture, by which to distinguish it from the 
formless mass of aggregate sensation to which the mind is continually subjected. The 
distinction between concept and object is thus of fundamental importance, and concepts 
are thus the indispensable medium of all knowledge for theorists of all persuasions. 
Simply put, empiricists and idealists take the view that concepts constitute the world, 
realists that concepts directly relate to real world objects, which in turn can be 
identified, specified, and assumed to exist in spite of their perception and interpretation. 
Returning to the beginning of this introduction, it is not simply justice and legitimacy 
that can be thought of as concepts, but also simple objects -  like a table, or an apple, or 
an individual -  insofar as they must be framed conceptually.4
This thesis interprets Schmitt by drawing on the idealist philosophy of Michael 
Oakeshott in order to treat reality as experience -  rather than an observable series of 
objectively true events -  and Schmitt’s texts as progressive attempts to establish 
conditions of coherence on that which he was obliged to think -  Oakeshott’s description 
of ‘objective reality’.5 What this means is quite a complex thing to convey -  particularly 
to one possessed of the realist or ‘common sense’ notion that words merely describe, 
rather than construct the world -  but is built upon the idea that the mind only sees what 
it has learnt to see through experience, what it has learnt to conceptually describe, and 
depends upon the existence in the mind of ‘concepts’, to the parameters of which 
external objects must conform before they can be understood as fully formed and 
coherent objects. Therefore if one sees something that does not conform to one’s 
internal conceptual and categorical distinctions -  something like the experience of ‘the 
sublime’ over which there has been a great deal of philosophical speculation -  it is the 
external world that ‘obliges’ an internal adjustment or correction. However, it should be 
clearly understood that these obligations are imposed on the internal world of
4 This way of thinking may seem somewhat confusing -  especially to those of a philosophically realist 
frame of mind to whom objects are objects, and our perception of them depends upon merely clear 
sightedness -  but as a way of thinking about perception and the mind, it is almost entirely taken for 
granted among neurologists. Indeed, one recently published book makes this quite clear by distinguishing 
between ‘inherited concepts’ and ‘learned concepts’ in order to make the case for studying culture as an 
arena of ‘philosophical enquiry by neurological means.’ Semir Zeki, Splendours and Miseries o f the 
Brain: Love, Creativity and the Quest for Human Happiness, (Oxford: John Wiley and Sons, 2009).
5 Micheal Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), p 59.
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experience, and given that meaning cannot be seen in any case, the occasions when the 
external world obliges an adjustment on the internal world of experience are likely to be 
rare and indeed limited to occasions when direct conceptual propositions can be 
definitively repudiated. The difficulty with this explanation is that Oakeshott -  being an 
extreme idealist -  would himself have rejected it, as he rejected a distinction between 
subject and object, however I include it in a probably vain attempt to make sense of an 
absolute idealist philosophy from within a context where the distinction between subject 
and object, external and internal, is taken very much for granted.6 For Oakeshott, even 
to talk of ‘objective reality’ is nonsensical, as an object is dependent upon a subject, and 
a subject is dependent upon an object; reality is experience, and as such can only be 
understood in terms of the absolute reconciliation of subject and object.7 Such is the 
burden of radical idealism.
The key insight that Oakeshott offers is that reality remains experience in spite of 
assumptions made concerning its objective qualities. To claim to know that something 
can exist in spite of the act of observing it is to claim to know that which -  as a 
condition of itself -  is necessarily unknown, which represents a contradiction for 
Oakeshott. Nevertheless, ‘reality is not whatever [one] think[s], it is what [one is] 
obliged to think.’8 This provides a robust philosophical platform from which to break 
away from the positivist language of much of IR, while remaining within the realm of 
explanation by being attentive to the communicability of ideas and the obliging 
characteristics of the ‘external world’ in which they must be collectively reconciled, 
rather than the conditioning truth of material reality. In short, the thesis treats Schmitt as 
conforming to a type of theorising that would have been understood by Oakeshott, and 
other philosophical idealists. He was concerned with concepts over objects, 
epistemology over ontology, and as such was indebted to a whole tradition of sceptical 
thought in which ontological propositions are held to be contingent, subordinate to the 
manner of their epistemological framing.
6 Oakeshott himself despairs of finding a way through this linguistic turmoil, venturing only that maybe 
something like Hegel’s ‘world of meanings’ would provide a language fit to bypass ‘extraneous 
conceptions’, Ibid., p 61.
7 Ibid., p 60. Beyond ‘reality is experience’ he immediately goes on to say that ‘experience is a world of 
ideas’.
8 Ibid., p 59.
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Schmitt’s conceptual formulations can and have been simply transplanted into other 
scholar’s accounts of IR, but usually without paying attention -  or only in passing -  to 
either the context in which these concepts were formulated, or to the later commentaries 
which Schmitt produced that shed a whole new light on the problems he was attempting 
to address, both in the context in which he was addressing them, and the insights his 
curiosity reveals to scholars today. This treats Schmitt’s conceptual formulations as if 
they are pure concepts, rather than concepts nested within -  and therefore dependent 
upon -  an entire conceptual architecture through which he interpreted the world. As 
explained in the introduction, consideration of Carl Schmitt as a theorist of International 
Relations must extend beyond using him as a conceptual storehouse, or a ‘critical 
voice’. Nevertheless, it is through an examination of some of his conceptual 
formulations that one must commence a Schmittian engagement with the broader 
strands of IR theory. Accordingly, these conceptual formulations need to be explored as 
a way of grasping his central curiosity before going on to consider his broader historical 
commentaries and decide on the appropriate terms on which to judge his value as an IR 
theorist.
The Concept of the Political
Of all the conceptual formulations attributable to Carl Schmitt, his The Concept o f the 
Political is both the best known and most frequently referenced, serving as a useful 
point of introduction. For Schmitt, ‘the concept of the state presupposes the concept of 
the political’,9 which artfully shifts the focus of analysis away from the state and 
towards the underlying social conflict that produces the state. Following this simple 
articulation, the state becomes a second order phenomenon, an expression of, and 
therefore vulnerable to, shifting tensions at the level of ‘the political’.10 This is not how 
the aphorism has always been read -  as shall be shown -  but forms a central assumption 
in this thesis. Therefore, according to Schmitt, the state is not itself an arena of political 
contest, but is instead the ‘stabilised results of conflict’.11 True political conflict within a 
state places the continued existence of the state in question, whereas for politics -  at a
9 Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political, (London: University of Chicago Press, 2007 [1932]), trans 
by George Schwab, p 19.
Alain de Benoist echoes this point, in ‘Global terrorism and the state of permanent exception: The 
significance of Carl Schmitt’s thought today’, in Odysseos and Petito (eds), The International Thought o f 
Carl Schmitt, p 73.
11 Hirst, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Decisionism’, op. cit., p 9.
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domestic level -  to take place properly, the continued existence of the state must be
assumed through some degree of homogeneity between the recognised political actors
10within it, and true political struggle must be externalised in some way. Of all the 
arenas of social activity; moral, political, economic and aesthetic, the differentia 
specifica of the political,13 according to Schmitt was the friend / enemy distinction. 
Thus the critical duality of the political is the difference between friend and enemy, just 
as in the moral sphere, it is between good and evil, and in the economic sphere, between 
profitable and unprofitable.14
However, the political as a category of social interaction does not sit alongside the 
others, it is instead prior to the others. The political dimension -  in which a person 
distinguishes between friend and enemy -  constitutes groups that will then articulate 
meaning in the other spheres of human activity according to their own habits and 
customs and in the light of their prior political separation. Any difference, linguistic, 
religious, moral or economic has the capacity to become political if it reaches an 
intensity sufficient to become conflictual and involve the possibility of actual killing.15 
But once a difference has become political, it constitutes a new sphere in which this 
new political distinction stands prior to new meanings within other areas of social 
activity such as morality and economics, creating a context of ‘order out of nothing’.16 
Thus it becomes impossible merely to reverse a political distinction and consider it 
within the realm of its pre-political category, for it has already become the conceptual 
mechanism by which two groups are divided from one another and cannot be further 
rationalised. This commitment is existential in nature and cannot be subject to external 
analysis.
Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge 
the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. Each 
participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate 
his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order 
to preserve one’s own form of existence.17
12 Ibid.
13 Schmitt, Concept o f the Political, p 26.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p 33.
16 Jan-Wemer Miiller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought, (London: Yale 
University Press, 2003), p 234.
17 Ibid., p 27.
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When ‘the political’ is described in this way, it should be stressed again that it can no 
longer be considered simply a separate sphere of social activity, but stands clearly prior 
to other spheres of activity such as morality or economics, establishing the parameters 
of a normative ground upon which a framework of values and meaning can be 
constructed, from which morality and economics draw their underlying reference 
points.18
The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity 
of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist 
theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon 
all those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions. The political 
enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as 
an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with 
him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; 
and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, 
existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case 
conflicts with him are possible. These can neither be decided by a 
previously determined general norm nor by the judgement of a 
disinterested and therefore neutral third party.19
It is customary to ascribe the causes of conflict to economic factors, ethnic or religious 
differences. However, according to Schmitt, while the primary instance of conflictual 
activity can usually be rooted in a religious dispute or a matter of economic interests, 
once the matter becomes conflictual, the conflict itself structures the emergent faith 
groups or economic interest groups into a hostile configuration of friends and enemies 
which in turn structures all further interactions between the collectives. In a sense this 
reflects both the resonance and the relevance of the old story concerning the two 
warring enemies that had long forgotten what they were fighting about, only in this case 
the observation would be valid for all instances of conflict.20 Once a truly political 
conflict has begun, the terms and articles of further mediation are drastically altered and
18 There is a significant debate concerning the intellectual origin of this assumption of the ‘priority of the 
political sphere’. Schueurman makes the case that Hans Morgenthau made this distinction in comments to 
Schmitt after the first [1927] edition of The Concept o f the Political, which was then revised into the 
second edition [1932] without acknowledgment (the second edition is the only one translated into 
English). William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1979), p 225. Either way, it has become a constituent part of Schmitt’s theories regardless of questions 
regarding authorship, and it will be further discussed in Chapter 5.
19 Schmitt, Concept o f the Political, p 27.
20 In modem literature, H.G. Wells makes extraordinary use of this ancient parable in The Shape o f 
Things to Come, which commences when a World War breaks out in 1940, and is so destructive, that by 
the time a new order of scientists emerges to wipe out the phenomenon of war and build a new 
civilisation on the ashes of the old, no-one has any recollection of what caused the war, nor what was 
being fought over. H.G. Wells, The Shape o f Things to Come, (London: Penguin, 2007 [1933]).
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it becomes no longer possible to negotiate effectively between the two emergent sides 
by returning to the original dispute -  or at least impossible to simply revisit the original 
terms of disagreement -  as this has been superseded by the overwhelming friend / 
enemy logic of the new conflict.
The political operates at a conceptual level, and needs to be understood conceptually 
before application to specific examples of conflict, suffice to say that the political -  
manifested in the friend / enemy distinction -  assumes a position prior to other spheres 
of social relations and determines interactions in respect of these relations. To do 
business with the enemy is possible -  even desirable -  but remains doing business with 
the enemy, rather than conducting normal transactional activities with other individuals. 
It is undeniably a formula for a type of ‘existential communitarianism’,21 in which 
individuals only gain a sense of self-understanding within a pre-existing community, 
learning both the habits and prejudices of that community. However, it is important to 
see this as a fluid process. There are always sets of friend / enemy distinctions that 
structure communities, but there is no conceptual barrier to the evolution of these friend 
/ enemy distinctions. Indeed such evolution should be assumed as inevitable, 
necessarily so if the political is to remain theoretically important. After all, Schmitt 
theorised the political, not simply as an act of political anthropology, but in order to 
expose the dangers of ignoring it.
The dyadic language of friend and enemy may seem unduly harsh to theorists more 
used to dealing with progressive degrees of enmity. It has the appearance of a black and 
white distinction, unsuited to making sense of the twilight greys of which the ‘real 
world’ is largely comprised. However, this would be to compare constitutive conceptual 
absolutes with their derivative expressions. That there are many states in the world that 
have varying degrees of association is not to theorise their origins in processes of hostile 
separation, nor does it preclude the continuing operation of dyadic friend / enemy 
oppositions in which their relations can be regulated. To put it simply, Schmitt’s 
proposition that the political derives its special meaning from the intense and existential 
dyadic opposition between friend and enemy is merely to theorise the necessary 
existence of separate, self-aware, hostile communities. That these communities retain
21 This phrase is borrowed from David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen 
and Hermann Heller in Weimar, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p 2.
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their sense of separateness and yet reach out to form relationships with other 
communities -  not necessarily hostile -  is only to see the effects of their prior 
establishment as political collectives. Schmitt’s framing of the concept of the political in 
dyadic terms speaks only to the absolute precondition for the continued existence of the 
community as a separate community. The concept of the political cannot be applied 
simply to the relations between states without first making the assumption that existing 
states are the sole and perpetual carriers of the political. To assume that states are like 
persons, or beings, that can freely choose the form of their relations with other states is 
to cast the relations between states in entirely different terms from the constitutive 
friend / enemy dyadic that Schmitt posed. It is instead to assume the existence of states 
prior to any expression of the political, the very assumption -  and indeed mistake -
O'}Schmitt accused his liberal opponents in Weimar Germany of making.
The real challenge of this theoretical landscape is to imagine how a community 
preserves itself in the face of these evolutionary logics of differentiation and 
subsumption. How does a community prevent the emergence of a new friend / enemy 
distinction that would cleave it into two new communities, conflictually disposed 
towards one another? Or, alternatively prevent being subsumed into a wider community 
through the recognition of a common threat and the emergence of a grander friend / 
enemy distinction in which previously conflictual relations are effaced by a greater 
threat of common extinction? It is possible to see analogies in the shifting alliances 
between states throughout history, but the political should not simply be applied to 
states. It is the process which produces states, but at the same time destroys them. It is 
the metaphoric building of a new temple on the shattered foundations of its predecessor. 
At this stage it is necessary simply to understand the friend / enemy distinction as at the 
root of Schmitt’s theoretical inquiries, and it is easy to see that without some form of 
institutionalisation, there would be a constant upwelling of new pressures -  
environmental or social -  that would result in new and highly mobile configurations of 
enmity. The political can then be seen as describing something like a force of nature,
22 There are many examples of this type of theorising, but a very good one is an article by Felix 
Berenskoetter, ‘Friends, There Are No Friends?: An Intimate Reframing of The International’ in 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 2007, Volume 35, Issue 3. In this article, Berenskoetter 
draws upon a wide range of theorists to make the case for friendship to be elevated as an explanatory 
variable, particularly for constructivists. But once again, the existential energy of a constitutive framing 
of friendship and enmity is missing from this work, positing friendship as just one type of possible 
relationship between pre-existing entities.
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under constant assault by the construction of traditions, prejudices and conservative 
social practices set up to contain its primordial dynamism. For Schmitt, the political has 
a protean, radically indeterminate quality; and it is something of a historical irony that it 
took such a naturally conservative thinker to posit such a raw and radical theory of the 
destructive power of the political.
The Collective Nature of the Political
If the political dimension is the arena of human affairs defined by the differentiation 
between friend and enemy, then one crucial aspect of this distinction is its solely 
collective nature.
‘An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity 
of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public 
enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of 
men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a 
relationship.’23
Schmitt contrasts a private enemy to a public enemy in order to make the point clear. 
Although the English language has only one word for enemy, the distinction is present 
in Latin, where an enemy translates either as hostis or inimicus. Hostis carries the root 
of ‘host’ as in multitude but translates as ‘stranger, enemy’, whereas inimicus is the 
opposite of amicus and means enemy in direct and personal sense, as opposed to the 
general and collective sense of hostis. As a reference Schmitt quotes the bible:
‘The oft quoted “Love your enemies” (Matt. 5:44; Luke 6.27) reads 
“diligite inimicos vestros,” and not diligite hostes vestros. No mention is 
made of the political enemy. Never in the thousand-year struggle between 
Christians and Moslems did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than 
to defend Europe out of love towards the Saracens or Turks.’24
The collective nature of the political further clarifies, and indeed demands consideration 
of man as a social animal, as opposed to an atomistic individual. Which in turn leads 
towards some differential comparison between Schmitt’s formulation of the political 
with the theories of Thomas Hobbes. Unfortunately, Hobbes exists in many guises. He 
is also a complex and thoughtful philosopher concerned with the changing political 
climate of his times, as well as a useful theorist of social relations, basing all social
23 Schmitt, Concept o f the Political, p 28.
24 Schmitt, Concept o f the Political, p 29.
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interaction on the primal imperative of fear. The Hobbesian state of nature is 
characterised as the “miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as 
hath been shewn) to the naturall passions of men, when there is no visible Power to 
keep them in awe,” . He also extends consideration of these men to “small Familyes”, 
“And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but 
greater Familyes”26. This will be familiar to all students of International Relations, but 
there is a problem here, and one that is relatively un-theorised -  even by Hobbes 
himself. The manner in which states and political collectives are merely equated with 
individuals in a state of nature both by Hobbes and by later theorists of IR is 
understandable, but poses a difficulty. Can it be assumed that a state or political 
collective acts in a comparable manner to an individual? Do states feel fear? Can they 
die? Can they be considered actors at all? All of these are hugely important questions 
within IR and have many different answers, but they also go to the heart of this thesis 
and therefore a careful explanation of the differences -  both explicit and implicit -  
between Hobbes and Schmitt over this question of political community is crucial.
For Hobbes, the Leviathan is a metaphor for a social institution in which many 
individuals subordinate their freedom in exchange for security, and in doing so escape 
the state of nature. If one could imagine a state of nature in which there were a number 
of individuals occupying a valley or an island, all known to each other, one can also 
imagine the possibility that -  according to Hobbes -  they would each have a reason for 
exchanging obedience for security. Therefore, the theorised Leviathan would achieve a 
state of perfection only if it included all of the people in the valley or on the island. 
There is no necessary outside within this conceptual formulation. Were a single 
individual to refuse to join, the Leviathan would have an obligation to protect those that 
had by eliminating him, thus achieving total membership of the remaining population. 
One can extrapolate from this example to greater and greater geographical areas, and 
greater and greater populations, but the logic remains the same. The Leviathan would 
always have an obligation to incorporate all people in the obedience / security covenant, 
or to destroy the outsiders as a duty to its obligation of protection. Were the Leviathan 
not to destroy an outsider who had not signed up to the social covenant, then this could
25 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (London: Penguin Classic, 1985 [1651]), Part II Of Commonwealth, Chap 
XVII, p 223.
26 Ibid.
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only signify that the Leviathan was behaving as i f  the outsider had signed up to the 
contract by assuming that he had acknowledged its power to destroy him, and had 
consequently internalised the forceful logic of obedience. The possibility of destruction 
at the hands of the Leviathan would therefore act as a powerful regulative influence on 
individual behaviour regardless of any actual decision to obey in exchange for 
protection. The important thing to take account of is that the logic of the Leviathan is 
internal to the theorised state of nature. It requires no outsiders, and indeed, is 
perpetually threatening to outsiders, and to the notion of an outside. Hobbes does give a 
number of reasons -  6 in fact -  why man would not perpetually live in a single 
community, but these reasons are rooted in an assessment of man’s sinful nature, as 
distinct from ants and bees, and are secondary questions that follow the establishment of 
political community under the protection of a Leviathan, rather than a co-constitutive 
dimension of the conditions under which a Leviathan would emerge.
Were the state of nature to span the globe, the same assimilative logic would apply to 
the entire population of the earth, and there would be no conceptual barrier to the 
Leviathan attaining a global expression, indeed, this would be the logical terminus of 
Hobbes’ argument. So as a conceptual device, Hobbes’ Leviathan achieves perfection 
only by incorporating everyone. His comments about ‘familyes, Cities and Kingdomes’ 
are merely his way of allowing for a variegated historical and geographical evolution 
from a universal state of nature.
Consider the universal state of nature; with a variegated geography, and a lack of 
modem day communications technology, numerous Leviathans might emerge which 
would eventually confront one another, giving rise to a type of political scenario that 
realists would recognise. These competing Leviathans may find some way of regulating 
their interactions, which would in turn give rise to something akin to a system or society 
of states. Nevertheless, the logic for each Leviathan would remain assimilative, and 
assumptions that the system would likely remain pluralist would have to be based upon 
pessimism concerning the eventual, possible, or even desirable triumph of one power
onover all the others. In any event, the pure conceptual system of the Hobbesian state of
27 There is an explicit parallel to this kind of thinking in the manner in which strands of realist thought 
concern the historically apparent reduction from multipolarity to bipolarity, to unipolarity, and even
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nature and the universal Leviathan is only disturbed by the introduction of the extra 
variables of geography, history, human nature and even perhaps morality. The 
Hobbesian logic of IR -  in which states act like individuals in the state of nature -  
therefore turns out not to be purely conceptual in form, but instead derives its structure 
through the intervention of historical and geographical distance and variability. The 
continued existence of a plurality of political collectives remains therefore a conceptual 
anomaly for a genuinely Hobbesian view of IR, proof of the continued existence of the 
state of nature -  found in the international domain in which differently attired 
Leviathans metaphorically joust with each other.28
The manner in which the characteristics of individual behaviour are assumed to 
transpose easily to political collectives is to elevate Hobbes’ explanation of a conceptual 
anomaly to a foundational prescription within IR theory, albeit a realist one. Hobbes 
was formulating his theory of Leviathan as a way of explaining the reasons for social 
relations between individuals. To extrapolate from this to a system of International 
Relations whereby states are assumed to behave like individuals has no theoretical 
argument in support of it, except to say that the international is the remnant ‘state of 
nature’ in which the existence of enemies can be assumed. Each Leviathan is an 
artificial person that is the expression of a covenant between the respective subjects, but 
the question of whether there can be a covenant between Leviathans in a similar fashion 
is more complicated and will be addressed in Chapter 5. There is, simply put, no 
conceptual barrier to the expansion of a Hobbesian state to encompass the entire globe. 
In a Hobbesian frame, all people are individuals subject to natural law and by their 
nature seek to organise themselves to be free of the violence and threat of others. This 
fundamental Hobbesian imperative has no conceptual limit on its expression.
potentially to a condition of apolarity. Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World 
Politics in the 21st Century (Oxford: Polity, 2004).
28 Michael C. Williams goes some way to establishing that a Hobbesian theory of the international looks 
nothing like its realist portrayal in Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits o f 
International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). And John Vincent makes this 
exact point, along with many others in his ‘The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International 
Thought’ in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 10, Issue 2, p 95.
29 So much has been written about Thomas Hobbes, but this conclusion is supported by referencing a 
wide range of work; David P. Gauthier, The Logic o f Leviathan, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Leo 
Strauss, The Political Philosophy o f Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936); 
Richard Tuck, Hobbes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Quentin Skinner, Visions o f Politics, 
Vol III: Hobbes and Civil Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). None of these 
important texts dwell on Hobbes and ‘the international’, principally, it would seem, because Hobbes was 
not terribly interested in questions concerning what we understand as ‘the international’. Also see 
footnote 27, this chapter.
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Schmitt’s account, on the other hand, is different in one crucial way. In eschewing 
Hobbes’ ontological or methodological individualism, Schmitt theorises the necessity 
and perpetuity of a plurality of political collectives. Indeed, an individual cannot 
constitute a political community, and is therefore not an actor at the level of the 
political. Recognition of the friend / enemy distinction is itself constitutive of at least a 
duality of political collectivities and provides a conceptual foundation for the existence 
of a plurality of communities.30 Given the same universal state of nature, either in a 
small valley or an island -  or even spanning the entire globe with perfect 
communications -  Schmitt’s account provides a coherent conceptual account that would 
explain -  indeed necessitate -  the existence of a plurality of political collectives without 
recourse to the vagaries of geography or history, or even just the assumption of 
essentialised enemies. A political community can only develop a recognisable system of 
norms or modes of social organisation once it understands itself as a political 
community separate to others, or at least another. The friend / enemy distinction is 
necessarily prior to the establishment of any other mechanisms of communal 
identification, and individual behaviour presupposes a collective context in which it 
finds mutually recognisable form. One can actually see these sorts of assumptions 
operating in the background in Hobbes, but they are both secondary problems, and part 
of a universally asserted human nature, which in the end simply take for granted merely 
that there are a plurality of potential enemies.
What this means is that Schmitt’s concept of the political can provide a conceptually 
coherent theoretical framework that is capable of explaining the existence of a plurality 
of political communities without it being merely a problematic anomaly or a source of 
ambiguity, as with Hobbes. In addition when utilising Schmitt’s framework, no 
assumption needs to be made concerning the state or other form of political collective 
sharing similar motivations for survival and collective organisation as the individual in 
the state of nature. Furthermore, Hobbes’ account provides no mechanism for 
explaining how the assumed units evolve or collapse, save human nature, or the
30 It is tempting to think that a purely Schmittian state of nature, fully worked out, would exist only as a 
duality not a plurality, but the fact that it is at the very least a duality is an important distinguishing 
characteristic between a Hobbesian and a Schmittian conceptual framework, particularly in respect of 
their relevance as theorists of a distinctive sphere of International Relations, as opposed to political 
theorists more generally.
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intervention of another assumed variable; power -  which is extremely difficult to pin 
down analytically. Schmitt’s theory on the other hand is predisposed to expect the 
expansion, evolution, subsumption or collapse of political collectives. Indeed, as will be 
seen in the next chapter, he goes to great lengths to explain the persistence of stable 
normative frameworks in their historical expression, as opposed to wallowing in 
cyclical pessimism.
For Schmitt, the political reduces to a process of collective identification, which can 
only take place constitutively of a recognisable collective of outsiders, collectively 
termed ‘the enemy’. It is only after this communal identification has taken place that a 
Hobbesian covenant of security for obedience can be theorised. For Hobbes on the other 
hand -  while he does acknowledge the power of the enemy to inspire collective 
organisation31 -  the fundamental drive for the establishment of the Leviathan is mutual 
fear among the covenanted population itself -  of each other, not outsiders. His analysis 
is not constitutive of an outside, but instead assumes the existence of a multitude of 
potentially hostile groups as self-evident rather than conceptually explained, allowing 
for the postulation that everyone could be subsumed into one group in which the same 
dynamic of mutual fear could result in a global Leviathan. There are suggestions in his 
text that man’s natural desire for honour would render such a totality very unstable, but 
it is not a central part of his analysis.33 It marks the difference between Hobbes, who 
sought an explanation for human behaviour in our nature, and Schmitt, who sought a 
conceptual formulation of social relations that is rooted in our inadequacy as individuals 
to be complete without the imprinting of some social norms that presuppose -  and 
indeed depend upon -  the possibility of alternative and opposing modes of behaviour; 
the friend / enemy distinction.
Simply put, the distinction between Hobbes and Schmitt consists in where they start 
from. Hobbes begins his analysis with the individual and extrapolates outwards to 
family, through bonds of kinship towards types of social organisation that have claims 
on the loyalty of the individual. If the implication that these bonds become weaker and 
weaker depending upon the distance and abstraction from the everyday concerns of the
31 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II, Chapter XVII, p 225.
32 Vincent, op. cit., p 95.
33 Ibid.
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individual is accepted, one can see how Hobbes or Hobbesians might postulate that 
universal claims on identity must necessarily be very weak and vulnerable to fracture or 
contestation, however, there is no conceptual barrier to their meaningful expression. In 
other words -  despite realist assertions to the contrary -  Hobbes cannot be used to rule 
out the emergence of a universal identity. Indeed, a properly Hobbesian world is one in 
which Leviathans must strive for dominance as a condition of the protective guarantees 
they offer for obedience. Schmitt -  on the other hand -  starts his analysis from the 
group, constituted by the successful articulation of the friend / enemy distinction. It is 
this distinction that creates a context of identification in which norms and values operate 
as connecting threads. The individual is a function of this distinction, and cannot be 
apprehended as external to a prior friend / enemy distinction, except in its barest, non­
social expression -  a person without language, knowledge, or the capacity to 
comprehend right and wrong, comparable only to both a psychopath or a completely 
autistic individual.34
Man as a social animal is already inhabited by social norms, so when Hobbes starts his 
analysis from the perspective of a man capable of reasoning his interests, his 
comprehensive framework is already contaminated by the norms that constructed the 
reasoning individual in the first place, a process which -  for Schmitt -  presupposes the 
prior existence of a constitutive friend / enemy distinction. Instead of understanding the 
individual as a freethinking and reasoning singularity, the process of socialisation 
introduces the human animal to more than simply a practice of interaction, but clear 
normative terms on which such interaction can take place. From a Schmittian 
perspective, as the individual become socialised he learns the pejoratives of a pre­
existing discursive firmament in which he finds expression as an individual. Therefore, 
for Schmitt, the political has existential characteristics that are immune to categorical 
analysis. Societies rooted in the friend / enemy distinction are prior to any analysis of 
those societies. A Hobbesian analysis starts with the individual, and therefore makes 
assumptions concerning the characteristics of that individual. A Schmittian analysis can 
only consider the individual as an effect of the process of group formation, which, as it 
is an existential and reflective process, theorises the inevitability of this group formation
34 In this Schmitt has more in common with Rousseau’s notion of the pre-social individual, than with 
Hobbes’ rational man, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins o f Inequality, (Hanover: 
University Press of New England, 1992 [1754]), and Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State, 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), p 149.
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process as a precondition for the very activity of examining the differential 
characteristics of individuals. Individuals therefore view the world through an
i f
inescapably ‘partisan schema’ that conditions their historical experience. Nietzsche 
reflects this kind of perspectivist thinking when explaining ‘truth’ in such a way as to 
invoke Hobbes and prefigure Schmitt’s representation of the decision.
...from boredom and necessity, man wishes to exist socially and with the 
herd; therefore, he needs to make peace and strives accordingly to banish 
from his world at least the most flagrant bellum omni contra omnes (war of 
all against all). This peace treaty brings in its wake something which appears 
to be the first step toward acquiring that puzzling truth drive: to wit, that 
which shall count as ‘truth’ from now on is established. That is to say, a 
uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this 
legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth. 6
Therefore, the political decision, in a Schmittian sense, is that which makes politics 
comprehensible. It is that which organises violence collectively and in relation to 
particular and existentially concrete normative parameters, as opposed to the un- 
pattemed and un-interpretable violence associated with a multitude of individual acts 
that might occur outside of the realm of the political. Just as criminality cannot be 
understood except in relation to the law which creates and contextualises it, so can 
political violence not be understood outside of the political context which structures it. 
Organised social action depends upon a basis for that organisation and a principle 
around which to organise, as in the above quote from Nietzsche, in which a norm is 
associated with a ‘truth’. If the central principle around which to organise politically 
must begin with a separation in order that social organisation can be understood in 
relation to what it is not, then Schmitt provides a powerful -  and conceptually workable 
way of understanding this centrality.
So according to Nietzsche, the grounds for truth are established in the decision that 
constitutes a social group, although he is less specific than Schmitt about the 
confrontational origins of the group. Nevertheless, Hobbes starts with an ontological 
individualism that implies a weak universalism. Schmitt starts from a constitutive 
existential communitarianism that necessitates the production of political pluralism. For
35 This form of words is borrowed from Balakrishnan, The Enemy, p 268, although he uses it in a slightly 
different context.
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1999), p 81.
32
Hobbes, a world state is a possible -  if unlikely -  eventuality dependent upon the 
emergence of a global Leviathan. For Schmitt a world state can exist only as a 
graveyard or a confusing darkness. A Hobbesian account of the relations between 
communities can only take those communities for granted, whereas Schmitt provides a 
theory of community that roots conflictual relations between communities as 
constitutive of the communities themselves. For Hobbes, theorising International 
Relations concerns the negotiation of differences between reconcilable communities, as 
simply one stage between the universal state of nature, and the universal state. Whereas 
for Schmitt, international relations as a field of inquiry is both the beginning, and the 
end of social theory. The beginning, in that a self conscious political community 
presupposes a plurality thereof, and gains its existential specificity from the manner in 
which it understands itself as distinct from that plurality; and an end because the 
elimination of the prevailing plurality of political communities would presuppose the 
elimination of the process of existential differentiation -  the friend / enemy distinction -  
upon which any interaction with the universal can take place.
The difference between the implications of Hobbesian and Schmittian worldviews is 
extremely important for this thesis and is rooted in the existential character of the latter 
and the different meaning of boundaries in each formulation. For Hobbes, there is no 
constitutive necessity of an outside for the formation of a political community. If a state 
of nature is theorised involving just a few individuals, the Hobbesian imperative would 
be for those individuals to agree collectively to abide by certain rules, which they would 
collectively defend. What this proscribes is stepping outside of those rules. Schmitt on 
the other hand presupposes a social separation that allows norms to be established and 
understood in recognisably distinctive terms. It necessitates a group of outsiders that 
behave in recognisably different ways. The norms that bind a society must be 
understood as concretely different rather than abstractly so, and certainly not universally 
valid. For behavioural norms to emerge presupposes a process of identification. The 
boundary of the community is therefore a point of normative inversion where the 
outside is concretely different rather than abstractly so. Whereas for Hobbes the outside 
could be entirely abstract, in which case the boundary itself would only have abstract 
expression and not mark a point of division, after all, a boundary is not a boundary if 
there is nothing beyond it. This can be graphically expressed as follows:
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2. Hobbes
1. State o f  Nature
3. Carl Schmitt’s ‘Friend /  Enemy’
Figure 1. shows the Hobbesian state of nature, or Schmittian anomie, in which each dot 
represents an unsocialised individual. Figure 2. shows the normal realist 
characterisation of Hobbes’ theory, with individuals socialised into a variety of 
distinctive groups. Figure 3. shows the Schmittian version. As can be clearly seen, 
Schmitt’s conceptual formulation theorises the inversion of the terms of enframement, 
and thus precludes the emergence of an outside, or any space outside of the friend / 
enemy distinction. All individuals are structured into a friend / enemy distinction, and 
thus gain a sense of themselves from the terms of their inclusion / exclusion. It also 
shows that the two new communities are umbilically linked by the precise normative 
character of the friend / enemy distinction; as there is no following separation, only a 
constant restatement and reinforcing of the original distinction. To progress from this
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basic distinction towards an even more divided world would impose too many demands 
on the graphical representation, but the point is clear that the formation of a distinctive 
political community depends upon a friend / enemy distinction that inverts the 
relationship between friend and enemy into a series of crucial opposites.
The Decision
A further conceptual formulation that is associated directly with Schmitt is that of ‘the 
decision’. It is not a description of an actual process, but is an attempt to capture 
something in the conceptual realm that can make sense of the ‘real world’ and was 
applied initially to the foundations of law. Simply speaking, a decision is that which 
divides ‘the norm’ from ‘the exception’, which raises further questions such as who 
makes the decision, and under what circumstances is a decision made or required. None 
of these questions has a simple answer, but attempting to answer them reveals some of 
the ambiguities inherent within the terms used by Schmitt, in order that comprehensible 
applications of certain politically important concepts, such as sovereignty, can be 
formulated.
Schmitt’s writing on the decision came before that on the political, and was a 
contribution to prevailing legal arguments in Weimar Germany, most particularly 
against the arguments of Hans Kelsen, described by Jan-Wemer Muller as a prominent
'J O
‘neo-Kantian’ and ‘legal positivist’. Kelsen’s particular tradition of thought relies on a 
hypothetical norm as the foundation of law. This is distinct from a tradition of natural 
law, in which there are -  in principle -  right actions, which can be judged according to a 
natural law, which in turn can only be revealed and not created. The difference is subtle 
but important; according to the natural law tradition, laws are imperfect expressions of a 
pre-existing and universal set of norms, and each law can in theory be judged according 
to what is universally right. This system of thought permits a judgment that a law can
37 Schmitt’s ‘decisionism’ can be unearthed in all of his texts at one level or another, but the clearest 
discussions can be found in, Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept o f  
Sovereignty, (London: University of Chicago Press, 1985 [1934,1st Edition 1922]), translated by George 
Schwab, and Carl Schmitt, The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy, (London: MIT Press, 1985 [1926]), 
translated by Ellen Kennedy.
38 MUller, A Dangerous Mind, p 22.
39 For a useful discussion on these complex legal/philosophical arguments see Sylvie Delacroix,
‘Schmitt’s Critique of Kelsenian Normativism’, Ratio Juris, March 2005, Volume 18 Issue 1, or Hidemi 
Suganami ‘Understanding Sovereignty through Kelsen/Schmitt’, Review o f International Studies, 2007, 
Volume 33, Issue 3.
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itself be wrong and that moral arguments can be used to disobey it, or even to oblige 
disobedience. Needless to say, much of the thinking on universal human rights springs 
from this tradition. Legal positivism, on the other hand considers laws as created not 
revealed.40
The first distinction in legal theory is therefore to be made between the ‘natural law’ 
tradition and the tradition of ‘legal positivism’. Both Schmitt and Kelsen were ‘legal 
positivists’ in the broadest sense, however Schmitt attacked legal positivists not for their 
positivism per se, but for their failure to properly theorise the ‘conditions of emergence’ 
for law.41 In Kelsen’s words: ‘As it is the task of natural science to describe its object -  
reality -  in one system of natural laws, so it is the task of jurisprudence to comprehend 
all human law in one system of norms’ 42 For Schmitt, there was no ‘system of norms’ 
prior to the political decision. Schmitt follows the Hobbesian formulation in that ethics 
and law are separate, but as can be seen in his notion of ‘the political’, instead of a norm 
upon which laws are based, it is a decision between friend and enemy that underwrites 
law. This theory therefore comprises a form of legal positivism, although one steeped in 
the existential logic of the Schmitt’s wider formulations. In other words, for Kelsen and 
other legal positivists, the normative realm remains universal and mediated by -  
although separate to -  coherent systems of law. Kelsen goes so far as to suggest that the 
international legal order is the ‘source of validity’ for national legal orders.43 Whereas 
for Schmitt, there are no norms by which to judge either individual laws -  as with 
theories of natural law -  or legal systems -  as in Kelsenian positivism. Furthermore, his 
analysis takes one step beyond Hobbes, who had some notion of the rational and fearful 
man covenanting a secure relationship with others as the foundational element of his 
system. As has been shown, Schmitt’s concept of the political places the decision at the 
very moment of constituting a group in opposition to another group. Hobbesian legal 
positivism remains internal to the community, and demands that the Leviathan be
40 Hobbes is therefore considered one of the first ‘legal positivists’ for the simple reason that the 
Leviathan is the embodiment of axiomatic positivism, although Quentin Skinner makes a detailed 
genealogical excavation of the roots of legal positivism and theories of the state, finding them in the texts 
of the reformation, rather than simply Hobbes sui generis, Quentin Skinner, The Foundations o f Modern 
Political Thought: Volume II, The Age o f Reformation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
41 Delacroix, op. cit., p 30.
42 Hans Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence’, in Harvard Law Review,
Volume 55, Issue 1, 1941, p 70.
43 Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law’, and for a more elaborate explanation see Hans Kelsen, Law and 
Peace in International Relations: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1940-41, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1942).
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obeyed at all times. Schmittian decisionism encodes the norms implicit within the 
original decision into the political community itself, and therefore theoretically defies 
the potential for arbitrary power that the Hobbesian sovereign might otherwise possess.
If a decision forms the grounds for truth, then truth reduces to a contextually agreed 
norm. But what is the difference between a norm and a decision? If, as in Kelsen’s 
version of legal positivism, laws can change, then the general understanding of the 
hypothetical norm on which they are based is also subtly altered. Whereas for Schmitt, 
laws can change but must remain consistent in respect of the original friend / enemy 
distinction. For legal positivists, law is not arbitrary, but is distilled in a process of 
reasoning -  at least theoretically. Whereas Schmitt is explicit in his endorsement of an 
underlying decision, and no register of norms or reason against which to judge this 
constitutive decision.44 This has been criticised as leading to a justification of 
Furherprinzip and even the end of law.45 However, if law is bound to reflect the 
underlying conditions of enmity through which it was constituted and from which it 
gains its ultimate justification, then law itself becomes bound by its terms, and the 
existential terms of political community within which the laws operate set parameters 
on how the laws can be written and rewritten. Otherwise the constant vulnerability of 
the political community would be refracted through disputes over individual laws.
The friend / enemy distinction therefore becomes analogous to a kind of normative 
bedrock against which the members of the community can judge whether laws conform 
to its precarious undulations. Thus, despite being a kind of legal positivism, a context of 
Schmittian decisionism reunites law and ethics, although ethics are contextually bound 
by the friend / enemy distinction within which laws are drawn up. So there can be no 
reference to any universal norms, or indeed norms that exceed the constitutive friend / 
enemy distinction in any way. However, the friend / enemy distinction is the condition 
of possibility for laws and normative evaluations, and the specific nature of the original 
decision sets the terms by which these norms are laid down. Therefore, if Furherprinzip 
is taken to be the total enslavement of a political community to the shifting will of one 
leader, then it becomes obvious that Schmittian decisionism does not permit this, as the
44 For a neat discussion of these legal ideas in a political context see Gianfranco Poggi, The Development 
o f the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978).
45 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law.
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constitutive nature of the original distinction between friend and enemy encodes a set of 
ideational parameters into the community itself that even a sovereign leader must take 
account of. This will be further explored in the brief section on sovereignty, but forms a 
further distinction between Schmitt and Hobbes, in that Hobbes’ Leviathan has far 
greater powers of command and obedience simply because he is obeyed and because the 
terms of obedience are internally rooted in a mutual fear and mistrust among the 
members of the community. Whereas for Schmitt, it is a capacity to distinguish 
outsiders that produces collective identification, therefore the sovereign must continue 
to attend to the terms upon which the community maintains its internal coherence. To 
restate; the Leviathan can determine the conditions of obedience that apply to its 
community, whereas the Schmittian sovereign must always respect the prior conditions 
of coherence for his or her political community, established in the specific nature of the 
friend / enemy distinction, over which he has little control. The sovereign is therefore 
merely embedded in the broader normative structure of the community, rather than a 
free and unfettered emperor. He must answer to the constitutive needs of the community 
or either he -  or the community itself -  will fall.
As with the concept of the political, the decision describes a point of inversion rather 
than simply a boundary. It does not simply constitute a collective -  in its separateness 
and absolute freedom of action -  as a group, but rather constitutes a group in terms of 
its relationship with other groups, and the specific terms upon which the distinction is 
made remain constitutive features of the group itself, cohering and giving it 
recognisable and ongoing form.
In terms of the three legal traditions; the natural law tradition relies upon a realm of 
ethics that is constantly apparent or at least hypothesised and regulative, along with 
each individual’s capacity to determine right within a stable context of universal norms. 
The legal positivist tradition -  sometimes called normativism -  steps aside from norms 
and concentrates on establishing legal frameworks that retain legal force even when 
judged to produce wrong outcomes as they are fundamentally rooted in some 
assumption of underlying universal principles. Even Hobbes has a universal assumption 
built into his positive framework, which he invokes with his references to nature and 
providence. Schmittian decisionism does not rely on universal norms, and instead helps 
to identify points of inversion that separate political communities from one another,
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allowing the conceptualisation of different contexts of identification and interpretation 
within which norms function as threads of meaning and coherence for the group, and 
which are in turn structured both by the original constitutive distinction and the 
sovereign husbanding of its evolution. But it should also be understood that although 
the constitutive decision may appear to be arbitrary, it must animate a community prior 
to its articulation or it would not be understood or interpreted as a constitutive 
distinction. In order to understand how the distinction is articulated and finds form, the 
conceptual formulation of the sovereign needs to be elaborated.
The Sovereign
Throughout Schmitt’s work, he makes reference to particular idealised individuals. 
Among his earliest texts is ‘the dictator’46, and in his later work he writes interesting 
commentary about ‘the pirate’ and further dedicates an entire book to a theory of ‘the 
partisan’ 47 Given what has been already outlined in the above sections, it should be 
clear that there is little room in Schmitt’s analysis for individuals. The political only 
operates at a collective level; communities are constituted in ways that set the terms for 
individuals to understand themselves as such, and collective identification is prior to 
establishing the evaluative norms that allow for self identification within groups. So 
when discussing ‘the sovereign’, it should be apparent that he was not attempting to 
create a category of behavioural traits common to pre-existing sovereigns. Nor was he a 
sociologist trying to identify different types of sovereign. He was instead trying to 
identify that which was essential to the idea of sovereignty -  a concept of sovereignty, 
or a conceptualisation of the idea of sovereignty -  and to do this he asked what is the 
particular task of the sovereign in relation to the community? His answer is another of 
his famous quotes; ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’.
The exception, for Schmitt, was anything that threatened the norm, and he elaborated 
this idea as a way of describing how legal systems could not legislate for all 
eventualities, that there would always need to be some provisions within a 
constitutional system for the preservation of exceptional sovereign power over the
46 Schmitt, Die Diktatur: Von den Anfangen des modernen Souveranitatsgedankens bis zum 
proletarischen Klassenkamph, (Munich: Dunker & Humblot, 1928).
47 The ‘pirate’ features in discussions both in Land and Sea and Nomos, and the ‘partisan’ in Theory o f  
the Partisan.
48 Schmitt, Political Theology, p 1.
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community. In keeping with his critique of Kelsenian normativism, the law itself could 
not be considered sovereign, but was dependent upon the capacity of the sovereign to 
step outside the law in order to defend it, to declare an exception and claim exceptional 
authority to restore the norm. The previous discussion of the decision concentrated on 
the original decision that provides the foundation for law. With his discussion on 
sovereignty, Schmitt further elaborates on the relationship between law and the 
political.
A decision operates in two ways, on the one hand as a kind of conceptual device 
concerning a historical distinction between friend and enemy that establishes a context 
in which norms can emerge to regulate the behaviour of the group, and as an ongoing 
mechanism for the preservation of the norm against the exception. The Sovereign can 
be seen as the holder of this remnant authority, a living embodiment of the coherence of 
the community, and someone -  or some institution -  entrusted, indeed obliged, to 
maintain that coherence. Therefore sovereign authority, like that of the Leviathan, 
resides in the obligation to protect the community, understood as a system of norms 
derived from the original and constitutive friend / enemy distinction -  the decision at 
the root of law. The original decision is therefore constantly re-inscribed by the 
sovereign acts undertaken to defend the norm against the exception, and therefore the 
existential sovereign decision represents a limit concept for any group that understands 
itself as a group. It exists both in relation to some conceptual origin in history, and as 
that which continues to distinguish the group in its separateness and potentially hostile 
relations with the concrete enemy.
The decision between the norm and the exception has therefore come to be understood 
in terms of historical and spatial limits; with both the emergence of the community, and 
in terms of its continued expression in spatial terms.49 But this is not necessary at a 
conceptual level. Time and space considerations are separate to the decision at a 
conceptual level. Every moment of decision has its sovereign, as implied by the maxim 
quoted above, however, when the sovereign decision is transposed onto the institution
49 Louiza Odysseos, ‘Dangerous Ontologies: the ethos of survival and ethical theorising in International 
Relations’, in Review o f International Studies, Volume 28, Issue 2,2002, and Louiza Odysseos, ‘Crossing 
the line? Carl Schmitt on the “spaceless universalism” of cosmopolitanism and the War on Terror’, in 
Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (eds.) The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt: Terror, 
liberal war and the crisis o f global order, (London: Routledge, 2007).
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of sovereignty, whereby it is expected that the sovereign will keep the power of 
decision, this introduces time to the conceptual formula. Furthermore, considering the 
sovereign decision within the context of the modem state system inevitably concerns 
how the institutions of the sovereign and of sovereignty are indelibly associated with 
maintaining the particularity of a specific group expressed in state form. Nevertheless at 
a conceptual level the sovereign has a direct relationship with the members of the 
community in whose name he or she ‘decides’. In other words, the formula is entirely 
reversible. The grammatical structure of the maxim posits the sovereign as the subject, 
and the community is only implied in the background. However, if examining the 
statement as if it is designed to identify the sovereign within a presupposed community 
-  rather than spell out an utterly arbitrary freedom of decision in the hands of the 
sovereign -  it has the opposite meaning, one that is highly suggestive of the reflexive 
nature of sovereignty; or as Oakeshott has it, ‘authority is always an endowment by 
those who it obligates’.50
Aligning the sovereign decision with the political moment shows that a community in 
whose name the sovereign speaks cannot be presupposed -  not until the friend / enemy 
distinction is made. And although it is the sovereign who articulates the friend / enemy 
distinction, the necessary implication is that the sovereign and the community, are co- 
constitutive. Furthermore, if it is suggested that the sovereign decision continually re­
inscribes the community, we can see that the sovereign and the community are 
perpetually co-constitutive, not simply related at one point of semi-divine or mythical 
origin. This is an important reflection for several reasons. First of all it further insulates 
the sovereign from comparison with an absolute dictator whose will commands all, 
secondly it describes the sovereign as in thrall to the friend / enemy distinction rather 
than in arbitrary command of it, and thirdly, it posits the community as having a logic 
that is internalised from the character of the prevailing friend / enemy distinction. What 
this means is that although the original friend / enemy distinction imprints itself on the 
community, the manner in which the sovereign re-inscribes the distinction over time 
allows for a subtle evolution of its terms. But it also imposes a duty on the sovereign to 
attend to the manner in which the political community evolves. Nevertheless the 
implication is that the sovereign is not simply free to decide whatever exception he or
50 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Talking Politics’, in Rationalism in Politics and other essays, (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1991), p 442.
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she likes and direct his or her subject community accordingly, but must be able to 
recognise the emergent exception whose terms are themselves constrained. Imagine, for 
example, if a sovereign simply failed to see an emergent threat to a community and 
failed to act against it. Without wishing to be prescriptive, the likelihood is that either 
the community will be destroyed by the emergent exception, or the institutional 
sovereign will simply be ousted and replaced by someone better placed to respond, or 
better able to identity the exception.51 If the community survives, the institution of 
sovereignty must form a part of its expression.
Once again Schmitt wrote about this during the Weimar period when he was active as a 
constitutional lawyer. It was -  in context -  a theoretical component of his defence of the 
emergency powers of the President, most particularly article 48 of the constitution, 
which gave the President wide powers to rule by decree. This has been widely 
interpreted as supporting a perpetual rule by decree, and ultimately a form of fascism. 
But viewed in the way set out above, sovereignty becomes a social institution, one 
necessitated by the very practice of existential differentiation that marks out the political 
community in the first place, and the sovereign is obliged to occupy the helm of that 
community as it navigates its course through history. But, to adapt a reputed aphorism 
of Otto von Bismark, the helmsman merely ensures that a ship stays on course, and 
must respond to the direction of both wind and currents. The political decision lives 
both in the continued existence of the community as a community, and in the 
underlying friend / enemy distinction that inscribed its unity in the first place. In this 
context, Schmitt’s expressive defence of the emergency powers of the President looks 
less like a defence of a particular form of authoritarian government, and more like a 
defence of the idea of Germany itself.
Proto-securitisation theory?
The combination of Schmitt’s concept of the political, and his notion of decision, lead 
ineluctably towards some comparison with the modem day Copenhagen School and 
what has become known as ‘securitisation theory’.52 To abstract from Schmitt’s situated
51 Examples of this might include Churchill’s rise to power, by which it could be imagined that Churchill 
accumulated sovereignty by his consistent opposition to appeasement, and was eventually seen as a 
‘natural’ candidate for office by simple virtue of having long warned of the rise of Germany.
52 There is a large amount of literature on this theme, commencing with Ole Waever, ‘Securitization and 
Desecuritization’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed), On Security, (New York: Columbia University Press,
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critique of the constitutional instability of the Weimar Republic towards a more general 
theory of social relations does produce a form of reflexive identification and exclusion 
that Ole Waever would recognise as at least similar, or related, to the speech act inspired 
process of Securitization Theory. The basic similarity is clear enough; security is inter- 
subjectively constituted between the securitizing actor and the wider society in which 
both the authority of the securitizing actor and the referent object are politically 
contested. Michael Williams makes much of the similarities in his article, ‘Words, 
Images, Enemies’53, in which he makes very clear the direct lineage between Schmitt’s 
radically indeterminate theorising of the political and his decisionism which sits at the 
genealogical root of Waever’s securitization theory. This view is shared by Jef 
Huysmans although perhaps Huysmans is stronger in his denunciation of the ethos of 
‘political horror’ that this radical indeterminacy in the realm of the political inevitably, 
he believes, inevitably leads to.54
This debate concerning Schmitt’s position at the conceptual root of securitization theory 
will surely continue, although one intervention is worth referencing for it points in the 
same direction as this thesis. Holger Stritzel introduces the epistemological language of 
‘intemalism’ and ‘extemalism’ as a way through what he identifies as a problem with 
some securitization literature, in that it fails to provide a useful empirical toolkit. He 
clarifies the distinctions between an ‘internalist’ logic, that draws inspiration from 
Derrida, and by implication Schmitt,55 and an ‘externalist’ logic that permits the 
application of these terms to empirically assumed entities that exist in the ‘real world’. 
The reason this is both useful and important is that it clarifies the epistemological 
priorities of securitization theory, in that if securitization theory is primarily concerned 
with a process by which security threats are inter-subjectively constituted, it is difficult 
to apply to contexts in which the ‘real world’ is held to be durable and mind 
independent. Just to be clear, Stritzel claims to offer a way through this problem, but
1995), and followed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for  
Analysis, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), with an indispensable review by Jef Huysmans, ‘Revisiting 
Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe, in European 
Journal o f International Relations, Volume 4, Issue 4,1998.
53 Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Image, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, in 
International Studies Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 4, 2003.
54 Jef Huysmans, ‘The Question of the Limit: Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political 
Realism’, in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 27, Issue 3,1998.
55 Holger Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond’ in European Journal o f 
International Relations, 2007, Volume 13, Issue 3. It is ‘by implication Schmitt’, because his reference is 
to the article by Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies’ rather than directly to Schmitt.
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nevertheless makes an important -  and to my mind valid -  connection between the post- 
structural theories of Jacques Derrida, and the radical existentialism of Carl Schmitt, not 
to mention the ‘Wilful Realism’ of Michael Williams.56 This theme will be picked up 
again in Chapter 5, but examining Waever’s original work, it is fairly clear he did not 
intend to leave securitisation theory stuck in the existential mire, therefore Stritzel’s 
article is both a worthwhile intervention and a useful clarification.
Legitimacy and Dictatorship
The three basic conceptual formulations outlined above are sufficient for understanding 
the mechanics of Schmitt’s theoretical reflections on the idea of community, for it 
should be obvious by now that what interested Schmitt was community above other 
things. The concepts of the political, the decision and sovereignty are all interlinked by 
his attempt to understand the besetting deficiencies of Weimar Germany and were 
formulated in respect of what Schmitt thought were the conceptual and ideational 
conditions thereof. They provide a notion of community that is uprooted from the 
foundationalism which merely views political communities as having historical or 
geographical origins, and those that regard communities as rooted in kinship, language 
or even culture. Schmitt’s reflections on community are anti-essentialist, rooted in the 
present through the constant re-articulation of the friend / enemy distinction that 
provides the underlying conditions for the establishment and navigation of contextual 
social truths.
Each community has its own existentially relevant reference points of differentiation 
that condition its relations with others, but each must remain attentive to the fact that as 
a community it is not grounded on an external norm, nor is it able to reason its existence 
as separate community. It does not ‘simply exist’ except through a continual re­
expression of difference via the sovereign management of the friend / enemy 
distinction.57 If a community fails to understand its relationship to this ongoing process 
of exclusion, then it risks not being able to recognise its vulnerability to an emergent 
exception. Which in turn places a general obligation on the sovereign to remain 
attentive to the idea of the exception. Individuals can only understand themselves as 
such if they already have a perspective, and are already inhabited by the inherited and
56 Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits o f International Relations.
57 Huysmans, ‘The Question of the Limit’, op. cit.
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evolved pejoratives of a friend / enemy community. There is no neutral position from 
which to observe these competing communities, as each individual is existentially 
committed to a worldview that is itself dependent upon the contextual truths that derive 
ultimately from one side of a friend / enemy distinction -  in other words, everyone is 
already deeply implicated in a ‘partisan schema’.
This existential presentism that inhabits a community is navigated through the reflexive 
relationship between the sovereign and the people. The prejudicial exclusion that forms 
the substance of the friend / enemy distinction resides in each and every member as an 
condition of existential recognition, thus the sovereign and his or her people are 
umbilically linked by a shared co-constitutive prejudice. For Schmitt, this relationship 
exists regardless of mechanisms designed to reflect or produce it, but when Schmitt was 
commenting on Weimar Germany, it is easy to see why he favoured a type of
f Q
plebiscitary populism as a way of endowing the President with legitimacy. In fact, it 
was central to his argument of Presidential authority and the exceptional power vested 
in article 48 of the constitution that the President carried greater legitimacy than the 
representative body of parliament precisely on account of his direct election, and 
therefore his direct relationship with the people. His early reflections on dictatorship59 
advanced the idea of a consular dictatorship with the exceptional power to restore the 
norm, echoing the traditions of the Roman Republic.60 In his work on Legality and 
Legitimacy, Schmitt provides a prescient analysis of the problems besetting the Weimar 
constitution and shows himself alive to the prevailing threat. Balakrishnan suggests that 
he was far more concerned about the rising power of the Nazis than he is often given 
credit for, judging them to have a malign intent to change the constitution after 
achieving power.61 It was a course of action to which he was actively hostile, suggesting 
that the power of a simple majority could never legitimately constrain the minority’s 
capacity to hold power in the future.62 And indeed that such a strategy would represent 
an emerging friend / enemy distinction within the constitutional framework itself. 
Which once again highlights the vulnerability inherent within any institutionalised form 
to the dimension of the political, which is prior to its institutionalisation.
58 Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004 [1932]), translated by 
Jeffrey Seitzer.
59 Schmitt, Die Diktatur.
60 Ibid.
61 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, p 175.
62 Ibid., p 96.
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It is this historical and conceptual web that surrounds and informs Schmitt’s notion of 
community that the rest of the thesis relies on to explain what value Schmitt has for 
International Relations theory. However, there is little room to engage with the myriad 
critical responses to these legal and political arguments in and of themselves. At this 
stage in the argument, it is simply important to excavate these Schmittian formulations 
in order to get at the underlying curiosity that inhabits his work. There is no doubt that 
his legal arguments concerning exceptional powers and legitimacy have spawned 
endless arguments within the legal field,63 as well as further philosophical speculation 
concerning the relationship between law, sovereignty and the political.64 All this is 
acknowledged openly. But for the purpose of this thesis, the trio of concepts outlined 
above are laid out to give some insights into the intellectual disposition of the man who 
formulated them. Which in turn allows one to bypass much literature on Schmitt, and to 
focus this thesis away from abstracted debates concerning the ‘true meaning’ of certain 
legal interpretations, or the ‘subtext’ of violence that inhabits his work. Instead, by 
providing a relatively basic outline of Schmitt’s ideas concerning the political, the 
decision, and the sovereign, it becomes possible to explain how these terms were 
expressed in his historical commentaries and his attempts to theorise systems of 
international order. It also becomes possible to place him and his curiosity at the centre 
of the analysis, rather than the particular concepts -  and their implications -  which he 
formulated.
Conclusion
The use of Schmitt as a conceptual storehouse has produced a large number of hugely 
interesting works of political theory, legal theory, and philosophy. But nowhere has a 
thorough account of him as a theorist of International Relations in his own right 
appeared. Each of his concepts has been picked up and used, either as a substantial 
component of another’s work, or as clearly expressed concept to be elaborated or
63 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law, plus Sylivie Delacroix, op. cit.,
64 Notable contributions to this literature include: Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), translated by Danile Heller-Roazen, State o f  
Exception, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), translated by Kevin Attell. Jacques Derrida 
‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundations of Authority”.’ in Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld and 
David Gray Carlson (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility o f Justice, (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
Jenny Edkins, Veronique Pin-Fat and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), Sovereign Lives: Power in Global 
Politics, (London: Routledge, 2004).
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deconstructed. The effect of this has been to reduce Schmitt’s thought to a series of 
spare parts in other works, or as a critical foil whose selective interpretation does 
incomplete justice to the range of his reflections. Chantal Mouffe has transposed his 
concept of the political into her own work on ‘agonistic democracy’, and Giorgio 
Agamben has provided a detailed and elaborate reworking of Schmitt’s notion of the 
exception in order to move on from Foucault’s use of the panopticon metaphor towards 
that of the concentration camp as a way of understanding contemporary social relations. 
William Scheuerman and many others have restricted themselves to talking about legal 
arguments and sought to criticise the radical indeterminacy in Schmitt’s formulations,65 
while simultaneously detecting a series of ‘hidden dialogues’ with later scholars. John 
McCormick has tried to reveal the underlying logic of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism in 
order to substantiate his connection with fascism;66 and notably, Ellen Kennedy has 
sought to identify Schmitt’s significant participation within the original debates of the 
Frankfurt School.67
Each of these and other literatures represents a worthwhile and interesting engagement 
with aspects of Schmitt’s thought, but each also relies on a capacity to isolate the 
particular aspect of his thought under discussion. However, in taking only specific 
aspects of Schmitt’s thought and then either using them or criticising them, these 
approaches rely on the relatively hidden idea that Schmitt is a legitimate authority on 
the concepts under discussion. This turns Schmitt into a series of relatively one 
dimensional representations in which he is either accorded a troubling degree of respect 
-  for a man who joined the Nazi party in any case -  or is treated as a grand straw man, 
whose Nazi party membership makes the point almost by default. Even when scholars 
of International Relations have used Schmitt, it is usually a Schmittian formulation of a 
particular concept that they bring to their argument.68 There are many examples of this, 
from liberals taking on his critique of liberalism, to postmodern approaches that 
acknowledge the brilliant and incisive dualism of his friend / enemy formulation -  for 
postmodernists who already agree with him that is -  to realists who claim him as one of 
their own and one who burnishes their suspicion of universal values, to critics of
65 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law.
66 John McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique o f Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
67 Ellen Kennedy, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School’, Telos 71 1987.
68 This applies to many theorists, from Michael C. Williams, to Chantal Mouffe and Louiza Odysseos.
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liberalism who revitalise his critique and transpose it to a contemporary setting. Each 
relies on the assumption that Schmitt produced useful and transportable conceptual 
formulations. But each also leaves questions unanswered.
If Schmitt is so useful to such a widespread variety of thinkers, this implies that his 
reception and interpretation lacks precision. Other theorists are accorded a place within 
certain traditions of International Relations, like Hobbes, Grotius and Kant. They are 
plucked out of history and accorded membership of an IR team.69 Thus there is a long 
and honourable discussion concerning what a Hobbesian or Kantian vision of IR looks 
like; assessments have been made of the whole picture and there is a general awareness 
of both the strengths and weaknesses of the entire schema. It is well known, for 
instance, what questions Hobbes left unanswered, and it is possible to speculate 
authoritatively what Kant’s perpetual peace reveals about his worldview. Schmitt on 
the other hand -  with his concepts -  provides a variety of tactical insights into how to 
play the game, but remains unselected as a player. Much therefore is known about his 
concepts, most particularly in relation to which other scholars use them and why, but 
this has not produced any deep reflection on what a Schmittian vision of IR looks like, 
what insights it provides, and what are its shortcomings.
In setting out and stitching together the Schmittian conceptual formulations in this 
chapter, this thesis can now go on to look at both the specific context that informed his 
curiosity and the manner in which he utilised his own conceptual formulations in order 
to theorise international relations. For one thing that becomes clear about reading 
Schmitt’s later works, is that he had a fully worked out set of ideas about the 
international, about the state, and about the historical processes that produced them 
both. Also, his later works can be used to clarify his earlier thinking as they are clearly 
still organised around the underlying curiosities that informed his entire intellectual 
output -  the fragile and undulating relationships between community, order and 
violence.
69 Chris Brown explicitly adopts the team analogy in his International Relations Theory: New Normative 
Approaches, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
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Chapter Two: Carl Schmitt as a theorist of Historical Crisis
Nomos is Greek for ‘pastu reand  ‘the Nomad * is a chief or clan elder who presides 
over the allocation o f pastures. Nomos thus came to mean ‘law fair distribution 
‘that which is allocated by custom ’ -  and so the basis o f all Western law.
Bruce Chatwin, The Songlines.
Introduction
In the previous chapter, an outline account was given of some conceptual terms that lie 
at the heart of Schmitt’s worldview. This chapter will seek to clarify the changing 
contexts in which Schmitt felt it necessary to attempt these conceptual formulations, and 
his broader disposition toward history. In effect, his analysis of the problems that beset 
the Weimar republic and his involvement in the intense legal constitutional debates of 
those times acts as an unorthodox introduction to a theory of world historical crisis that 
reconciles the various facets of his work, and in which the problems of Weimar 
Germany were but one highly distilled microcosm.
To this end it is possible to see the entire body of Schmitt’s work as something like an 
iterative process, in which he attempted to understand the underlying roots of a narrow 
range of problems that nevertheless unfolded within wider and wider political and 
geographical contexts. Hence Schmitt’s speculations went from thoughts on the roots of 
law, through criticism of the perceived failings of parliamentary democracy, to 
advocacy of the use of emergency powers and contemplation of the existential roots of 
political community. Then as the same problems that he sought to resolve simply 
intensified and the Weimar constitution itself collapsed -  a process in which he can be 
justifiably implicated in its later stages -  his concerns turned to the wider European 
dimension of international order and eventually the entire normative structure of 
international order. More simply, his work can be seen as a broadening search for the 
durable normative mechanisms that provided content and stability to the shifting 
dynamics of international order and disorder, and while his earliest works concentrated 
on the specific institutional mechanisms that allow states to function, he quickly 
graduated to the wider sphere of a more generalised crisis of the European state, and 
then the entire international order, to find firmer ground on which to base his 
understanding of the existential problem of political community. That the firmest
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ground he could eventually establish was written as a lament for a lost world is 
indicative of how elusive these foundations were for him, and explains both his 
fascination for grand metaphors and his sensitivity to the idea of history.1 For it is upon 
specific historical events -  and their characterisation -  that Schmitt depends in order to 
substantiate his conceptual formulations. It is therefore the contingency of history that 
allows for form and content to adhere to his theories and render them both 
comprehensible and in some sense relevant to any interpretation thereof.
Critique and Crisis
Rheinhart Koselleck provides a series of conceptual steps that allow for the 
interpretation of Carl Schmitt as first and foremost a theorist of historical crisis. In his 
text, Critique and Crisis, Koselleck links the practice of critique with the emergence of 
crisis.2 In short he suggests that the act of criticism, or judging, places the moral or 
intellectual capacities of the critic in a privileged relationship to the subject under 
criticism. Criticism relies upon a dualistic polarity, a ‘this’ opposed to a ‘that’, and in 
setting up this polarity the critic gives life to it, and does not merely discover or 
enunciate a given opposition. In his own words;
Criticism is the art of judging; its function calls for testing a given 
circumstance for its validity or truth, its rightness or beauty, so as to arrive at 
a judgement that extends to persons as well. In the course of criticism the true 
is separated from the false, the genuine from the spurious, the beautiful from 
the ugly, right from wrong.3
When examined alongside Schmitt’s description of ‘the political’ as rooted in the 
distinction between -  or perhaps judgement or decision in respect of -  friend and 
enemy, the inescapable conclusion is that Schmitt’s notion of the political operates as a 
kind of perpetual critique. Furthermore, when allied to Koselleck’s notion that critique 
gives rise to the oppositional terms in which it is framed, and thus every critique 
contains its own crisis hidden within it, Schmitt becomes a theorist of crisis precisely 
because the critique he offered always seemed to reveal some hidden aspect of an
1 Schmitt’s magnum opus - The Nomos o f the Earth -  contains his most expansive account of the period 
of European modernity, which as far as Schmitt was concerned had come to a definitive end by the time 
he wrote about it in the late 1940s.
2 Rheinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis o f Modern Society, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988 [1959]). Koselleck is well known for having learnt much from Schmitt, but 
the relationship is clarified best in Rheinhard Mehring’s, ‘Carl Schmitt and his Influence on Historians’, 
in Cardozo Law Review, Volume 21, 1999.
3 Ibid, p 103.
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unfolding crisis by merely framing it in oppositional terms. Furthermore, and in keeping 
with this chapter’s implicit divisions, as Schmitt’s critique grew in scope to take in the 
wider horizons of European political order, then the whole notion of international order, 
the crisis he progressively revealed also needed to match the breadth of his analysis. 
Hence his early career adopted a legal and political-theoretical language in order to 
grasp at the ongoing dilemmas of a shaky new republic. Then his critique developed a 
highly polemical and divisive tone when attempting to clarify the vortex of political 
instability into which Europe plunged in the 1930s. Lastly his ongoing critique was cast 
in reflective and world historical terms to capture the ongoing global crisis of the 
emergent Cold War, and the end of European modernity.
It would of course be overstating it to say that Schmitt’s critique in and of itself brought 
about the end of European modernity, but given that his critique has always been seen 
in terms of it radical edge, it is not going too far to claim that Schmitt participated 
actively in a more general process of critique, which in turn had many facets.4 The three 
phases of Schmitt’s career then, are not ultimately subject to the restrictions imposed on 
him by liberal interpreters, but instead divide themselves in relation to the widening 
contexts into which his ongoing critique clarified their corresponding crises. His 
critique of Weimar Germany pointed the way very directly toward its collapse and 
overthrow by the Nazi party, then his widening attempt to theorise a new European 
order definitively revealed the terms under which the old order would be eviscerated 
and replaced by an unstable balance of ideological rivals. Lastly his critique of this 
emergent world order contains within it the seeds of its collapse and subsumption into a 
broader liberal world order, to which he was both resolutely opposed and intellectually 
resigned. It is therefore, no surprise that his analysis became increasingly popular after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and seemed temporarily so prescient. His critique of 
the post war order contained within it the terms of the crisis it invoked, in that it 
heralded a world without order, or one with a false representation of a universal order. 
Which in turn goes some way to explaining why Schmitt can be so easily invoked by
4 His early communication with Walter Benjamin and Otto Kircheimer are dealt with in Chapter 6, and 
his involvement with radical right-wing politics is well known. The extent to which Schmitt’s writings 
have always been regarded as deeply troubling is best captured by Ernst Junger, who said that his work 
was like ‘a mine that explodes silently’, Andrew Norris, ‘A Mine that Explodes Silently: Carl Schmitt in 
Weimar and After’, in Political Theory, Volume 33, Issue 6.
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such a variety of different theorists; from realists to post-Marxists, they are all united in 
hostility to the idea of a universal world order.
Three Phases
This thesis has already outlined a strong opposition to periodising Schmitt in respect of 
his association with Nazism. However, this is not to dispense with the idea of 
identifying different periods within which to examine his theoretical output. Instead of 
considering when Schmitt arrived at a certain conceptual formulation -  in order to judge 
its general value or even its permissibility -  this thesis places each of his theoretical 
works alongside the particular scale and dimension of the unfolding crisis to which it is 
addressed. In this way, his early works can be seen to be directed at the crisis of 
constitutionalism engendered by the invention of a new liberal constitutional framework 
in the post World War I years, as a replacement for the Wilhelmine aggregation of 
inherited authority, tradition and hierarchical social norms that preceded it. This period 
encompasses his earliest work up to and including the first edition of The Concept o f the 
Political,5 and is characterised by a focus on the particular legal and constitutional 
debates, which took place in Weimar Germany. His middle period, in which he found it 
possible to associate himself with Fascism, and ultimately Nazism, probably dates from 
about 1929 -  with the publication of The Age o f Neutralisations and De-politicisations 
-  and ends with the clarifications and equivocations offered to his Nuremburg 
interrogators.6 Within this period he was attempting to conceptually address the great 
crisis of European meaning, for which Nazism offered its own degraded narrative of 
racial purity, but which also took many other forms. Schmitt’s preoccupation during this 
period was less with racial theories, than with a deep fear of Bolshevism, and a natural 
Catholic hostility to the collapse of European traditions and practices of statecraft. This 
is also the period in which he developed his theory of Grofiraum, which by coincidence 
is regularly offered as a contribution to a continuing version of the crisis of European 
meaning found within European contributions to the debates surrounding the concept of 
‘multipolarity’. The third or ‘late’ period of Schmitt’s interpretive range was marked by
5 Including; Political Theology, The Necessity o f Politics, The Rhineland as an Object ofInternational 
Politics, The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy, Die Diktatur, The Concept o f the Political, and 
Legality and Legitimacy. Please see ‘Works Cited’ for details.
6 Including; ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’, The Leviathan in the State Theory o f  
Thomas Hobbes, Volkerrechtliche Grofiraumordnung, and his Nuremburg Testimony. Please see ‘Works 
Cited’ for details.
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his descent into eulogy and a profound pessimism concerning the legitimate 
establishment of a global world order.
These three different periods are marked not by distinctive normative commitments to 
particular political realities, but instead involve Schmitt in exploring the implications of 
the same set of underlying questions as they played out in ever widening geopolitical 
dimensions. Nevertheless they are all connected, and all form widening perspectives on 
what eventually becomes a rather grand theory of global historical crisis to be found in 
The Nomos o f the Earth. The first period -  the crisis of the Weimar years -  simply 
became incorporated into a widening theory of international crisis, and in retrospect was 
cast by Schmitt as merely the first tremors thereof. It is therefore understandable that 
this early work takes on a fairly abstract character in that he was involved in actual legal 
/ academic debates concerning constitutional principles. The second period is marked 
by a far greater degree of polemical commitment -  even a sense of cultural and political 
emergency -  very much in keeping with the descent of Europe into Fascism and war. 
The late period of Schmitt’s reflections are expressed in a grander and more historical 
mode. The polemics have mostly disappeared, except as exculpatory moments 
alongside the general eulogistic sermonising, but equally the abstract dimension of his 
earlier work conforms more directly to the dictates of historical contingency. Ideas, 
which in his early work tend towards the universal language of principle and law, in his 
later work are more directly rooted in the historical progression of antecedent practices 
and context bound responses to real historical dilemmas.
It is perhaps only to be expected that Schmitt is often referred to -  as the first chapter 
made plain -  in terms of his conceptual formulations, but it is the late work of Schmitt 
in which these conceptual formulations find their fullest and most coherent expression. 
Confirming once again, not only the need to take account of the context of Schmitt’s 
speculations, but also the manner in which the context of Schmitt’s life and endeavours 
itself went through several evolutions, a knowledge of which is necessary in order to 
reconcile his early theories, with his later lamentations.
7 Including; Land and Sea, The Nomos o f the Earth, Theory o f the Partisan, and ‘The Legal World 
Revolution’. Please see ‘Works Cited’ for details.
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Early Schmitt: The Collapse of the Wilhelmine state 
The Political and the State
Much of the literature on Schmitt seems to ignore or explain away the principal and 
clearly expressed meaning of his famous declaration, ‘the concept of the state 
presupposes the concept of the political’. Indeed, even in the introduction to the English 
translation of the 1932 edition of The Concept o f the Political Charles Schwab 
considers this question directly, and adds further comments from correspondence of 
Schmitt’s, which is worth quoting at length.
Though this essay contains only germs of what subsequently matured into a 
relatively complete model, in the opening sentence of the 1932 essay 
Schmitt indivisibly linked state and politics. Reflecting on the connection 
between the two, he recently commented: ‘The decisive
question....concerns the relationship of ... state and politics. A doctrine 
which began to take shape in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a 
doctrine inaugurated by Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, and Thomas Hobbes, 
endowed the state with an important monopoly: the European state became 
the sole subject of politics. Both state and politics were linked just as 
indivisibly as polis and politics in Aristotle.8 (italics added for emphasis)
In declaring that the state is indivisibly linked to the political, Schwab has simply 
inverted the only conclusion that can be properly drawn, and which is reinforced by the 
very quotes Schwab presents in support of his alternative formulation. The words 
Schwab uses were also available to Schmitt, yet Schmitt cast the relationship in entirely 
different terms, and this was quite deliberate. According to a Schmittian reading, the 
state is merely the contingent expression of a primordial and ever present political 
predicament, that is a regulative feature of human societies of all types. Schmitt is 
ultimately just acknowledging that an insistent focus on the state as the sole carrier of 
the political is consequent on the acceptance of a doctrine -  an exclusively European 
doctrine -  that monopolises the political through the institution and convention of the 
state.9 This convention bears no necessary relation to the political -  to the existential 
quality of the political decision -  it is merely the historically contingent convention in 
which the process has become conventionally expressed at a pan-European level, along
8 Schmitt, Concept o f the Political, p 6.
9 Conclusion supported by the more recent work of Alain de Benoist, ‘Global terrorism and the state of 
permanent exception’, op.cit.
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with the tradition of Great Power politics and the Jus Publicum Europaeum that Schmitt 
theorised in his later work.10
The reason it is important to distinguish between the political and the state is that it 
allows for an investigation into the relationship between the two by requiring an 
examination of how the political becomes manifested in the state and what supports that 
process. Far from preventing this by assuming the indivisibility of the state and the 
political, Schmitt, by forcing an examination of the particular aspects of each, makes it 
possible. The political decision to distinguish between friend and enemy constitutes an 
inside and an outside, and the state can be thought of historically as an institutional 
mechanism by which a political community mediates interaction with the outside. 
Returning to the conceptual formulae outlined in Chapter 1, the reason Schmitt wrote 
about these ideas was because the Weimar state seemed ill-equipped to deal with certain 
prevalent exceptions, and therefore he made a distinction between the political and the 
state precisely because he thought it important to acknowledge the dependence on and 
extreme vulnerability of the state to the political. He viewed the existence of violent 
militia committed to overthrowing the prevailing constitutional settlement as inimical to 
the interests of the state, and the state form therefore needed more powerful legal 
arguments and instruments with which to defend itself. This is why he theorised the 
decision at the root of law, as a way of warning the Kelsenian positivists to attend to the 
arbitrary prejudice that is prior to the establishment of constitutional form. It was, he 
thought, a mistake to assume that a constitution was founded on a norm, as Kelsen 
argued, for this led to a kind of legal proceduralism in which the state was cast as a 
neutral space for the adjudication of political disagreements, within a broader normative 
context.11 Instead, Schmitt suggested that the state could not be neutral in respect of 
itself, that it was vulnerable to division or collapse precisely because it was not possible 
to take the relationship between the state and the political for granted, or to treat them as 
indivisible. Schwab is partially right in that the state was dependent on the political, but 
this is only one way in which the relationship works. If cast the other way around, the 
political is certainly not dependent on the state, therefore the two are by no means 
indivisible. Indeed when Schmitt wrote that ‘the concept of the state presupposes the
10 Schmitt, Nomos.
11 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, p 46-7.
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concept of the political’12 he was precisely making a distinction between the two in 
order to demonstrate their divisibility and by implication, the historical specificity of 
their relationship. And when he further commented that the relationship between the 
state and the political is a ‘decisive question’ he reasserts the distinction, suggesting that 
the reader needs to understand the nature and historical contingency of the relationship 
as a decisive question, not merely an indivisible quality.
What this demonstrates is that as soon as Schmitt’s purely conceptual realm is set aside
to allow consideration of forms of political organisation that exist in the world, the
prevailing historical context intrudes. In the aftermath of The Great War, Germany’s
position in the world was itself under question. Not only had its borders changed and
parts of it remained occupied, but also, there were a considerable variety of
interpretations concerning its role in the recent war, its place in history, and its future
1 ^course, from the payment of reparations to the restoration of full sovereignty. The 
victorious powers had established the League of Nations, and were establishing new 
rules of behaviour between states by which they were seeking to retrospectively judge 
Germany. The liberal constitution of Weimar was not universally accepted as a proper 
form or framework for the continued government of Germany. The young Willhelmine 
state brought together by Bismark had been tom apart, leaving behind a deeply 
conservative militancy that viewed the end of the war as a betrayal, alongside which 
there was a large and widespread leftist insurrection. Germany was no longer simply a 
philosophical and territorial problem united at least by the idea of itself as a unity, but 
represented instead an ideational playing field in which legal and philosophical 
arguments were a necessary part of any claim on the legitimacy to govern. Therefore 
questions such as ‘what is a state?’ and ‘what is law and how does it relate to the state?’ 
and even ‘when is it justified to use violence in support of constitutional norms?’ were 
paramount and extremely important questions of day-to-day policy, not merely matters 
of abstract law. With this in mind, Schmitt’s texts of this period can only be seen as 
shaped by this wider context. The experience of Germany was that of incipient social, 
political, and economic collapse; beset by violent Spartacist action and equally violent
12 Schmitt, Concept o f the Political, p 19.
13 This problem is dealt with extensively in Schmitt’s essay, The Rhineland as an Object o f International 
Politics, (Cologne: Rhenish Centre Party, 1925), translated by Dr. Karl Rick. But just in terms of 
common historical knowledge, compare the full restoration of France to the concert of Europe in the 
aftermath of the Napoleonic wars -  twice!
56
suppression by the Freikorps; further troubled by the constitutional wrangles of a 
regionally differentiated country, occupied and cast as an international criminal whose 
deposed sovereign lived out his days in the Dutch countryside, hostage to article 227 of 
the Treaty of Versailles that demanded his prosecution by specially convened tribunal.14 
Germany represented a problem at every level of the nascent system of international 
order, all the way from regional constitutional wrangles and the legitimacy of violence, 
to questions concerning the nature and extent of her ‘sovereignty’.15
This was the context in which attenuated questions of legal and philosophical theory 
had concrete meaning and effect. When Schmitt theorised the exception and the norm, 
and the friend / enemy distinction, he was responding to a changed world in which the 
old certainties had become indistinct, and therefore in need of clarification. At the end 
of the war and all through the 1920s Germany faced many crises, both political and 
economic, and it was often the very constitutional fabric of the state that appeared 
uncertain. This was the context in which Schmitt formulated his understanding of 
community as radically uncertain and ultimately anti-foundational, formed in the 
proclamation and reception of speech acts and the existential matter of collective 
identification. Therefore one can see how even in its barest conceptual form, Schmitt’s 
thought -  as critique -  is informed by a context in which it had immediate historical 
significance and application.
The ivory tower of the pure historian or the pure theorist was simply never available to 
Schmitt. His conceptual formulations were developed ‘in the breach’ so to speak, and 
were forged in the radically uncertain conditions of an actually -  as opposed to a 
theoretically -  struggling state, steering a course through the abstract principles of the 
Weberian liberal constitution, and the concrete demands of political coalitions formed 
to nurse violent grievances spilling out from the collapsed order of the Willhelmine 
state and the wider international crisis that followed the armistice in 1918. The United
14 The Treaty o f Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, (London: HMSO, 1920), 
Article 227, p 97.
15 Consider the exchange between Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, whereby Schmitt sought to ascribe 
the right of violence to the sovereign (along Weberian lines) whereas Benjamin sought to describe the 
general strike as the site of divine violence. It is difficult to imagine any country in the world at the time 
where such an utterly polarised dispute would have been possible, or even comprehensible. This debate 
forms the subject of some of Giorgio Agamben’s essays. Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, 
(Stanford: Stanford Univerisity Press, 1997), p 160.
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States -  a non European power -  had become involved in a European war for the first 
time in history, and indeed had a decisive influence on the outcome. The Soviet Union 
had emerged through socialist revolution -  consequent upon the depredations of 
effective defeat in 191716 -  which together challenged the very terms of legitimacy on 
which pre-war Europe was based. Thus Schmitt, in defence of a fragile order, 
contemplated the limits and latitude of authority in extreme circumstances, and 
questioned the casual assumptions of normative legal theorists and their implication of a 
neutral standard, which stood guard over the liberal principles of the new republic. The 
culmination of this period of active reflection was The Concept o f the Political, and the 
anti-foundational, strife-worn relationalism implied by the sovereign decision, married 
to the irrational prejudice of the friend / enemy distinction that sets the conditions for 
the defence of an articulated norm. All of Schmitt’s writings of the period, from Die 
Diktatur, though The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy and Legality and Legitimacy, 
to The Concept o f the Political can be understood in relation to the deeper constitutional 
crisis of the Weimar Republic through which he lived and participated.17
Middle Schmitt: The Crisis of European Meaning 
The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations
Schmitt’s attitude towards history is to some extent revealed by a short lecture he gave 
in 1929, when he baldly states -  following Hegel -  ‘that all historical knowledge is 
present knowledge, that such knowledge obtains its light and intensity from the present
1 ftand in the most profound sense only serves the present’. This text prefigures Schmitt’s 
later notion of nomos, which needs some explanation in order for its origins to be fully 
explored. Nomos is a Greek word which is usually taken to mean law, but in keeping 
with Schmitt’s focus on the conditions of possibility for law, he pushed the idea of 
nomos to being rooted in a foundational act of land-appropriation.19 He therefore 
considered nomos to be an all encompassing ideational dimension which is associated 
with land-appropriation, or a constitutive spatial ordering. This was linked by Schmitt to 
his earlier critique of legal positivism in the manner in which he sought to theorise some 
prior ordering principles onto which laws are then written. Laws can therefore be
16 Robert Service, A History o f Twentieth Century Russia, (London: Penguin, 1997).
17 A point made emphatically clear by Duncan Kelly in The State o f the Political: Conceptions o f Politics 
and the State in the Thought o f Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann, (London: British 
Academy, 2004.
18 Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’.
19 Schmitt, Nomos, p 67.
58
neutral only as far as they do not pertain to the conditions of their possibility. Nomos, as 
a word, refers to the decisive origins of an existing order. ‘The nomos can grow and 
multiply like land and property: all human nomoi are “nourished” by a single divine 
nomos. ’20 This concept will be developed extensively as the thesis progresses, but is 
offered here because the subtext of his essay ‘The Age of Neutralisations and 
Depoliticisations’ touches on the issue of grand historical evolutions in the ideational 
substrate upon which laws and ordering mechanisms are built and signified. When 
Schmitt eventually wrote The Nomos o f the Earth, the specific nomos he elaborated was 
rooted in a global land-appropriation by the European powers, after which Europe 
became a privileged sphere of ‘bracketed’ warfare, where the rest of the world was 
reduced to a force-field of European Imperial competition.
The earlier essay -  ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’ -  was offered as
an account of how the nomos -  although the word nomos is not explicitly mentioned,
the entire essay is pregnant with forewarning of his later work -  of European modernity
had migrated through several ‘neutral centres’, and how each of these navigations had
01posed a sort of general threat to the stable normative mechanics of international order. 
Adopting the schema of a theological centre giving way to the metaphysical, which in 
turn gave way to the humanitarian and finally to the economic via the interruption of 
romanticism, he tried to describe the shifting contours of the intellectual vanguard of 
European opinion. If anything, these transformations in the intellectual life of Europe 
nevertheless took place in a historical context in which the existence of Europe as a 
privileged sphere -  one of the key themes of Schmitt’s theory of nomos -  was taken for 
granted. It therefore formed a detailed framing of the evolution of chosen terms of 
conflict and agreement between European powers from the emergence of modernity, to 
the period of crisis that followed the First World War. In effect it can be seen as a 
preliminary comment on the concept of nomos, offered before he had fully given up on 
the old order, or more metaphorically, before the ‘falling of the dusk’.22 What it
20 Ibid., p 70. See once again the hinting at the divine, which partly explains why Schmitt is widely 
regarded as a Political Theologist, Heinrich Meier, The Lesson o f Carl Schmitt, (London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998).
21 Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’.
22 Following Hegel’s aphorism that ‘the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the 
dusk’ -  From the preface of his Philosophy of Right, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967 [1825]), p 
13. -  which is often interpreted as reflecting the value of hindsight, which is a deeply crude 
characterisation of what amounts to a profound philosophical principle of the nature of idealist history.
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O'Xcontains in some detail is a practical refutation of Hegelian dialectics and the offer of 
an alternative, anti-foundational and anti-progressive account of grand historical 
evolutions. But most importantly, its conceptual range has moved beyond the abstract 
institution of the modem European state -  a key subject of his earlier legal writings -  
and instead talks of the idea of Europe. This served the function of elevating the 
Weimar crisis to a more general European level, and rhetorically supporting what would 
later become a more general German geo-political claim, that of protecting Europe from 
the expanding threat from the East, from Russia; Bolshevism.
Progress is -  according to Schmitt -  an illusion consequent upon our perspective. 
Judging the normative conditions of one epoch against another is impossible due to the 
transformation of the very normative terms that might be brought to bear on the 
problem. Or as he put it ‘the concepts of changing generations can only be understood 
from these shifting centres’. There is no objectively neutral centre, yet there is always 
the quest for one, for terms upon which agreement can be reached or disagreements 
framed in a manner that would allow for eventual settlement. As an accompanying text 
to The Concept o f the Political, ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’ 
could not be more clearly anti-foundational, nor could this be more aggressively 
stipulated, and its implications -  when aligned with his eventual decision to join the 
Nazi party -  could be thought of as a troubling endorsement of the moral relativism that 
allowed Nazism to thrive. It is certainly a counter narrative to the idea that the period of 
modernity was characterised by enlightenment and progress, suggesting instead that 
progress is a matter of mere interpretation, and has no basis beyond a desire to see 
things that way. To demonstrate this he suggests that the idea of progress itself became 
dominant in the 18th Century -
an age of humanitarian-moral progress. Accordingly, progress meant 
above all progress in culture, self-determination and education: moral 
perfection. In an age of economic or technical thinking, it is self-evident 
that progress is economic or technical progress. To the extent that anyone 
is still interested in humanitarian progress, it appears as a by-product of 
economic progress.24
23 Which can also be found in greater detail in the Preface to the 2nd Edition of Schmitt’s Crisis o f  
Parliamentary Democracy.
24 Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’, p 135.
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While Schmitt succeeds in distancing himself from any sense of historical progress, he 
does not quite complete the picture in the way he eventually managed with The Nomos 
o f the Earth. Indeed, this earlier account of ‘The Age of Neutralisations and 
Depoliticisations’ contains several elements that he goes on later to refute; most 
particularly his brief characterisation that the principal of ‘cujus regio ejus religio’ only 
had political meaning as long as religious-theological matters remained the central focus 
of the European intellectual vanguard -  again the focus on Europe. He follows this with 
the idea that when culture began to occupy the neutral centre, nations took shape (cujus 
regio ejus natio), and that when economics came to occupy the neutral sphere, it 
became imperative that only one kind of economic system could exist within a state. To 
this end he suggested that the Soviet Union ...
realised the maxim cujus regio ejus oeconomia in a way which proves the 
connection between a compact sphere and compact intellectual homogeneity 
holds not only for the religious struggle of the 16th Century and for the 
majority of small and middle-sized European states but always 
accommodates the changing central spheres and the changing dimensions of 
autarkic world empires.2
This gives rise to a difficulty when compared to Schmitt’s later reconciling concept of 
nomos. For in accepting the idea of bracketed warfare, and the subordination of 
bracketed conflict in Europe to genuine political conflict outside of Europe, then the 
nature of disputes within Europe -  organised around the neutral centre -  was still not 
genuinely political; giving rise to the implication, later developed in The Nomos o f the 
Earth, that in the period of European modernity, wars in Europe were not genuinely 
political. However, it remains possible to see how Schmitt’s notion of the neutral centre 
is compatible with his presentist idea of history, and indeed how it illustrates the 
mechanisms by which the genuine friend / enemy distinction that he theorised at the 
core of his later nomos -  that of a spatial distinction between Europe and non-Europe -  
did change over time in respect of the terms in which it was cast. And just as a 
conceptual sovereign must remain attentive to the shifting terms in which the 
constitutive friend / enemy distinction finds expression -  either that or the political 
community becomes vulnerable to evolving exceptions from both within and without -  
so too must the grand political distinction of Europe against non-Europe also be 
understood as possessing evolving dynamics. In other words, it is because the neutral
25 Ibib., p 136.
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centre of the European intellectual vanguard was able to change over time that the 
Europe / non-Europe distinction could remain as the constitutive spatial distinction 
upon which the Eurocentric spatial order of the jus publicum Europaeum depended. It 
was the constant ‘striving for a neutral sphere’ that Schmitt implicitly suggests was at 
the heart of Europe’s self perception as Europe, and the necessary complement to the 
preservation of the superior domain of the jus publicum Europaeum. Put in the simplest 
possible terms, this short polemical essay delivers Schmitt’s earlier reflections on the 
existential roots of political community to a historical context in which Europe itself 
was losing its normative and legal constitutional bearings. It was prophetic in the sense 
that it marked the beginning of a slow turn in Schmitt’s thought, away from the 
particularities of Weimar’s constitutional difficulties and towards an analysis that saw 
the ongoing Weimar turmoil as symptomatic of a deeper European malaise.
Grofiraum
The Concept o f the Political contains Schmitt’s definitive comment on the crisis in the 
idea of the state, but contains little reflection on what may succeed the state as the 
defining political idea. ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’, constitutes a 
much more direct piece of historical commentary than The Concept o f the Political, but 
nevertheless bridges the gap between a crisis in the idea of the state, and the historical 
experience of a crisis of the idea of the state in Europe, within which the state was the 
primary political unit. Schmitt became more and more pessimistic concerning the 
stability of the old state system itself, concluding that it had been consigned to history, 
and with this he attempted to theorise both what had been lost, and what would emerge 
in its place. The frantic period of the early thirties, as the Weimar republic was 
hollowed out and overthrown by both the Nazis and their naive right wing ‘stirrup 
holders’ provided the context for Schmitt’s theory of Grofiraum, which deserves brief 
elaboration in order to see the emergence of his geo-political instincts.
What can be seen in Grofiraum, is Schmitt’s recognition that the old Westphalian order 
of territorially distinct sovereign states was breaking down. At this stage of his analysis 
the identified causes are rooted in the liberal universalism of the League of Nations, and 
the long occupation of the Ruhr valley by foreign powers. According to traditional
26 Hermann Beck, ‘The Nazis and their Conservative Alliance Partner in 1933: The Seizure of Power in a 
New Light’, in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Volume 6, Issue 2,2005.
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interpretations of International Law, occupation merely prefigured annexation or 
restoration, but the occupying power had the legal responsibilities of a governing 
authority. In the case of the Rhineland, this relationship between the occupiers and the 
occupied was complicated by the instrument of a League of Nations Mandate, which 
left it unclear who was responsible for what. For Schmitt this was the worst of all 
possible worlds, as this meant that the French had secured control of certain mineral
77rights through a Mandate -  in order to secure payment of reparations -  without taking 
on the responsibilities of government. Allied to this, the criminalisation of Germany and 
the new international context of the League of Nations -  which outlined certain 
principles governing the relations between states -  introduced a challenge to old notions 
of state sovereignty and, for Schmitt, presaged a decline of the state itself. Furthermore 
the non spatial roots of the League and the relationship to an overarching ethical realm 
in which states could be judged good or bad shifted the basis for the organisation of the 
international, away from sovereign states having a right of war in a grand contest of 
strength, towards humanistic norms that judged war to be a crime except in self defence,
752depriving sovereigns of their ultimate -  and indeed for Schmitt, decisive -  authority.
As the state and the international are essentially co-constitutive, as soon as the 
international is endowed with an ethical component, the state as the unit of the 
international is no longer sovereign in certain respects. In other words, it is no longer 
the business of states to determine the mechanics of their own interrelations as these are 
delimited by certain ethical parameters.29 Predictably, it was in the newly criminalised 
state of Germany where the full implications of these problems were realised. After all, 
it was a retrospective determination of the Treaty of Versailles that criminalised 
‘aggressive war’ in order to hold Germany responsible for the First World War. 
Certainly many Germans felt aggrieved that responsibility for the war was accredited to 
them, but more so that there were judicial penalties to pay for this responsibility in the 
form of a curtailment of sovereignty. Nor were these grievances felt only on the extreme
27 Schmitt, The Rhineland as an Object o f International Politics.
28 This is a very long standing critique -  not restricted to Schmitt -  that remains of some importance 
today and can be found in many texts, although Philip Cunliffe, Christopher Bickerton and Alex 
Gourevitch (eds), Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique o f Contemporary International Relations, 
(London: Routledge, 2007), is an illustrative edited volume, the debate is addressed directly by Hidemi 
Suganami in ‘Understanding Sovereignty through Kelsen/Schmitt’, Review o f International Studies,
2007, Volume 33, Issue 3.
29 A comparable contemporary UN doctrine o f ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is merely the logical extension 
of this principle.
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right of the political spectrum. To quote Meinecke, a prominent Weimar theorist of 
power politics,
It was suggested to us (Germany) that we had indulged the cult of power 
and of raison d’etat to an impermissible extent; and on this basis our 
conquerors assumed the right to treat us, not as a nation honourably 
defeated, but rather as a criminal. This reproach was quite clearly the mask 
of their own power-policy and raison d’e ta t.. .30
Although this sense of grievance is thought to have contributed to the rise of Fascism in
*5 1
Germany, for Schmitt it prompted a deeper meditation on the place of the state within 
the broader context of international order. Eventually, Schmitt tried to theorise the kind 
of international order that might emerge from this conceptual disorder and stabilise the 
international situation, that itself did not rely on the now outdated unit of the state. The 
international order was already moving beyond the state in several respects. Not only 
was Europe no longer the centre of an existing international order, but the models on 
offer had no spatial grounding, such that they were expressed in a universalistic 
language.
The theory of Grofiraum (great space) was first hinted at in the late 1920’s32 long after 
the notion of Lebensraum was first intimated in Hitler’s Mein Kampf and is crucially 
different from it in several respects.34 It actually bears closer resemblance to the 
European element of longstanding German thinking on geopolitics, which aimed at the 
domination of three separate spaces Mitteleuropa, Mittelafrica and Mittelasia. 
Grofiraum can be understood conceptually as a way of grounding powerful states within
30 Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism, (London: Routledge, 1956 [1924]).
31 The main conclusion of Niall Ferguson’s The Pity o f War, (London: Penguin, 1999).
32 Schmitt, Nomos, p 19. Eventually the theory was fully realised in Carl Schmitt, Volkerrechtliche 
Grofiraumordnung mit Interventionsverbotfur raumfremde Machte: Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im 
Volkerrecht, (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1941). As yet, no English translation exists, although an 
exceptionally good survey and interpretation of the idea can be found in Peter Stirk, Carl Schmitt, Crown 
Jurist o f the Third Reich: On Preemptive War, Military Occupation, and World Empire, (Lampeter: The 
Edwin Mellen Press, 2005).
33 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, (London: Pimlico, 1992), the idea o f ‘living space’ matched with the idea of 
the German race and nation needing ‘sufficient soil’ to be a great power appears towards the end of the 
volume when he orients National Socialist policy towards the East.
34 Schmitt makes this point very directly in his ‘Nuremberg Testimony’, op. cit., but the differences are 
also considered by Joseph Bendersky in his Theorist for the Third Reich (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), p 253, who also distinguishes Grofiraum from other similar Raum theories related to Karl 
Haushofer, Macht und Erde, Vol. Ill, Raumuberwindende Macht, (Leipzig: 1934).
35 Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), p 7. There 
is also a direct comparison between Schmitt’s theories and these wider German geo-political discourses 
in, Patricia Chiantera-Stutte, ‘Space, Grofiraum and Mitteleuropa in Some Debates of the Early Twentieth 
Century’, in European Journal o f Social Theory, Volume 11, Issue 2,2008
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specific spatial zones in which their primacy is clearly recognised, but most importantly 
it was a ‘political idea’.36 The Cold War antithesis of East versus West, although 
resembling a spatial distinction, was different for Schmitt because East and West were 
relative positions, unlike North and South which were fixed.37 Each Grofiraum would in 
itself constitute -  to adopt the language of the English School -  an international society, 
allowing for some complex juridical formulations, but relations between Grofiraume 
(great spaces) would be more systemic.
What this represents in the progression of Schmitt’s thought was his first attempt to 
theorise a notion of world order that was different to the liberal vision of the League of 
Nations. It corresponds to a fairly simple kind of multipolarity, and is invoked in an 
early 21st Century context with a similar aim in mind.38 At the time it was Schmitt’s 
way of holding on to the traditional association of ‘the political’ with the spatial, 
conceived as territory. In context it can be seen as an attempt -  following Schmitt’s 
earlier foreboding concerning Russia, expressed in ‘The Age of Neutralisations and 
Depoliticisations’ -  to hold on to a particular German vision / aspiration of its place as 
the guarantor of European freedom against the concrete threat of Russia. There are 
any number of contemporary ideas to which Grofiraum can be compared, from 
Lebensraum, to the more discursive connections between capitalism and Zionism as 
threats to the integrity of Europe. But aside from these possible comparisons, what is 
more interesting about Schmitt’s formulations is the manner in which he provided 
further context in which to estimate the value of Grofiraum in his later texts. He never 
quite gave up on the idea, but it became apparent how he relegated it to a status of some 
kind of intermediary condition, useful during periods in which the terms of order were 
openly contested -  a way of providing stability to a culturally pluralistic world in which 
difference continued to have a spatial expression. In the opening and closing essays of 
Nomos he posits it as one of three potential outcomes to the prevailing context of
36 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, p 253.
37 Schmitt, Nomos, p 353.
38 Chantal Mouffe makes a qualified endorsement of this type of spatial thinking as an aspect of her 
project of resisting American hegemony, in ‘Carl Schmitt’s warning on the dangers of a unipolar world’, 
in Odysseos and Petito (eds), The International Political thought o f Carl Schmitt.
39 Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’. Schmitt makes many elliptic references to 
Russia as a ‘mirror of Europe’ in this essay.
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indistinction, and not by any means the most likely.40 But this will be examined later in 
the chapter, after a further examination of the Schmittian concept nomos.41
The Katechon
The Katechon was originally a Kabbalistic metaphor, and was invoked by Schmitt to 
describe the defender of an established order. The word translates from the Hebrew as 
‘restrainer’ or ‘bulwark’ and for Schmitt, accompanied nomos -  against anomos - as its 
metaphoric champion,42 holding back the tide of Hegelian progress, cleaving out a 
spatial or temporal envelope in which the European order could be contained and 
protected.43 Once again, Schmitt reached for esoteric metaphor in order to conceptualise 
the importance of ideas rather than their material expression. He sought to explain that 
order needs more than simply material guarantees, but ideational content. In his later 
work, he further explained that the old pre-modem European nomos -  prior to the 
establishment of the first truly global nomos -  had the old Byzantine empire as its 
Katechon, not because it was immensely strong, on the contrary, it was weak, but 
because it was still recognised as authoritative.44 Even at its end, the Byzantine Imperial 
rituals were adhered to by the envoys of other European powers, it still had extensive 
sea power, both in itself, and through its nominal suzerainty of Venice, and it shielded 
Europe from the powerful and exceptional threat of the Seljuk and Ottoman armies. 
Schmitt makes the rather selective point that without the Byzantines, Italy would have 
been entirely conquered by the Moors,45 but much more importantly, the fate of the 
Byzantine Empire was central to collective European political and strategic activity 
from 1071 to 1453. In 1071, the battle of Manzikert -  in which the Seljuk Turks 
destroyed the last serious Byzantine army -  prompted a major international crisis to 
which Europe’s response was the promulgation of the First Crusade and the
40 Schmitt, Nomos.
41 This will be covered in the section on ‘Late Schmitt’, on page 77.
42 Mika Ojakangas, ‘A terrifying world without and exterior: Carl Schmitt and the metaphysics of 
international (dis)order’, in Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Pettito (eds), The International Political Thought 
o f Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis o f Global Order (London: Routledge, 2007). 
Ojakangas provides the most interesting explanation and interpretation of the concept of the Katechon 
that I have yet found.
43 Balakrishnan associates Schmitt’s notion of the Katechon with earlier examples of Schmitt’s thought, 
from the ‘commissarial dictator’ through ‘the sovereign’ to ‘leviathan’, in The Enemy, p 225.
44 Schmit, Land and Sea, 7-8. Schmitt is not consistent in his identification of the pre-modem Katechon, 
for in Nomos, he more often refers to the Holy Roman Emperor as the Katechon.
45 Ibid., p 8.
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inauguration of the crusading principle, central to the pre-modem European nomos.46 
1453 on the other hand, marked the end of Constantinople as a Christian city and 
prompted a new crisis of European identity, which flowed into Europe’s re-orientation 
towards the open ocean in search of trading routes to the Indies, and the new legal 
concepts o f ‘discovery’ and ‘occupation’.47
Previously, Venice had been the Christian power that controlled the important trade 
routes from the East, but after the final conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman Turks 
changed the terms of trade. The search for new routes prompted the Portuguese 
discovery of the route around the Cape of Good Hope, and the discovery of the New 
World -  or novus orbis -  a phrase taken directly from a verse by the Roman poet 
Seneca.48 Thus can be seen in Schmitt’s historical interpretations a sensitivity to the 
intellectual and ideational scaffolding upon which the material world depends to take 
shape and the metaphoric figure of the Katechon as the immense and esoteric defender 
of the European order, or what would become his idea of nomos.
Late Schmitt: The Crisis of International Order 
Land and Sea
So far this thesis has only hinted at the dependence of much of Schmitt’s analysis on the 
association he made between his Concept o f the Political and the idea of finite 
controllable space. His analysis began attempting to address the problem of order in the 
disordered context of Weimar Germany, and progressed through several evolutions 
before bringing into question the relationship he theorised so strongly as a condition of 
European modernity. Space -  or territory -  became the crucial mediator of political 
conflict, through the principles of territorial sovereignty outlined in the treaty of 
Westphalia, and the conceptualisation of Europe as a privileged sphere of bracketed 
conflict by which European powers contained their rivalry by externalising its most 
intense expression to the extra-European sphere. The legal and theoretical formulations 
of the spatial system of world order Schmitt termed the first global nomos, and is 
examined and described in The Nomos o f the Earth in the International Law o f the Jus
46 Johnathan Riley-Smith makes a similar argument by locating his analysis of Crusading very much in 
the world of ideas, in The First Crusade and the Idea o f Crusading, (London: Athlone, 1986).
47 Schmitt, Nomos, p 66.
48 Schmitt, Land and Sea, p 32. The manner in which Schmitt draw.s the connection between Seneca’s 
poem and the dawning of the modem age becomes fully clear in this small work.
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Publicum Europaeum. But the esoteric origins of this system are addressed in his much 
shorter and slightly earlier excursus on the relationship between Land and Sea as the 
perennial ordering opposition behind every system of political and social order. Land 
and Sea, therefore acts as a transitional text between his middle and late periods, the 
point at which he reaches for an international context in which to cast the deteriorating 
crisis of European order. According to Schmitt, the terms of the relationship between 
‘land’ and ‘sea’ are always coded into prevailing conceptions of order, and as 
conceptions of one shift, so too do conceptions of the other. ‘Man’, he asserts, ‘is a 
groundling’,49 describing the earth as ‘his standpoint and his base’. However, in Land 
and Sea, he weaves a tale of historical development that is entirely shaped by Man’s 
understanding -  and progressive mastery -  of the sea. With this in mind he describes the 
place of England and the English as comparable to the Venetians in the pre-modem 
period, except that -  borrowing terminology from Ernst Kapp50 -  Venice was described 
as a thallasic (sea) power for their domination of the Mediterranean Sea, whereas 
England was a maritime (oceanic) power.
The apparent point of this book is to make sense of history by explaining a constitutive 
oppositional relationship that can be used to trace patterns of ideas, but also to explain 
the specificity of the period of European modernity as the period characterised by a full 
and widespread appreciation of the totality of the planet. The former is made 
particularly clear by his reference -  once again -  to the Kabbalistic metaphors of 
Leviathan and Behemoth as capturing the essential qualities of this primordial 
struggle.51 The latter is clarified by his comments on Seneca’s mysterious verse that 
seemed to forewarn of the emergence of the planetary space,52 interrupted only by the 
slow decline and collapse of Rome, and its burial under the frosted soil of the dark ages 
and the closure of the European mind.
The one absolute conclusion that can be drawn from the book is Schmitt’s exclusive 
focus on the realm of ideas and their expression and appearance, both in theory, and in 
literature. It is not a materialist study of the economic or geographic conditions that 
presaged the discovery and conquest of the New World, nor an analysis of the strategic
49 Ibid., p i .
50 Ibid., p 9.
51 Ibid., p 6.
52 Ibid., p 31.
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advantages of sea power. He even goes so far as to explain that the European discovery 
of the Americas can be properly called a European discovery -  rather than a mere 
encounter -  because the Europeans went looking for it, i.e. their exploration and 
discovery was imagined before it was performed. It is a work of interpretation, 
involving elements of imaginative speculation, appreciation of context, and even 
something like discourse analysis, and although it is a mere essay in comparison to The 
Nomos o f the Earth, it provides considerable insight into the way the ideas in it 
developed. Most of all, it helps to illustrate his approach to history, which he viewed in 
broadly Hegelian terms as an attempt to interpret the past according to the present, 
which allows it to emerge as a meaningful explanation thereof. In other words, it is a 
present centred act of interpretation before it is a series of facts and dates. The facts and 
dates that comprise history are selected in respect of their significance within an 
interpretive framework, and this framework is conditioned by the terms and demands of 
the present.
The Nomos of the Earth and the Jus Publicum Europaeum
Where Grofiraum displays a certain poverty of imagination -  and was conceived of both 
as a critique of a collapsing order and a potential replacement -  by far the most 
sophisticated theoretical abstraction in Schmitt’s oeuvre is the jus publicum Europaeum 
and the accompanying idea of nomos. This is brought out most distinctively by his 
comparison between the jus publicum Europaeum and the notion of Volkerecht. The 
difference between the two is crucial for an understanding of Schmitt, and amounts to 
the jus publicum Europaeum (European Public Law) being a Eurocentric spatial order 
based on a strong spatial distinction between Europe and the rest of the world. 
Volkerecht on the other hand is merely described as interstate law with no spatial 
restrictions and corresponds with our current understanding of international law 
whereby states are the recognized units of interaction and are all theoretically bound by 
them equally.53
The jus publicum Europaeum, or Eurocentric spatial order, became endowed with a 
sufficiently political character that it allowed for the bracketing of war in Europe. This 
is what Schmitt means by the bracketing of war; that war was regarded as a legitimate
53 Schmitt, Nomos, p 227-232.
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and rule bound activity for the settlement of disputes between recognised states. 
However, for Schmitt, this bracketing was dependent upon the spatial distinction 
between Europe and the rest of the world, i.e. the rest of the world amounted to a 
geographical area in which unrestricted wars took place between European powers. For 
a European state to go to war against an African tribe was in no way regarded as a 
breach of the peace in Europe. For two European countries to go to war in Africa 
against each other was equally not the same as going to war in Europe.54 Schmitt makes 
much use of the concept of amity lines -  map coordinates written into treaties that allow 
for peace and war to be separated geographically -  in order to illustrate his point.55 As 
evidence, he draws on examples where European countries were at peace in Europe yet 
at war elsewhere, and the numerous treaties that make reference to particular 
coordinates beyond which hostilities were foresworn by the parties. The point that 
underlies this conception of the international system is that it was constructed around an 
explicit spatial distinction between Europe and the rest of the world. European powers 
were legal equals within the jus publicum Europaeum, but non European powers were
56not.
For Schmitt, The Nomos o f the Earth in the Jus Publicum Europaeum is a historical and 
diagnostic investigation and explanation of the origins and dynamics of international 
order that existed prior to 1917-18. He clearly felt the need to emphasise what he felt 
was the necessary spatial dimension of any international system. For him, the ability to 
bracket war in Europe depended upon a spatial zone in which conflict was not 
bracketed. He wrote it at a time when this spatial element was missing from 
international politics, and expressed the view that this was a tremendous problem.57 It 
was on this theoretical basis that he described the First World War as bracketed war 
when it began,58 but that due to the collapse of the spatial order, became political war 
by the end. When the Treaty of Versailles was signed and the League of Nations
54 This way of thinking about a Eurocentric spatial order corresponds well with what Edward Keene 
theorises as the hierarchical order of Westphalia, in Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism 
and Order in World Politics.
55 Schmitt, Nomos, p 92.
56 The whole theory, when examined in detail amounts to exactly the kind of hierarchical international 
structure theorised by ‘post-colonial’ theorists -  Edward Keene in particular -  making Schmitt a fairly 
unapologetic ‘colonial theorist’.
57 As an example of the language he uses, ‘Till now, the singular achievement of international law was 
not the elimination, but the bracketing of war.’ Nomos, p 187.
58 Ibid., p 259.
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established, Schmitt felt that the universal character of the new legal order could not 
withstand the re-emergence of political struggle, and he was equally pessimistic about 
the end of the Second World War, although not so explicitly. Furthermore he clearly did 
not feel Germany -  or indeed himself -  had much to say on the concept of the new 
world order, announcing in the forward to The Nomos o f the Earth;
The earth has been promised to the peacemakers. The idea of a new 
nomos of the earth belongs only to them.59
But despite this, he does provide some interesting commentary on the period leading up 
to and immediately following the First World War. Many commentators have 
interpreted this book as an extended critique of America and its universalist 
aspirations,60 and although it has this flavour, he is not unremittingly critical of 
America. He is certainly critical of the idea of a non-spatially grounded international 
law, as he makes clear when he invokes positively the work of Alejandro Alvarez who 
theorised a specifically American international law in 1910, claiming that the 
Americans missed a great opportunity to reorder the world on firm spatial foundations.61
Schmitt also locates the origins of this Nomos of the Earth -  which he terms the first 
global nomos -  as a reaction to the discovery of the New World. In brief, he suggests 
that the transformation of the European imagination brought about by the emergence of 
the planet earth as a finite spatial sphere provoked a series of theological, legal and 
philosophical discourses that eventually produced the Westphalian order as the jus 
publicum Europaeum, consequent upon the idea that Europe was a privileged legal 
sphere and the rest of the world was a domain of absolute political conflict. It is clearly 
a somewhat romantic view, but will be discussed in more and more detail as the thesis 
goes on. Suffice for now to say that Schmitt regarded the nomos of the Westphalian 
order as the great achievement of European civilisation.
Shorn of its spatial limits, international law becomes Volkerecht, an attempt to 
encompass all political struggle within the constraints of a universal international law.
59 Ibid., p 39.
60 Chantal Mouffe, ‘Carl Schmitt’s warning on the dangers of a unipolar world order’, Louiza Odysseos, 
‘Crossing the line? Carl Schmitt on the “spaceless universalism” of cosmopolitanism and the War on 
Terror’, Chris Brown, ‘From humanized war to humanitarian intervention: Carl Schmitt’s critique of the 
Just War tradition’, all in Odysseos and Petito (eds), The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt.
61 Schmitt, Nomos, pp. 229-230
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Schmitt regarded this as fatally compromised because it assumes that pure existential 
political struggle, can be encompassed by laws regarding its conduct; whereas the 
domain of the political -  with its existential oppositions -  was prior to any law, however 
international. When considering alternatives, Schmitt uses the model of the Monroe 
doctrine to demonstrate his theory of Grofiraum, which further distances him from a 
criticism of all things American. The international law that emerged out of the First 
World War was incompatible with Schmitt’s view of the irrepressible political 
dimension and the need for a spatial grounding to the international order, but the 
Monroe doctrine and the possibility of an American world order, was not.
This juridical realm of the jus publicum Europaeum forms a background that is crucial 
to understanding the nature of European conceptions of war. A definition of war is quite 
hard to pin down as the word is used so widely, but it should not be equated merely 
with organised violence. Moreover, the juridical context in which war had a legal 
meaning is vital to understanding war as an activity of states, rather than a merely 
disordered state of affairs. Clearly the word war has a meaning beyond its legal aspect, 
but without the international juridical context in which war becomes the business of 
states, war reduces to an empirical contest of force against force. In this sense, war can 
be said to have an implicit connection with the idea of justice, as the justice that attaches 
to war is written in to the juridical sphere of the international. Just War theory is a long 
tradition of scholarship, but is fundamentally rooted in a theory of natural law -  that 
laws are to be discovered as codifications of right actions according to a divine or 
universal standard. Schmitt’s theory of war as a legitimate activity of states means 
precisely that wars formally conducted by states are necessarily just wars.
Another meaning of ‘just war’ places war within an ethical matrix that analyses each
fkXparticipant’s reasons for going to war. So the question of which approach to take in 
relation to an analysis of the justice of war is determined by whether war is considered 
to be the legitimate activity of states and prior to ethical considerations, or whether an 
ethical sphere in which the fact of war can be determined as just or unjust is theorised.
62 William Rasch makes this point well when he explores the admiration Schmitt had for the ability of the 
Americans to transpose their own national values onto the universal domain, much as he was also critical 
of it Sovereignty and its Discontents, (London: Birkbeck Law Press, 2004).
63 This corresponds with a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ view of Just War theory outlined by Chris Brown in ‘From 
humanized war to humanitarian intervention: Carl Schmitt’s critique of the Just War tradition’, all in 
Odysseos and Petito, The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt.
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This forms a neat distinction between jus in bello’ and ‘jus ad bellunC. Jus in bello 
relates to the treatment of combatants in war, and offers no commentary on the justice 
of the war itself. On the other hand, jus ad bellum’ is specifically concerned with 
whether or not the war itself can be justified. Ironically, extending the notion of justice 
from the treatment of combatants to the justice of the entire war could (and for Schmitt 
did) imperil the lives of the combatants by invoking a moral dimension for their 
actions.64 According to Schmitt’s critique of Just War, judging a war to be just 
legitimises the most appalling atrocities.65 He makes the point that in mediaeval wars, 
certain weapons like the crossbow were outlawed by papal decree, but the effect of this 
was to specifically endorse the use of these weapons against heretics or non-Christians. 
Laws concerning the justice of wars -  for Schmitt -  ensured a greater ferocity of 
prosecution, whereas laws concerning the conduct of soldiers in war, implicitly 
recognised the legitimacy of war as a practice of states, and were a feature of the 
‘bracketing’ he theorised as a constitutive component of the jus publicum Europaeum. 
In other words, the comradely conduct of soldiers in European wars was predicated on 
the savage treatment of non-Europeans, or of Europeans in a non-European context.
For Schmitt, elevating ethics above the question of war -  rather than judging the 
individual behaviour of soldiers in war -  forces consideration of war from an ethical 
perspective. If war is a question of ethics, then ethics must also be a question of war. If 
war is a matter for states, then the only unjust war is waged by outsiders to the state 
system; which in turn forms the central and most powerful argument that underlay the 
establishment of the interstate system through the accumulation of treaties and the slow 
emergence of an identity of interests between the states that constructed the jus 
publicum Europaeum. It is no accident that both war and peace during the period when 
the jus publicum Europaeum prevailed were legal states between only states, and not 
merely existential conditions of hostility or amity. It set the conditions for the 
crackdown on piracy -  for example -  by all European powers after the terms of the 
international order were firmly established, and it was accompanied by the principle of 
non-interference, by which European states suppressed and expelled unwelcome
64 Schmitt even applauds St Augustine’s ‘wonderful Chapter T  in which he says ‘that, for a wise man, 
human imperviousness makes the idea of just war even more discouraging that the idea of war itself.’ 
Nomos, p 155, from St Augustine, City o f God.
65 Schmitt, Nomos, p 321.
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minorities. Both of these practices are embedded within the development of the 
European sovereign state, and by extension the principle of sovereignty.66
The Partisan
The Partisan formed the subject of one of Schmitt’s last important works (and will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6) and explains his estimation of the territorial, or 
telluric quality of the resistance fighter.67 This connects many different themes from 
across his writings, but most particularly his sense of the political being a fierce 
existential opposition, which has no external normative context in which it can be 
framed, merely an aesthetic ‘vehicle of confusion’68 from which it can be drawn. The 
political moment is an absolute beginning, which establishes the norm of order and the 
content thereof, in opposition to the prevailing exception; it divides the norm from the 
exception and names them both. The title of the work is Theory o f the Partisan: 
Intermediate Commentary on the Concept o f the Political, which shows that he viewed 
it as a clarification of his earlier work. Indeed, what becomes clear in reading it is the 
stress that Schmitt continued to place on the important mediating condition of space, 
suggesting that the telluric qualities of the partisan obviate any need for further abstract 
justification of his or her actions.
The notion of man as a ‘groundling’ returns to point up his implied valorisation of 
autochtheneity as an unimpeachable claim of legitimate action. In essence Theory o f the 
Partisan is merely the logical entailment of his earlier work on The Concept o f the 
Political, the principle difference being the ‘global political context’. In the earlier 
work, he was concerned to point out the contingent nature of the state as an institution, 
and its vulnerability to the paralysing indecision of parliamentary democracy. It was a 
work very much of its time that accompanied his polemical insistence that President 
Hindenburg should invoke article 48 -  claiming emergency powers -  and arrest the 
prevailing threats to the constitutional norm. After theorising The Concept o f the 
Political -  in which the state’s existence is rendered contingent upon the prior category 
of the political -  Schmitt went on to offer a critique of both the assumptions behind a
66 A view found in detail both in Schmitt, The Nomos o f the Earth, and in Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, 
Pirates and Sovereigns: State-building and Extra Territorial Violence in Early Modern Europe, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
67 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan, p 21.
68 Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’, p 84.
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new European order, and eventually the wider international context of The Nomos o f 
the Earth in order to encompass the historical limits of the period in which the 
normative foundations upon which the state and the state system had been built, no 
longer held sway.
The Concept o f the Political has been read as a defence of the state, which it is, but that 
Schmitt thought the state needed defending is itself illustrative of his view of its 
vulnerability. His further reflections on Grofiraum and the idea of nomos demonstrate 
that he had given up on the state -  and by implication European modernity -  as it was 
dependent upon the normative foundations of a nomos that had collapsed.69 Therefore 
Theory o f the Partisan can be seen as part of Schmitt’s attempts to understand the 
establishment of order in a world without a governing nomos. Thus Theory o f the 
Partisan became an Intermediate Commentary on the Concept o f the Political in a 
political context in which the normative remnants of a former system of order had been 
definitively blown away. Furthermore, despite being something of a career codicil for 
Carl Schmitt, it has been written about many times as one of his most illuminating texts 
for the post Cold War age, bringing the analysis in this chapter all the way back to the 
beginning in offering insights for why Schmitt’s critique of the Post-war world were 
taken up so readily in the post Cold War world. Once again, Schmitt offered a critique 
of a world without order, or with a false sense of liberal order, and in the aftermath of 
the Cold War many theorists opposed to such a world were looking for intellectual 
resources with which to meet this new challenge. Then, in the aftermath of 9/11 his 
texts took on added significance for realists who imagined he had been ‘right all along’, 
and that he could thus be mobilised as a source of ‘critical insights’ for IR. Needless to 
say, the variety of interpreters of Schmitt had some way to go to establish common 
terms of interpretation, but they largely avoided any attempt to understand Schmitt as a 
theorist of historical crisis, engaged principally with critiquing the progressive
69 Roland Axtmann ‘Humanity or Enmity? Carl Schmitt on International Politics’ in International 
Politics, Volume 44,2007. Axtmann refers clearly to the view that Schmitt was looking for forms of 
political organisation that replace the existence of state and state system, but seems also to support the 
view that Grofiraum was a coherent and sufficient new nomos that could replace the old nomos. This 
thesis takes issue with this line of argument. Schmitt’s commitment to Grofiraum only really extended to 
the years encompassing his accommodation with Nazism, and in Nomos, he lists it as only one of three 
potential replacements, and one merely able to operate as a sort of stable conceptual holding pattern until 
new conditioning ideas emerged. Groflraum essentially reduces to a regional expression of the principle 
of non-interference and has nothing to say about how those regions might be acknowledged or recognised 
by other regions with other regional hegemons.
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unfolding and collapse of the nomos of the old global European order, and instead 
tended to transplant his theory of crisis onto an unfamiliar world.
A New Nomos?
At the very end of The Nomos o f the Earth, Schmitt theorised three possible outcomes 
in which a new international order might emerge: and it is worth examining them in 
order to explore further the context in which offered his late phase critiques. First was 
the idea that one global power might ‘win’ the newly established rivalry of the Cold 
War and appropriate the whole earth according to its own Imperial designs. Schmitt 
explicitly discounts this possibility, presumably in part because he recognised that it 
would no longer be Europe but one of the emergent superpowers, but also because it 
would represent ‘the end of history’ and importantly he states that,
A widespread, purely technical manner of thinking knows no other 
possibility, because, for it, the world has become so small that it can be 
overseen and managed easily.70
Which directly implicates certain modes of Hegelian or Marxist dialectical thought. 
Even when Schmitt wrote these words, it must have been clear to him that such an 
eventuality was an extraordinarily difficult strategic objective. But this book was 
published in 1950, and until 1949 there had been only one global power with a nuclear 
bomb. The significance of this is made abundantly clear when one considers that even 
Bertrand Russell (among others) -  the academic and prominent pacifist -  openly 
advocated the use of the nuclear weapon on the both the Soviet Union and Britain if
71they attempted to develop the bomb. For Russell, it was the unanswerable power of 
the atom bomb on which a new civilisation might be built -  that is to say, a new nomos 
might emerge. So as far as Schmitt was concerned, he warned against the terrible 
eventuality of a single world civilisation precisely because he felt it was theoretically 
unattainable, and potentially horrifying. But he made this warning at a time when the 
idea of a new world civilisation informed the thinking of a great many academics and 
statesmen around the world.
70 Schmitt, Nomos.
71 Bertrand Russell, ‘The Bomb and Civilization’, in Glasgow Review, Number 33, 18* Aug 1945.
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The following two possibilities are where he directed his more considered interest. The
77next possibility follows an explicitly Mahanian logic, whereby he suggested that the 
US may be able to restore the age old balance between land and sea (the fundament of 
the old nomos) and also introduce the new element -  air. In Schmitt’s words;
A second possibility might be an attempt to retain the balance structure of 
the previous nomos, and to maintain it in a way consistent with the 
contemporary technical means and dimensions. That would mean that 
England’s former domination of the oceans be expanded to a joint 
domination of sea and air, which only the United States is capable of 
doing. America is so to speak, the greater island that could administer and 
guarantee the balance of the rest of the world.73
This essentially characterises Britain as the Katechon for the old nomos, to be replaced 
by the United States as a new and more powerful Katechon able to take up the burden of 
guaranteeing something comparable to the old nomos, now that Britain had lost both the 
means and the will. It actually breaches a number of Schmitt’s theoretical stipulations 
concerning the constitutive distinction between Europe and non-Europe as the 
structuring friend / enemy dichotomy for the old nomos, but at least appeals to the 
possibility that the US might serve as a proxy for a European power, or that they may 
establish the US as a privileged sphere according to the same logic.74 He clearly 
remained critical of the implicit Wilsonian impulse that -  at least in part -  continued to 
drive American foreign policy considerations, but he might have at least seen the logic 
in the more conservative tradition of realpolitik that formed an important alternative 
influence. The third scenario is the idea of Groflraum, as mentioned previously. It only 
warrants a short paragraph in The Nomos o f the Earth, quoted here.
The third possibility also is based on the concept of a balance, but not one 
sustained and controlled by a hegemonic combination of sea and air 
power. A combination of several independent Grofraume or blocs could
72 There is a long and extensive tradition of geopolitical thought, from Mahan in the USA, Mackinder in 
Britain, and extended by Douhet’s consideration of the effects of air power. There are also many German 
predecessors for this type of geopolitical thinking, notably Haushofer, op.cit., Alfred Thayer Mahan, The 
Interest o f America in Sea Power: Present and Future, (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1897). 
Douhet, Giulio, The Command o f the Air, (London: 1943), translated by Dino Ferrari. Mackinder, 
Halford, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, Geographical Journal, 23, 1904. For an excellent 
summary of this literature, refer to Patricia Chiatera-Stutte, ‘Space, Groflraum and Mitteleuropa in Some 
Debates of the Early Twentieth Century’, in European Journal o f Social Theory, Volume 11, Issue 2, 
2008.
73 Schmitt, Nomos, p 355.
74 Referring back to Alvarez, discussed in Schmitt, Nomos, p 229.
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constitute a balance, and thereby could precipitate a new order of the 
earth.75
There are interesting aspects to this idea, but he clearly had no wish to develop them at 
the time of publication. At the end of the Second World War, Schmitt had been captured 
by the Russians first, who released him as a harmless academic, but then by the 
Americans, who held him for some time before also deciding to release him. The 
conflicting agendas of the US and the USSR at Nuremburg after the war are interesting 
in their own right, but it is clear that the arrest and questioning of Schmitt does highlight 
the greater ideological component of US intentions at Nuremburg. The Soviets wanted a 
show trial of the political and military leadership, followed by their execution, but the 
US and Britain wanted to put the idea of Nazism itself on trial. To this end the 
questioning that Schmitt endured revolved to a large extent on whether his theory of 
Gropraum had in any way provided an ideological justification for what the Americans 
considered to be war crimes. In other words the Soviets were interested in who 
ordered and led the invasion of the Soviet Union, whereas the US were just as interested 
in who justified it. Therefore any idea that seemed to reflect or support German 
aspirations for hegemonic control of Europe were necessarily suspect.
However, as has been pointed out, the idea of Gropraum was also problematic on 
Schmitt’s own terms. It had none of the clarity and normative depth of The Nomos o f 
the Earth as expressed in the jus publicum Europaeum, and given that each regional 
hegemon would be an absolute enemy of every other -  there being no possibility of 
externalising their implicit rivalry and creating a spatial zone of bracketed conflict -  
order would be characterised by a world of perpetual conflict at the borders of great 
regions. There would be no means by which to determine which country belonged to 
which region except naked military contest. If anything GroPraum as a system, looks 
remarkably like Samuel Huntington’s Clash o f Civilisations thesis, although without the
77essentialised civilisations to provide its taxonomical foundations. In any event, 
Schmitt never pursued the idea of a new nomos very vigorously, content to lament the
75 Schmitt, Nomos, p 355.
76 Transcript of ‘Interrogation at Nuremberg by Robert Kempner, Parts I, II, and IIP, plus written 
responses to questions in Telos 72,1987 [1947], translated by Joseph W. Bendersky and Capers Rubin.
77 Samuel Huntington, The Clash o f Civilisations and the Remaking o f World Order, (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1996).
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fall of the old nomos, and proclaim the right of the new rising powers of the earth to 
form a new one.78
One thing that can be asserted, is that the idea of Gropraum is theoretically difficult to 
reconcile with Schmitt’s other ideas, and that it does not comprise a significant 
component of his work -  being articulated mostly in a couple of texts written at the
70height of his accommodation with Nazism -  which makes it all the more surprising 
that it is one of the few ideas taken up almost without criticism as applicable to the 
modem world. Schmitt himself implicitly acknowledges these theoretical deficiencies at 
the beginning and the end of The Nomos o f the Earth. At the end of the second of the 
Five Introductory Corollaries to The Nomos o f the Earth -  referring to the premodem 
system of competing empires -  he states,
The idea of a coexistence of true empires, of independent GroPraume 
[literally, large spaces; figuratively, large spatial spheres] in a common 
space, lacked any ordering power, because it lacked the idea of a common 
spatial order encompassing die whole earth.80
When Schmitt returns to the idea of GroPraume in the final lines of his book, he leaves 
open the question of their ‘meaningful differentiation’, without which, the same 
theoretical limitations as he identified for the pre-modem version of GroPraume 
necessarily apply.81
The perceived contemporary polemical imperative of ‘resisting American power’ finds 
form in a variety of theories of multipolarity, which are directly comparable to, and 
occasionally openly claim inspiration from Schmitt’s theory of Gropraum, once again 
demonstrating the problem with using Schmitt as a conceptual storehouse. To repeat, 
the interesting thing about Schmitt’s notion of Gropraum is what it reveals about the 
spatial preponderance of his theoretical formulations. It also draws attention to the 
problems that he thought needed resolving and highlights some of the compromises he
78 Schmitt, Nomos, p 39.
79 Most of Schmitt’s serious writing on Gropraum was written in 1940 and 1941: ‘Raum und Gropraum 
im Volkerrecht’, in Carl Schmitt, Staat, Gropraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969, (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1995), and Carl Schmitt, Volkerrechtliche Grofiraumordnung mit 
Interventionsverbot fur raumfremde Machte: Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegrijf im Volkerrecht, (Berlin: 
Duncker und Humblot, 1941).
80 Schmitt, Nomos, p 55.
81 Ibid, p 355.
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thought were necessary for at least a temporary resolution to the prevailing absence of a 
secure nomos. Beyond that, assuming that Schmitt’s notion concerning the temporary 
utility of Gropraum has applicability today presupposes that the same fundamental 
problem of a slowly collapsing world order that Schmitt progressively critiqued, 
characterises the political context of today, a claim that must be considered deeply 
contestable for reasons outside the scope of this analysis.
Conclusion
This chapter, in characterising Schmitt’s collected reflections as a form of Koselleckian 
critique, repudiates the interpretation of Schmitt as a purely conceptual thinker, and 
instead suggests that Schmitt’s continuing importance resides in the consistency of his 
critique as applied to an ever widening crisis of historical meaning. The insights that a 
study of Schmitt provides consist both in his conceptual formulations on their own 
terms -  insofar as they provide examples of a sophisticated attempt to address the 
difficult problem of order in a disordered and deracinated post-Nietzschean world -  and 
also crucially in their limitations. It is because Schmitt was attempting to make sense of 
a slowly collapsing international order that he was confronted with the need to theorise 
prevailing and expanding problems of order, law, legitimacy and sovereignty. And it is 
because he theorised no absolute or essential foundation for his concepts, but instead 
offered them as highly contextual aspects of a broader and unfolding critique, that gives 
him a degree of contemporary relevance. He attempted to formulate a coherent and 
workable conceptual framework in which it would be possible to explain the structuring 
effects of ideas on historical events, insofar as ideas express ongoing attempts to frame 
perennial existential dilemmas. However, his critique stands as a kind of forensic 
dissection of a normative order that no longer obtains, therefore its value resides in the 
extent to which certain ideas concerning international order which were held to be true, 
continue to be held to be true.
This argument has also affirmed an image of Schmitt as possessing a philosophically 
idealist disposition in that he was concerned with ideas over objects, but also very much 
influenced by elements more characteristic of Nietzsche than Hegel (the foremost 
idealist philosopher with an obvious influence on Schmitt). This is not without its own 
difficulties, as Nietzsche’s eschewal of Hegel’s Philosophy o f History makes a 
comparison difficult, but following Allan Bloom’s distinction between Nietzsche’s
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value relativism, and his psychologism or naturalism, Schmitt’s criticism of Hegelian 
dialectics and his clear anti-foundationalism show that he carries a full measure of 
Nietzsche’s value relativism without imbibing his naturalism. Thus although Schmitt 
clearly lived in the world of idealist philosophy, he was nevertheless informed by an 
absence of certain foundations upon which coherent frameworks of ideas could be built; 
ideas without an accompanying measure for their truth. Hence he searched for 
resolutions to the problems of order, authority, legitimacy etc. and reached out from 
specific, context bound, conceptual and legal formulations in his early career, to the 
wider and wider horizons of the history of European ideas, and the transformational 
character of historical events on whole systems of reconciling norms in which the 
preceding problems of order could be framed.
Schmitt’s historical commentaries should therefore be read, not as a series of well- 
informed and testable opinions concerning the truth of particular propositions or 
discourses, still less an ideological attempt justify the rise of Nazism, but instead as a 
complex and evolving set of arguments concerning the prevailing migration of 
international norms. These reached all the way from his conceptual contributions to a 
generalised legal and constitutional crisis that accompanied the entire period of Weimar 
Germany, through the crisis of historical meaning into which Europe plunged in the late 
1920s and early 1930s, eventually erupting into the Second World War as the collapsed 
European, juridical order of empire and bracketed warfare, finally atomised somewhere 
between Potsdam and Hiroshima.
82 Allan Bloom, The Closing o f the American Mind, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).
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Section II: Carl Schmitt’s Implied Critique of IR
Introduction
The first section concentrated on outlining Schmitt’s ideas on their own terms. This 
commenced with consideration of some of his conceptual formulations that have been 
widely drawn upon in later works of political theory, then these ideas were drawn 
together to explain both their historical context and their connecting preoccupations in 
order to present them as a form of ongoing critique. From this point on in the thesis, the 
focus rests on the value of Carl Schmitt for International Relations theory today. It is 
well known -  for instance -  that he said many things that people would later regard to 
be prescient observations, even predictions, concerning the direction certain political 
dynamics would take, not least in respect of the Cold War,1 but also in the aftermath of 
the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on Sept 11th 2001. It could be 
argued that there was a minor ‘turn’ towards Carl Schmitt at this point on account of the 
clarity of his Manichaean formulation of the political and the apparent need of new 
theoretical tools to describe a transformed political landscape, but this turn was 
relatively superficial and relied largely upon only the barest Schmittian terminology of 
friend and enemy. He was -  for a time -  associated with Samuel Huntington’s Clash as 
Civilisations thesis, and lauded as having been right all along.2 Then, as the American 
response to 9/11 grew into a renewed sense of exceptionalism which seemed to take 
hold of the Executive office, inspiring the kind of universalising rhetoric not heard since 
Reagan -  or even Kennedy3 -  linkages were made between Schmitt and what has 
become understood as ‘Straussian neo-conservatism’, as if somehow Carl Schmitt was 
the evil genius behind the Project for the New American Century. This interpretation 
was quite strongly resisted by theorists with a longer standing interest in Carl Schmitt, 
whose response was best articulated by Chantal Mouffe when she made the case that, if 
anything, neo-conservatism should be understood as exactly the kind of ‘muscular
1 Schmitt, Nomos, p 355. Schmitt foresaw that only the US -  ‘as the greater island’ -  could sustain a 
balanced international order.
2 Bryan S. Turner, ‘Sovereignty and Emergency: Political Theology, Islam and American Conservatism’, 
in Theory, Culture and Society, Volume 19, Issue 4,2002.
3 The search for the authoritarian roots of so-called ‘neo-conservatism’, particularly insofar as it has 
become understood as a foreign policy discourse of intervention and democracy promotion has always 
seemed slightly misplaced to me, particularly when even a cursory glance at President John F. Kennedy’s 
famous inauguration speech -  in which he pledged to ‘pay any price... bear any burden’ seems to have all 
the important elements.
82
Wilsonianism’ that Carl Schmitt warned against.4 Unfortunately this reduces to a 
doctrinal dispute about the ‘correct’ interpretation of Carl Schmitt, attaching 
significance to whether Schmitt was ‘right’ in his formulation of the political. Equally, 
it confirms once again that regardless of admonitions that Schmitt must be ‘handled 
with care’, he is often invoked by those with only limited understanding of his work or 
its context, or -  as in the case of Chantal Mouffe and others -  defended as if his 
association with Nazism has only limited implications for the utility of his ‘critical 
edge’.
This thesis on the other hand, takes the view that it is neither his ‘true’ understanding of 
the human condition nor his capacity for predicting future events -  these being very 
unspecific at best -  that make him interesting in the present context, but instead that 
Schmitt was an intelligent and revealing commentator on his own times; a ‘lucid’, 
‘fearful’ and ‘besieged watchman’, as Derrida described him.5 There are aspects of his 
thought that appear fairly dated now -  two or three generations past his prime -  but 
examples in his works of short-sightedness or even downright refusals on his part to 
engage with the complete contingency of the political as he himself formulated it, are 
both telling and interesting. There is no doubt that he favoured authoritarian solutions to 
particular manifestations of disorder, and there is little doubt that his Catholic faith 
informed many of his dispositional cadences.6 Nevertheless, he was clearly a gifted 
thinker and insightfully aware of the absence of any certain and immutable laws 
concerning human societies, or at least, none that transcended a universal human 
impulse toward social organisation with any actual content concerning the nature or
4 Mouffe, ‘Carl Schmitt’s warning on the dangers of a unipolar world order’, in Odysseos and Petito 
(eds.) The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt, and Sergei Prozerov, ‘Liberal Enmity: The 
Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism’, in Millennium: Journal o f International 
Studies, Volume 35, Issue 1, 2006.
5 Derrida, Politics o f Friendship, p 107, footnote 4.
6 Schmitt had a semi-detached relationship to his church on account of a divorce and second marriage but 
his Catholicism finds expression in both his account of politics as theology -  see Meier, The Lesson o f 
Carl Schmitt -  and his Roman Catholicism and Political Form, among other works. I take the view 
expressed by Allan Bloom that ‘philosophers cannot believe in God’ without demanding that they 
become atheists. For Schmitt, his suggestion that all modem political concepts are merely secularised 
theological propositions leads someway to understanding what might be termed a Catholo-Philosophical 
Gestalt, heretical perhaps, but respectfully so. The Catholic church for Schmitt represented what he 
termed a ‘complexio oppositorio’ or complex of ideational opposites from which meaning can emerge. In 
any event, this thesis has no room, nor enthusiasm, for discussing the strength of Schmitt’s faith, merely 
to note the often and repeated use of Catholic terminology, and the disputatious temperament of a man 
highly trained in the scholastic traditions of an ancient and serious Church.
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characteristics of the actual forms of social organisation that would necessarily emerge 
or evolve.
When attempting to situate a theorist within wider strands of thought and intellectual 
tradition, the process is complicated by the assumptions made about the other theorists 
to which the subject is compared. As this thesis depends upon treating Schmitt, not in 
terms of his authentic and unambiguous contribution to true formulations of concepts 
useful to International Relations, but instead treats his formulae as locations of 
intellectual contestation around which interpretations of IR are negotiated, so too do the 
thinkers he is compared to also exist as sites of contestation for others ideas. When 
referring to Hobbes therefore, it is necessary -  as has been ‘shewn’ -  to try to clarify 
points of difference rather than merely assume their joint membership of some category 
of analysis. And a problem that then emerges is that there are various interpretations of 
the work of Hobbes. Equally so the main traditions of IR -  Liberalism, Realism, 
Marxism and the English School -  against which an image of Schmitt has been and is to 
be projected. Nevertheless, viewing the thought of Carl Schmitt himself as a lens 
through which these other traditions of thought might be examined, allows -  even 
perhaps obliges -  one to play a parlour game of ‘Schmitt by proxy’ as a way of 
illuminating a topological relationship between different types of theorising. In other 
words, it is possible to illustrate a Schmittian theoretical disposition by imagining how 
he might relate to each of these bodies of theory in turn, and in so doing, reveal what is 
assumed about the bodies of theory themselves in order not to get bogged down in 
debates about whether ‘Constructivism’ actually resolves the materialist / idealist 
dilemma, or some such other theoretical conundrum. Each of these bodies of theory are 
attempts to provide a coherent way of understanding the world, and looking at them 
from a ‘quasi-Schmittian’ perspective allows us to sharpen an understanding of him as a 
theorist, at least in so far as he reveals himself theoretically. However, this examination 
should proceed from some understanding of his theories, rather than searching his texts 
for references to Realism or Liberalism, let alone the English School. Thus the 
argument concerning Schmitt’s relationship with IR theory needs to have a 
philosophical character concerning the coherence of the ideas as ideas. In this sense, a 
theoretical comparison is always an examination of hidden dialogues produced by an 
alignment of ideas, rather than an explicit examination of the actual engagements that 
theorists had between themselves. It is possible for example, to examine the comments
84
made about Carl Schmitt by Hans Morgenthau, but these should not be mistaken for 
authoritative comments on the comparability of their theoretical formulations, for to do 
so sidesteps any judgement of the value of these comments. Instead it is necessary to 
approach a comparison of the two thinkers by the via media of understanding their basic 
theoretical propositions and determining the more coherent formulation of the common 
elements.
According to Scheuerman, Schmitt had little engagement with academic philosophy 
beyond a few questionable references to Hegel,7 but this thesis has already made 
reference to Hegel and Nietzsche as intellectual markers, in order partly to acquire 
intellectual bearings. The reason this is important is quite simply that thinking 
contextually about particular thinkers imposes an obligation to appreciate the context of 
one’s own inquiry, yet this in due course implies a circularity of analysis.
This section therefore, commences by considering Schmitt’s intellectual disposition, 
describing in approximate terms what kind of thinker he was, and then outlines an 
appropriate way to consider his contribution to the history of ideas. The argument has 
already been partially made in Section I, but is made more substantially in this section 
in order to permit examination of the three main traditions of IR as coherent traditions, 
while retaining some grasp on the broader intellectual undercurrents that inform them.
Following this, there are chapters that explore the relationship between Schmitt and the 
different basic traditions of IR which each serve several functions; first of all, I provide 
further clarification of Schmitt’s thought and explain why Schmitt does not lend himself 
easily to categorisation as an IR theorist, and why he is more often simply treated as a 
‘critical voice’. Then I attempt to expose some of the limitations of the main categories 
of IR insofar as they are understood as different theoretical dispositions divided by 
different philosophical and historical assumptions about the external world. Finally I 
characterise the whole discipline of IR as a series of responses to common underlying 
questions concerning the appropriate preconditions for the legitimate use of violence 
between collective actors. All of the arguments both in Section I and in Section II can 
be thought of allegorically -  to borrow terminology from Clausewitz -  as arguments of
7 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt and the End o f Law, p 265, n 21.
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movement, which set up the final Section III, for the rather more demanding argument 
of position on which the thesis stands, and this argument of position attempts to 
encapsulate the conclusions of this section by outlining a few propositions situated at 
the level of philosophical coherence. In short, the final section will offer some 
conclusions on the relationship between Schmitt and IR theory, having used the first 
two sections to throw both into question. Metaphorically speaking, this will resemble 
the examination of two distinct traditions of scholarship in order to get some bearings 
on the meta-theoretical high-ground from which it becomes possible to observe 
illuminating and productive commonalities; applicable in turn to the broader project of 
understanding the dynamics and mechanisms of contemporary problems of order, 
collective identification, and the legitimate use of violence in the world today.
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Chapter 3 -  Carl Schmitt, Theory-politics and IR Theory
History, like the drama and the novel grew out o f mythology, a primitive form o f  
apprehension and expression in which -  as in fairy tales listened to by children or in 
dreams by sophisticated adults -  the wine between fact and fiction is left undrawn. It 
has, for example been said o f the Iliad that anyone who starts to read it as history will 
find that it is full offiction but, equally anyone who starts reading it as fiction will find  
that it is full o f history.
All histories resemble the Iliad to this extent, that they cannot entirely dispense with the 
fiction element. The mere selection, arrangement and presentation o f facts is a 
technique belonging to the field offiction.
Arnold J. Toynbee1
Introduction
The first section of this thesis has concentrated on presenting a direct interpretation of 
Carl Schmitt as a theorist, in order to develop a rich but relatively straight-forward 
reading of what unites his work. However, in order to proceed from this direct reading 
of what Schmitt actually proposed, towards a more reflective and abstracted reading, 
something like a ‘methodology’ is needed in order to look at Schmitt as more than 
simply a political commentator searching for and utilising idealised concepts in order to 
interpret a period of historical crisis. With this in mind, this chapter draws much from 
the work of Quentin Skinner in order to establish a basis for the interpretation of 
Schmitt in context, and from this extract a measure of the ‘surplus value’ in his work 
that might contribute to an understanding of his significance for IR theory today. The 
first section implicitly followed a Skinnerian or Koselleckian conceptual historical 
approach, in that it sought to explain the continuities in Schmitt’s thinking by 
excavating his underlying curiosity, that is to say, the questions that he sought to resolve 
and which inhabit much of his work. This is extended in this chapter, and following 
this, an approximate curiosity posited that inhabits and unifies the broad trends within 
IR as a discipline.
1 This quote is taken from the novel The 25th Hour by Virgil Gheorghiu, (London: Heinemann, 1950), for 
which it serves as an introductory comment.
2 Kari Palonen, Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric, (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p 69.
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Where Oakeshott provides a foundation for understanding theory -  laying out a clear set 
of tools for a philosophically idealist argument, and distinguishing between philosophy 
and scholarship such that distinct traditions of scholarship can be compared meta- 
theoretically as components and expressions of different philosophical dispositions -  
which in turn sets the argumentative context of the thesis, Skinner and Koselleck on the 
other hand, provide an approach to thinking about Schmitt as a theorist; a way of 
threading his works together as a progression of ideas -  unified by a single underlying 
curiosity -  formulated in response to an evolving historical context. Using Skinner also 
allows for the prospect that IR can be characterised as a self conscious context in which 
ideas have progressed within implicit parameters, and as a looser set of responses to a 
recognisable, and fairly durable, matrix of interlinked questions.
Of course the work of Quentin Skinner -  and conceptual historians more generally -  is 
not without different interpretations, but as will be shown, given the subjects of his 
analysis, and his own intellectual associations, his work is in some ways comparable 
with Schmitt’s and of interest to IR more generally. Skinner -  for example -  talks 
extensively about understanding Machiavelli through both of his main texts insofar as 
they each reveal a different kind of thinking but both as particular kinds of political 
argument made in different contexts. They can -  and have been -  simplistically divided 
into early and late Machiavelli,4 but this misses the subtlety of Skinner’s argument. 
According to Skinner, there are not two separate and coherent Machiavellis, but instead 
two separate contexts in which each of his texts was written,5 comparison of which 
exposes an underlying coherence that they both share. The differences between them 
reveal to a certain extent how the prevailing political climate flexed and bent over the 
period of Machiavelli’s life and the changing conditions of his social context, how new 
modes of expression had arisen in the intervening period, and how different kinds of 
political problems presented themselves to the relatively consistent and unified curiosity 
that animated him.
3 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations o f Modern Political Thought: Volume I, The Renaissance, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p 118.
4 Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), in which there is a chapter entitled 
‘The Twofold Character of Machiavelli’s Teaching’.
5 This a similar argument to that made by Maruizio Virolo, Machiavelli, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), p 3. He makes the point, following Skinner, that Machiavelli was a rhetorician, thus the 
problem of the ‘two Machiavellis’ simply disappears.
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Taking a Skinnerian conceptual historical approach to Schmitt -  and following the 
arguments outlined in the first section -  sees Schmitt’s work in respect of its 
continuities. Accordingly account must be taken of both his body of main texts and their 
respective contexts for what each reveals about him and his theoretical interventions. 
Taking a Skinnerian approach to IR Theory as a whole is altogether more complicated, 
but is nevertheless an important part of the argument. Although IR Theory cannot be 
assumed to embody as coherent and unified a curiosity such as might inhabit an 
individual, it is at least unified as a collective endeavour, and the idea that the discipline 
has at its heart several important questions is indisputable. Exactly what those questions 
are has been and always will be disputed, not simply in terms of their substance, but 
also their form and expression, which also means that they will altered by the very 
debates in which they are contested.
However every participant within the discipline must assume that they are engaged in 
the same basic pursuit as every other, even if they have deeply critical attitudes to other 
modes of theorising. By the same token religious practices may differ across the faiths, 
even to the point of violence, but they are all engaged with questions that can be 
summarised with concepts like God and or the human soul. In other words, people may 
have very different answers to the same questions, but they at least have to assume a 
degree of agreement over the underlying questions, otherwise there can be no 
disagreement, let alone eventual agreement. In any event, if a person can be understood 
by reference to their inhabiting curiosity, the idea of an academic discipline must also 
conform to a similar analysis, insofar as it has existed and continues to exist as a 
discipline. To describe oneself as a scholar of International Relations is to engage in 
particular kinds of debates and claim knowledge of particular conceptual formulations. 
Therefore to suggest that the entire discipline can be understood in terms of an evolving 
-  but relatively stable -  matrix of central problems to which everyone applies 
themselves and contributes, is not altogether outlandish, even if there is considerable 
disagreement about the terms that might be used to frame these problems.
Quentin Skinner and Theory-politics
Skinner prioritises the role of language in politics. He follows Wittgenstein in thinking 
about language games and the ‘grammar’ inherent in every word, in order to theorise 
the inherent normative structure of any language in which it is possible to say only
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certain things.6 Certain phrases are incoherent as they associate words that can have no 
meaningful association in the prevailing normative linguistic structure. A good example 
would have once been the phrase ‘animal rights’ in that rights-bearing subjects were 
citizens within a legal context, whose central attribute was a capacity to articulate and 
represent those rights. Animals have no such capabilities, therefore when the term was 
first coined, it would have been incomprehensible except as an attempt to open up the 
normative structure of language to a different kind of use. The effect of this association 
was to alter the meaning of a rights-bearing subject. The role of the theorist is therefore 
primarily linguistic or ‘rhetorical’. A theorist exists within a context in which meaning 
can only be conveyed according to certain linguistic conventions. He or she therefore 
seeks to change word associations, making connections between words that are 
pejorative, and those that are not, in order to open up new possibilities for political 
action. In the contemporary context, phrases like ‘New Labour’ or ‘Compassionate 
Conservatism’ are obvious examples of this kind of rhetorical technique.
Skinner is most famous for writing about theorists like Machiavelli and Hobbes, and he 
engages in a prolonged excursus on the development of the concept of sovereignty, 
locating its emergence as a very specific response to the religious wars sweeping 
Europe in the 16th Century.8 He pays particular attention to the example of France 
becoming a sovereign nation through the cathartic consolidation of power following the 
St Bartholomew’s day massacre. This process is captured most emphatically in the 
writings of Jean Bodin, often thought of as the ‘father of sovereignty’. But the power of 
Skinner’s argument rests in his prioritisation of context when interpreting meaning. He 
specifically avoids the notion that there is an ideal type of sovereignty, or that it was a 
concept that was discovered in 16th Century Europe. He articulates the importance of 
context in order to explain that the concept of sovereignty needed formulation in 
language before it could be in any way understood, and that Bodin was responsible for 
altering the structuring norms within the prevailing political discourse in order to 
provide a solution to a prevailing problem. That this later became understood as the 
concept of sovereignty, in all its conceptual finery, merely disguises the sense that it 
was a highly contextual response made possible only through the rhetoric of Bodin’s
6 Palonen, Skinner, p 4.
7 Ibid., p 133.
8 Skinner, Foundations: Vol II, p 289.
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text and argument. It was a concept that was invented through a series of rhetorical 
shifts, bending and twisting the pejorative associations of words in order to navigate a 
restrictive set of linguistic conventions that were invested with tremendous normative 
power. Because Bodin was able to do this, conceptual formulations migrated to form 
new constellations of meaning around the idea of sovereignty.
Interestingly this closely parallels Schmitt’s approach to the very same concept of 
sovereignty which he explores from the perspective of a range of early modem thinkers 
who were grappling with a particular set of problems, and who ‘produced’ the solution 
of sovereignty as a response to the chaos of the religious wars.9 For Schmitt, 
sovereignty was in no way merely waiting to be discovered. The sovereign state and the 
jus publicum Europaeum were the highest achievements of European civilisation,10 and 
being an ‘achievement’ means a ‘rhetorical artefact’ very much in the Skinnerian mode.
This way of looking at the relationship between language and politics, which takes so 
much from Wittgenstein, turns theorists into politicians, and politicians into the mere 
functionaries of theorists. In other words, although the politician may be the organ 
grinder, the theorist writes the tune. This may seem a somewhat self-serving metaphor, 
but for a philosophical idealist, concerned with the conditions of coherence and 
sufficiency, there is no other available interpretation. It is the normative conditions of 
structuring ideas that Schmitt was exploring with his conceptual formulations, ideas 
which are expressed in language, or rhetoric. If it is assumed that politicians have a 
power with words -  a power of oratory -  then it is the power over words upon which 
they are dependent, a power encapsulated by Skinner’s theory-politics.
The State of Exception
Another important element to be considered when using Skinner is the notion of 
‘surplus meaning’. If we interpret rhetoric as shifting the normative structure of 
language, then surplus meaning can be understood as the possible directions these 
rhetorical actions open up. In this sense a political theorist engages directly with 
contemporary problems, but of necessity cannot fully engage with the implications of 
doing so. For instance in devising the concept of sovereignty as a response to the
9 Schmitt, Nomos, p 127.
10 Ibib.,p 151.
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religious wars in the 16th century, Bodin et al. could not have imagined all of the 
ramifications of this rhetorical shift. Their interest lay in finding a resolution to 
immediate problems, not setting the normative terms for 300 hundred years of European 
history.
However, when drawing on previous thinkers, it must be acknowledged their theory-
politics apply to a different context, that is to say, they are exploring areas and rhetorical
associations which no longer necessarily apply. A first example of developing the
surplus value in Schmitt can be examined by briefly considering how Giorgio Agamben
relates Schmitt’s ideas directly to those of Walter Benjamin. When considering
Benjamin and the ‘Eighth Thesis in his “Theses on the Philosophy o f History”'11 he
makes much of the so called ‘state of exception’, which he claims originated in
Schmitt’s Political Theology. According to Schmitt, ‘Sovereign is he who decides on
the exception’,12 a position itself derived from the Hobbesian treatment of miracles,
11whereby the Sovereign relied upon the decisionist dictum ‘Auctoritas, non Veritas' to 
declare what constituted a miracle, and therefore what must be believed to be a 
miracle.14 The relationship between Schmitt and Benjamin is exposed and extended by 
Agamben in developing his theory of ‘a perpetual and interminable state of 
exception’15, ‘the context in which Benjamin’s theses acquire their proper meaning.’16
17Schmitt himself did not theorise a permanent state of exception. As has been shown in 
Section 1, he theorised the state of exception to be that which gave meaning to the 
norm. It had a legal meaning that permitted and obliged the sovereign to step outside of 
the law in order to restore the norm. It feeds into his critique of liberalism in that a state 
cannot be indifferent to itself and must preserve an understanding of its constitutive 
existence in respect of an original friend enemy distinction. However, in theorising a 
‘state of exception’ he could not control where this would lead or how it would be 
developed and interpreted. Both Benjamin and Schmitt were fully aware of each other’s
11 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, p 161-2.
12 Schmitt, Political Theology, p 1.
13 ‘Nothing here is true, all is authority’
14 Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory o f Thomas Hobbes, p 55.
15 Agamben, Potentialities, p 171.
16 Ibid.
17 This runs counter to Mark Lilia’s conclusion in The Reckless Mind, but it is clear enough from 
Schmitt’s writings that he would not theorise a permanent state of exception, although perhaps the 
permanent possibility of a state of exception.
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work, and indeed were partly writing against each other. For Schmitt the exception was 
within the exclusive power of the sovereign, and as has been explained, exposed the 
reflexive co-constitutive character of the sovereign and the community. Benjamin, on 
the other hand, was a peculiar kind of aesthetic Marxist, imagining legitimate violence 
to be properly located in the general strike. Thus the two were opposed to one another in 
locating sovereign violence as emerging from opposite ends of the social spectrum; for 
Schmitt, in the declaration of the sovereign, and for Benjamin, the action of the working
1 ftclass. Agamben performs a fascinating act of deconstruction in linking the two 
thinkers, but there is no way that Schmitt, or for that matter Benjamin, intended this 
interpretation.
But without Schmitt and his central claims concerning the exception and the condition 
of sovereignty, what would have provided Benjamin with his point of departure? Mark 
Lilia makes the point that Benjamin continued to credit Schmitt as a major influence on 
his work up to 1930 when he dedicated a book to him.19 So in a Skinnerian sense, we 
can see Benjamin utilising the rhetorical shifts and the new normative conventions 
opened up by Schmitt when enacting his own theory-politics and writing Political 
Theology. In other words, Schmitt’s ‘surplus meaning’ allowed Benjamin to draw 
insights of his own, and further enabled Agamben to condense his reflections into the 
contemporary social metaphor of the concentration camp, giving rise to the common 
usage of the word ‘camp’ in a great deal of contemporary literature.20
The Political
Building on the Koselleckian insights from Chapter 2, Schmitt’s formulation of ‘the 
political’ deserves brief re-examination. From this perspective it is easy to see why 
Schmitt’s Concept o f the Political could be described as theory-politics in that he 
elaborates a prior category of ‘the political’, based on the friend / enemy distinction that 
gives rise to the institutional form of the state. In this way he describes the state in a 
similar way to Hobbes for whom the state was rooted in a natural human instinct for
18 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, in Peter Demetz (ed), Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, (New York: Schocken Books, 1977).
19 Lilia, Reckless Mind, p 95.
20 Along the lines Agamben has traced, Jenny Edkins and Veronique Pin-Fat (and others) have 
consistently explored the theme of the exception, which arguably draws inspiration from this same 
original debate between Benjamin and Schmitt. For an indicative edited collection see Edkins, Pin-Fat 
and Shapiro (eds), Sovereign Lives.
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survival. But as extensively explained in Section 1, Schmitt does not carry the 
ontological individualism of Hobbes and talks in much more Rousseauian terms about 
social collectivities. The friend / enemy distinction is thus a much more powerful 
explanatory metaphor than Hobbes’ state of nature in that it provides a conceptual 
analysis that explains the continued existence of a plurality of states or state-proxies. 
This is a decisive move away from a taxonomical analysis in which the state is treated 
as a category and studied for its variation. This is -  according to Hirst21 -  partly the 
inspiration for Schmitt’s The Concept o f the Political addressed as it is not to the 
comparative nature of pre-existing states, but to the origins of states as self asserted 
expressions of political commonality.
Schmitt has been read as merely a 20th century Hobbes, and his admiration for him does
00little to dispel the comparison. But in a very strong sense, Schmitt’s theory-politics 
opens up the analysis of the state by exposing the inherent vulnerability of the state to 
further friend / enemy distinctions, both within the state, and transcending the state. 
Hobbes does something similar in valorising Leviathan as the mortal god, but contrasts 
this against chaos, whereas Schmitt invites the interpretation that it is not simply chaos 
or ‘nature’ that threatens the state, but other kinds of friend / enemy distinctions, i.e. the 
political both constitutes and threatens the state.
A war need be neither something religious not something morally good 
nor something lucrative. War today is in all likelihood none of these.
The obvious point is mostly confused by the fact that religious, moral 
and other antitheses can intensify to political ones and can bring about 
the decisive friend-and-enemy constellation. If, in fact, this occurs, then 
the relevant antithesis in no longer purely religious, moral, or economic, 
but political23
The numerous changes and revolutions in human history and 
development have produced new forms and dimensions of political 
groupings. Previously existing political structures were destroyed, new 
kinds of foreign and civil wars arose, and the number of political entities 
soon increased or diminished.24
21 Hirst, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Decisionism’, op. cit.
22 There is extensive praise for Hobbes, along with a dedication, in Schmitt, Leviathan in the State Theory 
o f Thomas Hobbes.
Schmitt, Concept o f the Political, p 36.
24 Ibid, p 46.
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In writing the first edition of The Concept o f the Political in 1927, Schmitt was 
explicitly engaged in the project of defending the Weimar Republic from the twin 
threats of Bolshevism and Fascism. In it and in other texts (particularly The Crisis o f 
Parliamentary Democracy) he makes the point that the state cannot be neutral; it cannot 
be indifferent to itself. The state finds its origins in a constitutive friend / enemy 
distinction, and is ordered around that exclusionary moment. If it fails to recognise and 
to sustain that exclusivity, it gives up on the necessity to defend itself as a separate and 
coherent political collectivity and falls victim to new order structured around a different 
friend / enemy distinction. During this period he actively campaigned for the use of 
emergency powers to arrest and detain those whose political objectives were the 
overturning of the state.
Whatever his political choices, his presentation of the state as a contingent entity -  
rather than a complete category of analysis -  is an extremely potent rhetorical move. 
For now he could be read as a theorist of a strong state, precisely because he was 
acutely aware of its critical vulnerability -  very much in contrast to the whole tradition 
of ‘German Power Politics’ epitomised by Meinecke for whom the state was the sine 
qua non of International Politics.25 The question remains as to how often this crisis of 
vulnerability occurs, which is an important practical question for IR scholars who might 
reasonably suggest that the state is a sufficiently robust institution to deserve 
categorisation as a fundamental pillar of the International System. This will be picked 
up in Chapter 5, but for now the originality of Schmitt’s move is posited as provoked by 
the actual condition of the Weimar republic, and when pondering the vulnerability of 
the Weimar state, Schmitt’s analysis was necessarily directed towards the constitutive 
norms of the international system of states also. Therefore, although IR scholars can 
easily assume a condition of stability for the international state system, this in turn 
renders them dependent upon the continuation of that same condition of stability. 
Schmitt, on the other hand, attempted to expose and understand the limits of that 
stability, and therefore the normative qualities it possessed and the exclusionary 
dynamics upon which it rested.
25 Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism, (London: Routledge, 1956 [1924]).
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Furthermore, The Concept o f the Political does not simply mark Schmitt’s commitment 
to the state form, but also reads like the last word he will say on the matter of the state, 
for shortly afterwards, he moved away from the state as the key form of political 
modernity. Interestingly, one of Skinner’s insights when talking about politics as 
rhetoric, is that in searching for modes of legitimation through language, because of the 
power of the prevailing normative structure of language, a theorist may be easily 
misunderstood. If the theorist is attempting to shift and open up prevailing linguistic 
conventions, he or she runs the risk of being interpreted according to the old rules. It 
can therefore take a far sighted interpreter to understand the significance of his/her 
rhetoric, or indeed the passage of time for the surplus meaning to become apparent. In 
the case of this particular example, it is striking to see just how many theorists and 
interpreters have invoked Schmitt precisely because of his strong commitment to the 
state form, without apparently understanding the manner in which he undermined it by 
rendering it vulnerable to a prior category of ‘the political’. Furthermore, it is interesting 
to note how Schmitt himself was always aware of, but felt uncomfortable with this 
particular interpretation of his work and made a range of rather flimsy qualifications to 
this relationship between the state and the political over the course of his life.
One can read directly from here to Schmitt’s 1963 text Theory o f the Partisan, where 
Schmitt considers the figure and metaphor of the partisan, as the purest embodiment and 
carrier of ‘the political’, who articulates an opposition to a prevailing order, has a strong 
telluric connection. The partisan constitutes his own legitimacy claim and engages in 
his own acts of ‘sovereign violence’ outside of a stable context in which to describe 
them as such. The interesting thing about this development from a Skinnerian 
perspective is the extent to which Schmitt can be read as directly addressing the matter 
of legitimate violence. In writing about the partisan, Schmitt can be interpreted as 
attempting to shift the normative content in the linguistic structures that had hitherto 
contained the notion of guerrilla or partisan activity. He talks about the generality of 
contexts, which set the condition of possibility for guerrilla and partisan activity to be 
interpreted as such, and then goes on to draw distinctions within this wider conceptual 
milieu. At root this can be seen as an attempt to legitimate particular kinds of resistance
26 Schwab’s foreword to The Concept o f the Political, this is discussed at length in the early part of 
Chapter 2.
27 Ibid.
28 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan, p 68.
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activity that accompanies a kind of analytical explanation of the phenomenon. In 
Schmitt’s world however, the Partisan does not simply oppose himself to the state, but 
to his much grander concept, nomos. In the era of the state and the encompassing state 
system, the partisan could only be understood as a criminal, yet he acquires a telluric 
legitimacy in times when the whole normative order is thrown into question. In the case 
of Schmitt’s analysis, this was a situation that he thought prevailed in the contested 
post-World War II world, the tremors of which he observed in the earlier global conflict 
of the Napoleonic wars. So it is indicative of the linguistic shift enjoined by Schmitt’s 
earlier Concept o f the Political that he felt the need to address this particular topic as 
and when he did. In a sense the latter subject is a direct consequential interest of his 
earlier theory-politics, and the title -  in addressing itself to the earlier text -  reflects
90exactly this.
The Nomos of the Earth
This introduces further consideration of a concept that has unique and particular 
Schmittian characteristics. As Schmitt moved away from his consideration of the state 
as the most appropriate form in which the political finds effective expression, he 
engaged in a kind of historical sociological analysis that attempted to explain the origins 
of the state in a more historically contingent way. This in no way conflicted with his 
theory of the political, but was a further exploration of the connection between the 
political and the state.
In The Nomos o f the Earth Schmitt expands on the concept of nomos to incorporate a 
dimension that amounts to a constitutive appropriation. The nature and form of the 
appropriation are discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, but briefly consist in the idea that 
Europe -  after the discovery of the New World -  commenced a series of theological, 
legal and philosophical discussions that eventuated in the legal categorisation of Europe 
as a privileged sphere distinct from the non-European realm, which in turn was legally 
classified as a zone in which European states could mount contests of strength and 
domination without disturbing the peace in Europe. It was this legal classification -  and 
the norms that surrounded and enabled it -  which set the course and laid the foundations
29 Ibid., remembering that the full title of the work ends with Intermediate Commentary on the Concept o f 
the Political.
30 Schmitt, Nomos, Part 1, Chapter 4, ‘On the Meaning of the Word Nomos’
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of European domination of the rest of the world and was therefore a normative 
appropriation upon which relative peace -  or bracketed war -  in Europe was 
constructed. This runs counter to alternative conceptions of nomos that, even today, are
I
rooted in the concept of ‘conventions’ or ‘laws’. In much the same way as a 
freestanding category of ‘the state’ was not sufficient for Schmitt, a free standing and 
un-interrogated category of ‘international order’ equally provided only a limited 
explanatory grasp. When elaborating on the concept of nomos, he describes it as a 
context in which the state can find expression as a territorial entity. Moreover the 
nomos, allows for the existence of formal war and formal peace and by extension 
neutrality.32
Schmitt’s idea of nomos is closely tied up with the classical European state system 
epitomised by the treaty of Westphalia, but represents the prior condition in which the 
Westphalian state system became possible. This is classic theory-politics. Schmitt is 
explicit in seeking to associate the concept of order with that of appropriation, 
suggesting that order depends upon a prior appropriation. The two words have different 
normative values, appropriation carrying more pejorative meaning than order. This is 
exactly how Palonen describes the Skinnerian methodology of theory-politics. The 
manner in which political theory reduces to language play for Schmitt is merely 
evidence of the manner in which he sought to shift the firmament in which political 
discourse took place. This was not merely innocent analysis or diagnosis. This was 
politics as rhetoric.
Nomos, for Schmitt, had a constitutive aspect, without which its central meaning would 
be lost. This constitutive moment was not rooted in a purely political discrimination 
itself, but gave rise to new modes in which the central political discrimination between 
friend and enemy could take place. The prevailing nomos of European modernity was 
brought about by ‘an unrepeatable historical event’34; the discovery of the New World. 
What becomes apparent from reading his descriptions of how this event shattered the 
old nomos, based on the legitimacy of the church in Europe, and inaugurated a new, and
31 For example -  Richard Ned Lebow makes extensive reference to nomos as approximating to laws, 
traditions practices and social conventions, The Tragic Vision o f Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders, 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2003), p 141-146.
32 Schmitt, Nomos, p 142.
33 Palonen, Skinner, p 51.
34 Schmitt, Nomos, p 39.
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for the first time global nomos, is that this event was fundamentally aesthetic in 
character. When he described the origin of this great historical change, he referred to the 
shift in global image that occurred over a period of time, the emblematic event of which 
was the discovery of the new world in 1492. Which in turn evokes Schmitt’s comments 
on the aesthetic dimension as a ‘zone of confusion’, from which new constellations of 
meaning can emerge.35
In Land and Sea, he implies that all revolutions are spatial revolutions. This book, 
along with The Nomos o f the Earth, is built upon the idea that the emergence into 
modernity and the emergence of the Westphalian system, were contingent upon the 
arrival of a new global image. The spherical earth, finite and measurable, floating in the 
great void of the distant heavens, changed the idea of Man’s place in the cosmos. That 
the modem territorial state emerged in Europe around this time was no accident for 
Schmitt and in setting up his theory of nomos, he theorised ‘the political’ operating on 
two levels. The distinction between Europe and the rest of the world formed a political 
distinction in which European states could treat one another as legal equals regulating 
internal European affairs by a kind of ‘bracketed war’. So for Schmitt, European states 
could be at war and at peace simultaneously through the geographic device of the 
‘amity line’.37 Following from this, Schmitt did not regard European wars as truly 
political between the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and about half way through the First 
World War. In other words, states could follow rules of conduct within Europe, while 
simultaneously pursuing ruthless political friend / enemy struggles against other 
Europeans outside of Europe. This spatial conditioning of the political strongly 
intensified the relationship between territory and the political.
If Theory o f the Partisan is read alongside The Nomos o f the Earth, what quickly 
becomes apparent is the degree to which the partisan is strongly rooted in Schmitt’s idea 
of nomos, or at least the absence thereof Schmitt theorises the emergence of the 
partisan during periods when the nomos, or Westphalian state system, was under 
tremendous pressure or had collapsed. He dates the first serious partisan activity to the 
period of the Napoleonic wars in Spain and Russia, which he describes as a period when
35 Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’, p 84.
36 Ibid, p 2 8 -29 .
37 Schmitt, Nomos, p 92.
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the nomos suffered ‘tremors’. Then following the breakdown of the old nomos -  
during the First World War -  as the underlying context in which the rise of partisan or 
guerrilla activity during the twentieth century can be understood.
So the nomos for Schmitt constituted something like an international society founded 
upon an idealised distinction between what constituted Europe and therefore non- 
Europe. This distinction formed the basis for what amounted to a global land 
appropriation by European powers of the rest of the world, and intensified the 
association between the political and territory. It was a Eurocentric spatial order 
grounded in the ability of European states to agree a particular mode of behaviour 
towards one another, but which presupposed Europe’s capacity -  and right -  to 
dominate the rest of the globe both economically and militarily. It could be described as 
a European agreement concerning the terms of inter-imperialist rivalry, an idealist 
counter to Lenin’s materialist analysis,39 as the distinction was a normative one and laid 
the intellectual foundations of the European idea of supremacy at every level.
For Schmitt, the aesthetic event of the change in global image brought about a new 
beginning and a new nomos,40 but it also brought about the end of the old nomos. 
However the most troubling omission in his work is the lack of any serious speculation 
on the nature of the spatial revolution that brought about the end of the Westphalian 
nomos. He goes so far as to acknowledge this, but to warn that ‘[o]nly in fantastic 
parallels can one imagine a modem recurrence’ of the ‘unrepeatable historical event’ of 
the discovery of the New World, and further that ‘The question of a new nomos of the 
earth will not be answered with such fantasies.’41 Here is clearly another example of 
Schmitt setting up a powerful theoretical interpretation on the one hand, and yet 
warning people off coming to any further conclusions that are implicit within it. If the 
old nomos of the earth was produced by a single unrepeatable event, then that same 
event overthrew the previous nomos. If he is theorising the recent collapse of the nomos,
38 Ibid., p 150.
39 Lenin for example contrasts the ‘fact’ that seizure of the world had been completed by the Capitalist 
countries, with the possibility of an entirely new partition in, Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f 
Capitalism, (London: Pluto Press, 1996), whereas Schmitt’s concept of nomos lays down the ideational 
terms upon which such a new partition might take place, as a consequence of colonial wars between 
European powers, which remain at peace in Europe.
40 Schmitt, Land and Sea, p 29-35.
41 Schmitt, Nomos, p 39.
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then something must have precipitated that collapse. This is addressed to some extent in 
Chapter 4, but Schmitt’s idea that he was somehow engaged in the ‘hazardous task’ of 
finding a new nomos*2 seems therefore somewhat fanciful when according to his own 
historical analysis of the emergence of the first global nomos, the terms of the new 
nomos are likely to be found in the very same process that brought about the end of the 
old nomos. According to this logic, Skinner’s notion of ‘surplus meaning’ applies fairly 
directly to Schmitt’s work. On the one hand he opened up lines of inquiry that picked 
away at firm and assumed theoretical relations -  encoded within his notion of nomos for 
instance -  but nevertheless could not complete the ‘hazardous task’ of imagining a new 
nomos.
Interpreting the ‘oeuvre’
The whole of Schmitt’s work can be read as an extended existential reflection on the 
possibility of locating a collective identity in a wider context of radical indeterminacy, a 
political context in which an individual might understand himself and his surroundings 
through the negotiation of referential meaning -  through a complex of opposites -  and 
the naming of this meaning ‘truth’,43 then situating this collective identity, both 
temporally and spatially. But each of his texts should be read as a particular set of 
responses to prevailing problems with doing just this, i.e. as theory-politics.
The temporal connection to the friend / enemy distinction comes in the form of the 
Katechon;44 the great restrainer who holds back the antichrist and the coming 
apocalypse. Schmitt, through his repudiation of the possibility of eliminating the 
political, makes an enemy of both Hegel and Marx. The ‘end of history’ and the coming 
of the ‘last man’, marks for Schmitt, as for Nietzsche, the extinction of human life as a 
comprehensible or meaningful activity. The spatial connection emerges with the 
appearance of the finite sphere of planet Earth and the intensification of the relationship 
between territory and the political, which produced the historical context of European 
modernity.
42 Ibid.
43 Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth, p 81.
44 Schmitt, Nomos, p 87 and 238.
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His Concept o f the Political is a statement of existential origins -  that origins in 
themselves are existential -  that can be read as an attempt to legitimate particularistic 
political arguments in a prevailing context of liberal political language. The source of 
the political distinction is unimportant, for once a distinction emerges into conflict, it 
mutates into a political antithesis that can no longer be assessed in relation to its original 
qualities. Once a distinction becomes political, it structures a new order in which the 
participants understand themselves in relation to this new distinction, and rewrite their 
history to reflect this -  or at the very least recode the same history with different 
pejorative associations. Foucault and his exploration of the discourse of race war 
provides an exemplary study of this kind of process.45 It is not the reality of war 
between Normans and Saxons in Mediaeval England that concerned him, but the 
purpose to which this history was put, the manner in which it facilitated a particular, and 
current, political self understanding. Schmitt, with Foucault and Skinner, becomes 
unconcerned with the ‘truth’ of history, but instead forces an understanding of the 
purpose of history in constructing and perpetuating a political distinction that cannot be 
understood in relation to its actual pre-political origins.
With existential notions of origin, and the metaphor of the Katechon, Schmitt can be 
seen trying to stretch the present. It is not possible to look beyond particular sets of 
historical origins because a different political ordering renders it incomprehensible, or at 
least only interpretable in respect of a prevailing political distinction. But the attempt to 
transcend the political distinction brings about the collapse of the structuring power of 
the original friend / enemy distinction, and the emergence of a new political antithesis 
which itself cannot be assessed beyond its own origins. In a sense this marks the death 
of a political order and the necessary end of a basis for the negotiation of meaning that 
might substitute for a new ‘truth’.
Following Skinner, and conceptual historians more generally, Schmitt is interesting not 
because of the conclusions he came to, or the political prescriptions he outlined, but 
because of the questions that he attempted to address, and the manner in which his
45 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended (New York: Picador, 2003).
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conclusions reveal these.46 These questions are not obvious, and perhaps were not 
obvious even to Schmitt, but when Schmitt’s work is read as a totality, continuities of 
approach can be identified -  as briefly summarised here and more extensively in 
Section 1 -  it comprises a prolonged meditation on the multilayered questions of 
collective identity, legitimate violence and durable normative frameworks of order. He 
sought to locate the terms by which particular forms of violence became legitimised, 
and then expressed in the particular forms of political community and interdependence 
that were established in a condition of European modernity.
IR Traditions as Theory-politics
Alongside the steady progress of research within the discipline of International 
Relations have appeared occasional attempts to think again about what holds the 
discipline together. In 1998 a book was published entitled ‘The Eighty Years’s Crisis’47 
which brought together a variety of reflections on the state of the discipline, but the 
clear implication was that IR remained unsure of its intellectual boundaries, further 
implying that the crisis was a condition of the discipline rather than the world. Barry 
Buzan and Richard Little also explored this theme in an article published in 2001, which 
then went on to explain that what was needed was a greater appreciation of world 
history and systems theory, offering the English School as a good place to start for 
useful insights. Buzan went on to reinforce this notion in another article about the 
English School, which arguably provoked another wave of English School research.48 
There have been a number of implicit responses to this ongoing challenge concerning 
the appropriate parameters of the discipline, much of which has only restated long­
standing divisions between methodologies or philosophical distinctions. However, some 
clues to a way through these division have emerged. Brian Schmidt’s ‘History and 
Historiography of IR’49 offers suggestions for rethinking the history of the discipline as 
a discursive interchange between different methodological and philosophical 
viewpoints, and latterly, Daniel Deudney has drawn together the insights of an entire
46 Palonen makes direct reference to Schmitt in this respect, in Skinner, p 83, and also makes a passing 
reference to the influence Schmitt had on Koselleck and his Critique and Crisis, discussed extensively in 
Chapter 2.
47 Tim Dunne, Michael Cox, Ken Booth (eds), The Eighty Year’s Crisis, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).
48 Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: An underexploited resource in IR’, in Review o f International 
Studies, Volume 27, 2001.
49 Brian Schmidt, ‘On the History and Historiography of IR’, in Handbook o f International Relations, 
(London: Sage, 2002).
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career to produce Bounding Power, which is predicated on a characterisation of IR -  or 
political theory more generally -  as a prolonged negotiation within what he terms 
‘republican security theory’, each move being a response to what he terms ‘the security- 
political question’.
There are many other contributions to this debate, but for now it is sufficient to notice 
that Schmidt and Deudney resolve the problem of the limits of IR theory as a discipline 
by reference to some underlying question or dilemma. In Schmidt’s words:
[T]he important point is that disciplinary history can be a vehicle in fostering 
critical insights and opening additional space in which to think about the 
central dilemmas that continue to confront the study of international 
politics.50
Whereas for Deudney, ‘From its inception, republican security theory has been 
concerned with what might be termed the security-political question: what kinds of 
political arrangements are necessary for security?’51 This quote is revealing, both for the 
italicisation of the word ‘question’, and the application of the definitive article. Clearly 
Deudney thinks that ‘the security political question’ is comparable to a motivating 
imperative.
This fits nicely with the portrayal of Carl Schmitt so far offered in this thesis, as 
constantly intervening in ongoing debates surrounding the problems of order, 
community and legitimate violence. But much more than this, it offers a view of IR 
theory that aligns itself with Schmitt’s own conceptual preoccupations. If IR theory can 
be reduced to a series of differently inflected responses to a common set of problems or 
questions, then the problem of inscribing limits to the discipline no longer revolves 
around methodology, or even the necessary truth of certain philosophical claims. 
Instead the discipline emerges united as an unending process of interrogation around 
certain long-standing problems, with no genuine limit on the type or form of responses 
that emerge.
50 Ibid., p 17.
51 Daniel H. Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p 28.
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Nevertheless, there are continuities in the manner in which certain responses -  or types 
of responses -  have indeed emerged, and these are found in the various traditions, 
disputes between which have shadowed the history of the discipline. Although, 
following Skinner, the discipline can be seen in passing as a terrain in which the 
different traditions operate as distinctive repositories of theory-politics, attempts to shift 
the discursive core of the discipline in one direction or another, most obviously with 
areas of theory like ‘liberal institutionalism’ or ‘neo-realism’.
With this in mind, some basic distinctions can be posited with which a broader critique 
of IR theory can be mounted, such that the different traditions can emerge with greater 
clarity as differently inflected responses to the same underlying curiosity that unites the 
discipline. And these different inflections are consequent upon two distinct theoretical 
arenas, philosophy and history. On the one hand, there remains a basic underlying 
division between an idealist and a realist frame of mind, and on the other hand, 
theoretical accounts usually orient themselves around a theory of history that is either 
progressive and linear or cyclical and static.
Ontology and Epistemology, Realism and Idealism.
Once IR is reduced to a question, or a complex family of related questions concerning 
order, collective identity and legitimate violence, then underlying philosophical 
differences can be viewed in terms of a productive interaction, rather than an existential 
battlefield. But a deep philosophical dilemma resides in the extent to which what ‘is’ 
can be assumed to correspond with what is ‘known’. This basic problem comes in many 
forms -  the problem of ‘naturalism’, disputes over ‘objective truth’ etc. -  and in IR 
these disputes have a long and debilitating pedigree, raising the spectre of a divided 
discipline of incommensurable languages. Most particularly in the difference between a 
‘positivist’ epistemology, and a ‘post-positivist’ epistemology that formed the 
substantial reference points of the third ‘great debate’ in the discipline. However, this 
dividing line is to my mind overstated. A purely epistemological disagreement can only 
take place once the question of ontology is settled, or taken as settled -  and vice versa -  
but given that certain epistemologies refute the possibility of settling ontological claims, 
it seems strange merely to focus on different epistemologies as a dividing line within 
the discipline of IR. Far better to frame the relationship between epistemology and
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ontology as a fluid interdependent relationship and examine different approaches within 
IR as informed by a superior ontological or epistemological disposition. A theoretical 
account either assumes that theory proceeds from the world, or that the world proceeds 
from theory; that ontology precedes and conditions epistemology, or that epistemology 
precedes and conditions ontology.
Ontology boils down to the study of what ‘is’, whereas epistemology is the study of 
‘knowledge’. The two are inevitably intertwined but each forms a distinctive 
perspective from which to approach all further theoretical propositions. An object is a 
matter of ontology, of what ‘is’, whereas a concept is a matter of epistemology, of 
‘knowledge’. To briefly simplify, theoretical accounts either refer to the world, or to the 
manner in which the world is understood and conceptualised, the one always being 
somehow implied in the other. Certain realist philosophies make the claim that a direct 
apprehension of the external world is possible through scientific method, and that this 
certain knowledge must form the basis for testable theories, rejecting value judgements 
as subjective, and therefore unscientific. Opposing idealist philosophies take the 
opposite view and claim that reality is forever unknown, hidden behind the veil of 
‘Maya’,52 and that all judgments are ultimately subjective. Furthermore, claims to 
objective truth are unverifiable and potentially dangerous.
Therefore extreme realist views reduce epistemological questions to a subordinate 
status, not irrelevant, but mostly concerned with the criteria of ontological validation. 
Idealists, on the other hand, subordinate ontological matters to the manner in which they 
are framed epistemologically, even to the extent of rejecting the idea of ontology. This 
is not to say that the two can ever be genuinely separated and resolved, after all, 
questions concerning what ‘is’ need to be framed as knowledge in order to be further 
considered. However, there are two ways of looking at this philosophical dilemma in 
IR, on the one hand as if a resolution must precede the manner in which IR questions 
are resolved, or on the other hand, as if IR constitutes a relatively stable arena of inquiry 
in which differently inflected -  philosophically speaking -  answers contribute to a 
broad stream of reflection or theorising. If a philosophical commitment -  towards the
52 Schopenhauer is famous for deploying the concept of ‘Maya’ from Hindu philosophy, in support of his 
maxim ‘The world is my representation’. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1969 [1859]).
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priority of ontology or epistemology -  must precede stepping into the terrain of IR, then 
paradigmatic divisions are a natural consequence, rather in the manner of which 
‘positivist’ and ‘post-positivist’ epistemologies are assumed to create conditions of 
conceptual incommensurability. However if philosophical differences are set aside, then 
paradigmatic divisions can be reduced to a productive tension between different types 
of answers to complex questions. Ontologically situated theories that revolve around the 
interactions of assumed stable actors can then be enriched by epistemological reflection 
on the terms of that stability, or the precise manner in which actors can be consistently 
distinguished or intersubjectively constituted.
Unfortunately, an argument like this inevitably strays onto the well trodden turf of 
paradigmatic incommensurability, obliging some clarifications on how to avoid getting 
bogged down in debates about explanation, understanding, and ultimately causation. 
However, Wendt conducts some of the ground work by differentiating between causal 
and constitutive theories as addressed to different types of question. ‘Causal theories 
answer questions in the form of why’,54 whereas ‘[constitutive theories have a different 
objective, which is to account for the properties of things by reference to the structures 
in virtue of which they exist.’55 However, if we are dealing with a limited range of 
questions that revolve around order, community, and legitimate violence, then the exact 
grammatical framing of the question is a second order matter. Causal and constitutive 
explanations can therefore set aside their differences and address themselves to the 
common purpose, each reinforcing the other. One thing that the endless paradigmatic 
disputes have demonstrated very clearly is that IR is not well suited to resolving 
incommensurable philosophical claims, except where they have a common purpose in 
mind. If that purpose is a rich understanding of a series of interrelated problems then a 
distinction between causal and constitutive theory is perhaps informative, but not 
terribly productive. Furthermore -  and to my mind decisively -  as soon as the world of 
Skinnerian theory-politics is entered -  based as it is on John Austin’s speech act theory 
-  then the entire distinction between causal and constitutive theories becomes effaced
53 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have written the definitive traditional account of the relationship 
between these two modes of enquiry in Explaining and Understanding in International Relations,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), but this should not obscure the extent to which this fundamental 
division has been challenged, most notably by Alexander Wendt in ‘On constitution and causation in IR’ 
in The Eighty Years’ Crisis, op. cit., p 101.
54 Wendt, ibid., p 104.
55 Ibid., p i05.
107
by the necessary consideration of both illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of 
speech acts. If every speech act has both its literal intent -  illocutionary -  and its 
facilitating conditions -  perlocutionary -  then every statement has its direct and causal 
dimension, along with the constitutive factors that allow it be properly understood.
Therefore, instead of rehearsing hoary philosophical and methodological debates within 
IR -  which as a discipline is not well equipped to resolve them -  it is easier to move 
past the ‘positivist’ or ‘post-positivist’ epistemology debate and examine instead the 
deeper relationship between epistemology and ontology. After all, ‘positivist’ and ‘post­
positivist’ epistemologies really differ in the manner in which they are assumed to relate 
to an underlying ontology, positivists assume direct correspondence, post-positivists do 
not. Even to cast the third ‘great debate’ in IR in terms of positivist and post-positivist 
epistemologies is a fundamentally realist proposition. Epistemology and ontology exist 
always in an relationship of interdependence, not as different aspects of the same 
unified claims, but as different grammars of interpretive salience. IR would be 
incomplete were it not to retain a place for ontologically and epistemologically reasoned 
responses to the questions that unite it. There is no way of coming up with a certain 
estimation of the ontological coordinates of IR, that would not then be immediately 
susceptible to critique from an epistemological perspective. In other words, one cannot 
say what the discipline ‘is’ without also making assumptions about how that knowledge 
can be tested. But equally the more epistemology becomes the focus of enquiry, the 
tougher it becomes to anchor any resulting commentary in a way that does not refute the 
very epistemological terms on which it based.
In the discipline of International Relations no claims need be made concerning the 
ontologically certain nature of things, for the importance of an assumption that a 
discussion can take place about the same thing to be apparent. The world may exist 
independently of any subjective experience of it, or the world may be constructed by its 
interpretation, either way the discussion proceeds, and in this way, different worlds can 
thus be assumed to be the same insofar as they each serve the identical function -  once 
the persistent dilemmas of IR have been posed -  of reconciling competing conceptions 
of collective political interaction, and positing answers to the loose family of questions 
that unite IR as a discipline -  then it becomes important merely to understand what kind 
of explanation or interpretation is being offered.
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History, Progress and Justice in the World
The second dividing line in International Relations concerns history, not just in terms of 
how history is theorised, but at a more basic level, whether it is taken to be generally 
progressive or generally cyclical, the idea that history is repetitive or cyclical is the 
common view of realists. Progress is deeply implicated with an idea of justice, and its 
proponents are often referred to as optimists, even ‘idealists’ in a naive sense of the 
word. Whereas pessimists tend to the view that there is no fundamental justice in the 
world and that history repeats itself, first -  famously -  as tragedy, then as farce.56
Current debates in IR tend to focus on what history ‘is’, how to do it properly, or what
cn
the invocation of history entails. Clearly arguments about progressive and cyclical 
assumptions are wrapped up within these debates, but these arguments are at one 
remove from the basic distinction outlined here. It is -  for example -  always possible to 
make a direct comparison between two historical contexts and claim that one would 
have been a preferable context for a certain type of life experience, but the idea that 
humanity -  for example -  is headed somewhere has a long pedigree in the social 
sciences, and in particular International Relations. Herbert Butterfield addresses the idea 
of progress directly, and claims that progress itself has its own history, originally dating 
from the beginning of the 18th Century,58 but eventually sweeping all before it and 
subsuming other forms of knowledge, such that ‘even the people engaged in the natural 
sciences began to envisage the universe historically’.59 So the emergence of scientific 
approaches to IR can in no way be treated as if it is an entirely ahistorical development, 
but instead is bound up within the same tendency to ‘envisage the universe historically’, 
despite the criticism that scientific methods are themselves ahistorical, or de-historicised 
accounts.
Michael Oakeshott further clarifies the debate by dismissing the idea of progress or 
teleology as mere prophecy -  as acknowledged by St Augustine.60 He distinguishes
56 A paraphrase of Marx’s flippant reduction of Hegel.
57 For an excellent forum on the relationship between History and IR Theory, see Millennium: Journal o f 
International Studies, Volume 37, Issue 2, for contributions from Edward Keene, John M. Hobson,
George Lawson and Christian Reus-Smit.
58 Herbert Butterfield, The Origins o f History, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1981), p 214.
59 Ibid., p 215.
60 Michael Oakeshott, On History, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), p i l l .
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between history told in respect of teleologically complete processes, ‘like Spengler’s 
“cultures” or Toynbee’s “civilisations’”,61 and a genuine teleology, which he decries as 
‘absurd’ and ‘a self-contradiction’.62 Nevertheless, he continually sees the implicit mask 
of teleology in words like ‘dialectic’, ‘purposive’ and ‘progressive’, which, in keeping 
with his broader views on the different modes of experience, cannot count as history, 
but are instead only to be understood as forms of ‘practical’ thought.63
In International Relations, Fukuyama provides the archetypal analysis of history in its 
progressive mode,64 but there are many, many more. At a basic level, Marxist and 
Liberal approaches are inevitably progressive, whereas Realist accounts tend to distance 
themselves from intimations of progress and teleology. However, there is also an 
important sense in which IR is already bound up with what Butterfield identifies as 
‘envisag[ing] the universe historically’. As will be shown in the next chapter, the origins 
of IR are to be found in the general dislocation and despair that followed the First 
World War, and therefore IR has always been laced with the notion that it is a project or 
an endeavour directed at eliminating or reducing the scourge of war, which in turn has 
to be read as a progressive aspiration, in that it implies a direction. Nevertheless, there 
are degrees of commitment to the idea of progress in history, and it is a worthwhile 
distinction to make because its terms lie outside IR. As with the debate between 
ontologically and epistemologically framed responses to common questions, the extent 
to which history can be regarded as progressive is a problem that will find no resolution 
within IR, and therefore must be considered as an intellectual or ‘prophetic’ 
commitment to which one is attached prior to attempting to resolve the common 
questions of IR Theory.
Conclusion
When reconsidering Schmitt and his associations, whatever view is taken on his 
conscious or unconscious choices, or on whether to indelibly associate Schmitt with the 
Nazis, another view is also possible. Considering this analysis as a whole, his 
association with the Nazi party is not terribly important in relation to interpreting 
Schmitt as engaged in Skinnerian theory-politics. It is through understanding Schmitt’s
61 Ibid, p 112.
62 Ibid, p 115.
63 Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, p 250.
64 Francis Fukuyama, The End o f History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 1992).
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own exclusions, that it becomes possible to apprehend the full extent of his ‘lucid and 
paranoid’ reflections.65 And where he sought to close down certain implications -  such 
as what the new nomos might look like66 -  he essentially unfolded a map on which were 
many destinations, only some of which he chose to explore as he engaged in his own 
polemical theory-politics. The ‘surplus value’ in Schmitt that is being deployed today in 
pursuit of certain rhetorical shifts is an entirely different political project from the one 
he pursued, but it is nevertheless important to see this as just another kind of theory- 
politics that simply invokes Schmitt when attempting to legitimate particular kinds of 
rhetorical moves.
Schmitt therefore constitutes on the one hand, something of a reluctant revolutionary, a 
conservative figure who both foretold and chronicled the passing of the old world, but 
refused to speculate on the new, and on the other hand, a man explicitly engaged in 
tearing up the fabric of linguistic conventions that constituted the constraints of 
prevailing political discourse. Not merely a diagnostician, but an innovator. Palonen 
quotes Skinner when outlining that ‘Every revolutionary is to this extent obliged to 
march backwards into battle’ at least insofar as he has ‘to show that at least some of the 
terms which his ideological opponents use... can be applied to include and thus 
legitimate his own untoward behaviour’. In this sense Schmitt can be seen as an 
archetypal Skinnerian revolutionary, marching backwards into battle, bending and 
twisting the linguistic associations that formed his normative conceptual and linguistic 
context in order to legitimate a very different approach to politics. The fact that he is 
widely perceived as a conservative figure, perhaps illustrates the degree of success he 
had with his rhetorical moves, and the paradoxical extent to which he remains so 
interesting to altogether more radical theorists. But it also explores the extent to which 
he was prepared to accept certain elements of the ‘surplus meaning’ inherent in his 
texts. That he went on to theorise Gro/3raum as a possible way of living in the absence 
of the old nomos demonstrates the limitations of his own imagination in respect of the 
relationship between territory and the political. But the manner in which he returned to
65 Derrida, Politics o f Friendship, p 107, footnote 4.
66 Schmitt, Nomos, p 39.
67 Palonen, Skinner, p 53.
68 Rob Walker clearly outlines the alternative that Schmitt never reached for, that the dangers of de- 
territorializing politics do not necessarily imply that they must be re-territorialized, something Schmitt -  
and indeed many of his contemporary interpreters, not least of which are Chantal Mouffe and Louiza
111
the question repeatedly and displayed a strong desire to declare such speculation ‘off 
limits’69 in spite of the obvious implications in his theory-politics is also revealing.
The first section of this thesis concentrated on providing a rich picture of Schmitt as a 
theorist of International Relations. This chapter has established an approach to Schmitt 
as particular kind of political actor and theory politician. The rest of this section will 
follow this broad outline to offer a Schmittian critique of each of the main traditions 
within IR theory, each examined on a background where the key distinctions are made 
between the ontological or epistemological framing that predominates within each 
tradition, along with the general attitude towards history as either progressive or static. 
In this way, a meta-theoretical account of IR theory emerges where the different 
traditions are portrayed as a range of different philosophically and historically inflected 
reservoirs of theory-political responses to an underlying set of common questions. 
However, what should be becoming clear is the extent to which Schmitt’s underlying 
curiosity towards the multilayered questions of collective identity, legitimate violence 
and durable normative frameworks of order, represents a remarkably concise framing of 
the central preoccupations that unite IR theory more generally, regardless of 
methodological differences. Thus the value of Schmitt for IR theory today could not be 
more clearly posed than this concluding quote in a review article by Andrew Norris;
if one moves beyond judging Schmitt to asking how one can use him ...
perhaps the best way one might do so [is] as a model of a political thinker
attempting to understand the terms of the questions our time poses to us.70
Odysseos -  insisted upon. This can be found in his conclusion to Edkins, Pin-Fat and Shapiro (eds), 
Sovereign Lives.
69 Schmitt, Nomos, p 39.
70 Andrew Norris, ‘A Mine that Explodes Silently: Carl Schmitt in Weimar and After’ in Political Theory, 
Volume 33, Issue 6, 2005, p 897.
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Chapter 4 -  Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism
I f  we don Y end war, war will end us 
John Cabal in H.G. Wells’ Things to come
Introduction
Carl Schmitt is perhaps best known for his trenchant critique of ‘liberalism’. It surfaces 
in a variety of guises and has been a consistent feature of responses to his work since 
the 1920’s. Some thinkers have sought to refute his critique and reassert the value of 
liberalism, and this often takes a pejorative tone towards Schmitt and his seemingly 
Hobbesian formulations.1 But it is rarely acknowledged that he responded carefully to 
similar critiques in his own time and in a way that remains difficult to rebut. 
Furthermore, the use of his critique of liberalism today often involves the invocation of 
a few pithy comments rather than a substantive and careful analysis of the context in 
which he was addressing the problem of liberalism, or indeed the specificity of the 
liberalism he was critiquing, and least of all a studied analysis of the manner in which 
many so-called ‘liberal’ states have actually taken on board a crucial measure of 
Schmitt’s prescriptions for the failings of the Weimar liberalism he encountered.3
Some other present day thinkers take on board his criticism with minimal qualification, 
using it as a point of departure from which to attack contemporary trends in global 
politics, particularly the ‘End of History’ thesis and variations on the universalism 
implicit within prevailing liberal political discourses concerning ‘human rights’ and 
indeed the ‘war on terror’.4 But both of these responses to Schmitt’s critique pay little 
attention to the object of his concerns, and they both rely on a fairly coherent and 
comprehensible formulation of liberalism without always making it explicit in their 
analysis. In setting up liberalism in the way they have, they partly avoid the force of 
Schmitt’s criticism, and instead defend a political system that was unlike the object of 
Schmitt’s concern -  in that many liberal states hold in reserve extensive emergency
1 Chris Brown, for example, treats Schmitt respectfully, but suggests that he offers a ‘devil’s bargain’, or a 
choice between a limited amount of arbitrary war between legitimate actors, or a perpetual war for a 
perfect society in ‘From humanized war to humanitarian intervention: Carl Schmitt’s critique of the Just 
War tradition’, in Odysseos and Petito (eds.) The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt.
2 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy, preface to the Second Edition p 1-17.
3 Even the most liberal modem states have fairly extensive recourse to ‘emergency powers’, as has 
certainly become obvious in the last few years.
4 Theorists such as Chantal Mouffe, William Rasch and Louiza Odysseos etc.
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powers of the sort that Schmitt advocated, and have found occasion to use them.5 
Therefore this chapter starts with an attempt to summarise Schmitt’s thinking on 
liberalism, clearing away many of the rather detailed and selective positions concerning 
his pronouncements on sovereignty and suspicion of parliamentarianism and instead 
tries to organise his thinking according to his existential communitarian disposition.
Following this, I argue that Schmitt’s attitude towards liberalism can be reduced to a 
generalised hostility to what could be termed ‘the discourse of humanity’ which forms 
an actuating strand of the form of the universalised liberalism that he was confronted 
with in post WWI Germany. What becomes clear is that many facets of what is often 
understood as liberalism held no real terrors for Schmitt, but when it became invested 
with a universalising ethos and came to represent a political ideology rooted in the 
equality of man, not merely as citizen of a established polls, but instead ‘all Mankind’, 
this is when it becomes possible to see the continuity of Schmitt’s counter­
enlightenment thinking as it inhabits the smallest of his constitutional propositions and 
the grandest of his historical constructs, and it becomes possible to see his mistrust of 
liberalism more properly described as anti-humanism, avant la lettre.6
The chapter then goes on to discuss the emergence of enlightenment humanism and two 
distinct ideational responses to it that can be described on the one hand as pseudo­
scientific racism, and on the other by the search for autochtheneity (the claim of original 
inhabitation of particular territory). It is argued that these two discourses emerged in the 
different spatial domains of Europe and non-Europe -  a classic Schmittian motif -  and 
that this assists with understanding the evolution and demise of what Schmitt theorised 
as The Nomos o f the Earth. Finally, this chapter concludes its Schmittian critique of 
liberalism by clarifying his hostility to liberalism in terms of the underlying 
commitment to universal justice and equality that informs much of the liberal tradition 
within IR, rather than the more economistic or trade focussed liberalism that with which 
it is often discursively confused.
5 Any number of examples can be drawn from recent history, but just to choose a pair of notable 
moments, President Bush’s proclamation 7463 of Sept 14th 2001, and more historically, Pierre Trudeau’s 
invocation of the War Measures Act in Canada during the FLQ crisis in the 1970s.
6 This is made abundantly clear in Schmitt’s Preface to the Second Edition of The Crisis o f Parliamentary 
Democracy.
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What did Schmitt mean by liberalism?
Many texts have read Schmitt’s critique of liberalism in different ways. McCormick
deals with the relationship between liberalism and technology, addressing Schmitt’s
relationship to the latter and articulating a defence of post Cold War liberalism that
defies what McCormick characterises as ‘Politics as Technology’. Renato Cristi on the
other hand makes the case that Schmitt formulates a political framework largely
consistent with a state focussed free market structure that bears comparison with an
Adam Smithian neo-liberal model.8 However, it is possible to broadly summarise the
key elements of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism thus; first of all, a mistrust of
parliamentary democracy;9 secondly, criticism of the presentation of the state as a
neutral sphere of arbitration between all the possible political interests that exist within
it;10 thirdly, the establishment of a universal terrain of political activity in which
humanity and its correlate -  the individual -  are privileged over and above any
particular community;11 and lastly, the introduction of the discriminatory concept of
war, or the idea that war was generally a crime, and should only happen under specific
conditions, thus establishing external norms by which to judge the actions of
1 ^existentially self-asserting communities.
The first two points are addressed most specifically by his Weimar texts on decisionism
and The Concept o f the Political. They are mostly internally directed critiques of the
weakness of the Weimar republic in the face of the twin threats of Bolshevism and
Nazism. The latter two can also be found in The Concept o f the Political, but are more
directly invoked and elaborated by his later text The Nomos o f the Earth. All of his
thinking is informed by his attitude towards the existence of self-affirming political
communities as the source of ‘the political’. Therefore the repudiation of a universal
sphere of legitimation by which the actions of self asserting political collectives
underpins everything else he outlines in all of his texts. He is often characterised as
1 ^against democracy or against law, but both of these positions neglect much of what he
7 John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique o f Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1997).
8 Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997).
9 Schmitt, The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy.
10 Ibid., and Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy.
11 Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political.
12 Ibid., and Schmitt, Nomos.
13 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law.
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wrote. He was not against the rule of law per se, merely suspicious of certain attitudes 
concerning the source of law and the presentation of law as our best guess and 
approximation of some underlying universal laws, in other words, he was against 
natural law, and Kelsenian positivism. Although Schmitt asserted -  with Hobbes -  that 
laws were man-made rather than divine in origin, contemporary legal positivists like 
Hans Kelsen stressed the importance of coherent constitutional frameworks, while 
believing them to be ultimately based on norms that are external to the constitutions 
themselves, and that all human laws need to be comprehended in ‘one system of 
norms’.14 Schmitt was most emphatically a political thinker who rooted law in a 
necessary and primordial political wager concerning the identification of friend and 
enemy. Legal positivists must accept the law as they find it and not inquire into its 
source, whereas for Schmitt, the source was everything. He was also not against 
democracy per se, outlining a kind of populist bonapartism as the most effective way of 
ensuring a direct relationship between the people and the ruler, bypassing what he 
thought were the corrupt practices of interest protection, the hobbling indecision, and 
the political fakery of parliamentary and representative systems.15
It is perfectly possible to think of liberalism as a relatively benign system of law bound 
government, respect for private property, and participation in the law making process, 
and Schmitt can easily be reconciled with this. Indeed, Balakrishnan draws a distinction 
between Schmitt’s views on the ‘classical liberalism’ of Constant, Guizot and Mill, and 
his contempt for the prevailing ideas of legal positivism and pluralism.16 But when 
liberalism enters the more theoretical terrain of making universal claims concerning the 
rights of man, this is where Schmitt and liberalism part company. Therefore it is fair to 
ask whether liberalism has always been understood in this way, and if not, when 
liberalism became indelibly associated with this kind of universalist ethos? And 
furthermore, if there is not something that is associated with liberalism that might be a 
more appropriate and simpler foil to draw out in order to illuminate more clearly the 
real target of Schmitt’s critique. If a distinction can be made between a ‘classical’ 
liberalism concerned with the rights of the individual in respect of the state, property, 
accountability in legislation etc. and a more contemporary universalist form of political
14 Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law’, p 50.
15 Schmitt, The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy.
16 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, p 68.
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ideology based on individual rights and the assumption of a universal human 
community, then it becomes possible to isolate some more specific and precise 
component of contemporary liberalism that underpinned Schmitt’s critique.
This chapter proceeds on the basis that the real target of Schmitt’s criticism was not the 
complex set of political practices that comprise what is generally understood as 
liberalism, but instead a deeper discourse that has fully invested contemporary 
liberalism, even though it remains distinct. That discourse can be understood as 
humanism, and is spoken of in terms of claims made about ‘humanity’, in which the 
enlightenment universalism that displaced the unknowable mystery of God with the 
entirely knowable and rationally decipherable Mankind as the object of scholarly 
inquiry, and which was then subsumed by the notion of ‘progress’ as outlined in 
Chapter 3.17 It is this mistrust of the humanism, or the ‘discourse of humanity’ that 
liberals find most troubling in Schmitt, not his ambivalent relationship with particular
1 ftforms of democracy or his attitude towards free speech. For in endorsing Proudhon’s 
claim that ‘whoever invokes humanity, wants to cheat,’19 he is attacking the foundations 
of a whole host of further assumptions concerning international law and, more 
generally, the norms that inspire the entire project of International Relations -  a 
discipline rooted in the humanist tradition.
Schmitt’s Critique of Humanity
Schmitt’s early career concentrated on the political experience of the Weimar republic 
and its problems. The texts he wrote in this period made his reputation as a 
sophisticated and clear-sighted interlocutor, and also constituted his earliest attempts to 
address problems that concerned him throughout his career. His open identification with 
the principles of Catholicism, his political theology, and his work on sovereignty carve 
out a clear anti-liberal disposition. However, as has been pointed out, he was not against 
democracy, and he was a strong advocate of the rule of law as opposed to the arbitrary
power of the sovereign. Of course, he did separate constitutional power into two forms,
00pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitue -  following Abbe Sieyes -  which meant
17 Butterfield, The Origins o f History, p 214.
18 Sergei Prozerov orbits this basic insight in ‘Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political 
Ontology of Liberalism’, in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 35, Issue 1,2006.
19 Schmitt, Concept o f the Political, p 54.
20 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law, p 69.
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that he was opposed to the judgement of any particular political order -  based on the 
friend / enemy distinction -  in terms of norms or standards that originate outside or 
prior to the prevailing and determining friend / enemy articulation -  but also against 
arbitrary power, demanding that emergency powers be used solely to preserve the norm, 
not as general conditions of rule. This is a fairly standard communitarian position; that 
there is no system of universal norms that can exist over and above the level of 
particular political communities, but in terms of his opposition to liberalism 
specifically, he was not predisposed against liberal measures insofar as they existed 
within political communities. He even went so far as to concede the utility and 
preferable nature of many liberal ideas, going on only to question the universal
^ i
principles upon which they were founded. His critique of liberalism in the Weimar 
years concentrated on the tensions inherent in a parliamentary system and its 
distinctness from direct democracy.
Furthermore, in his response to Richard Thoma,22 Schmitt locates this underlying 
tension between ‘liberal individualism’ and democracy as a historical trend that will 
remain long after ‘Bolshevism is suppressed and fascism held at bay’, for it is an 
important communitarian position that liberal individualism is -  in the last instance -  
incommensurable with democracy, which -  for Schmitt -  rests upon a specific notion of 
a community forged in the exclusive mechanism of the friend / enemy distinction. So, 
in keeping with my intention to treat Schmitt’s work as a totality rather than a series of 
distinct phases, one can see that the same mistrust of ‘humanity’ that is exhibited most 
clearly in his later work, is just as evident in his earlier work, simply phrased 
differently. His use of the term ‘individualistic-humanitarian ethos’,24 betrays his 
characteristic hostility to the notion of man as a singular representative of Mankind, the 
universal community -  an individual appealing to a system of norms that treats him as 
an individual outside of a specific political community -  whereas for Schmitt, norms are 
produced in the prevailing friend / enemy distinction which in turn produces the 
individual situated within a political community.
21 Schmitt, The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy, p 3.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p 17. This strand of Schmitt has been extensively developed by Chantal Mouffe.
24 Ibid., p 13.
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To sum up, Schmitt quoted favourably liberal theorists such as Bentham, Mill, Guizot, 
Constant et. al., because they were largely not writing about the universal community, 
but instead principles of effective and rational government.25 This is not to say that a 
humanistic and universalistic spirit is absent from their work, but if it is there, it is sotto 
voce compared with the prevailing liberal discourse of Schmitt’s time. He had a 
relatively ambivalent relationship to ‘classical liberalism’, reserving his venom for the 
universalising form of liberalism to be found in the aftermath of the First World War. 
Furthermore, this kind of liberalism should be understood as a ‘liberalism of rights’ 
rather than an ‘economic liberalism’. This is very long standing and easily recognisable 
distinction within liberalism,26 but for the purpose of this thesis Michael Sandel’s 
discussion of ‘deontological liberalism’ captures it very well27 although this requires 
further elaboration.
Liberalism in IR
If a distinction is made between classical liberalism and a more contemporary 
universalist variation embedded within the discourse of humanity -  suggesting that 
Schmitt was much more hostile to the latter -  then the manner in which liberalism is 
expressed within IR, as the tradition of Liberalism -  with its focus on interdependence, 
the diminished importance of the state, the prioritisation of the individual and an 
understanding of ‘human rights’ -  is a fairly clear distillation of all the things that 
exercised Schmitt about liberalism more generally. Therefore a much more focussed 
understanding of Schmitt’s relationship to liberalism as it presents itself in IR emerges 
by focusing on the element of contemporary liberalism that distinguishes it from 
classical liberalism -  a progressive humanism, or the idea that humanity is the 
privileged political community, and each individual, a representative thereof.
When liberalism is invoked in IR, it is much more commonly thought to relate to a 
‘liberalism of rights’, as opposed to ‘economic liberalism’ which usually lines up more 
closely with ‘Systems theory’ and the sort of liberalism found in International Political
25 Although he refers to these theorists as ‘antiquated’, Ibid., p 7.
26 R.D. Mckinlay and Richard Little make a similar distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘compensatory’ 
liberalism, but the point is much the same, in Global Problems and World Order, (London: Frances 
Pinter, 1986).
27 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
p 7-9.
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Economy. Christi and Scheuerman have both written on the connections between 
Schmitt and authoritarian liberals like Hayek and the wider Austrian School,28 but the 
important distinction is that for both of these writers, it is the connection between 
Schmitt’s authoritarian politics and domestic economic liberalism which is paramount. 
Schmitt certainly wouldn’t have advocated ‘global economic liberalism’, for exactly the 
reasons spelled out in The Concept o f the Political and his other texts -  that it would be 
a mere mask for the universalising dynamics of the liberal powers, but he would have 
had little objection to Christi or Scheuerman’s interpretation of his work.
The liberal tradition in IR is much more strongly associated with arguments about 
human rights and draws its inspiration from Kant and Mill, rather than Smith or Hayek. 
This rights based liberalism can been seen very clearly in the spirit of the Treaty of 
Versailles and the Wilsonian ethos to which Schmitt was opposed from the earliest 
point in his career. However, if we follow the logic of this thesis to interpret the liberal 
tradition in International Relations as an evolving source of Skinnerian ‘theory- 
political’ interventions into ongoing debates about underlying questions of order, 
collective identity, legitimate violence, then where does these leave liberalism and Carl 
Schmitt? Furthermore, how can Schmitt’s opposition to liberalism be understood in 
respect of the irresolvable divisions that drive the productive tensions of IR theorising?
Sandel’s discussion of ‘deontological liberalism’ is useful, for it firmly situates 
liberalism on the side of those more interested in the epistemological framing of the 
human subject, rather than its ontological assertion, and despite the rationalist and 
positivist disposition of many liberal theorists, their wider preoccupations invariably 
invoke highly normative characterisations of justice and the possibility of 
conceptualising change, or naive idealism. Furthermore, the other division -  concerning 
whether history is generally viewed as progressive or static -  is fairly clearly resolved 
by the assumption of historical progress for liberal theorists. These themes will be taken 
up in more detail in Chapter 8, but are set out here in order to act as an implicit guide to 
the following exploration of Schmitt’s critique of liberal humanism.
28 Sheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law, and Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian 
Liberalism.
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Humanity
The next part of the chapter makes an identification between liberalism and humanism 
in order to explore the idea of humanity insofar as it emerged historically. This is then 
set against Schmitt’s account of the destruction of the European nomos of the jus 
publicum Europaeum (JPE), a key Schmittian narrative. Schmitt theorised the JPE as a 
truly spatial world order founded on the political distinction between Europe and non- 
Europe. He went on to explain the eventual collapse of this world order, or nomos, as a 
result of the development of a ‘discriminatory concept of warfare’ and the triumph of 
the twin universalist ideologies of liberalism and communism that emerged from the 
wreckage of the First World War. The chapter will go on to make a close historical 
identification with these developments, and the emergence of the idea of humanity as a 
political community, in order to describe ‘humanity’ as a necessary function of the same 
revolution of the European imagination that produced Westphalia and the JPE 
(following Schmitt’s account). This will allow the contextualisation of Schmitt’s elegiac 
nostalgia for the JPE as an inevitable nostalgia on its own terms, and his critique of 
liberalism as framed by these historically situated theoretical developments.
Space and the Political
For Schmitt, the historical epoch of European modernity was triggered by the discovery 
of the Americas, or at least this event was itself emblematic of a broader aesthetic 
transformation, that of the vertical to the horizontal. Europe at this time was a fine 
patchwork of competing and overlapping loyalties, in which cities and regions swore 
loyalty to different crowns almost irrespective of any territorial understanding. 
Furthermore, everyone was involved at some level in the negotiation between spiritual 
and temporal authority. They owed obedience to their overlords, but their souls only to 
God. This entire multi-layered structure began to fall apart with the rise of the nation 
states and the concentration of temporal authority, ultimately resulting -  according to 
the familiar narrative -  in the Treaty of Westphalia and the Westphalian state system.
However, following Schmitt’s account, this change was made possible first in the 
imagination. When Columbus discovered the Americas, the world, quite simply,
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changed.29 As the globe appeared in the European imagination, the actualities of 
Heaven and Hell lost their locations above and below to become despatialised 
metaphors, and perhaps even more important, the world itself became finite. It was still 
vast and unexplored, but there was now only so much of it to go around. As the globe 
was measured and mapped, another transformation occurred in that the open sea took on 
actual dimensions, as opposed to simply being an alien and hostile environment. It 
became a highway, a trade route, and a challenge. A spatial domain susceptible to 
mastery and control.30
The political effects of this transformation were to strengthen the relationship between 
territory and the political. The friend / enemy distinction, which for Schmitt is the 
differentia specifica of ‘the political’ became ineluctably associated with a territorial 
expression rather than the more diffuse set of loyalties and identifications that had 
characterised mediaeval Europe. And this territorial expression took on the character of 
the modem state. Schmitt looks to Bodin and Hobbes for the final theoretical flourishes, 
but the Treaty of Westphalia takes pride of place in this narrative, not as constitutive o f  
the modem international system, but as produced by this aesthetic transformation of the 
Earth properly emerging as a finite sphere floating in the heavenly void. The keystone, 
as opposed to the cornerstone, in the architecture of political modernity.
In The Nomos o f the Earth, Schmitt draws up an important set of theoretical 
postulations. Firstly, that although European states related to each other in a hostile 
configuration, the greater ‘political’ distinction that allowed for the development of 
formal states of war, peace and neutrality, in the affairs of states, was the distinction 
between Europe and non-Europe. This permitted the emergence of the concept of 
‘bracketed’ war, whereby wars were fought according to a strict set of rules. However, 
these wars were European wars, and the condition of their possibility was the spatial 
domain outside of Europe, which was a force-field of absolute conflict. Europe was 
therefore a spatial zone in which peace was possible through the constmction of an 
international society, whose first and unstated assumption was a set of territorial limits.
29 There remains some doubt on the extent to which people really believed the Earth to be actually flat, 
see Christine Garwood, Flat Earth: The History o f an Infamous Idea, (London: Pan Books, 2008). The 
age of discovery may be understood as a series of voyages to map out the unknown world, but it was first 
and foremost a change in orientation in the thinking of Europeans.
30 Schmitt’s fascinating little book: Land and Sea -  ostensibly dedicated to his daughter and written as a 
children’s history -  explains this ideational transformation in some detail.
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From this point on, until 1917 (apart from the interregnal episode of the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars) wars in Europe were not truly political wars, according to 
Schmitt. Following this, it is relatively easy to describe Schmitt as an ‘anti-Realist’ 
within the context of IR, for inter-state conflict was itself a second order phenomenon 
within the broader structure of European imperial expansion.
One crucially important insight worth restating here, is to understand how Schmitt 
reinterprets the word nomos away from its common usage as describing ‘laws’ and 
instead privileges a prior appropriation without which its meaning is never fully 
understood. This is how he attempts to shift the way in which international order is 
theorised, in order to consider its origins in an original -  and historically situated -  
appropriation. The crucial insight, more specifically, is that after the discovery of the 
Americas, a series of theological, ethical, legal and philosophical exchanges took place 
as a response to the problem presented by the altered conception of the world and 
Europe’s place in it, and in order to create a juridical and ideational frame for Europe’s 
appropriation of the New World. Out of these debates emerged a conceptualisation of 
Europe as a separate and privileged spatial domain from non-Europe. Furthermore, that 
the rest of the planet outside Europe was determined to be essentially ‘free space’. In 
other words, it was legally classified, and in this legal classification, it was also legally 
appropriated. The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 commenced this process by carving up 
the entire extra European world between Spain and Portugal, ratified by papal authority,
- l 1
but this would not go unchallenged for long. Other European states immediately 
began to chip away at this authority, but in the process, formalised the existence of a 
zone of relative peace in Europe where wars were governed by rules distinct from the 
extra European sphere. Therefore, according to this Schmittian logic, the next four 
hundred years of imperial expansion and conquest were merely the de facto 
consequences of a prior de jure appropriation. In other words again, the conquest and 
appropriation of the entire globe by European powers took place in the 15th and early
tfipart of the 16 Century, and the whole following story of European exploration, trade, 
domination and eventual conquest encompassing almost the entire globe, was a story 
whose plotlines were already written. Schmitt’s theory of nomos is to some extent
31 Schmitt, Nomos, p 89.
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comparable with Edward Said’s theory of ‘Orientalism’32 in that they are both elaborate 
ideational frameworks in which relationships with the non-European world were 
constructed and determined by an exclusive European sense of difference, and indeed 
superiority; for Said this superiority was framed culturally, for Schmitt it was expressed 
legally.
The spatial appropriation of the globe by Europe was a consequence of being able to 
apprehend the entire globe as a finite sphere, to calculate its dimensions, and then to fill 
in the blank spaces on the map and claim them for exclusive trade and imperial 
expansion against other European powers. This hierarchical world order is the 
substantial normative content of the international society of the jus publicum 
Europaeum. Greater material power than the inhabitants of these distant realms was not 
the most important question,33 for the defence of these territorial claims needed only to 
be made against other European powers, any local opposition could last for years 
without any threat whatever to the broader European claim of supremacy. The only fear 
a European power could have, was from other European powers. Local armies were 
often annihilated by greater technology, but running an empire was not about 
maintaining police control and responsible government of a population, but about 
defending certain commercial interests from other European powers. The actual 
question of the human populations of the colonies became important only later in the 
story of imperialism, but ultimately stems from the same impulse that led to the legal 
appropriation of the entire globe by Europe -  that of finitude -  for if it was politically 
significant to understand the globe as a finite space, it was infinitely more important in 
the long run to apprehend Mankind itself as finite in number. And this is where 
Schmitt’s analysis becomes interesting for what he says about humanity, but also for 
what he does not say.
Humanity as a non-spatial discourse
Apprehending the biological totality of mankind was a rather more complicated affair 
than that of its spatial limits. Space, territory, land were concepts that were familiar to
32 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (London: Penguin, 2003).
33 Schmitt, Land and Sea, p 40.
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Europeans at the time of the discovery of the Americas.34 However, humanity was a far 
more slippery set of ideas, depending as it did on a set of scientific rationalistic 
discourses concerning what we now understand as the planetary ecosystem. At the time 
of the discovery or conquest of the Americas, it was widely believed that there were all 
sorts of partially human creatures in existence. The discussions concerning these 
newly discovered ‘peoples’ revolved around whether they were ‘Christian’ or 
potentially so, not whether they were ‘human’.36 It was also widely believed that people 
in other parts of the globe actually intermingled reproductively with animals. In other 
words, later biological theories concerning the origins of mankind as a particular -  and 
to a large extent unified -  species, simply did not exist.
However, as the process of exploration and rational examination of the flora and fauna 
of the planet progressed, the idea of ‘humanity’ as a distinct kind of animal began 
slowly to emerge. There are a number of texts that date this emergence to the 18th 
century and implicate such figures as Gustav Linnaeus. Importantly though, this 
emergence of the human animal was accompanied by much thinking on the concept of 
race, or the breaking down of humanity into different types, even a hierarchy. This 
pseudo-scientific taxonomy of man as a number of different racial types has several 
origins, but in retrospect can clearly be seen as part of an attempt to find an intellectual 
formula that explained and protected the idea of political communities based on kinship. 
This is contrasted with the effort of naturalists to find commonalities among other 
species in order to develop a proper and accurate table of relationships. In the case of 
human beings, assumptions of considerable differences, both in physical and mental 
capabilities on the one hand, and moral qualities on the other appear alongside the idea 
that mankind was a single entity. This chapter has no space to describe this process in 
any depth, but Foucault’s description of man as an ‘empirico transcendental doublet’ is
34 There are a large number of stories concerning North American Indians having no such understanding 
of land as property, and simply being unable to conceive of what it was to codify land as legally owned 
by anyone, hence the apocryphal story of exchanging Manhatten Island for glass beads.
Kenan Malik, The Meaning o f Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 1996).
36 Francisco de Vittoria, ‘On The American Indians’, in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (eds), 
Political Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p 231.
37 Malik, The Meaning o f Race, p 35.
38 A couple of linguistic remnants of this discourse is the description applied to children bom with 
Down’s syndrome, who were traditionally referred to as ‘Mongol’ or ‘mongoloid’ children. This was 
because the condition was assumed to be the appearance of recessive genetic characteristics of an earlier 
and less developed ‘type’ of human. The traditional hierarchy went from Negroid, through Mongoloid to 
Caucasoid, being the most developed.
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useful, for it suggests that mankind is both a fact of nature and a set of ideas that 
condition the interpretation of the fact, and that the two cannot be completely 
disaggregated. When looking at how Mankind as a single species emerged into the 
intellectual world, there is no difficulty in seeing how general preconceptions that white 
Europeans were somehow superior than other ‘types’ or ‘races’ of human must 
necessarily have conditioned how humanity came to be understood as a whole, certainly 
among Europeans in any case.
Returning momentarily to Schmitt, when he considers the breakdown of the old nomos, 
he points to a specific set of events, such as the recognition of the neutrality of the 
Belgian Congo, and the development of the concept of discriminatory war,40 that lead to 
the collapse of the old spatial distinctions. However, the two underlying developments 
he is really pointing to are more discrete than this.
Although the recognition of the neutrality of the Belgian Congo is for Schmitt 
problematic because it extrudes the spatial possibility of neutrality into the extra- 
European space (where, by Schmittian definition, there can be no neutrality), it also 
parallels -  in time -  the historical end of imperial expansion. The scramble for Africa, 
was essentially over as there was not much space left to scramble for.41 It is no 
coincidence that much discussion of German imperial ambitions at the time concerned 
their desire to ‘secure a place in the sun’, which would inevitably involve some other 
European power giving up some or all of their colonies. The First World War aims of 
the German imperial general staff, (Mitteleuropa, Mittelasia, and Mittelafricaf2 were 
explicit challenges to other European powers, particularly Britain and Portugal and are 
talked of even today in terms of upsetting the ‘balance of power’. So even at the time, it 
was recognised that there was little if any ‘free space’ left for imperial expansion. This 
puts an interesting spin of the development of Schmitt’s ideas, which appear strikingly
39 Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things, (Abingdon: Routledge, 1989 [1966]), p 347.
40 Schmitt, Nomos, p 217-237.
41 In some ways, the implications of Schmitt’s reading of European Imperialism reflect Lenin’s reading of 
the end of European imperial expansion provoking the commencement of a European war, although 
Schmitt is not critical of empire in the way that Lenin was. The difference is important in that Lenin’s 
critique was materialist and depended upon the completed partition of the non-European world by the 
capitalist powers, whereas for Schmitt, it was the extrusion of humanitarian principles into the extra- 
European sphere that closed off the possibility of legitimate contests of strength outside Europe and 
therefore resulted in an absolute (i.e. not bracketed) European War, a firmly ideational reading. Lenin, 
Imperialism.
42 Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, p 21.
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convenient for a German thinker in the aftermath of the First World War, legitimating a 
pre-war extra-European test of strength for the new German Empire as a way of 
deflecting retrospective blame for commencing an ‘aggressive war’.43
The second discrete change behind the emergence of a discriminatory concept of war 
was the overwhelming of a predominantly spatial political discourse concerning 
particular political communities (states and empires at that time) by a more humanist 
discourse concerning the primacy and innate rights of the individual -  the discourse of 
‘humanity’. This was also a feature of an older European idea that was behind the 
‘bracketing of war’ in Europe. Armies -  not populations -  fought wars in Europe and 
non-combatants had rights as good Christians. A fact not widely known was that until
ththe latter part of the 18 Century, musketeers were not supposed to aim their weapons 
except by pointing them forwards in line with their position and parallel to their 
neighbours. To aim your weapon at a particular enemy combatant was akin to murder (a 
mortal sin). All this inevitably changed of course with the development of rifling 
technology etc., but this should not obscure the fact that there was a serious moral 
component to even the low level practice of warfare in Europe. However, outside of 
Europe, Europeans did extraordinarily vicious things to one another. Schmitt talks 
explicitly about Franco Spanish competition in Florida44 as emblematic of the kind of 
genocidal ferocity of extra-European competition between Europeans. He makes the 
claim that the only bestiality Europeans did not visit upon each other outside the 
European zone of bracketed war, was cannibalism.45
This whole spatial system contained in Nomos is both elaborate and seductive, but the 
manner in which it forms a retrospective legitimation of 19th Century German imperial 
strategy is striking, if not entirely successful. Germany did after all want to assert 
hegemonic control of Mitteleuropa46, although arguably by means of traditional, rule 
bound, bracketed war. However, the old nomos of the spatial discourse of the JPE was 
undermined, not simply because of the development of the discriminatory concept of 
warfare, but also because of a lack of any meaningful free space in which the Europe / 
non-Europe distinction could be meaningfully expressed. Although Schmitt does talk in
43 The judgement of the liberal powers in the aftermath of WWI.
44 Schmitt, Land and Sea, p 39.
45 Ibid., p 40.
46 Fischer, Germany’s aims in the First World War, p 21.
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terms of the free space of extra-Europe being the free space for contests of strength to 
take place,47 by the end of the 19th Century, Imperial powers were thinking far more 
seriously about the government of their empires, rather than simply their material 
exploitation. And this meant that Schmitt’s notion of ‘free space’ was itself a dubious 
appellation for much of the extra-European world by the outbreak of the First World 
War. Furthermore, the discourse of ‘humanity’ that Schmitt opposed was made 
inevitable at the very same moment from which Schmitt dates the emergence of the 
finite planetary sphere. As soon as the concept of finitude is applied to the domain of 
space, it necessarily and ineluctably follows that this same finitude applies to the 
content of that space. Furthermore, as soon as one begins to measure and chart planet 
Earth in order to claim it, one inevitably commences the process of tabulating its 
contents.
What remains is a time lapse, in which a universalising spatial discourse raced ahead of 
a following universalising discourse concerning the inhabitants of that same space. The 
finite nature of available space was an obvious and immediate realisation of the 
discovery of the spherical nature of planet earth. The finite extent of humanity, was a 
rather more esoteric discovery, but was inevitably rooted in the same historical 
processes that brought about the discovery of the finite planet Earth -  the realisation of 
spatial finitude. Therefore Schmitt’s eloquent nostalgia for the truly spatial world order 
of the JPE, was an inevitable nostalgia, and perhaps even out of date long before the 
First World War arrived to destroy the last remnants of the spatial discourse that was the 
JPE.
One is left to conclude that by the same logic that the story of European imperialism 
was written in a series of discussions concerning the finite nature of Planet Earth, it 
follows that the story of world government is not simply one that is being negotiated 
now, but one that has already been written in discourses concerning the existence or 
emergence of ‘humanity’ -  the ‘empirico transcendental doublet’ of Foucault48 -  the 
consequences of which are only now emerging. And this has interesting implications for 
the discipline of International Relations, at least insofar as Schmitt’s thought can be 
read as an anti-humanist critique thereof -  which in turn might explain why Schmitt has
47 Schmitt, Nomos.
48 Foucault, The Order o f Things, p 347.
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become fashionable among those most critical of the ‘closure’ implicit in the idea of 
world government, or at least discourses that seem to entail it, if not state it explicitly.
Although, this chapter -  to repeat -  argues that Schmitt’s identification of the aesthetic 
transformation of the European imagination consequent upon the discovery of the 
Americas in 1492, was incompletely theorised. If that moment when Columbus set eyes 
on Hispaniola really did trigger the transformation of the context of argumentation, and 
thereby contribute significantly to the European enlightenment, modernity and the 
nomos of the Westphalian state system, then that same moment also produced the 
humanist -  and by extension liberal -  nemesis of the great mechanism of spatial 
mediation produced by the welding of the spatial and the political in the Treaty of 
Westphalia -  the discourse of humanity. Planet earth and humanity are both empirically 
finite, and the manner in which they are interpreted depends upon transcendental 
notions of their totality. European powers were always going to run out of space as an 
outlet for their competitive impulses, and even if they had not, European ideas 
concerning the equality of Mankind would eventually transcend the limits of Schmitt’s 
conditions for European spatial domination. The questions that remain to be answered 
concern how this happened, and whether there were spatial differences in the emergence 
of -  or responses to -  the discourse of humanity.
Nationalism and Scientific Racism: Autochtheneity and Universality
This chapter has so far attempted to elaborate the relationship between the discourse of 
‘humanity’ and the spatial discourse of the old nomos that it undermined and succeeded. 
But a further explanation is necessary. For Schmitt, the new spatial order that emerged 
in the wake of the discovery of the Americas, was articulated on the basis of a friend / 
enemy distinction between Europe and non-Europe. Thus the discourse of humanity 
also had two theatres in which it could find expression, and so resistance to this 
emerging discourse would need also to find expression in a manner that was appropriate 
for the spatial context in which it took place. The spatial discourse of the JPE was a 
way of describing and relating to the whole world, but was exclusive to European 
powers. Equally the discourse of humanity arose out of the same perspective and was 
also European in origin. One can therefore divide the responses into one that was 
appropriate for the European context and one that applied to the European experience 
outside of Europe.
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In Europe, ‘humanity’ found an extraordinarily potent expression in the rationalism and 
universalism of the French Revolution, and the response, in the shape of the 
nationalistic ethos that set the direction for European social and political developments
ththroughout the 19 century can be seen as a critical ideational response to this 
universalistic ethos. The German romantic tradition had a strong association with 
homeland, place, landscape, and the whole Romantic Movement can be seen as a hymn 
to a slightly mystical connection between land, people and culture, which was deeply 
rooted in the German experience of invasion and conquest by Napoleon.
This development can be understood as a search for autochthoneity -  the idea that a 
people are linked to specific territory as its original and inviolable inhabitants -  and as 
such, with an unchallengeable claim to a particular area of land. Schmitt describes this 
as a telluric connection, in that it is ‘of the soil’. Man, he asserts is a ‘groundling’,49 and 
if the connection between the political and the spatial is challenged, then man reverts to 
pre-modem claims of ownership, and territory is legitimately controlled by those who 
are o f  it, rather than simply from it.50 This quality of ownership and occupation is prior 
to any institutionalised form of social organisation that incorporates the territory, and is 
the appropriate way to look at a European response to the universalistic sentiments of 
revolutionary France. This argument brings into question the notion of autochtheneity 
as a ‘particularist’ sentiment, for it follows that in making the claim that ‘we live here’, 
a necessary pair of corollary assumptions is that ‘everyone belongs somewhere’, and 
that therefore by implication ‘everywhere that is inhabited, belongs to someone’. 
Therefore even claims of autochtheneity and nationalism are principles that can be 
universalised, even if terms to judge their validity cannot, but nevertheless they are 
communitarian in spirit. Claims made on behalf of individual actors are difficult to 
reconcile with a worldview consistent with the exclusivity and separateness of different 
political communities, whether these communities are based on ties of blood or 
language or religion. Claims of autochthoneity can only be assessed subjectively or 
existentially, no matter their expression in terms of a generalisable category.
49 Schmitt, Land and Sea, p 1.
50 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan.
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According to Schmitt, the legal notion of ‘free space’ was an exclusively extra- 
European category. What is important to note, though, is that Germans through the 
period of modernity were unambiguous members of the international society of the JPE. 
And their romantic reaction to the universalistic ideas of the French revolution was cast 
in terms of an identification made between those ideas and France, in other words a 
challenge to their universality. Germany was different and Germans were rooted in a 
different kind of relationship with their homeland. In any event France and French ideas 
could be externalised. French people lived in France, and only German theorists were 
capable of saying what was a truly German idea, therefore combating the ruthless 
rationalism of French discourse by simply rejecting it as ‘out of place’. Furthermore, 
France and French people could be externalised within the international society of the 
JPE, and according to its rules. There was no need or interest in dehumanising the 
French, for they had a country in which to live their particular lives, a country which 
was recreated and reinstalled as a full member of the JPE in the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic wars, and as part of the reconstruction of Europe. Principles of 
autochtheneity demanded that the French be permitted to live their French lives in 
France. In the aftermath of German unification, there were disagreements over the 
correct borders, but even these were informed by the sense that there was a Germany 
and there was a France, and therefore there was a notionally ‘correct’ border between 
them. There was no existential dilemma between French universalism and German 
romanticism after France and the French had agreed to remain within certain borders.
On the other hand, the extra-European response to the discourse of humanity was quite 
different. For Europeans in Europe, people of a different race were simply understood 
as ‘from elsewhere’, their colouring or different habits serving as identifiers for 
otherness, but nevertheless a secondary characteristic than their being simply ‘from 
elsewhere’, rooted in some other place. Different people had somewhere they belonged 
and so could be treated as fellow members of humanity, just dislocated members.
For Europeans outside of Europe -  most specifically in the New World -  racial 
characteristics took priority over origins insofar as everyone was ultimately ‘from 
elsewhere’ except the indigenous inhabitants. In this way, race was always a problem 
that was external to Europe, whereas it was very much internal to settler societies, 
particularly ones whose economies were founded upon slavery, but also in terms of the
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settler’s treatment of indigenous inhabitants.51 For Schmitt, clearly autochthoneity took 
priority over race as a discourse of legitimation.52 One only needs to think of Kipling’s 
poem ‘White man’s burden’ and Theodore Roosevelt’s praise for the appropriation of 
the Americas and Siberia for ‘the white race’, to see the very different 
conceptualisations of more imperially minded thinkers. Schmitt rarely talks of race, yet 
eulogises autochthoneity.
The French Revolution was a European exercise in rational state formation along 
universalistic lines, but there are one or two well know flies in the conceptual ointment. 
The attempted re-conquest of San Domingo in 1802 (modem day Haiti) following a 
slave revolt that openly deployed the rhetoric of the universal rights of Man, providing 
ample evidence of the conditionality of those rights. The drive towards rationalism in 
European politics took muted forms and emerged slowly in repeated revolutions 
throughout the 19th Century. Only in the so-called ‘new world’ were there sustained 
attempts at rational state formation, which Anderson identifies as prefiguring modem 
nationalism.54 However, Anderson’s attempt to theorise nationalism was precipitated by 
the failure of rationalist Marxism to overcome the autochthonous loyalties that 
inhabited South East Asia, another replay of race or place countering revolution. What 
is interesting about Anderson’s thesis is that he is essentially trying to explain the 
failure of Marxist theory (an unambiguously universalist doctrine), and in characteristic 
fashion he turns towards formulations of autochthoneity in order to explain it.
Kenan Malik examines the issue of race as a discourse, and concludes importantly that 
it was not racism that produced slavery, instead it was slavery that produced racism; i.e. 
it was the prior existence of socio-economic distinctions that already formed a hierarchy 
that needed to find some means of political and legal expression, and therefore needed 
some legitimating discourse that could nevertheless apply universally. Racism as a 
discourse therefore, needed a slave owning society in order properly to emerge, and 
although Europeans owned and traded slaves in Europe, slavery was not a foundation of
51 Malik, The Meaning o f Race, p 61.
52 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan. Autochthoneity, or the ‘telluric’ quality of the ‘defensive partisan’ is a 
crucial theme.
53 C L R James provides the most impressive account of this insurrection in Black Jacobins: Toussaint 
I 'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).
54 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1983).
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socio-economic relations. For that, the colonies were of crucial significance, and the 
colonies, were necessarily outside of Europe. Malik himself adopts a broadly Marxist 
framework, and makes no reference to precise spatial distinctions, however, for the 
purposes of this argument he does two important things. First of all he locates the 
discourse of humanity largely in the 18th century, although dating its origins to the 16th 
century (exactly following the discovery of the Americas, and therefore planet Earth -  
implicitly following Schmitt). And secondly, most of his discussion centres on how 
colonial societies dealt with the question of race. In other words, although he doesn’t 
explicitly acknowledge it, the discourse of race can be firmly located in Europe’s 
encounter with non-Europe.
None of this is to make the claim that racism, scientific or otherwise, was unknown in 
Europe, far from it, but it did not become an organised legal or political narrative until 
the 20th Century.55 For example, Mahatma Ghandi studied in England and came to think 
of himself as an educated professional middle class man. But as is well known, it was 
his experience of racial politics in South Africa -  where he faced explicit, law bound 
discrimination that he had not encountered in Oxford -  which contributed to his
tliradicalisation. Kennen Malik also cites the English Judge, William Blackstone’s 18 
Century judgement that ‘spirit of liberty is so implanted in our constitution, and rooted 
in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England falls under the 
protection of the laws and becomes eo instanto a freeman’.56 What this judgement 
meant was that all men had equal status under the law, a condition that could not apply
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in colonial societies without instantly comprising a revolution. But an important coda 
must be acknowledged; that the legal judgement makes explicit reference to English 
‘soil’ and the values that reside in England. Even in legal judgements did spatial 
vocabulary appear and reveal the commonplace awareness that Europe and non Europe 
were different legal domains.
The spatial pulse of European modernity ran out of the conditioning spatial distinction 
between Europe and non-Europe that allowed for expansion, and yet when this
55 Anti-semitism is of course as old as Europe, but there is much to say about the extent to which anti­
semitism became subsumed within a growing racial discourse. It is -  in other words -  anachronistic to 
refer to historical European anti-semitism as simple racism.
56 Malik, The Meaning o f Race, p 62.
57 Simon Schama makes much of the connection between the institution of slavery as causally linked to 
the American Revolution, in Rough Crossings, (London: BBC Books, 2006).
133
expansion became more difficult, the spatial discourse was finally overwhelmed and 
transformed into the universalistic discourse of humanity. The First World War sprang 
out of absolute European spatial competition, which unleashed the spectre of total 
political warfare on European soil for the first time since the Treaty of Westphalia. The 
collapse of the old nomos turned Europe into a battlefield of ideas in which the liberal 
powers tried to contain the emerging forces of Fascism while holding communism and 
revolution at bay. Read this way, Nazism emerged as the bastard child of the two 
nineteenth century discursive responses to the universalism unleashed by the French 
Revolution. The old European claims of autochthonous Germans, native to the soil of 
the Fatherland, mixed with the pseudo scientific, and therefore importantly, universal 
discourse of racism, which was an extra-European rhetorical development to the lack of
f  o
European autochthoneity in the frontier lands of the New World. As the spatial 
discourse of JPE finally collapsed in the First World War, liberalism was not the only 
universalistic discourse that was imported into Europe -  newly bereft of its historically 
privileged position as the organising centre of human affairs -  in the aftermath. 
Europeans learned their universalism overseas when trying to forge new states and self 
governing territories with the raw materials of new lands to be farmed, and forced 
labour with which to do it. They therefore had to adjust European methods to new 
conditions, and patch up the missing elements with new ideas of domination, carved 
from newly invented principles. Class distinctions in Europe gave way to racial 
distinctions elsewhere.
Schmitt’s actual association with Nazism aside, his theoretical formulations position 
him as one who lamented the decline of the old European spatial order of the JPE, 
rather than one who perceived an opportunity to reshape conceptions of world order 
along universal racial lines. Nevertheless, his hostility to ‘the discourse of humanity’ 
traces its way through all of his works, and one manifestation of this disposition is in his 
account of the collapse of the JPE and his hostility to the new universalist inspiration 
behind the League of Nations and the outlawing of war as a legitimate tool of state 
competition.
58 ‘Nazi tribalism differed from other versions in having the backing of a supposedly ‘scientific’ system 
of beliefs. This was crucial in turning resentment into genocide’. Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral 
History o f the Twentieth Century, (Yale: Nota Bene, 2001).
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Therefore, instead of using Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism to attack the 
universalist aspirations behind the contemporary ‘war on terror’ -  Schmitt certainly 
enables this, but so do many other theorists -  or overuse his legal writings on 
emergency powers to describe liberal states as bordering on authoritarianism, with 
modem liberal subjects living in metaphorical ‘camps’ -  when he was specifically 
calling for the use of emergency powers in defence of the liberal constitutionalism of 
the Weimar Republic -  it is possible to distinguish between his ambivalence for 
classical liberalism and his antipathy for universalist liberalism to work through his 
critique of humanity as a discourse, and by this means add texture to his narrative of 
European modernity and the spatially variegated evolution of normative principles of 
international order. In the end, he remained a philosophical idealist, simply one 
unimpressed by the claims of universal justice or historical progress associated with the 
emergence of the concept of humanity.
Conclusion
This chapter has taken as its starting point a couple of Schmittian propositions 
concerning the spatial segregation that anchored European modernity and allowed the 
construction of Europe as an international society. But in taking Schmitt’s arguments 
concerning the origins and inspiration for this spatial segregation and extending this 
same quality of finitude to the contents of global space as opposed to simply the space 
itself, I argue that the very same historical processes and events that produced what 
Schmitt understood as European modernity, also produced the conditions for its demise. 
I have tried to avoid suggestions concerning whether Schmitt was right or wrong in his 
historical analysis, but instead attempted to harness his incomplete arguments to their 
logical entailments. In order to do this I have outlined Schmitt’s anti-humanism, which 
is a more thorough and precise way of understanding his well-known critique of 
liberalism, then explained the emergence of two distinct forms of discourse that are 
responses to the post enlightenment consensus of mankind as an empirical category, 
both located at the level of the transcendental -  authochtheneity, and pseudo-scientific 
racism -  and each of which emerged predominantly in different spatial domains.
Refining Schmitt’s critique of liberalism into a counter-humanist, counter progressive 
account of European Modernity helps to shed light on a range of historical narratives 
connected to race, empire, slavery etc. It adds some understanding to why the legal and
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moral pressure for the ending of slavery emerged in Europe despite being largely 
suffered elsewhere. And although this chapter in no way seeks to grade European and 
non-European societies in ethical terms as more or less racist, the fact that racism 
became legally codified largely in settler societies is an effect of their demographic and 
socio-economic character, not their aggregate moral qualities. Racism was just as 
pronounced, if not more so, in Europe than outside of it, but its legal codification was 
either unnecessary or mediated through the possibility of physically excluding people of 
different national origins; once again, wrapped up in the conceptual apparel of empire.
In effect, this chapter seeks to explain European reactions to the incipient humanism of 
the enlightenment -  of confronting the ‘empirico-transcendental doublet’ of humanity 
as a totality -  and it does so by suggesting that there were two generalised responses, 
each characteristic of the different spatial domains; Europe and non-Europe. This in turn 
adds texture to many different histories of racism and slavery, and provides a general 
account of Europe’s experience of race and empire that can help explain why different 
European countries have different specific historical and cultural experiences in respect 
of the connections between race, law and politics. It helps to explain why Britain, 
despite having the most extensive experience of colonialism, simultaneously developed 
arguably the most liberal and tolerant society in Europe, from which came the main 
impetus for the abolition of the slave trade. It helps to explain why France could speak 
so loudly for the rights of man, yet attempt to suppress the slave revolt in San Domingo 
in 1802 -  a contradiction that needs more than simply a material justification -  and 
finally it helps to explain why the worst experience of racial politics in Europe occurred 
in perhaps the most culturally and scientifically developed country in Europe, with only 
the smallest experience of empire. The story of Europe and empire has an ideational 
narrative that Schmitt outlines quite clearly, and each national experience with empire 
and race, must be told as a part of a coherent ideational whole, rather than simply 
independent parts of a grand material contest.
Ultimately the chapter attempts to set an ideational context for the differential responses 
to the universal humanism implicit within enlightenment thought. Materialist accounts 
of European domination and empire have little room for idealist arguments that consider 
more carefully elements like legal and ethical justifications -  transcendental arguments 
that provide the context for people to behave in ways that suit their material purposes,
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yet codify their practices and make their behaviour predictable to others -  the 
precondition of order. But in building an epistemologically biased account of the 
idealist context that provided the normative foundations for European empires, based on 
a strong spatial distinction between Europe and non-Europe, Schmitt reveals both the 
terms of its inevitable demise, and the limitations of his own anti-humanist thinking; the 
first of which is useful for understanding the evolutionary dynamics of systems of 
international order that form the subject matter of IR.
Schmitt’s unapologetic account of the collapsed European world order helps to clarify 
the ideational origins, effects and entailments of World War I -  which according to his 
logic (although not his actual arguments), should not be understood as the first 
European war that encompassed the entire globe. Instead World War I was the first time 
that the 400 year-old worldwide European war for world domination -  which 
Westphalia had successfully externalised -  had come home to consume its participants. 
Given that IR is centrally concerned with both the treaty of Westphalia and the First 
World War, which both mark important parameters of periodisation, the arguments 
outlined in this chapter -  although ostensibly about race, space and humanity -  have 
important interpretive implications in exposing a grand contest of normative and 
ideational discourses that shaped Europe’s encounter with the world, and eventually 
with itself.
Finally -  in returning to a direct engagement between Schmitt and Liberalism -  if 
Liberalism is placed meta-theoretically at the intersection between an epistemologically 
prioritised philosophical disposition -  concerned as it is with concepts over objects -  
and a historically progressive commitment to universal justice and a form of equality for 
all mankind, then Schmitt’s critique of liberalism can be seen to be primarily directed at 
the normative commitment to justice, and not at the underlying epistemological bias. 
Which partly explains why liberal theorists find Schmitt so troubling, and yet also 
useful,59 for he makes arguments about international order, law and legitimate violence 
by using ideational language and terminology with which they are intimately familiar.
59 Chris Brown makes the argument that Schmitt has a fully worked out system to offer as an alternative 
to liberal theories of international law, in contrast to realists who instead assert the ontological primacy of 
power, therefore rejecting even the terms upon which a disagreement with liberals might take place, in 
Brown, ‘From humanized war to humanitarian intervention: Carl Schmitt’s critique of the Just War 
tradition’, in Odysseos and Petito (eds.) The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt.
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What this all leads up to is a better contextualisation of Schmitt’s opposition to 
liberalism, and his relationship to IR theory. If it is accepted that Schmitt’s hostility to 
liberalism is more precisely framed as an opposition to the discourse of humanity, then 
it was of a piece with his wider lament for the collapse of the European nomos of the 
JPE. E.H. Carr was not alone as an IR scholar in identifying the origins of the discipline 
of International Relations as a normative response to the horrors of the First World 
War,60 and for whom the expression ‘the war to end all wars’ served as a foundational 
irony. However, for Schmitt, the phrase ‘war to end all wars’ -  in describing the First 
World War -  was no irony. The collapse of the nomos, meant the collapse of a 
framework of interpretation from which war -  and indeed peace -  drew its conceptual 
meaning, leaving behind a context in which the legitimate practice of war as a 
prerogative of sovereign states, became relativised and therefore indistinguishable from 
more general forms of violence. The First World War, in heralding the end of the 
European nomos, actually subverted the stable conceptualisation of war, setting it up 
instead as an intellectual problem, rather than a legally determined fact. Liberalism in 
IR formed the first organised response to this general crisis, but was itself -  for Schmitt 
at least -  implicated in producing the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the 
discipline itself; the subversion of the stable conceptualisation of war.
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism -  however prescient for the world of the 1990s -  was 
really bound up with a theory-political polemic against the collapse of the Westphalian 
world order, and was not an appeal for a new multipolar world order, much as he came 
to that eventually with his theory of Grofiraum. Instead it was an appeal for the 
restoration of European supremacy, and a polemic against the subversion of the 
classical conception of war.
60 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001 [1st ed. 1939]), p 8.
138
Chapter 5 -  Carl Schmitt and the Realist Reaction
The world is what it is
Salim, the narrator of V.S. Naipaul’s A Bend in the River
Introduction
While the previous chapter made the uncontroversial suggestion that the discipline of IR 
was bom of liberal humanist instincts and formed an academic discipline around the 
relatively polemical aim of reducing -  or even eliminating -  war, this chapter seeks to 
situate the realist disposition, both as a base for theory-political interventions in IR, and 
as an act of criticism. Furthermore, as Schmitt is largely characterised as something of a 
realist, this relationship will be tested and clarified.1 As will be shown, he certainly 
shared a critical disposition to the prevailing liberal international order, and a general 
hostility to the idea of historical progress, but the main difficulty confronted when 
making this comparison is his philosophical disposition. In other words, to be a realist, 
it is necessary to do more than criticise liberalism. Indeed, the argument I will make is 
quite simply that early realist attitudes to the idealism at the heart of the tradition of 
Liberalism, along with their claim to address the world ‘as it is’ rather than as they 
‘would like it to be’2 is a hugely reductionist caricature of the underlying philosophical 
idealism within the liberal strand of IR -  pejoratively termed ‘utopianism’ -  which 
nevertheless gained a certain currency within the broader discipline of IR. Furthermore, 
as Peter Wilson has pointed out, the antagonistic disposition between idealism and 
realism that is widely supposed to have characterised the discipline of IR in the early 
years has been heavily mythologized. For example, many of the early ‘idealists’ and 
the inter-war liberal intellectual elite found it difficult to take E.H. Carr terribly 
seriously, rooting their criticisms in relatively basic flaws they found in Carr’s rather
1 The classification of Schmitt as a realist has a long pedigree. In IR Hans-Karl Pichler was among the 
first to identify the influence of Schmitt on Morgenthau in ‘The godfathers of ‘truth’: Max Weber and 
Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau’s theory of power politics’, in Review o f International Studies, Volume 24, 
1998, but it has become a conceptual commonplace to refer to Schmitt as a ‘realist’.
2 Hans Morgenthau has a version of this sentiment as the very first of his ‘Six Principles of Political 
Realism’, in Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (4th ed), (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1967 [1949]), p 4. E.H. Carr also insists on the importance of realism as ‘the necessary corrective 
to the exuberance of utopianism, in The Twenty Years ’ Crisis, p 10.
3 Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the First Great Debate’, in Review o f International Studies, Volume 24, 
Issue 5, 1998.
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muddled ontological assertions.4 On the other side of the Atlantic, Morgenthau’s 
relatively sophisticated rendering of the German power politics tradition had to be 
simplified and tailored to a more practical audience of power politics practitioners 
before the realist tradition properly emerged as a series of basic assumptions about the 
‘nature’ of international relations and the power seeking human animals that make it 
inevitable.5
Ultimately this chapter makes clear that Schmitt cannot be properly classed as a realist 
for a number of reasons, and although his thinking does bear some comparison to 
certain realist formulations -  and certainly shares their historical pessimism -  the 
differences are deeper, located as they are in the perennial philosophical distinction 
between concepts and objects. Simply put, Realism in IR tends to prioritise the object 
over the concept, and therefore tends to frame responses to the underlying questions that 
unite the discipline in ontological terms. As Nick Rengger makes clear in his Oakeshott 
inspired critique of Morgenthau, “ Realism’ in IR, is ... a child of the world’,6 and as I 
hope I have made clear by now, Schmitt’s disposition is much more strongly 
epistemological, concerned first with concepts rather than objects. Therefore, although 
Realism is itself a deeply contested term, a proper engagement with Schmitt’s theories 
both encourages some examination of what is meant by Realism in IR, and clarifies 
Schmitt’s distance from much that a ‘realist’ would take for granted.
The chapter begins by offering a Schmitt inspired critique of two key realist terms -  
power and anarchy -  then goes on to consider the two forms of realism that have 
dominated IR; Classical Realism and Neo-Realism. Following this, two contemporary 
attempts to breathe life into Realism -  Wilful Realism7 and Realist Institutionalism8 -
4 Leonard Woolf makes this point very directly in ‘Utopia and Reality’ The Political Quarterly, 11,2 
(April-June, 1940). And Susan Stebbing follows up these same basic criticisms in Ideals and Illusions, 
(London: Watts & Co, 1941).
5 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, ‘The six principles of political realism’ are missing from the First 
Edition. According to Richard Ned Lebow, they were formulated and inserted into the text of the later 
editions precisely to make it more accessible to policy practitioners (confirmed in private discussion with 
the author).
6 Nicholas Rengger, ‘Realism, tragedy, and the anti-Pelagian imagination in International political 
thought’, in Michael C. Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy o f Hans J. Morgenthau in 
International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
7 Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits o f International Relations, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
8 Allesandro Colombo, ‘The “realist institutionalism” of Carl Schmitt’, in Odysseos and Petito (eds.), The 
International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt.
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are examined with respect to how each uses the theories of Carl Schmitt. In turn I 
attempt an explanation for the continuing appeal of Realism along with the misplaced 
notion that Realism is the only true theory IR has produced. In contrast to this, I make 
the case that the repeated ‘turns’ to Realism mark only repeated theory-political 
interventions over the underlying questions that cohere the discipline, each informed by 
a relatively consistent ontological bias, and a pessimistic disposition towards the idea of 
historical progress.
Interestingly, and in keeping with the implied schematic of this thesis, the more recent 
formulations or re-formulations of Realism I discuss bear scrutiny not just for the use 
they make of Schmitt, but instead because by using Schmitt, they subtly undermine long 
held ideas about Realism. In other words, it is Schmitt’s radically indeterminate 
formulation of ‘the political’ that permits the boundaries of Realism to be extended. 
Furthermore, it is -  in part -  little more than the assumption or assertion that Schmitt is 
indeed a ‘realist’ that permits these new forms of Realism to continue to claim the label 
‘Realism’, while being recast along profoundly idealist lines. However, if Schmitt is 
shown to be fundamentally not a Realist -  in the sense usually meant in International 
Relations -  it becomes harder to sustain the use of the term Realism when framing new 
theory-political interventions within the contested field of IR Theory. When examined 
more carefully, Wilful Realism and Realist Institutionalism share with Realism a 
refutation of the idea of historical progress, but carry an epistemological bias that chafes 
at the ontological straitjacket that Realism in IR has always held on to as its most 
fundamental philosophical criteria.
Power and Anarchy
Of the many different variants of Realism, two concepts are of paramount importance; 
power and anarchy, each of which deserves some prefatory consideration. In the first 
instance, power is at the heart of realist arguments, being famously -  for Morgenthau -  
the means and the ends of International Politics. But power as a variable is in a pure 
sense only amenable to use by materialists, or philosophical realists, for the simple 
reason that only philosophical realists are capable of measuring power in absolute 
terms. Idealists cannot conceive of power except as a relational term, and it therefore 
becomes descriptive only of particular contexts of relationality, rather than a
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generalisable characteristic. If power is always relational, then it can only be examined 
within a context of relations, and the only thing it pertains to is the specific qualities of 
the particular relations under examination. In other words, it is perfectly normal to talk 
about power, but only after establishing the specific characteristics of the context in 
which power will be measured and observed, along with the terms of its measurement. 
Power, without a specific context in which it operates, makes no sense. From an idealist 
perspective power is not, and never can be an independent variable. Oakeshott takes up 
this point in a revealing lecture entitled ‘Talking Politics’,9 in which he attempts to 
clarify the conceptual confusion behind the use of the term ‘power’, along with its 
rhetorical function in relativising the far more important concept of ‘authority’. If the 
problem of power is examined from the two perspectives outlined in this thesis, it 
becomes obvious why power is a term more often used by those theorists working 
within an ontologically framed context. In such a context, actors are specified, and 
relations can be considered implicit within a firm ontological framework in which the 
units remain the same and the terms of relationality are both assumed to be quantifiable, 
and quantified. Unfortunately, for more epistemologically curious theorists, it is the 
relations that are themselves fluid and intersubjective, therefore power cannot stand as 
an independent variable, but is itself expressive of particular relations.
What this points to is the degree to which the different philosophical dispositions of 
realism and idealism can be identified by reference to different vocabularies. To talk of 
power, is to step into the ‘real world’ of ontological assertions and to rely upon agreed 
categories. It is philosophically to treat the world ‘as i f  it exists and is comprehensible 
by reference to those categories -  be they state, human nature, universal justice etc., 
along with the power each of them possess. To avoid talk of power is to remain open to 
its mutation, and to examine it as expressive of certain stable normative reference points 
concerning legitimacy, authority and law. Material power can be a clear component of a 
context that needs explanation, and can serve certain ends, but makes little sense 
without reference to the normative landscape within which it is deployed. In 
International Relations, an analysis of pure power relations may be possible, but it 
would explain almost nothing about why such a context exists in which power is the 
determining variable, and would require a prior assumption of ‘ceteris paribus’ in order
9 Oakeshott, ‘Talking Politics’, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, p 447.
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to deflect criticism from those more used to ‘wishful thinking’ concerning the unstable 
coordinates of normative orders. Equally the pursuit of power can be observed, but once 
again, other interesting problems concern who pursues it, and why, or at least concern 
the normative framework in which power becomes the determining factor of hostile 
relations, which are properly epistemological questions. There are, of course, some 
sophisticated theoretical considerations of the concept of power,10 but my criticism here 
is intended to draw attention to the utility of the concept for certain ways of theorising 
International Relations, and there is little doubt that power is, if not monopolised, then 
certainly ‘oligopolised’ by realists and other ontologically disposed theorists. Power can 
be naked, restrained, potential, hard, soft or smart, but it always requires an 
ontologically firm context in order to be theorised as an independent variable. 
Epistemologically biased theoretical accounts privilege the contingent and 
intersubjective context in which power can only be spoken of insofar as it reveals the 
changing terms of uncertain relations, thus its utility as a concept is derivative and 
thereby analytically undermined. And bringing this brief sketch back to Schmitt, power 
appears in detail in only one his texts. In Political Theology, Schmitt makes extensive 
reference to power in order to firmly and unequivocally associate it with the concepts of 
sovereignty, law and authority.11 Much like Oakeshott, Schmitt provides a complex 
refutation of the independence or abstract nature of power, and in doing so reduces it to 
mere symbolism.
The second concept that needs some elaboration is that of ‘anarchy’, which Stefano 
Guzzini identifies as the key ‘assumption which would demarcate realism’.12 Obviously 
anarchy has been theorised in numerous ways over the years, but it has crucial realist 
characteristics in that it describes the absence of any clear structure of rules to govern 
the relations between assumed states. However, as should be clear by now, Schmitt’s 
theories do not conform to this characterisation of anarchy. The friend / enemy 
distinction constructs the normative parameters of the particular hostile relationship that 
it frames around specific differences, and in its most abstract sense these conditions of 
hostility form the conceptual lineaments of a broader nomos, thus relations between
10 There was an entire special edition of Millennium: Journal o f International Studies dedicated to 
precisely this theme, that was later published as a book. Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, 
Power in World Politics, (New York: Routledge, 2007).
11 Schmitt, Political Theology.
12 Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The 
continuing story o f a death foretold (Routledge: London, 1998), p viii.
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collectives are given normative content in the particular manner in which they are 
expressed. Friends and enemies are at root co-constitutive, and therefore co-dependent 
upon continuing relations of hostility. The friend / enemy distinction does more than 
simply divide one community from another, creating independent free floating 
communities, but constructs each according to contingent -  but importantly 
comprehensible -  terms. Anarchy -  for Schmitt -  is comparable to a context in which 
the enemy, and therefore the friend, is unknown, and in this context, the idea of 
International Relations itself breaks down with the absence of a concrete enemy. To 
restate, for Schmitt, the friend / enemy distinction contains both the conceptual roots of 
a plurality of political collectives, and the terms of their interaction. To use Waltzian 
terminology, the units are not distinct from the system but are themselves constructed 
by the terms of interaction that are embodied by the system. Therefore the anarchy 
problematic has no comparability with a Schmittian framework, except if anarchy is 
taken to be a highly constructed condition of normative and legal equality between 
recognised states, i.e. not a realist framing of anarchy.
Given that these two key realist terms have no place in a Schmittian framework it might 
be thought unnecessary to proceed with a comparison. But Realism is arguably the key 
theoretical tradition within IR,13 and a Schmittian critique offers much more than a 
simple refutation. Indeed, the thesis ends with a consideration of what Schmitt offers to 
IR that leans towards a deep reflection on the idea of International Relations, rather than 
Schmitt, so a more thorough Schmittian critique of Realism is both called for, and 
worthwhile.
Realism in IR Theory
The previous chapter dealt with Schmitt’s relationship to liberalism, suggesting that 
Schmitt’s hostility to liberalism reduced to a deeper suspicion of the ‘discourse of 
humanity’ in which it was embedded. Schmitt can certainly be grouped with a variety of 
theorists who became known as realists for their stinging criticisms of the liberal world 
order of the League of Nations. Morgenthau and Carr both attacked the idealism -  or 
‘utopianism’ -  at the heart of the liberal institutionalism, believing it to be a kind of
13 Ibid., The concluding sentiments of Guzzini’s book are that realism is a ‘necessary hermeneutical 
bridge to the understanding of world politics’, p 235, this of course would be rejected by many realists, 
but demonstrates how Realism serves a function as a coherent body of ideas for those of a more 
hermeneutical temperament.
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dangerous -  if seductive -  wishful thinking. For Morgenthau, ‘in order to improve 
society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives’;14 and for 
Carr, Realism was the ‘necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism’.15 Both 
theorists clearly believed in the importance of ‘utopianism’, but demanded that it be 
grounded by a realistic sense of what was possible, giving rise to a sense that realism 
was at root a pragmatic, or practical disposition suitable for the cautious business of 
state-craft. The good where possible, the prudent where not.
The problem with both of these positions is their characterisation of idealism, which 
was shorn of its philosophical roots and merely associated with ‘wishful thinking’, or 
the Kantian maxim that right should be done, though the world fall. A properly idealist 
position would be to reject outright the notion that the real world can be appreciated 
except through its interpretation. In other words, philosophical idealism is not simply a 
matter of having an idealistic conception of how the world should be, but is instead a 
philosophical view concerning the priority of ideas in structuring the external world. 
The latter is of course implicit in the former, for imagining that a new and peaceful 
world order can be conjured up through the establishment of laws and institutions to 
regulate the behaviour of states relies upon the structuring power of ideas, but a ‘realist 
critique’ of this position is merely a restatement of an ancient philosophical dilemma. In 
no way can a realist position concerning the priority of ‘is’ over ‘ought’ -  or even the 
derivation of an ‘ought’, from a realistic conception of what ‘is’ -  address basic 
philosophical idealism except through assertion. Whatever historical or contemporary 
proof is brought to bear on the problem will always have a comprehensive idealist 
response, not least -  following Oakeshott -  on the problem of what constitutes historical 
knowledge in the first place.16 Schmitt, in this context, provides it, for Schmitt’s critique 
of liberalism is an idealist critique of liberalism, suggesting that the ideas at the heart of
1 7the liberal disposition are wrong as ideas, not because they are ideas. It is not ‘facts’ 
nor ‘the world as it is’ that Schmitt counters to liberal humanism, but is -  according to
14 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p 4.
15 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p 10.
16 Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, p 86. Nick Rengger makes this point extremely well when 
directly drawing upon Oakeshott’s rejection of Morgenthau’s use of die concept of tragedy, in ‘Realism, 
tragedy, and the anti-Pelagian imagination in International political thought’, op. cit.
17 Brown, ‘From humanized war to humanitarian intervention: Carl Schmitt’s critique of the Just War 
tradition’, in Odysseos and Petito (eds.) The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt. See fii 58, 
Chapter 4, this thesis.
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him -  a more powerful and more coherent body of ideas concerning the exclusionary 
logic of communities alongside their organisation around common norms and ideas that 
structure their existential relations with others -  the friend / enemy distinction. Even 
more comprehensively, Schmitt’s critique of liberalism is also directed at the implied 
claim of the ‘fact’ of humanity as a single political community -  recalling the
152‘empirico’ element of Foucault’s ‘empirico-transcendental doublet’. For Schmitt, It is 
through the exclusive and existential friend / enemy logic that ideational terms are 
established for individuals to relate to the world. Without this there can be neither 
utopia, nor reality.
Schmitt’s critique of liberal humanism was definitely not directed at a presumed 
‘wishful’ or ‘unrealistic’ element within it, but instead was very directly critical of the 
violence inherent in liberal ideas in and of themselves. Schmitt did not -  like Carr and 
Morgenthau -  fear that liberalism was simply not up to the task of regulating affairs 
between states, he feared that it was, and that this would produce a more 
comprehensively violent and disturbed world than the alternative. It is on this 
background that Schmitt’s ideas can be projected and interrogated in respect of the 
perennial realist critique of liberalism, and most importantly, the philosophical idealism 
that underlies it.
Classical Realism
The first expression of what came to be understood as Realism has a specific historical 
context in which it emerged, and as is well known, offered itself as a mature reflection 
on the ‘realities’ of international politics. Particularly in respect of the prevailing 
idealism -  or utopianism -  embedded in the charter of the League of Nations. To that 
extent it can be seen as moment of critique, on both sides of the Atlantic, most 
characteristically expressed by E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau.19 Carr probably had 
more immediate influence, as his book was published at the beginning of the Second 
World War and provoked a sustained debate, inviting direct comment from important -  
though perhaps now relatively obscure -  intellectuals like Susan Stebbing and Leonard 
Woolf. Morgenthau on the other hand was a little known German emigre at the start of
18 Foucault, The Order o f Things, p 347.
19 Carr, The Twenty Years ’ Crisis, and Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations.
20 Stebbing, Ideals and Illusions. Woolf, op. cit.
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the war, and his main text was not published until 1948, where it caught a mood and 
formed a timely and serious theoretical expression of a prevailing mode of practical 
post-war politics.
The Twenty Years’ Crisis is more than simply a textbook of International Relations; it is 
a polemical assault on a prevailing cast of mind. It draws on many years academic 
reflection, and an early career as a diplomat, during which Carr worked as a member of 
the British delegation of the Versailles treaty negotiations. Much of his analysis -  
particularly concerning the now commonplace revisionist notion that the Peace of 
Versailles was directly implicated in the rise of Fascism -  was little different to similar 
points being made in Germany in the 1920’s, by Schmitt himself in some respects.21 
Carr’s accompanying notions that the liberal powers simply dressed up their own 
interests in the garments of universality was a point also made earlier by Schmitt in his 
The Concept o f the Political. One further point of similarity concerns the careers and the 
habits of mind of the two. Both were active on the margins of politics -  Carr as a 
diplomat, Schmitt as a constitutional lawyer -  both wrote stylishly and extensively 
across a range of conceptual fields, particularly those with a bearing on international 
affairs, and both demonstrated a degree of pessimism over the chances of peace in the 
inter-war period. This much they certainly shared. But one area where they clearly 
differed is revealed in their philosophical assumptions. EH Carr gets his confession in 
early when he criticised what he termed ‘Utopians’ for ‘couch(ing) optative propositions 
in the indicative mood.’22 What this means is simply the common sense notion that one 
should not confuse what one would like to be, with what is -  the classic realist 
proposition -  a commitment above all else to seeing the world as it is, not as one would 
like it to be.
There are of course several responses to this, which were rehearsed by various ‘utopian’ 
theorists -  notably Norman Angell23 -  but the last word probably goes to Leonard 
Woolf. Woolf pointed out that the same concern for the utopian habit of ‘couching 
optative propositions in the indicative mode’ could be applied to EH Carr himself. His 
article dealing with Carr’s book is entitled ‘Utopia and Reality’, which oddly enough
21 Schmitt, The Rhineland as an Object o f International Politics.
22 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p 13.
23 Wilson, ‘The Myth of the First Great Debate’, p 2.
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was the preliminary title of the Carr’s book,24 and the title of its main theoretical 
chapter. Unfortunately, as Woolf points out with what might be termed guarded scorn, 
Carr never makes the distinction between the two categories clear, nor does he 
acknowledge his own utopianism. ‘All policies,’ Woolf points out ‘even of the most 
realist statesmen, aim at unattained ideals or objectives.’25 Eventually, Woolf concludes 
his response by suggesting that Carr is merely trying ‘to rationalize (his) own and other 
people’s primitive psychology.’26
Susan Stebbing takes Woolfs criticism further, and in turn demonstrates the 
philosophical idealist response to this kind of realist claim, that all interpretations of 
reality are at least to some extent wishful thinking -  at the very least, measured in 
respect of some notional ideal, without which even simple comprehension would fail -  
but this is most particularly so when theorising human behaviour. Stebbing essentially 
points out that Carr is not simply overly pessimistic, but conceptually flawed and 
irredeemably shallow. She is worth quoting at length:
When in the affairs of life we call a man an “idealist” we ordinarily mean 
that he is influenced in his actions by ideals -  that is, by his conception of 
what it is worth while to achieve, or to attempt to achieve. ... But . . . to  
have ideals is not the same as to have impracticable ideals . . . .  Failure to 
remember this has led to the use of “idealist” as a term of condemnation, or 
at least of gentle rebuke. ... Those who make this mistake regard the 
opposite of an idealist as a “realist” -  that is, one who takes note of the 
facts and, presumably, is not in any way guided by ideals. ... those who 
talk in this way talk nonsense.27
O
Stebbing goes on to discuss Carr as the pre-eminent example of such a thinker. As 
Peter Wilson makes clear, the prominent idealists of the day did not feel particularly 
threatened by Carr’s pithy warnings, so much as fail -  due to his philosophical naivety -  
to take him seriously. It is perhaps all the more surprising that Carr’s text has become 
so canonical when it is remembered that the 1st Edition supported Chamberlain’s policy 
of appeasement, which Woolf tactfully noted was an aspiration that had almost 
immediately proved at least as futile as anything Carr had criticised. However -  and in
24 It was rejected by the publishers. Revealed in the intro to Carr’s The Twenty Years’Crisis by Mick 
Cox, p xii.
25 Woolf, Leonard ‘Utopia and Reality’ The Political Quarterly, 11,2 (April-June, 1940), p 174.
26 Ibid., p 182.
27 Susan Stebbing, Ideals and Illusions, p 5-6.
28 Ibid., p 6.
29 Wilson, ‘The Myth of the First Great Debate’, op. cit.
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defence of Carr -  if his philosophical realism was somewhat under theorised in The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis, it did at least mature into a more fully developed historical 
materialism in later years,30 thus at least confirming his commitment to the independent 
existence of the ‘real world’ and a desire to understand its mechanics. But more 
importantly lending weight to one of the basic propositions contained within this thesis 
-  that the philosophical idealist / realist divide is an important consideration when 
thinking about how IR is theorised.
Stebbing then considers the actions of various statesman, speculating as to whether they 
can be properly described as ‘realists’, and finding that they cannot. Her key example is 
the arch-‘realist’, Bismark, who was noteworthy for the clarity of the ideals he pursued. 
The real strength of Stebbing’s analysis concerns her discussion of the central 
characteristics of what might be called ‘realism’, finding it in Machiavelli’s proposition 
concerning the need for evil means to secure good ends, or more specifically the 
separation between morality and politics. This observation leads in several directions, 
but thankfully provides a direct conceptual route back to Schmitt. Stebbing essentially 
gives voice to a problem within Realism, and that problem relates to its relationship 
with norms and ideas more generally. On the one hand, Machiavelli clearly makes the 
case that in a world governed by Christian principles, certain objectives were not easily 
realisable without recourse to actions themselves judged to be evil. Princes, in other 
words, were obliged to ignore Christian moral restraint in certain circumstances and to 
act in a way they knew to be evil. This implies two things: first of all, that there is an 
assumed actor -  in Machiavelli’s case the Prince -  and secondly that the choices the 
actor makes can be separated into those which are morally good and those which are 
morally bad but politically expedient. So although many ‘realist’ theorists can claim a 
level of sophistication beyond the simplistic formulae of state and system, turning 
instead to history and human nature, they nevertheless depend upon an assumed actor, 
and a strong distinction between morality and politics in order that their explanatory 
frameworks can construct distinctions between ‘might’ and ‘right’, or between ‘politics’ 
and ‘morality’, or even the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’. To quote Stebbing again:
30 Michael Cox, ‘Will the real E.H. Carr please stand up?’, in International Affairs, Volume 75, Issue 3, 
1999.
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‘The realist judges that the end justifies evil means and that the evilness of 
the means is not to be taken into account. The non-realist, unfortunately 
called an “idealist”, judges that the end does not justify the use of evil 
means. These judgements are judgements of ethics. Further, the judgement 
that certain means are evil (which is contained in the realist’s judgement 
regarding means and ends) is another ethical judgement, and it is certainly 
not a judgement based upon politics.’31
Realists, in other words, depend upon the existence of the ‘ought’ in order to insist upon 
the ‘is’. They acknowledge that power is independent of moral restraint, but do not 
acknowledge the morality or norms that are embedded into the idea of the actor called 
upon to act, morally or otherwise. A state has power because it is believed to be a good 
in and of itself; therefore, imagining a statesman to have a choice that is independent of 
morality -  of the ‘ought’ -  is to efface the ‘ought’ that makes the state comprehensible 
as an actor. Interestingly it is not hard to imagine that Machiavelli was fully aware of 
this -  he was a republican after all -  but once these principles are extrapolated into the 
realm of IR they take on the appearance of hard facts, of a given world where 
predictable actors behave in predictable ways. Which in turn creates the tension 
between the expression of ‘might’ and ‘right’, along with the need to talk in general 
terms of ‘power’ and ‘interests’. But if this is a key principle of Realism, then Schmitt -  
who makes morality dependent upon the political -  fundamentally erodes this 
distinction and makes it impossible to distinguish between might and right in the 
conventional way. If Schmitt’s thinking is applied to a world of presumed actors -  e.g. 
states -  then he looks rather like a realist. But if his account of the state as an intensely 
normative artefact of social processes of identification, then he loses this apparent 
similarity with realists. There remain points of comparison, but only in terms of 
immediate policy recommendations, not in terms of historical analysis or conceptual 
solidity.
Machiavelli opposed morality and politics, Hobbes exiled morality to the intensely 
private sphere of one’s own conscience, Schmitt placed morality in the service of 
politics. Therefore if Stebbing is right in saying that realists depend upon the distinction 
between morality and politics, then Schmitt cannot be considered a realist. In fact, given 
that Machiavelli was quite clear in his advocacy of Christian morality for all except the 
Prince, it is possible to see how Realism depends upon a broad context of morality in
31 Stebbing, Ideals and Illusions, p 12.
150
order to make clear the exceptional nature of political acts. To view Schmitt as a realist 
depends upon a belief in a wider context of an ethical realm in which his advocacy of 
the primacy of politics can be judged comparable to a Machiavellian logic. Given that 
Schmitt had no conception of a wider ethical sphere -  which for Machiavelli was 
Christianity -  in which political conduct could be judged, Schmitt is thus further 
detached from Realism.
This point is brought into sharper relief with consideration of the work of Hans 
Morgenthau, who arguably bears easier comparison to Schmitt than does Carr. Where 
Carr’s philosophical realism is vested in his defence of an apprehension of the ‘real’ 
world, it inevitably leads in the direction of a historical materialist disposition; it renders 
his utopianism -  of which he is fairly accused -  more a feature of a determinist 
historical mindset, than a man placing hope above expectation.32 Morgenthau, on the 
other hand, shares much more with Schmitt. He lived and studied in the same post- 
Weberian, post-Nietzschean, post-war Weimar Germany, and actually engaged in a 
dialogue with Schmitt concerning The Concept o f the Political. Most importantly, his 
early works share a similar disposition towards conceptual speculation, rather than 
determined and declarative statements of ‘fact’. Nevertheless Morgenthau maintains a 
Machiavellian commitment to a sphere of universal ethics in which realist judgements 
can be interpreted as such. This can be found in his ‘Six principles of political 
realism’, particularly in numbers 4 and 5, and by implication 6.34 Principle 4 
acknowledges the moral significance of political action and restates the basic 
Machiavellian tension between the good and the necessary evil. Principle 5 states that 
‘Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the 
moral laws that govern the universe’ which expresses the prudent reservation of 
distinguishing between truth and opinion, but refutes his very first principle of political
32 Cox, op. cit.
33 Some recent research on the relationship between Morgenthau and Schmitt makes this point even 
clearer. Oliver JUtersonke -  ‘The image of law in Politics Among Nations', in Williams (ed.), Realism 
Reconsidered -  suggests that the relationship between Morgenthau and Schmitt has been overstated, 
particularly given that Morgenthau’s thoughts on the justiciability of international disputes draw much 
more from the work of Hans Kelsen than from Schmitt, in that they depend upon the possibility of a 
universal sphere of norms within which to judge international disputes. As has been made clear in the 
earlier parts of this thesis, Schmitt’s legal theories were composed in direct and polemical opposition to 
Kelsen’s, so it is perhaps no surprise that this is the same basic problem that divides Morgenthau and 
Schmitt more generally.
34 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p 4.
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realism -  that politics is governed by objective laws -  with the sceptic’s caveat that the 
truth of those laws will be forever disguised.
Nevertheless, if Carr is to be faulted for his identification of ‘wishful thinking’ with 
idealism, then Morgenthau must suffer the same judgement for saying 
distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion -  between what is true objectively 
and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a 
subjective judgement, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and 
wishful thinking.’35
William Scheuerman has written an influential book on Carl Schmitt’s legal theory 
entitled Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law, at the end of which he enters the world of IR 
Theory in order to make a comparison between Schmitt and Morgenthau, of which he 
has this to say;
both theorists were proponents of a tradition of Realist thinking in 
international politics, defended forcefully in Western political philosophy 
by thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes3
Aside from the obvious problem of conceiving of the realist tradition in this way -  
along with the anachronism that it existed as an independent strand of thought with its 
own conditions, and of which Machiavelli and Hobbes would have been aware, let 
alone ‘forcefully defended’ -  Scheuerman goes on to divide Realism into two distinct 
types; ‘Realism for War’ and ‘Realism for Peace’.37 This bears an odd resemblance to a 
contemporary division within realism between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ forms of 
realism.38 Nevertheless in the context of a comparison between Morgenthau and 
Schmitt, it fails to capture the central dilemma between the two. Morgenthau turns to a 
notion of tragedy, and tragic realism, because he cannot abandon the idea of good and 
evil in the world. Schmitt places good and evil in the service of the friend / enemy 
distinction, as part of the transcendent idealisations that entail from the human need to 
render the external world comprehensible through the nominalising process of framing 
conceptual oppositions. That the political reduces to a friend / enemy distinction is for
35 Ibid.
36 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law, p 246.
37 Ibid.
38 Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate’, in International 
Security, Volume 24, Issue 1, 1999.
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Schmitt the source of meaning, without which there would be no framework of 
opposites (complexio oppositorium) to act as a panorama of interpretation. The friend / 
enemy distinction is a precondition of social life, without which the world would be not 
simply dangerous or even evil, but incomprehensible.
The challenge presented by this radical moral and legal indeterminism is surely not 
overcome with the simple suggestion that he was ‘wrong about that’ -  that a universally 
applicable standard of the good does apply -  for that would be to refute not simply 
Schmitt, but also Nietzsche and a large family of idealists, sceptics, relativists, post­
positivists, post modernists etc. The greater challenge of Carl Schmitt is first to grasp 
the problem of moral and legal indeterminacy, or the dependent relationship of ethics on 
the political, and then explain what to do about it. However, Scheuerman’s critique can 
be seen as part of the continuing process of theory-political interventions by which 
International Relations has evolved, so cannot be entirely dismissed. Furthermore, he 
goes on to reference an important debate concerning their actual -  rather than their 
theoretical -  relationship.
The strangest story concerning the relationship between Morgenthau and Schmitt is the 
accusation that Schmitt somehow stole Morgenthau’s idea concerning the prioritisation 
of the political.39 This refers to the differences between the 1927 and the 1932 editions 
of The Concept o f the Political. In the first edition, Schmitt apparently echoed Weber in 
placing the political on the same level as other spheres of human activity; and in the 
second edition, the political is placed before other spheres -  as interpreted from the 
beginning of this thesis -  and measured by a degree of intensity rather than any specific 
characteristics. Morgenthau claimed that this conceptual innovation originated in his 
written response to Schmitt’s first edition of The Concept o f the Political, which 
comprised his doctoral thesis and which he had sent to Schmitt.40 Apparently Schmitt 
was so impressed he invited Morgenthau to meet him, a meeting that Morgenthau 
recalled with the deep hostility that prefigured his description of Schmitt as ‘the most 
evil man alive.’41
39 William Scheuerman, ‘Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau’, in Michael C. Williams (ed.), Realism 
Reconsidered, p 63.
40 Ibid.
41 Pichler, ‘The godfathers of truth’, op. cit., p 192.
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What is interesting about this account is simply that Schmitt follows through with this 
element of his theory, whereas Morgenthau distances himself from it by inserting the 
conditioning panorama of universal ethics into his formulations.42 For it is precisely this 
prioritisation of the political that militates against the judgement of ethics on political 
decisions, exactly that which gives life to Morgenthau’s political realism and three of 
his ‘Six Principles’. And it is this embedded universalism -  implicit within most forms 
of Realism -  that allows a self-confessed liberal such as Scheuerman to find 
Morgenthau a more appealing figure than Schmitt.43 Furthermore, although 
Scheuerman’s critique of Schmitt is to my mind unpersuasive, he nevertheless makes it 
easier to see that the proper distinction between Schmitt and Morgenthau is located in 
their differing relationship to ethics. Morgenthau, despite claiming credit for Schmitt’s 
innovative rendering of the ethical in the service of a prioritised political distinction 
between friend and enemy, nevertheless retains a Machiavellian commitment to the 
existence of an independent sphere of ethics by which the political can be judged -  
following Stebbing -  even if it is to be judged a necessary evil.44 But, if Morgenthau 
can really be excused from following through with Schmitt’s (or his own) prioritisation 
of the political domain, then it is difficult to see how he can simultaneously be credited 
with it. If Morgenthau really did originate the idea that the political was a prior sphere 
of human activity characterised by a degree of intensity -  allegedly appropriated by 
Schmitt -  then what remains confusing is why only Schmitt engages properly with this 
conceptual formulation?
What all this demonstrates is that although Schmitt does bear comparison to some 
realist thinkers, the differences are striking. First of all, he follows Hegel and Weber 
with his philosophical idealism and his attempt to engage with the world through 
conceptual speculation rather than firm ontological assertion. His basic conceptual 
formulations lead ineluctably to a world directly shaped by the manner of its 
conceptualisation, and he does not ground his analysis at any stage in a firm ontological
42 Confirmed by none other than William Scheuerman, ‘Was Morgenthau a realist?: Revisiting Scientific 
Man vs Power Politics1, Constellations, 2007, Volume 14, Issue 4, but also supported by Jiitersonke -  
‘The image of law in Politics Among Nations1, op. cit., and indeed Chris Brown in “‘The Twilight of 
International Morality”? Hans J. Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt on the end of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum’, in Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered.
43 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End o f Law.
44 A view confirmed by Michael C. Williams in his deep reading of Morgenthau, in The Realist Tradition 
and the Limits o f International Relations, p 94.
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framework of given ‘facts’. Even his grandest historical rendering of the opposed 
relationship between land and sea,45 relies upon the manner of their historical 
apprehension rather than an opposition of their material qualities. Carr manages to come 
up with remarkably similar criticisms of the liberal world order to Schmitt’s, while 
doing so on the basis of a critique of utopianism. Michael Cox and Peter Wilson have 
challenged Carr’s characterisation as a realist46 -  and even Scheuerman has called into 
question Morgenthau’s classification as a realist47 -  but his expression of a general 
attachment to philosophical realism does arguably emerge in his slow migration towards 
a historical materialist theoretical disposition. So although the criticisms of Leonard 
Woolf and Susan Stebbing certainly stand with regard to The Twenty Years' Crisis, 
Carr’s implicit response -  by edging closer to a more fully formed materialism -  at least 
shores up his credentials as a philosophical realist, if not a realist in IR.
Morgenthau on the other hand straddles the division between philosophical idealism 
and realism. He remains committed to the ‘objective laws’ of political realism, while 
invoking Machiavellian logics concerning the tension between what should be done and 
what must be done. Thus the true dilemma of a tragic vision of politics is the casting of 
ideals that are necessarily unrealisable, as a way of measuring human conduct; one way 
among many to remain committed to the ideal of humanity, while simultaneously 
defending the necessary evil. Schmitt’s response to this dilemma, as the previous 
chapters have hopefully demonstrated, was to rail against the invidious concept of 
humanity, and by doing so retain a consistency to his attempts to formulate an idealised 
system of conceptual reference points for the interpretation of concrete human life. In 
other words, Carr turns to the motors of history and economics to understand existence, 
Morgenthau paints a picture of a liberal heaven against which to contrast tragically the 
real behaviour of the power hungry animal called man, and Schmitt attempts to 
establish a set of conceptual tools to understand the ideas that condition the behaviour 
of man. For Morgenthau morality acts as an inefficient -  but crucial -  restraint on 
human conduct, whereas for Schmitt, the friend / enemy distinction sets the terms for 
human interaction, and by extension makes it comprehensible; an existential contract 
within which morality is a mere sub-clause.
45 Schmitt, Land and Sea.
46 Wilson, ‘The Myth of the First Great Debate’, op.cit., and Cox ‘Will the real E.H.Carr please stand 
up?’, op. cit.
Scheuerman, ‘Was Morgenthau a realist?’, op. cit.
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Both Morgenthau and Carr share a commitment to the world ‘as it is’, although for very 
different reasons, they are -  with Realism in IR -  ‘of the world’. Schmitt on the other 
hand, is constantly engaged in the struggle of idealisations, and is thus the more 
authentic inheritor of Nietzsche’s value relativism and Weber’s idealism than 
Morgenthau. In any event, Schmitt’s radical idealism presents grave problems for any 
interpretation of him as a realist, particularly in IR.
Neo-Realism
When first approaching the discipline of International Relations, an unavoidable early 
encounter is made with the concept of ‘levels of analysis’, usually as outlined by 
Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, and in order to offer some Schmittian 
insights, this text will be taken as representative of the whole.49 The concept of levels of 
analysis is not unique to IR theory, originating instead in the philosophy of science, 
which helps to situate the emergence of neo-realism within the broad move towards 
scientific methods that characterised the discipline of IR in the post-war world.
Man, the State and War has been a hugely important text, and at the very least 
constitutes a very powerful kind of Skinnerian theory-politics in itself. Perhaps it said 
little that was new in and of itself, but it did frame the whole question of war and 
International Relations in a powerful and systemic manner, providing a whole new 
language and set of conceptual conventions which arguably constrained and limited the 
practice of International Relations in such a way as to legitimate the practice of Cold 
War balancing; or at least this would be a Skinnerian reading. However, when examined 
from a Schmittian perspective neo-realism seems an insufficient tool of analysis. On the 
one hand, the proposition that the individual cannot be understood outside of a social 
context -  Schmitt’s Rousseauian inheritance -  makes the ‘first image’ problematic, but 
on the other hand, prioritising the category of ‘the state’ prevents an examination of the 
means by which a political collective understands itself as such, and forces an 
acceptance of a strong distinction between civil wars and inter-state wars without any
481 would go further and suggest that Morgenthau’s attempts to ‘reconstruct liberalism’ -  discussed in 
some detail by Michael Williams -  as a form of what Nietzsche would have criticised as ‘pale atheism’, 
but that is outside the scope of this thesis.
49 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959).
156
examination of the juridical conditions that make this possible. Therefore neither of 
these images can be said to develop from a set of linguistic conventions, or context, 
which Schmitt had any hand in producing.
Given that Schmitt was actively investigating the state as a normative artefact, the 
whole discourse of neo-realism shares only a minimal fit with his thinking. Of course 
Waltz makes the point that it is ultimately in the ‘third image’ that we can pare down 
the problem of war to the basic and relatively unproblematic variable of relative state 
power in an anarchic international system, but even this analysis relies upon a degree of 
conceptual stability when thinking about the units, not to mention the Schmittian 
critique of both power and anarchy offered earlier in this chapter. A stability which, 
given the mutability of the friend / enemy distinction, is difficult to sustain from a 
Schmittian perspective. The point worth making at this stage is that if Schmitt’s 
Concept o f the Political is viewed as a kind of rhetorical move in which the state is 
undermined by the positing of a prior political category, then Waltz’s focus on the state, 
or more particularly the state system -  when viewed against the backdrop of Schmitt’s 
long obituary for the European state system50 -  bears no genuine comparison. 
Furthermore, Waltz gets his ahistoricism in early with his easy comparison of the state 
thinking of both Plato and Rousseau et al. -  the unexplored merging of the classical and 
the modem -  which places his analysis at odds with the ‘conceptual historical’ accents 
within this thesis as a whole. This is not to say that these comparisons cannot be made, 
but when these comparisons inform an entire ‘image’ of Waltz’s theory of structural 
realism, this in itself gives reason to suspect that structural realism -  from a Schmittian 
point of view -  is little more than a tottering edifice of egregious assumptions; that in 
turn may possess logical clarity and explanatory potential, but may also lead to some 
spectacularly odd prescriptions.
In the first instance, Waltz’s text, Man, the State, and War, is an analysis based on three 
distinct categories of evaluation, each organised to make sense of the bewildering array 
of possible answers to the simple question, ‘Where are the major causes of war to be 
found?’51 However, the true novelty of this book is not the categorical framing -  despite 
the influence this has had on IR and the question of ‘levels of analysis’ -  but instead the
50 Schmitt, Nomos.
51 Waltz, Man, the State and War, p 12.
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suggestion that the entire discipline can be understood in respect of a limited curiosity, 
very much in keeping with the outline -  in Chapter 3 -  of this thesis. One need not 
agree with the wording of the question Waltz formulates to see that this simple 
theoretical innovation allowed Waltz to produce one of the most theoretically influential 
and conceptually ambitious texts in the history of the discipline. Although it is 
interesting to note that this forms only one paragraph of the entire book, demonstrating 
that he was clearly more invested in the categorical typology than in justifying the 
process of inquiry.
Without overstating, Waltz’s analysis can be read as a work of ideas about ideas, and if 
it had included a deeper discussion of the philosophical commitments and assumptions 
of his research, and the ontological bias in the manner in which the original question 
was framed, it might have been titled ‘Ideas about man, the state, and war.’ To put it 
simply, Waltz moves from comparing different answers to the same basic question, to 
positing a theory based upon the truth of his organisational method. However, the 
categories of ‘man’ and ‘the state’ are, and remain, deeply contested. This is 
acknowledged explicitly by Waltz but the difficulty and contestability of each is the 
central reason why the third image comes into focus as the arbitrative medium for the 
resolution of his central question of the whole discipline of IR. Which brings the whole 
discussion full circle. Waltz offers a series of reasons why theories drawn from the first 
and second images cannot fully answer the question ‘Where are the major causes of war 
to be found?’ and in the light of this, offers the non-existence of a global leviathan as 
the key -  although he calls it a ‘permissive’ -  causal factor. However, from an idealist 
perspective, a permissive cause is less a cause than a pernicious abstraction. On the one 
hand, it is well known that a negative cannot be proved, but Waltz goes beyond this, 
suggesting that a negative -  in itself -  can act as the reconciling element within his 
theory.
Furthermore, and in a very direct sense, his theory can be read as an appeal for a global 
leviathan, for if this is the sole reason why war persists, no other conclusion can be 
drawn from a work of theory that views this as its central problem. And with this in 
mind, even the prescription of Waltz’s text can be viewed in terms amenable to the most
52 Waltz, Man, the State and War, p 232.
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basic kind of utopianism, but particularly as a work of philosophical idealism, where 
concepts precede objects. However, even if it is assumed that Waltz’s work is analytical 
in form and has no normative aspiration, he nevertheless relies upon the conceptual 
form of a global leviathan -  in spite of, and in fact because of, its lack of material 
expression -  as a central proof of his argument. It is because a global leviathan can be 
imagined, without any evidence of its existence -  a concept without an object -  that 
permits Waltz’s work to be understood. His conclusion that the first two images act as 
the forces of world politics -  where one recedes the other advances -  and the third 
image as the necessary missing element in any explanation for the continuation of war 
introduces the possibility that everything is to be done, or nothing. That either 
optimistic utopianism or pessimistic realism are equally reasonable -  or equally 
irrelevant -  responses to the problem of war.
Yet there are moments in his text that lead in another direction, a more Schmittian 
direction, and assist in unpicking the metronomic practicalities of a neo-realist world. 
The three images are acknowledged as productive assumptions for the organisation of a 
meta-theory of International Relations, and towards the end of his book he 
acknowledges that the three are interdependent, that human nature shapes society, that 
society shapes human nature, and that the international system -  or rather, absence of a 
monopoly of force at the level of the international -  also interacts both with domestic 
politics and with -  arguably -  human nature. Unfortunately, this organising triad of 
man, state, and international system, are not -  by his own admission -  comparable 
elements. The first two are assumed to relate to really existing things, the third to an 
absence of a thing. If a semblance of world government ever emerged -  even as an idea 
-  then the third image would disappear, subsumed by the second within a potentially 
feeble grasp, but nevertheless, only two images would be available as an organising 
duality. Most explanations for war could -  according to the same underlying Waltzian 
logic -  henceforth be made by reference to the feebleness of ‘world government’, rather 
than its absolute absence, which would be a second-image explanation rather than a 
third-image permissive cause. The Schmittian direction is revealed by the potential for a 
triadic system to disguise a potential underlying dyadic system similar to that discussed 
in when considering The Concept o f the Political in Chapter 1.
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None of this is to explain the continuing appeal of neo-realism, which has, and 
continues to have many adherents. The systemic formulae devised by Waltz and 
elaborated in his Theory o f International Politics have an attractive simplicity.53 But the 
third image necessarily assumes a mind independent reality, and the idea of a mind 
capable of stepping outside of its context to judge and compare the actions of like units 
in a context of anarchy. Despite its meta-theoretical appearance, neo-realism is rooted in 
an analysis of the external world that is independent of it. It is an attempt to set out a 
ontological vision of the world ‘as it is’ with little acknowledgement of the 
epistemological straightjacket at its heart. It has left a legacy of theorising the status 
quo, according to a grand theoretical construct, itself based upon the assumed truth of a 
negative. The ‘levels of analysis’ problem is the key theoretical crutch for the entire 
spectrum of neo-realism thought. Acknowledged as a lens, it inevitably serves as 
justification. The third image of the international system represents the commitment 
neo-realism has to the external world, such that a real absence of a thing imagined -  a 
global leviathan -  can be considered in some way causally related to the real existence 
of something that IR has only imagined -  dreamed even -  the absence of since its 
inception; ‘that miserable condition of Warre’.54
Once again, this thesis seeks only to explain the differences between a neo-realist 
approach and a Schmittian approach to IR. Neo-realism is a coherent complex of 
assumptions and general laws, very much situated in the world of ontological assertions 
and explanations. And although most neo-realists do not claim to be accurately 
theorising the real world, so much as providing mechanisms for its simplification, 
interpretation and for the guidance of action, epistemological inquiry about underlying 
concepts, legal justification and the conceptual fluidity of assumed units can only serve 
to modify the assumptions built into the workings of the ontologically rooted model. 
Therefore, neo-realism, being ‘of the world’, holds on to and intensifies the classical 
realist prioritisation of ontology above epistemology in the manner in which it frames 
its theory-political interventions over the persistent dilemmas of IR. So not only can 
Schmitt be distanced from Carr and Morgenthau’s versions of realism, he shares little or 
nothing with neo-realism.
53 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), in which Waltz entirely 
dismisses the first two images and concentrates on setting out a completely systemic theory.
54 Hobbes, Leviathan, p 223.
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Contemporary Realisms
Criticism of neo-realism formed a key strand of argument within what became known 
as the second ‘great debate’ in IR, between behaviouralists and classical theorists. 
However, without going into any detail about the broader arguments, the recent 
recovery of Hans J. Morgenthau, and indeed Schmitt himself -  wearing his realist mask 
-  owes something to a general dissatisfaction with the polarity and sterility of the neo- 
neo debate of the 1980s. Accordingly, there has been something of a (re)tum to classical 
theory that is arguably responsible for much of the contemporary interest in Schmitt 
from within International Relations, certainly with respect to the literature that this 
thesis has concentrated on. Two new forms of Realism are of particular importance 
because Schmitt occupies an important role in the argumentation of each. They are 
Wilful Realism, which forms part of Michael C. Williams’ general attempt to breath 
new life into Realism, and recover interest in the Classical Realist scholars,55 and 
Realist Institutionalism, as theorised by Alessandro Colombo.56
Wilful Realism
Morgenthau takes centre stage in a book by Michael Williams entitled The Realist 
Tradition and the Limits o f International Relations, in which he attempts to excavate a 
more sophisticated understanding of Realism based upon a reinvigorated analysis of 
some canonical thinkers. For Williams, Hobbes, Rousseau and Morgenthau have 
become hollow caricatures, yet when re-examined have much to offer. He argues that 
‘far from supporting claims about International Relations as an inevitable ‘state of 
nature’, or a realm of realpolitik, these thinkers actually develop understandings of 
International Relations that profoundly challenge many of the dominant claims which 
they are today used to support.’57 It is to this book that I am indebted for many insights 
into Morgenthau’s work, but I also suggest that Williams interpretation downplays the 
opposed relationship between philosophical idealism and realism. Accordingly, 
Williams makes the case unanswerable that Morgenthau is more than the ‘Six 
Principles’58 just as Hobbes and Rousseau are also far greater thinkers than a brief
55 Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits o f International Relations, and Williams, Realism 
Reconsidered: The Legacy o f Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations.
56 Colombo, ‘The “realist institutionalism” of Carl Schmitt’, op. cit.
57 Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits o f International Relations, p 4.
58 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p 4.
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analysis of their place in IR would suggest. But he leaves unanswered the extent to 
which his proposed revolution in Realism owes much insights more commonly 
associated with philosophical idealism.
Simply put, Williams’ three components of what he terms ‘Wilful Realism’ are as 
follows; scepticism concerning knowledge claims, which is ‘taken as a challenge 
requiring the active construction of political and social order’. This is followed by a 
condition of relationality, meaning no ‘fixed or given’ nature of ‘either the self or 
political order’; and the last component is that of ‘power politics’.59 Setting aside the 
last component, the first two are clearly implicated as part of a philosophical disposition 
that prioritises ideas over objects.60 That objects have no fixed or given nature and that 
scepticism gives rise to a need to ‘construct ... political and social order’, sounds 
remarkably opposed to a vision of a reality governed by objective laws as referred to by 
an orthodox reading of Morgenthau’s ‘Six Principles’, or even Carr’s early statements 
concerning the confusion between the ‘optative’ and the ‘indicative’. Indeed it seems 
more like a version of constructivism. The last component -  that of ‘power politics’ -  is 
outwardly a realist concern, but has an odd feel when set alongside the second 
component of relationality, for power is inherently relational -  as discussed in the 
earlier part of this chapter, and following both Oakeshott and Schmitt -  which gives the 
inclusion of ‘power politics’ in Williams’ schematic the appearance of a conceptual 
afterthought, or perhaps a votive offering on the altar of disciplinary inclusion.
I should stress that I largely agree with Williams’ interpretations of Hobbes, Rousseau 
and to a great extent Morgenthau, I simply suggest that Wilful Realism offers an 
opportunity to rethink Realism beyond the philosophical parameters that most realists 
would be entirely comfortable with, although I acknowledge that Realism remains a 
contested domain -  and that this chapter can be counted an intervention within that 
ongoing contest for the soul of Realism. Williams makes this particularly clear where he 
offers a detailed reinterpretation of the ‘Six Principles of Political Realism’ that 
specifically subverts their orthodox interpretation as providing a fundamentally 
materialist logic to Morgenthau’s thinking, and therefore that of Realism more
59 Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits o f International Relations, p 5.
60 And they are of a piece with the title of another of Williams’ articles, ‘Why Ideas Matter in 
International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power 
Politics’, in International Organization, Volume 58,2004.
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generally.61 There are two reasons for this: first of all; although I concede that 
Morgenthau has been done an injustice by his reduction to the implied (even if 
incorrectly) materialism of the ‘Six Principles’ it should also be acknowledged that he 
wrote them, and he therefore must be considered complicit in his own conceptual 
truncation.
Secondly, and more importantly, there is a fundamental philosophical dilemma in the 
very words chosen by Williams to describe his notion of Realism -  Wilful Realism. 
The use of the word ‘wilful’ introduces a huge problem into the idea of ‘realism’. Will, 
describes what has become understood as the capacity of agency, or in simple terms, the 
means by which reality is altered according to some inner desire, and represents an 
emphatic assertion of the priority of concept over object. Will is exclusively a part of 
the idealist philosophical tradition along with its sense that reality is a secondary 
artefact of a system of ideas. Wilful Realism is therefore rather a surprising conceptual 
juxtaposition, deliberately so, but rendered more so when Schopenhauer -  the principle, 
important theorist of ‘will’ before Nietzsche -  is unmasked as a profound and absolute 
idealist philosopher for whom the idea of ontology was hidden behind the veil of 
‘Maya’, and for whom ‘everything that exists for knowledge, and hence the whole of 
this world, is only an object in relation to the subject, perception of the perceiver, 
representation’, which he offers as an extended comment on the opening line of his 
principal work, ‘The world is my will and representation’.63 It could be argued that this 
is a philosophical distraction, not central to the points made in his book, however I 
would argue that it lends un-stated context to Williams’ argument, and has a direct point 
in respect of the argument in this thesis. If Realism is taken to be a body of comparable 
theory-political interventions within the wider scheme of IR -  united as it is by a 
persistent set of questions and dilemmas concerning collective identity and legitimate 
violence -  then what unites Realism is a hostility to the idea of progress in history, and 
a tendency to frame arguments in terms of ontological categories. And it is against this 
test that Wilful Realism fails to qualify as Realism. I should also add that Williams’
611 could draw upon a wide variety of texts to make this point, but fortunately Williams usefully 
concedes it, in The Realist Tradition and the Limits o f International Relations, p 109.
62 Although it should be noted that the rhetorical tactic of prefacing an old descriptive term -  Realism -  
with a new and seductive partner -  Wilful -  is classic Skinnerian theory-politics.
63 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, § 1.
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extensive efforts to escape the ‘tyranny of false polarities’ is to set aside what I regard 
to be a productive tension within the broader discipline of IR.
Williams certainly demonstrates the value of Morgenthau as a theorist ready for 
reappraisal,64 but it is difficult to simultaneously credit him with profound insights into 
the workings of the real world and its ‘objective laws’, exonerate him from a superficial 
interpretation of the ‘Six Principles’ that he himself wrote as a set of summary 
principles, and co-opt him into an apparently idealist attempt to reconstruct the realist 
tradition within IR around a ‘wilful’ conception of Realism.65
One last point worth making within the context of this thesis concerns Williams’ 
extensive use of Schmitt to make his argument. This thesis has already established the 
inherent idealism in Schmitt’s work, and the manner in which -  although he shares with 
Realism a profound hostility or mistrust of the idea of progress in history -  he 
prioritises epistemology over ontology. The fact that Schmitt plays a central role in 
Williams’ reinterpretation of Realism, and serves to support the radical scepticism and 
therefore epistemological bias within Wilful Realism also hints at the dangers implicit 
in assuming that Schmitt is indeed comparable with Realism in IR, for if ‘realist 
Schmitt’ is replaced with ‘idealist Schmitt’ then Wilful Realism becomes more than a 
simple critique of Realism in IR, resembling instead a refutation of its key assumptions.
Realist Institutionalism
One final form of Realism worth discussing is what Alessandro Colombo has called 
‘realist institutionalism’; formulating this term in order to describe Schmitt above all 
other theorists. Colombo’s insightful and thorough reading of Schmitt contains these 
words: ‘That Carl Schmitt belongs to the realist tradition cannot be seriously put into 
doubt.’66 I therefore need to make some explanation for why I disagree, but in doing so 
I hope to reveal more of the ambiguity associated with the term Realism. For although
64 Going on to do just that, in Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy o f Hans J. Morgenthau.
65 Interestingly, although Michael C. Williams expands and reinterprets realism in order to lead it in the 
direction of philosophical idealism, Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics, 
(London: Routledge, 1992), argues that Morgenthau and Waltz are both better understood as idealists in 
the first place. I take Griffiths’ point, but mention it merely to make clear the mutability of these terms, 
and therefore these theorists.
66 Colombo, ‘The “realist institutionalism” of Carl Schmitt’, in Odysseos and Petito (eds.) The 
International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt, p 22.
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Colombo makes this initial statement, the rest of his article is an explanation of the 
specific and important differences between Schmitt’s theories and the Realism of 
Morgenthau and Waltz. His account differs in the detail from the account offered above, 
but not in substance, and, as with Michael Williams’ efforts to reinterpret Realism, I 
suggest that it is with Colombo’s use of the word Realism that this thesis differs in 
interpretive focus.
Colombo’s basic point is that Schmitt gives an account of institutions rather than power 
politics, and rejects the view ‘that international politics has remained immutable 
through the centuries’.67 In this way does Schmitt fail to conform to a realist worldview. 
Furthermore, he adds that ‘(i)nstitutions are not conceived as substitutes for the realist 
game of international politics; instead it is the realist game of international politics that 
is conceived of as an institution.’
Using the simple definitions of philosophical idealism and realism outlined in this thesis 
-  that of the opposing hierarchies of concepts and objects -  it is clear at this point that 
Schmitt’s focus on concepts -  of law, of sovereignty, and all the other arguments in this 
thesis -  secures him a place in the idealist camp even for Colombo. But examining 
Colombo’s account of Realism further distances Schmitt from Realism, for even in his 
own words -  realist institutionalism -  he is attempting to breath life into a ‘concept, 
which can legitimately seem an oxymoron in contemporary International Relations 
theory, since most institutionalists reject realist assumptions and most realists reject the 
role of institutions.’69 And a further quote:
Schmitt explicitly puts the significance of anarchy into perspective, not 
only by recognizing that order can exist in anarchy, as realists and neo­
realists also do, but, beyond them, by understanding that the international 
order is something more than the {ever changing) result of power relations: 
it also depends, at a more profound level, on a {more persistent) set of 
political, juridical and cultural restrictions which over the last three 
centuries, have allowed international competition to develop according to 
certain rules and, above all, in keeping within certain limits;7
67 Ibid., p 25.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p 22.
70 Ibid., p 23.
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Here, Colombo comes perilously close to admitting Schmitt’s basic philosophical 
idealism, with his prioritisation of the conditioning power of ideas. I would take his 
analysis further and suggest that those ‘certain rules’ were embedded within the 
articulation of the grand European friend / enemy distinction outlined in The Nomos o f 
the Earth. To recognise one’s enemy is also to know the terms of any permissible 
relationship with the enemy. Following this, the account Schmitt gives of European 
order is founded upon a basic level of respect for other Europeans that allowed the 
conditioning friend / enemy distinction of those ‘three centuries’ to be that between 
Europeans and non-Europeans. Competition between Europeans took a rule bound form 
in Europe and thus war was humanized -  and importantly de-politicised -  in Europe, 
according to Schmitt. Real enmity existed outside of the European space where the 
European domination of the non-European was a pre-agreed norm of intra-European 
relations. Thus, even the most existential conflict was conducted according to 
institutionalised norms of interaction, mediated by the institutionalised expression of a 
spatial distinction between Europe and non-Europe.
In arguing against Colombo’s use of the term Realism -  as in realist institutionalism - 1 
will stress again, that I find his interpretation of Schmitt utterly compelling, the 
difficulty hangs solely on his seeming need to hang on to the category of Realism. It 
could be argued that I am offering only the most basic distinction between idealism and 
realism in order to illuminate my account of IR theory, but if both Williams and 
Colombo have to redefine Realism -  and each in different ways -  in order to claim that 
Schmitt and others remain fundamentally ‘realists’, I hope this gives pause for a deeper 
reconsideration. A multitude of different understandings of Realism does not add clarity 
to an interpretation of Schmitt or anyone else. Colombo is absolutely right to highlight 
Schmitt’s institutionalism, and while this does not make him a liberal, or a utopian, it 
does nevertheless make him a philosophical idealist more than a realist. Furthermore, 
the distinction between a theorist who prioritises objects over concepts and one who 
prioritises concepts over objects does allow for a clearer topography of conceptual 
relationships to emerge within IR. And it is for this reason that I highlight Schmitt’s 
idealism, for it allows a much more productive set of theoretical relationships to be 
established in exactly the area that Colombo identifies, between Schmitt and the English 
School. This however, will be dealt with in Chapter 7.
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Conclusion
What this chapter has demonstrated, I hope beyond doubt, is that Realism in IR -  
however defined -  is a derivative expression of philosophical realism, rooted in the 
basic proposition that the external world is independent of its interpretation, and 
reducible to a series of testable facts. The Classical Realism of Morgenthau and Carr 
looks to history to find patterns of human behaviour expressed through political 
collectives. Themes such as the balance of power, the pragmatic use of state power, and 
the cyclical nature of the rise and decline of power predominate, along with a critical 
disposition towards the prevailing historical progressivism of inter-war liberalism. Neo- 
Realism on the other hand, moves away from history and focuses on transhistorical 
reflexive frameworks in which the balance of power and the ‘levels of analysis’ have 
theoretical primacy.
Nevertheless, with Rengger, and by extension Oakeshott, this thesis holds that Realism
71-  classical and neo -  is a ‘child of the world’, in that it makes ‘the world’ the standard. 
Whereas other approaches to IR make the manner of the world’s conceptualisation the 
standard, believing the world itself to be largely hidden behind its interpretation. 
Imagined this way, Realism emerges not as a tradition united by muscular cynicism, nor 
even the dominant tradition within IR, but instead as a broad philosophically coherent 
location from which to launch theory-political interventions over the unifying family of 
questions that inhabit and cohere the discipline of IR -  concerned as it is with collective 
identity and legitimate violence, framed either conceptually or objectively.
Two recent attempts to stretch the boundaries of Realism -  and therefore breath life into 
its failing conceptual strength following the theoretical onslaught of the 1990s -  have 
mobilised the work of the ‘arch-realist’ Carl Schmitt. However, in my view this has 
served merely to move Realism out of ‘the world’ and into the welcoming arms of the 
radical sceptics, idealists and the other-worldly shamans who hide behind the veil of 
‘Maya’, but who nevertheless posit their own epistemologically framed assaults on the 
heartland of IR Theory. That Schmitt was there all along may come as a surprise to 
some, but given his theological outlook, the inspiration he took from Kierkegaard and
71 Rengger, Realism, Tragedy and the Anti-Pelagian Imagination, p 131.
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Schopenhauer, and the radical indeterminacy of his conceptual formulations, perhaps 
not so surprising after all.
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Chapter 6 -  Partisan Politics, Marxism in IR
I  jumped up. “This is unthinkable! I t ’s stupid! Can’t you see that what you ’re plotting is 
... revolution?”
“Yes -  revolution! Why is that stupid? ”
“Stupid -  because there can’t be a revolution. Because our -  this is me talking, not you 
-  our revolution was the final one. And there cannot be any further revolutions o f any 
kind. Everybody knows tha t...”
Her brows make a sharp mocking triangle: “My dear, you are a mathematician. You ’re 
even more, you ’re a philosopher o f mathematics. So do this for me: Tell me the final 
number. ”
“The what? I ... I  don’t understand. What final number? ”
“You know -  the last one, the top, the absolute biggest. ”
“But 1-330, that’s stupid, Since the number o f numbers is infinite, how can there be a 
final one?”
“And how can there be a final revolution? There is no final one. The number o f 
revolutions is infinite, how can there be a final one? ”
Conversation between D-503 and 1-330 in Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We.
Introduction
The last chapter in this section is an attempt to make a head on comparison between 
what might be broadly termed the Marxist tradition in IR, and the thought of Carl 
Schmitt. The reason for this is threefold. First of all, Marx acts as a reference point for a 
particular brand of theorising, and given that Schmitt commented directly on Marx, 
there is at least some preliminary material to consider. Secondly, some of the early 
engagements with Carl Schmitt in the English language considered his relationship with 
the Frankfurt School1 and were followed by a self identified ‘post-Marxist’ 
interpretation.2 Lastly, the grouping of IR into three traditions -  one of which is Wight’s 
‘Revolutionism’ -  is both familiar and uncontroversial, and this chapter completes the 
trio of comparisons within this thesis. This is conducted on two basic grounds; a direct 
reading of the elements of Schmitt’s theory that pertain to Marxism along with a critical 
reading of his alternative formulations, followed by a critique of some contemporary 
areas of IR theory where Marxism is still openly acknowledged as an inspiration, which 
obviously takes a Schmittian character.
1 Ellen Kennedy, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School’, Telos 71 1987.
2 The work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau for example.
3 Martin Wight, International Theory, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), p 6.
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The structure of the chapter forms around a brief consideration of Schmitt’s comments 
on Marxism, and is followed by a more detailed reading and interpretation of his text, 
Theory o f the Partisan.4 Then an attempt is made to contextualise the nature of his 
relationship to Marxism by returning to the Hegelian elements within his thinking. This 
leads eventually to a the characterisation of Marxist theory along somewhat Weberian 
lines -  which should come as no surprise -  but also assists in further distancing the 
treatment of Schmitt within this thesis from the more directly political commentaries of 
the ‘post-Marxists’ and those primarily concerned with the politics of the exception.5 As 
the thesis is concerned with Schmitt’s relationship to International Relations, I am 
naturally more concerned to investigate the distance between a Schmittian interpretation 
of IR and the tradition of IR influenced -  directly or derivatively -  by Marx, in order to 
say something about them both.
Schmitt’s Critique of Marxism
Although it goes without saying that Schmitt was not a Marxist, his critique of Marxism 
is much more than simply a dismissal. In fact, as with his critique of liberalism -  to 
which he accorded a high degree of respect -  Schmitt shows some admiration for the 
simple dualism of class warfare, even finding an explanation for its appeal. As will be 
shown, his criticisms concerned the underlying assumptions that inhabit Marxism, and 
the inevitable conceptual limits to a Marxist political schema. In fact, reading Lenin, 
Trotsky and Mao reveals many pithy dualist formulations concerning the necessity of 
violence and the irreducible dichotomy of decisive political moments that echo Schmitt 
very clearly, and indeed might even be transposed directly on occasion. All of these 
theorists lived in a world of reductive oppositions, yet only for Schmitt did these 
oppositions end at a point of fundamental indeterminacy. For the other three, history 
had its forces, productive technology had its nature, and class was everywhere. For 
Schmitt, on the other hand, class was an invention; no more nor less than an idea. 
Socio-economic categories had no necessary political content, and Marxism served only 
to invest ambient socio-economic divisions with sufficient intensity as to become battle 
lines in a global war. For Marxists, this war would be the final war for humanity and for 
socialism. For Schmitt, the war would never end. So there are very distinct comparisons 
to be made between Schmitt and the Marxist tradition because Schmitt provides a fully
4 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan.
5 Chantal Mouffe, Giorgio Agamben, Hardt and Negri etc.
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realised critique of exactly the assumptions upon which much Marxist theory in IR 
rests.
In The Concept o f the Political, Schmitt makes the point very clearly:
The most conspicuous and historically the most effective example [of a 
dualist antithesis] is the antithesis formulated by Karl Marx: bourgeoisie 
and proletariat. This antithesis concentrates all antagonisms of world 
history into one single final battle against the last enemy of humanity. It 
does so by integrating the many bourgeois parties on earth into a single 
order, on the one hand, and likewise the proletariat, on the other. By doing 
so a mighty friend-enemy grouping is forged.6
Schmitt then goes on to contextualise this as taking place in the historical period after 
which the industrial society of England had triumphed over the military imperialism of 
Napoleon, and roots its origin in the liberal triumph of economics most accurately 
theorised by Benjamin Constant. To this extent, his critique of Marxism is not simply 
analogous to his critique of liberalism, but an extension thereof. And as if to add insult 
to injury, his critique of Marxism, in line with his critique of liberalism, ultimately 
treats it not as a philosophy of history, but merely one of a series of competing 
interpretive historical idealisations, one whose end is the same as that of liberalism; a 
‘final battle against the last enemy of humanity’. The only difference really amounts to 
where the respective friend-enemy distinction is made. For liberals, humanity becomes 
a series of moral demands against which to test individual behaviour, whereas for 
Marxists, disputations concerning class habits and the difference between the 
revolutionary and the reactionary mind predominate. Whatever shocks were to befall 
old fashioned Marxists when the gulag finally gave up its secrets, Schmitt’s account 
leaves little room for genuine surprise. Nor does it permit the interpretation of the gulag, 
the Cultural Revolution in China, and the killing fields of Cambodia as aberrant 
excesses, but instead reveals them as the inevitable and perpetual destination of 
materialist history as class borne destiny.
Schmitt deals more explicitly with Marxism in his earlier work, The Crisis o f 
Parliamentary Democracy, in which he goes into greater depth concerning the Hegelian 
dimension of Marxist thought, which could never be anything other than a direct
6 Schmitt, Concept o f the Political, p 74.
7 Ibid.
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refutation of the materialist philosophical commitments built into Marxism, particularly 
insofar as this dominates Marxist thinking in IR. Schmitt concentrates his criticisms on 
the manner in which the Hegelian notion of Geist or ‘world historical spirit’, is replaced 
by an ‘iron necessity’ of historical materialism,8 and goes on to suggest that this 
transforms the idea of dictatorship latent within Hegelian thought. To begin with, 
Schmitt casts the idea of Hegelian dictatorship as a ‘vanguard of the Weltgeist ... an 
avant-garde that has the right to act because it possesses correct knowledge and 
consciousness, not as the chosen of a personal God, but as a moment in development.’9 
He goes on to contrast this educative dictatorship -  which contains an inherent 
democratic dimension -  with the forceful assertiveness of a philosophy of material life, 
bom of scientific certainty. Despite Schmitt’s criticism of Hegelian dialectics and the 
implied sense of progress in his philosophy of history, he remains a Hegelian in the 
sense that he draws a distinction between the philosopher -  who is able to identify the 
world historical personalities of ‘Theseus, Caesar and Napoleon’10 -  and the individuals 
who are the instruments of the Weltgeist. Napoleon, who so impressed Hegel in Jena in 
1806, ‘was a soldier, not a Hegelian’.11 Two quotes neatly parenthesise Schmitt’s 
thoughts on the matter.
Only when it was scientifically formulated did socialism believe itself in 
possession of an essentially infallible truth, and just at that moment it 
claimed the right to use force.12
As Trotsky justly reminded the democrat Kautsky, the awareness of 
relative truth never gives one the courage to use force and to spill blood.13
What these quotes reinforce, is that Schmitt interpreted Marx fundamentally as a 
Hegelian, but one whose historical materialism was an unreflective condition of a 
particular historical consciousness, not to be taken too seriously, and in effect being the 
principle flaw in his work. To speak metaphorically, for Schmitt, Marx demanded that 
the owl of Minerva take flight only at the rising of the dawn, and rather than cast its 
wise eyes upon the passing day, it heralds the arrival of the light of historical 
materialism. For Schmitt, Marx, therefore, had failed to turn Hegel on his head, and had
8 Schmitt, The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy, p 53.
9 Ibid., p 58.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p 53.
13 Ibid., p 64.
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in fact worked entirely within the parameters of his philosophical outlines; except 
possibly in the one small regard of confusing a capacity to see the instrument of the 
world historical spirit, with becoming it.
The influence of Marx on International Relations is almost impossible to summarise. 
Marx himself saw the existence of states, and therefore a state system as part of the 
superstructure of capitalism, therefore in a sense, a Marxist or Marxian disposition 
inevitably arrives at ‘the international’ because its persistence represents a conceptual 
problem, rather than a simple state of affairs. However, it is perhaps worthwhile to deal 
with two general areas in which the influence of Marxism is widely acknowledged, and 
in each case, a couple of clear Schmittian critiques emerge. These two areas are; Critical 
Theory and International Political Economy. In both cases there are many theorists who 
would not identify Marx as an influence, but nevertheless, it could be argued that each 
area of research would look quite different were it not for the influence of Marx.
Critical Theory
In the first instance, Critical Theory14 probably has the closest direct association with 
Carl Schmitt. Ellen Kennedy identified the role he played in the early development of 
the Frankfurt School in an article written in 1986.15 This was met with extreme hostility 
in a series of follow up articles, which displayed at least some of the sensitivity covered 
in the introduction of this thesis.16 However, Kennedy further responded, restating her 
original charge that Schmitt was a prominent and openly acknowledged source of ideas 
for Otto Kircheimer, Franz Neumann and Walter Benjamin, even going so far as to 
detail the extent to which Theodore Adorno deliberately edited Benjamin’s work after 
the war to remove all of the extensive references to Schmitt, and the letters they 
exchanged from his published correspondence.17 This is a debate that could continue 
forever, the details of which are not important for this thesis, suffice that concerns about 
the connections between these various theorists centred on the question of divine 
violence, political theology, and even attitudes towards positive and natural law. In each
14 Critical Theory should be distinguished from the somewhat overused term ‘critical’, and here only 
refers to the long tradition of thought that emerged from the Frankfurt School, stopping short of the 
‘postmodern theorists’ often dubbed ‘critical’ within the discipline.
Ellen Kennedy, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School’, Telos 71, 1987.
16 Articles by Martin Jay, Ulrich Preuss, and Alfons SOllner published also in Telos 71,1987.
17 Ellen Kennedy, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School: A Rejoinder’, Telos 73, 1987.
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case, it is assumed by the defenders of the Frankfurt school that positions on these 
questions serve as entry requirements to the Frankfurt school, thus Schmitt -  on account 
of adhering to the wrong side of a settled argument -  can be safely excluded. Kennedy 
is, I think, right to insist that this is not her central concern, and that highlighting the 
rather obvious points of engagement between prominent Frankfurt school theorists and 
Carl Schmitt is treated with such hostility precisely because of some of the key 
normative assumptions of Frankfurt school theorists. The Frankfurt school was, after 
all, bom of the crisis caused by the rise of the Nazi party, and to admit of the influence 
of a theorist who went on to become a sometime Nazi apologist is clearly controversial, 
but nor can the connections be wished away. Kennedy’s point is not that Schmitt should 
be acknowledged as a member of the Frankfurt school, but that given the depth of the 
engagements between him and the three named theorists, he was more than simply a 
provocateur. Instead he set the conceptual context by clarifying certain important 
questions concerning violence, the political, and the problematic relationship between 
legality and legitimacy -  among other things, and in doing this, outlined the intellectual 
parameters of debates that the Frankfurt school took up. Schmitt and the Frankfurt 
school may have disagreed about the solution to the social and political dilemmas of 
Weimar Germany, but they certainly shared an appreciation of some of the problems.
When it comes to the discipline of International Relations, Critical Theory has a 
relatively short history, tracing back to Robert Cox and his seminal article ‘Social 
Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’.18 This article 
operates as a critique of the discipline, but quickly became a point of theoretical 
departure for a new approach to the persistent dilemmas of International Relations. 
Although Cox draws Marxian inspiration through Gramsci, he nevertheless directly 
asserts that Critical Theory derives from Historical Materialism, offered as a corrective 
to neo-realism.19 The problem of the international, according to Cox, is produced by 
underlying social and political evolutions, and has no standing independently of their 
historical form. Thus International Relations is not an free standing enquiry into the 
relations among an assumed category of social organisation; that being the state. Instead
18 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 10, No 2,1981.
19 Ibid., p 133.
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IR needs to take account of the social theoretical origins of both states and the 
international system.
Cox usefully refines Critical Theory into a series of five principles concerning its 
underlying philosophical commitments. One important dimension of Critical Theory, 
is that although it remains rooted in a materialist philosophy, it nevertheless places a 
strong emphasis on ideas, and in this respect, the five principles outlined by Cox relate 
largely to the world of ideas and their relation to action.21 Thus, although it would be 
wrong to reduce Critical Theory to a form of idealism, the stress is certainly placed on 
the obligations of a theorist to understand his or her role in constituting or reinforcing
the conditions within which certain ideas, ‘habits, pressures, expectations and
00constraints’ shape actions. Therefore -  and this is the really key component of Critical
Theory -  the last of Cox’s five principles concerns the pathos of the whole enterprise,
00which is oriented towards transformation and emancipation. Thus Critical Theory 
steps gingerly away from the ontological framing of classical Marxism, towards the 
contingent epistemological terrain of inter-subjective theory construction, while 
remaining firmly committed to the view of history as progressive rather than static or 
cyclical.24 Which in turn sets up the great disputes between ‘critical theorists’ and ‘post­
modern’ theorists over the concept of progress and the idea of modernity as an 
emancipatory project.25
When comparing Cox’s five rules to a Schmittian frame, it is possible to detect some 
minor differences, but mostly similarities; all except the orientation towards 
emancipation or transformation. To go through them in turn; an appreciation of the
20 Ibid., p 135.
21 Stephen Roach (ed) explicitly identifies the origins of Critical Theory in the tradition of German 
Idealism, before taking a materialist turn, in Critical Theory and International Relations: a reader, (New 
York: Routledge, 2008).
22 Ibid.
23 These criticisms -  just for the sake of space -  must be taken to be indicative rather than comprehensive, 
but insofar as Critical Theory has found expression in IR Theory, a brief glance at Mark Hoffman’s 
‘Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate’, in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies,
Volume 16, Issue 2, and Andrew Linklater’s ‘The Question of the Next Stage in IR Theory: A Critical 
Theoretical Point of View’, in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 21, Issue 1,1992, 
seem to bear out this somewhat insubstantial treatment.
24 A view also taken by Nick Rengger, who uses Oakeshott’s critique of Rationalism in Politics to tease 
out the progressive teleology in ‘Coxian Critical Theory’, in ‘Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman’, in 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 17, Issue 1, 1988.
25 Richard Beardsworth usefully reframes these debates in ‘The Future of Critical Theory and World 
Politics’, in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 34, Issue 1, 2005.
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‘human experience that gives rise to the need for theory’, knowledge that ‘the task of 
theory can never be finished in an enclosed system but must continually be begun 
anew’, that ‘the goal of theory is to understand’ how the ‘framework for action changes 
over time’, that ‘this framework has the form of an historical structure ... which has a 
certain coherence among its elements.’ All of the above apply to one extent or another 
to the kind of analysis and commentary that Schmitt concerned himself with throughout 
his life. The only real difference concerns the purpose of undertaking this study. For 
Critical Theorists, the goal is to create change; for Schmitt the goal is to properly 
understand, in order to preserve; an attempt to endow the past with its purpose and 
function in the guise of the present. In this respect Schmitt clearly holds on to a 
conservative Hegelian philosophical disposition, where Critical Theorists clearly inherit 
the radical orientation towards the future that is properly characteristic of Marx, even if 
their underlying materialism is somewhat disguised. Nevertheless, in terms of the 
relationship between Carl Schmitt and Critical Theorists, the political context of 
Weimar pulled each far enough away from the source of their theoretical impulses -  
Hegel and Marx respectively -  to be separated by little more than posture. Critical 
theorists differ from Schmitt because of their commitment to historical progress and 
emancipation, whereas for Schmitt, transformation has a dangerous appeal that will only 
serve to destroy the historically contingent expressions of order in which freedom and 
emancipation properly reside. This general conclusion is supported by a brief quote 
from an article by Ian Manners when referring to the relationship between Wight’s 
‘revolutionism’ and Critical Theory;
there is a tension here in that Wight’s revolutionism was clearly intended to 
include Marxist thinkers such as Immanuel Wallerstein and his ‘world 
system’ theory set firmly in the structuralist ‘paradigm’ of historical 
materialism. However, Critical Theorists try to distance themselves from the 
structuralism of Marxist thinking and its focus on historical materialism in
97order to refocus on the post-positivist approaches of discourse ethics.
Finally, the proposition that ‘theory is always for someone or some purpose’ may seem
98somewhat uncontroversial today, but this would ignore the importance of this insight
26 Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, p 135.
27 Ian Manners, ‘The Missing Tradition of the ES: Including Nietzschean Relativism and World 
Imagination in Extranational Studies’, in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 32, Issue 
2,2003, p 247.
28 The most famous of Cox’s maxims that he is credited with introducing into the discipline in ‘Social 
Forces, States and World Orders’, op. cit.
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for International Relations theory at the time it was formulated. Furthermore, Schmitt 
would find this insight entirely unsurprising -  as it is a version of his ‘concepts are 
always polemically directed against other concepts’29 -  and prefigures a latent 
conclusion within the whole thesis; that the practice of International Relations is an 
inherently polemical enterprise.
International Political Economy
International Political Economy is another field in which Marxism has had a strong 
influence in the field of International Relations. I do not intend to give much space to 
this comparison, suffice to point out the distance between a Schmittian mode of 
interpretation and any analysis that prioritises economics. Strangely enough, Robert 
Cox provides a useful distinction with which to clarify Schmitt’s relationship to Critical 
theory by separating Marxism into two different strands; one concerned with his 
philosophy of history, from which Cox claims Critical Theory inherits its use of Marx, 
and a more economistic strand, in which Marx lays the foundations for an unusually 
deep and thorough engagement with prevailing economic structures.30 He suggests that 
this latter strand flows through Althusser and is best understood as a way of 
interrogating the operation and dynamics of capitalism, rather than being too concerned 
with progress, even perhaps mitigating against political action, everything being to a 
large extent determined by the prevailing economic structure. The only argument to 
raise in this context is the extent to which it is possible to properly disaggregate the 
critique of capitalism from the philosophy of history in Marx. If Cox’s distinction is 
accepted, then it follows that the Marxist elements of IPE have no basis of comparison 
with Schmitt’s conceptual formulations for reasons stated above; but if it is rejected, 
and instead reasserted that Marx’s critique of capitalism is an integral part of his 
philosophy of history -  an indispensable aspect of the dialectical progression of history 
-  then Critical theory could be accused of only inheriting the elements of Marx that suit 
its radical transformative agenda. In other words, Critical Theory gains its normative 
agenda from somewhere other than Marx. For Marx, history does the work of 
emancipation as long as revolution constantly removes the obstacles; for Critical 
theorists, emancipation is the job of the theorist, implying that it must be imagined and
29 Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’.
30 Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, p 133.
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theorised before being brought about by political action; for Schmitt, history has no 
direction, and emancipation leads to anarchy.
Schmitt’s critique of Marxism is directed at its philosophy of history, its dialectics, and 
its sense of progress. But it is because Marxism constructs a grand polemical friend / 
enemy distinction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie that Schmitt finds it a 
worthy theoretical adversary. Schmitt therefore would clearly be resistant to the idea 
that Marx’s critique of capitalism could be disaggregated from the whole; for Schmitt, 
the analysis of capitalism is the summation of Marx’s philosophy of history, the very 
polemical point of it. Critical theory, on the other hand, inherits the emancipatory 
pathos from Marx -  apart from which Critical theory contains many elementary 
propositions that can be found in Schmitt’s work -  but relies upon a reduction of Marx 
-  by Cox at least -  to something that Schmitt would have found uninteresting, even
"X1perhaps ridiculous. Therefore returning to the direct comparison between Schmitt and 
the Frankfurt school, from which Critical theory -  via Habermas and into IR through 
Andrew Linklater -  derives much of its theoretical horsepower, it is possible to see that 
the similarities remain strong. However, it is ultimately Schmitt’s conservativism, his 
mistrust of transformation and emancipation, that make him such a problem figure, both 
for the Frankfurt school -  explaining the depth of hostility expressed against Ellen 
Kennedy’s now widely accepted observations -  and for the contemporary critical 
theorist. Without emancipation, without an underlying political project of 
transformation, Critical theory has little to offer IR that cannot be found in the work of 
Carl Schmitt along with many other so-called ‘post-modern’ theorists.32 But the search 
for the appropriate terms of transformation is also the central problem of Critical theory. 
Therefore, when viewed through a Schmittian lens, the only distinctive element offered 
to IR from Critical theory, is the problem at its heart; transform to what? Emancipate in 
what sense? And if Schmitt’s only contribution is a reminder that this problem is not yet
31 Schmitt, The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy, p 53. In another example of Schmitt’s ascerbic 
sarcasm he says ‘it would be peculiar to organize a political party for the achievement of a coming eclipse 
of the Sun’.
32 If anything, this lines Schmitt up alongside the post-modems, and helps contextualise Derrida’s 
flattering -  if not uncritical -  interest in Schmitt, but is again, not that surprising given the radical 
indeterminacy that characterises Schmitt’s work, along with his hostility to the idea of ‘progress’ and all 
the ‘closure’ that entails for post-modem theorists.
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resolved, then this is at least something, but it is also not surprising that critical theorists 
do not like to be asked the one question, above all, that they struggle to answer.33
The Partisan
What the above account reduces to is a demonstration that Schmitt’s relationship to the 
Marxist tradition is both hostile and critical, but nevertheless productive. There is little 
crossover between Schmitt and IPE for the simple reason that any body of theory that 
prioritises economics is bound to efface -  for Schmitt -  the political dimension, 
although the politicisation of the economic dimension is something he understood very 
well. However, the Marxist approach to IPE is at least prominently interested in the 
structural dimension of international relations, even if -  for Schmitt -  this could only 
apply in a specific historical context and be polemical in character. Critical theory, 
however, is much closer to Schmitt, sharing a similar intellectual focus, if not a 
polemical disposition. What both IPE and Critical Theory share, in distinction to the 
more formal elements of International Relations theory covered by the two previous 
chapters, is a similar sense that IR is neither simply a separate academic discipline, 
defined by a unique methodology nor merely a problem solving matter with 
conceptually assumed or ontologically given categories of actors. Instead, IR needs to 
be explained with reference to deeper social theoretical dimensions, particularly in 
respect of its own conditions of possibility. The Marxist tradition, in its various guises, 
offers a critique of IR by positing a deeper social theoretical engagement with 
institutions such as the state, or the international system, which can be taken rather for 
granted by many IR theorists. And this much, at least, they share with a Schmittian 
polemical / analytical disposition. However, there is one more comparison between 
Schmitt and Marxism worth making, which revolves around his essay Theory o f the 
Partisan?*
It might not be immediately clear what Schmitt’s work on the partisan has to do with 
Marxist approaches to IR, particularly given that recent work on Schmitt’s essay 
considers the extent to which it offers conceptual tools that allow for a greater 
understanding of the prevailing phenomenon of global terrorism, and hence the ‘war on
33 Once again, Richard Beardsworth’s article, ‘The Future of Critical Theory and World Politics’, 
demonstrates this ongoing conceptual anxiety at the heart of Critical Theory.
34 To repeat its full title; Carl Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan: Intermediate Comment on the Concept o f 
the Political, (New York: Telos Press, 2007 [1962]).
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terror’.35 However, any examination of the actual text, and a brief contextualisation 
concerning its focus, reveals that he wrote it precisely in order to comment on the 
broader phenomenon of war and violence in the absence of any framework with which 
to judge the legitimacy of such violence. Furthermore, the readiness with which Marxist 
political philosophy can be -  and indeed has been -  deployed as a conceptual context 
for the legitimation of guerrilla warfare -  from national resistance fighters to 1960s 
urban guerrillas -  provides the essential connection. Schmitt wrote his essay as an 
attempt to explain what kinds of violent acts -  and in what contexts -  acquired political 
legitimacy, in a context characterised by an absence of a stable nomos within which to 
make a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence. Given that Marxist 
theorists had a ready answer for this, Schmitt’s theories act as a direct and polemical 
critique of their ideas. Marxist theory, to this extent, acts as the polemical counterpoint 
against which Schmitt directed his comments. Therefore, it is an unavoidable 
confrontation, but also one that again reveals the extent to which Schmitt’s reflections 
form a coherent whole, along with the extent to which -  for Schmitt -  the actions of 
single individuals need to be understood in a theoretical context in which a complete 
explanation is possible.
Lastly, there is a need to contextualise recent interpretations of Schmitt’s writing on the 
partisan. Given that Schmitt was drawing on Mao and Lenin, and generally commenting 
on the universality implied within the idea of world revolution, the fact that Ulmen, 
Rasch and Behnke feel able to invoke Schmitt in order to draw worthwhile distinctions 
in the contemporary and relativistic domain of terrorism and freedom fighting, shows 
little except how denuded liberalism has become of the means to assert itself 
aggressively. An appeal to Schmitt is therefore really an endorsement of elements of his 
critique of liberalism, rather than an engagement with the context in which he 
formulated his Theory o f the Partisan. Therefore the transposition of Schmitt’s 
formulations on the partisan from the context of post-World War II revolutionary
35 Andreas Behnke, ‘Terrorising the Political: 9/11 Within the Context of the Globalisation of Violence’, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 2004, Volume 33 Issue 2; Gary Ulmen, ‘Partisan warfare, 
terrorism and the problem of a new nomos of the earth’, in Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (eds.) The 
International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt; William Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents: On the 
Primacy o f Conflict and the Structure o f the Political, (London: Birkbeck Law Press, 2004).
36 Mao himself -  arguably the father of modem guerrilla warfare -  makes this point very directly, 
dividing guerrilla warfare into two types; those that move with history, have broad legitimacy and are 
inevitably successful, versus those which move against history, and that lack a broad foundation. Mao 
Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961 [1937]), p 47.
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activism, to the context of liberal globalisation in the early 21st Century contains a 
number of subtle problems, not least of which is the assumption of comparability 
between the universal aspiration built into the idea of Marxist world revolution -  to 
which Schmitt was opposed -  and the animating spirit of extremist Islam -  a 
contemporary flag-bearer for violent resistance to the universal values of liberalism. 
This is not to say that the comparison cannot be made, but it does tend towards a 
restatement of a neo-conservative characterisation of Islam or ‘politicised Islamism’, 
particularly in respect of its assumed global character. To this extent Rasch’s suggestion 
that it is the language and terminology of the war on terror which must be resisted 
makes this point rather well.37
The Concept of the Partisan
The partisan occupies a very indistinct terrain within the discipline of International 
Relations. Often thought of as a practitioner of a very particular type of warfare, but 
very much on the margins of what might be termed a ‘legal combatant’, he has made an 
appearance in a wide variety of different wars, struggles and revolutions throughout 
history. However, the rather diffuse categorical restrictions presupposed by many 
writers make appropriate description difficult and a coherent theory excessively 
dependent upon laborious contextualisation. Depending on one’s perspective, even the 
act of naming a partisan can be a deeply political manoeuvre, or a securitising 
discourse. The overused phrase ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom 
fighter’ points toward the same ambiguities as encountered by any investigation into the 
partisan. Nevertheless, it is important to identify and articulate a usable language with 
which to consider the partisan, which is not rendered meaningless through dependence 
on an entirely subjective perspective.
Strategic and military thinkers tend to lump the partisan in with a range of other so- 
called ‘irregular fighters’, but the term is most interchangeably confused with the term 
‘guerrilla’. Thus the problem for a military strategist when considering the partisan is 
not so much one of identification as it is the specific operational capabilities of the 
irregular combatant, which may be termed partisan or guerrilla depending on the 
context. Less important is the distinction between different types of irregular
37 Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents, p 148.
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combatants. A powerful country, must understand the techniques of partisan warfare in 
order to effectively limit threats to its internal coherence, or indeed to its overseas 
interests. In the case of modem powers at the beginning of the twenty first century, no 
army is complete without a contingent of ‘special forces’ ready to engage in irregular 
warfare, sabotage, infiltration and counter-insurgency. The partisan, existing just on the 
margins of accepted notions of legality in combat, has a direct parallel in the ‘special- 
forces soldier’, who might also be said to exist just on the legal boundaries. The 
difference between them cannot be reduced to tactics or operational organisation, but 
instead can only be considered in the conceptual realm of competing legitimacy claims. 
In other words, the special-forces soldier acts in the name of a ‘legitimate’ authority, 
whereas a partisan can only rely upon an alternative legitimacy claim, usually a posited 
‘right of resistance’.
It is in this regard that Carl Schmitt’s Theory o f the Partisan elucidates a coherent and 
useful means of understanding the phenomenon of ‘the partisan’ that carries with it a 
relevance transcending the end of the Cold War and the demise of the only serious 
competing theory of the partisan -  derived from a Marxist interpretation of the 
inevitability of world revolution. Interestingly Schmitt’s considerations provide, not 
only a means of untying the knotty contra-distinctions between ‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom 
fighter’, but also a means of examining the hidden but clearly implicit presuppositions 
that condition any use of these terms, such that listening to contemporary journalistic 
coverage of trouble-spots like Iraq allows one to understand both the prevalence, and 
un-stated relevance, of Schmitt’s theory today.39 This touches on the notion of 
‘facilitating conditions’ as referenced in Securitization Theory, which points up the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of certain speech acts, namely trying to find 
appropriate terms to use when describing certain political actors without pulling all sorts 
of rhetorical triggers in the facilitating conditions and conceptual underlay of certain 
terms.40
38 William J. Pomeroy makes this point repeatedly in Guerilla and counter-guerrilla warfare: Liberation 
and Suppression in the present period, (New York: International Publishers, 1964).
39 The well known problem the BBC -  who claim an institutional commitment to journalistic impartiality 
and objectivity -  had in devising an institutionally coherent terminology with which to describe the Iraqi 
‘insurgents’, in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion / intervention.
40 See Chapter 1 of this thesis, ‘Proto-securitization theory’. Schmitt’s Theory o f the Partisan is clearly 
sensitive to similar rhetorical logics as those theorised in Securitization Theory.
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Furthermore, an examination of the figure of the partisan reveals the limits of prevailing 
conceptions of the international precisely because no theory of the partisan could fail to 
invoke a normative or conceptual context in which their status as actors can be 
determined; or as Schmitt puts it, ‘for a complete theory of the partisan, it is important 
to recognise that the power and significance of his irregularity has been dependent on 
the power and significance of the regularity that he challenges’.41 In fact, a theoretical 
work on the concept or theory of the partisan must ultimately be an attempt to theorise 
the conditions under which a partisan might be recognised as a partisan. It is the 
partisan who engages in the elemental political struggle that, according to a Schmittian 
interpretation determines the boundaries -  or the ‘regularity’ -  of the international. The 
partisan, in establishing and defending a claimed sphere of legitimate occupancy and 
defence, seeks recognition of that legitimacy in an international context, and by this 
means becomes an international actor in his own right. With this insight, Schmitt offers 
us a way of grasping the necessary interconnectedness of the partisan and the 
international.
For the purpose of this examination, the words partisan and guerrilla are both used, and 
are meant to signify an irregular combatant. The reason I generally favour partisan is 
simply to follow Carl Schmitt, but he also used the term guerrilla to describe the same 
subject. However, one rather simple insight offered by this thesis is that there is a strong 
etymological dimension for why Schmitt preferred the term ‘partisan’ over the more 
Marxist term ‘guerrilla’ and, although this is more suggestive than substantive, it is no 
less interesting for that.
Historical Roots
Although the terms ‘partisan’ and ‘guerrilla’ are used interchangeably, in common 
usage both arguably derive from different theatres of the same tumultuous period of 
European history; that being the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This period is of 
special interest to Schmitt, for he describes it as an interregnum during which the global 
spatial ordering of the Jus Publicum Europaeum was extensively challenged by the 
universalising mission of revolutionary and imperial France 42
41 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan, p 3.
42 Schmitt, Nomos, p 161.
183
The word guerrilla comes from Spanish and means literally Tittle war’. The Peninsular 
campaign, in which the French occupation of Spain was progressively worn down by a 
well organised, if numerically small, British army under the command of Arthur 
Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) was significantly aided by what were termed 
‘guerrillas’. The French had recognisably occupied Spain, but there were a large amount 
of ‘patriots’ willing to take up arms and ally themselves with the British. Rather than 
form organised battalions of these men, Wellesley and the British did what they could to 
facilitate their use as irregular forces, attacking enemy supply lines, making the country 
unsafe for small parties of French soldiers, and providing an extensive intelligence 
network, thus denying France effective control of the territory. In short, the Peninsular 
campaign was characterised by a long series of skirmishes and only the very rarest of 
heavy engagements in which British defensive tactics, aided by good intelligence, 
usually prevailed.43
The Spanish irregular forces served a variety of purposes. They were highly mobile, 
supported by the population, and could strike anywhere, rendering the countryside 
hostile to French control without much larger forces than would otherwise have been 
necessary. This in turn, meant that when serious engagements were fought, the French 
needed to hold back sufficient forces to keep their supply lines open, levelling up the 
odds for the numerically smaller British, Spanish and Portuguese regular forces, and 
usually ceding the advantage of choosing the battlefield. In the larger scheme of things 
this also meant that Napoleon was fighting on two fronts after he invaded Russia in 
1812. Needless to say, defeat in Russia meant the Spanish threat was magnified 
tremendously and became merely one direction from which France was eventually 
encircled and defeated in 1813. The guerrillas, allied to the main British forces, and 
supplied from the coast under the protection of the Royal Navy, proved an extremely 
useful component of a much larger campaign, and in that sense, the first so-called 
‘guerrilla war’ was a success from the point of view of the guerrillas.44
The first ‘partisan war’ was similar, but was fought in Russia and Germany after the 
advance of the French grande armee on Moscow in 1812. So spectacular was the
43 The recent work of Charles Esdaile largely confirms this general view. Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular 
War: A New History, (London: Allen Lane, 2002).
44 As Esdaile -  Ibid. -  makes abundantly clear, it was a far more complicated conflict that such a 
summarisation does justice to, but it is nevertheless crucial to take account of the wider context.
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advance, that the shattered Russian forces never had the chance to regroup effectively 
and many small units were left behind as the main Russian forces retreated and turned 
the countryside into a wasteland, abandoning and burning Moscow at the last. Napoleon 
then found his huge army in occupation of a very hostile country, unprepared for the 
winter, and with lines of retreat constantly under attack by small raiding parties of 
locally supported Russian troops.45 These were the ‘partisans’; a French word deriving 
from Italian and meaning an unquestioning commitment to the aims and interests of one 
side in a dispute 46
The main difference between the Peninsular campaign and the Russian campaign was 
that there was little chance that the main Russian army would regroup and engage the 
retreating French. So where the ‘guerrillas’ could accurately be characterised as 
irregular skirmishers, raiders and saboteurs attached to a larger force by a strategic 
rationale and a directing influence, many of the ‘partisans’ in Russia were independent 
and irregular fighting forces that were not directly attached to a larger army.47
A problem with this distinction between partisan and guerrilla is that it is purely 
strategic and merely sets up arguments about the degree of regular support a particular 
band of irregular fighters had.48 In the event that partisans attach themselves to the 
strategic aims of a larger and organised armed group, do they then become mere 
guerrillas? Clearly such a discussion would not be very interesting, and needless to say 
would contribute very little to an understanding of the concept of the partisan, as 
opposed to a categorical definition. The point of this examination is to find some 
conceptual specificity to the term ‘partisan’ that allows the construction of a coherent 
theory of the partisan and partisanship. So rather than attempt to distinguish between the 
two similar words, it is better to imagine that the meaning inherent in the two terms 
‘guerrilla’ and ‘partisan’ overlap rather than oppose one another. It may be possible to
45 Arthur Campbell, Guerrillas: A History and Analysis, (London: Arthur Baker Ltd, 1967), p 24, and for 
a broader account of the complications internal Russian controversies that accompanied the partisans, see 
Alan Palmer, Napoleon in Russia, (London: Constable, 1967), and Janet Hartley, ‘The Patriotism of the 
Russian Army in ‘Patriotic’ or ‘Fatherland’ War of 1812, in Charles Esdaile (ed), Popular Resistance in 
the French Wars, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005).
46 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan, p 15-16.
47 Esdaile also makes clear that during the Peninsular war there was also great hostility to the guerrillas 
among the Spanish regulars, in The Peninsular War, op. cit.
48 Which is certainly a preoccupation of most of the historical literature cited above, Esdaile, Palmer, and 
Hartley in particular.
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delineate between the guerrilla and the partisan insofar as the guerrilla relies on the 
assistance of a regular force, and a partisan represents an emergent regular force with a 
more formal command structure and a uniform, but they both exist on an existential 
continuum whereby their central effort is the establishment or defence of a zone of 
legitimacy, both conceptual and spatial. The central connection between the strategic 
contexts of the Eastern theatre and the Iberian theatre in the Napoleonic wars was that in 
both cases, the aim of the irregular fighters, however described, was the denial of 
territory to the invading army. Furthermore, in both cases, this denial of territory was 
made possible by the friendliness of the local population to the irregular fighters 
involved, which could be understood as a strong sense of popular legitimacy that 
attached to their aims, or as Mao famously put it, ‘the water in which the fish swim’.
According to one reading, both the partisans in Russia, and the guerrillas in Spain 
served the wider function of undermining the French revolutionary challenge to the 
European order, enabling both defeat, and more importantly, a restoration of the system 
of spatial ordering that obtained prior to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.49 
However, this would unite the partisans and guerrillas only in common enmity with the 
universalising mission of the French. Each was in fact fighting to restore a different 
particular order within separate but specific spatial domains. The guerrillas were 
fighting for an independent Spain, the partisans for an independent Russia, and these 
were two quite different things; one Catholic, one Orthodox. The French on the other 
hand were proclaiming a new world order, spreading the values of the enlightenment 
and overthrowing the tyranny of the ancien regime, both in France, and in Europe as a 
whole. The enlightenment itself had presented an entirely different legitimacy claim 
than the old Westphalian order of respect for state sovereignty, based instead on 
republican and humanist values.50 The attempt to restore the old Westphalian order after 
the Napoleonic period was a refutation of these enlightenment ideals in pursuit of 
international stability. In other words, a return to the ‘bracketing’ of European land 
war51 such that territorial constraints limited the likelihood of further conflict, echoing
49 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan, p 9.
50 The burning embers of this debate -  best captured in interchanges between Edmund Burke and Thomas 
Paine -  can still be revivified today, see Christopher Hitchens’s polemical Thomas Paine’s ‘The Rights o f 
Man’: A Biography, (London: Atlantic Books, 2007).
51 Schmitt, Nomos, p 150.
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Schmitt’s interpretation of the ‘marvellous product of human reason’ that was 
Westphalia.52
As should be clear by now, this historical period was interesting to Schmitt because of 
the light it shed on his own times. He thought that the revolutionary wars prefigured the 
dilemmas of the twentieth century by placing into question the whole system of 
international norms upon which international order was established. It was precisely this 
system of norms, or nomos, that collapsed during the First World War,53 leaving a 
legacy of crisis in Europe and throughout the world, and which eventually gave rise to 
his analysis of the partisan as the first and last carrier of legitimate violence in a world 
without a normative framework for the adjudication between legitimate and illegitimate 
organised violence. In this case the partisan acts as the decisive figure, both in 
establishing a zone of normality and in protecting it.
Clausewitz and Guerrilla war -  The Century of the Guerrilla
Further opportunity for excavating the theoretical dimension of the partisan is offered 
by Clausewitz. In his work On War he concluded by predicting that the 19th century 
would be the century of ‘people’s wars’.54 He is widely thought to have been mistaken 
in this regard, but according to a Schmittian reading, his prediction falls neatly into 
place, merely delayed by about a century. What Clausewitz saw was the danger of a 
universal humanistic legitimacy claim, stemming from the ideology of Revolutionary 
France.55 What he perhaps underestimated was the extent to which the post-Napoleonic 
restoration -  as Schmitt called it -  temporarily reasserted the old normative conditions 
of the Westphalian nomos, thus deferring the realisation of his fears.56
A people’s war according to Clausewitz stemmed from a new and intensive relationship 
between the citizen and the state, as theorised in revolutionary France. That an 
individual owed a duty of obedience to the state was a principle well established in 
Europe, but the intensification of warfare during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
period made these demands greater than they had been before, to the extent that
52 Ibid., p 161.
53 Schmitt reiterates this basic point in the closing comments of Theory o f the Partisan, p 95.
54 Carl von Clausewitz, On War: Volume II, (New York: Dutton and Co, 1940), p 341.
55 Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, (London: Pimlico, 2002), p 25.
56 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan, p 9.
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Napoleon essentially mobilised the whole of France and, by extension the whole of 
Europe. The slow reaction during the nineteenth century therefore saw the increasing 
identification of individuals with the ‘nation state’, and it was the rise of these new 
national identities in Europe that emerge as a characteristic of 19th century European 
political developments. Fairbaim provides a useful summary of Clausewitzian 
principles of peoples -  or guerrilla -  war, comparing them to those of Mao, but he also 
states;
despite the potentialities Clausewitz perceived in what he called “people’s 
war”, including its guerrilla aspect, the thrust of European politics in the 
nineteenth century was not favourable to the development of guerrilla 
warfare.57
This chimes well with Schmitt’s explanation of the manner in which the legitimacy of 
the old Westphalian order was re-established at the congress of Vienna, and that this 
order lasted throughout the 19th century. What both Fairbaim and Clausewitz fail to 
acknowledge is the political context in which guerrilla warfare finds meaning. 
Clausewitz merely theorised people’s war in a tactical and strategic context, Fairbaim
th thsimilarly. Schmitt lays out the ideational developments of the 19 and 20 centuries, in 
which Clausewitz’s prediction essentially comes true, by theorising the political context 
in which the partisan fully emerges as peculiar to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
interregnum, and then against the backdrop of the twin universal legitimacy claims of 
communism and liberal capitalism that survived the First World War, precisely when
f  o
the old Westphalian nomos met its end.
Another reference relevant to this stage of explanation is that of Cambell, who states in 
his introduction that, ‘Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare, not a type’.59 What he 
means by this is that guerrilla warfare can be pursued as a component of any one of the 
four types of warfare which he lists as; total war, general war, limited war and 
revolutionary war. A Schmittian interpretation of warfare -  with its distinctive 
existential and political aspect of recognition of the enemy -  posits this as forming the 
foundation of legitimacy, and privileges guerrilla or partisan warfare, not only as a type
57 Geoffrey Fairbaim, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version, (London: 
Harmondsworth, 1974), p 45.
58 Schmitt, Nomos, p 150.
59 Campbell, Guerrillas: A History and Analysis, p 1.
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of warfare, but as the irreducible type of warfare. All other types of warfare derive from 
this basic type, and indeed, where there are constraints on the behaviour of armies on 
either or both sides, it is due to the recognition on the part of the combatants of a wider 
sphere of legitimacy in which this constrained warfare might take place.60 Partisan 
warfare is, if anything, characterised by a lack of constraints, and therefore represents 
the most elemental type of political struggle. Therefore partisan war is far from merely a 
form of warfare. It is quite possible, indeed likely, for limited or general wars to be 
fought with no partisan aspect, precisely because it is not total or existential warfare, but 
were the ‘rules of war’ to be abandoned by one or other side, or the stable 
conceptualisation of war to be subverted, then the likelihood would increase that war 
would degenerate into its most fundamental type; a ruthless and bitter struggle over 
territory that is partisan war.
A Marxist interpretation of the Partisan
The partisan has often been thought of as having a strong relationship with theories of 
socialist revolutionary ideology. Within a Marxist interpretive paradigm, the partisan 
features as a particular kind of revolutionary activist, driven by the pressure of social 
inequalities and awakened to the inevitable course of world history, eventually to take 
up arms and liberate the masses from the oppression of world capitalism. In this sense, 
Marxist theories demonstrate their ability to incorporate a wide range of phenomena 
within their conceptual embrace. Indeed, relying as they do on a progressive historical 
teleology, it becomes necessary to find an explanation for all things, describing them 
either as ‘revolutionary’ or ‘counter-revolutionary’ according to context.61
Generally speaking, various partisan and guerrilla groups have echoed the language of 
socialist revolution because it has worked as a legitimising force. But the story is more 
complex when it is noted that that partisan or guerrilla warfare has not noticeably 
decreased since the fall of the Soviet Union, which openly sympathised with a wide 
range of guerrilla groups, referring to them as ‘national liberation movements’. 
Furthermore, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan during the 1980’s were clearly a collection
60 Schmitt’s theory of Nomos that allowed for ‘bracketed warfare’ in Europe.
61 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, providing the paradigmatic example, p 47.
62 The doctrinal point being that nationalist revolution could sever the colonies from their European 
masters and bring about revolution in Europe, along with the colonial world’s emergence into die 
dialectical march of history.
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of partisan or guerrilla organisations which openly defied the Soviet Union and had no 
relation whatever to revolutionary socialism. Indeed it was the official Soviet backed 
government in Kabul that, at least on paper, believed in socialist revolution, not the 
rebels in the mountains.
However, what is interesting about Marxist theories of the partisan is that they seek to 
articulate a particular kind of legitimacy that attaches to a mass popular movement. In 
other words, central to a Marxist partisan is the sense of an unassailable popular 
legitimacy that allows him to operate freely among ‘the people’ wherever he goes. Thus 
the failure of Marxist analysis is not a failure to understand the nature and particular 
dynamics of partisan conflict -  Mao’s handbook is still the definitive text for guerrilla 
campaigns -  but in imagining whatever legitimacy that obtains to any particular partisan 
group reduces in the final analysis to a universal and progressive historical dimension in 
which they operate as catalysts. There are clearly many different contemporary and 
historical partisan groups that have not articulated a belief in socialist revolution, 
therefore, Marxist claims to understand guerrilla and partisan war within the paradigm 
of socialist revolution are necessarily selective in terms of which groups are recognised 
as legitimate partisan or guerrilla groups. Political groups using guerrilla or partisan 
tactics that do not conform to socialist ideology would be alternatively described as 
‘counter revolutionary’ or even ‘reactionary’ from this point of view.
With this in mind, much literature written about guerrilla warfare was written by 
Marxists. A characteristic example is a small volume written by William J. Pomeroy 
called Guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, which is a concise summary of the 
prevailing ideas when published in 1963 and entirely sympathetic to a communist 
interpretation of national liberation movements, which presents guerrilla warfare as the 
necessary and inevitable reaction to imperialism.64 He makes a comparison between 
French, British and US strategies of ‘counter-insurgency’, going so far as to describe
63 Aside from a once fashionable academic interest in the phenomenon of the ‘urban guerrilla’, one 
irresistible footnote of a famous contemporary example concerned the reception of the Hell’s Angels 
among the Berkley University academics in the late 1960s; in which the Hells Angels were theorised as 
marginalised socio-economic actors and held up as exemplars of radical activism, until -  famously -  they 
began to attack the anti-Vietnam war protesters, and their leader -  Sonny Barger -  wrote to President 
Johnson offering the services of the Hells Angels as ‘gorrillas’ (sic) to take on the Viet Cong. There is no 
better account of the Hells Angels as a social phenomenon than that provided by Hunter S. Thompson, 
Hell’s Angels, (London: Penguin Classics, 2003 [1966]).
64 Pomeroy, Guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare.
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each as an imperialist power, thus doomed eventually to fall to the ineluctable forces of 
history, merely able to temporarily defy them with the greater and greater ferocity of 
special forces and destructive weaponry, but in so doing undermining any possibility of 
retaining popular legitimacy. Pomeroy thus cites the beginning of guerrilla war as 
occurring in the American war of independence, as the archetypal anti-imperialist 
struggle against the British crown,65 going on to articulate the sense of the partisan 
being the servant of the people in their historical struggle for emancipation. There are 
clear connections between the revolutionary ideology of the emergent United States and 
that of France, evoked by the observation of the Marquis de Lafayette after the final 
British defeat; ‘Humanity has won its battle. Liberty now has a country.’ Once again 
clarifying the connection between the progressive discourse of humanity -  discussed in 
Chapter 4 -  with the progressive idea of history.
What this quote illustrates is the degree to which the aspiration of ‘freedom’ was 
expressed on behalf of ‘humanity’. The United States was founded in the name of the 
universal principles enunciated in the ‘Declaration of Independence’ and the same 
universalistic impulse actuated the French revolution that followed. Thus although 
Schmitt dates the emergence of guerrilla war to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
period of European history, the overthrow of British rule in the US can easily be seen as 
prefiguring events in France, at least insofar as aspirations were proclaimed on behalf of 
universal man.
Pomeroy goes on to quote approvingly the maxims of Lenin66 who declared that the 
guerrilla gains nobility through the adoption of revolutionary socialism, implicitly 
acknowledging the illegal character of guerrilla warfare, but also employing the 
Machiavellian logic that the end justifies the means. In the Second World War Stalin 
was deeply suspicious of anything outside his direct control, and the character of the 
partisan -  of strategic necessity a fairly autonomous figure -  was in reality placed under 
significant political control in the Soviet Union’s ‘Great Patriotic War’. Interestingly, 
the German army, as a result of their experiences, produced a manual of counter­
65 Ibid., p 19.
66 Ibid., p 92.
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(\ 7insurgent warfare which continued to be referenced for many years afterwards. 
Because of Stalin’s political constraints, the Russian partisan campaign in WWII was 
not terribly effective, however this was also due to the existential barbarity of the 
broader campaign, which from the beginning took on the character of an unrelenting 
campaign of racial extermination. In other words, the policy of uprooting large parts of 
the population and the ruthless character of German tactics casts the whole German 
army as existing outside the rules of war in the same way as any corresponding partisan 
resistance. Thus the whole eastern front formed a war unbridled by broader norms, and 
in which the partisan had no special claim on the extremities of existential war.
Mao Tse Tung went much further in his understanding of guerrilla warfare than Lenin 
or Stalin. He developed a highly sophisticated strategy for the prosecution of guerrilla
fSLwarfare and laid down principles that are still practiced today. This involved the long 
political preparation of the people, a rural focus, the necessity of guerrilla forces 
eventually becoming regular forces and the slow and deliberate cultivation of the 
enmity of the people for their government through the provocation of atrocities and 
over-reaction on the part of the governing authorities.69 Clearly, the success of Mao’s 
campaign against the nationalists in China marks him out as a remarkable strategic 
thinker, and his general theories of guerrilla warfare were manifestly cautious, 
deliberate, and ultimately effective. His focus on fostering the loyalty of the people, 
particularly the rural population, is characteristic of most theories of guerrilla or partisan 
war.
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, through his death provides a fascinating validation of Schmitt’s
7fttheory. His book was essentially written as a direct critique of Maoist principles of 
guerrilla warfare, and the contrast with Mao’s theory is clear; the historical inevitability 
of the overthrow of capitalism by the working classes was understood by Guevara not 
merely rooted in a historical teleology, but as constituting an irresistible legitimacy 
claim already existing in the mind of the people on whose behalf the revolution would
67 Ibid., p 45. Schmitt also talks about this manual, but dates its publication to 1944, too late to make any 
difference, but applauded as extremely effective guidelines by the British after the war.
68 The recent political developments in Nepal have centred on a Maoist insurgency, so described because 
it was a relatively unambiguous example of Maoist guerrilla warfare.
69 Mao, Guerrilla Warfare.
70 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (New York: MR Press, 1961), the opening phrases of the book 
contain two direct refutations of Mao’s theory of guerrilla warfare.
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take place. Guevara thus theorised that the long and careful political preparation of the 
population, as theorised by Mao, was unnecessary and that a small band of guerrillas 
could, through their actions, mobilise a population by acting as a focus (foco) for their
*71latent revolutionary tendencies. The Cuban revolution was presented as a paradigmatic 
example of the new theory by Guevara and offered as an example of how this process 
could occur elsewhere, however his lack of success outside Cuba, and his eventual 
death in Bolivia indicate the nature of his mistake, existing as it did in his theory. The 
reason why Guevara is interesting in the context of Schmitt’s theory of the partisan is 
precisely because his failure to politicise the potential revolutionaries of Bolivia and 
elsewhere confirm that the legitimacy required for successful partisan war has to be 
cultivated and does not merely exist. His failure does not repudiate Marxist theory 
entirely, but the difference between Mao and Che is essentially captured by Schmitt 
with his articulation of the ‘political’ decision as the source of legitimacy. However, 
there is no mistaking that Che Guevara articulated what was essentially the logical 
extrapolation of Marxist theory, and was therefore the better Marxist.
Mao implicitly acknowledges this through his strictures on the necessity of prolonged 
political preparation of the population, for this preparation forms the construction of an 
alternative legitimacy claim. And therefore the partisan or guerrilla war that follows is 
the defence of an articulated ‘norm’ (legitimacy claim) against the inevitable counter­
insurgency. Moreover, Schmitt makes this point quite explicit when he praises Mao for 
thinking territorially, and learning to live with an ‘inner contradiction’ whereby a 
‘universal, absolute and global enemy lacking any territorial space -  the Marxist class 
enemy -  [was linked] with a territorially limited, real enemy of the Chinese-Asiatic 
offensive against capitalist colonialism’. Finally, Mao’s insistence on the eventual and 
necessary emergence of ‘regular forces’ rounds off the legitimacy cycle by asserting 
and defending the new norm of a different legal order grounded in the separate 
legitimacy claims of the insurgency.
Partisan war in the 20th century was, as stated above, largely associated with socialist or 
communist revolutions. Partisan wars were often anti-imperialist in character and due to
71 This critique of Mao’s theory of Guerrilla Warfare was given a more intense theoretical expression by 
Rigis Debray, in Revolution in the Revolution?: Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America, 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1967).
72 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan, p 58.
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the rapid decline of European imperialism during the post-war years, this association 
grew to seem more than mere coincidence. However during the 1970’s war broke out 
between China and Vietnam, then between Vietnam and Cambodia, all of which were 
post-revolutionary states. This contradicted the most basic revolutionary ideology and 
left many confused over how to explain it. Benedict Anderson wrote his well known 
text Imagined Communities as an explanatory response, breathing life into a theory of 
nationalism that associates it explicitly with modernity, but which also serves as a 
defence of a broadly Marxist perspective.73 In the 1980’s the appearance and eventual 
success of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan could be blamed for a time on American 
support, but eventually the notion that the partisan was a figure of the left became 
untenable.
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is no longer possible to accept a 
connection between partisan war and communist revolution. In the long aftermath of the 
collapse of communism -  and whatever global legitimacy claim that represented -  there 
came a resurgence of a type of irregular warfare that seemed to evoke a particularly 
Schmittian interpretation. This was most apparent in the Balkans, where the dissipation 
of the last vestiges of legitimacy that attached to the central Yugoslavian government, 
directly descended of course from a fierce and determined partisan movement under 
Tito, resulted in the eruption of what was often regarded at the time as the pre-modem 
barbarism of ethnic conflict. However, the descent of the Balkans into fratricidal 
conflict would seem to be exactly the kind of conflict that Schmitt would have theorised 
quite successfully. The basis for the articulated friend / enemy distinctions were 
generally ethnic in character, but in any event the conflict revolved around particular 
political groups establishing control over specific territory through the identification of 
enemy groups. In many cases this resulted in the migration of threatened populations, 
sometimes worse, but this competition for the identification of space with political 
groupings demonstrates the extent to which conflict reduces to this when there is a 
collapse in the traditional ordering and an absence of stable sphere of legitimacy in 
which conflict might be mediated by some accepted norms of behaviour.
73 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism, 
(London: Verso, 1991).
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One interesting observation is that as the Soviet Union began to fade, it became a 
theatre of a variety of partisan wars. There are certainly a range of partisan struggles in 
the Russian Caucasus -  particularly Chechnya -  which provide serious problems of 
interpretation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the events of 1956 in Hungary 
and 1968 in Czechoslovakia can be seen as alternative emergent legitimacy claims that 
threatened the ideological sense of the Soviet Union, as much as the actual territorial 
reach.74 The point being that a partisan war, both in the context of the Napoleonic wars, 
and in the context of the twentieth century struggles against colonialism, communism or 
liberal capitalism, is the expression of a particularist separatism. It may claim some 
recognisable language of legitimacy, such as revolutionary socialism, but as was shown 
by the example of South East Asia, this merely masks a deeper political discrimination 
that gains its force from the emergent capacity to recognise an existential enemy. 
Precisely the political theory of Carl Schmitt, although for Schmitt there is nothing to 
distinguish a partisan who moves with history, and one who moves against -  after 
Mao’s formula -  except eventual success or failure.
The Partisan as legitimate actor in war
According to the jus publicum Europaeum, war as a public activity conducted by states 
and between states, in which the private individual could play no part, but could expect 
to have their property respected (as far as possible) and would have means of redress 
from the occupying forces. For a private individual to make war, merely constituted a 
criminal act, for a private individual did not have the right to make war (jus belli). The 
rules of war even stipulated the manner in which weapons could be used, such that the
thintroduction of rifles capable of being aimed at some distance, during the late 18 
century, was thought of as at least dishonourable and possibly illegal. Famously, 
Admiral Nelson was killed by the bullet of a sniper at Trafalgar. When the sniper was 
brought before the dying Nelson, so the legend goes, he was ‘forgiven’ for the ‘crime’ 
that was to see him put to death. During the naval skirmishes of the times, the captain 
and officers stood on particular parts of the ships deck in full view of their enemies, and 
although shooting at them was a common enough tactic, it was regarded as outside the 
rules. Other naval tactics of the time included sailing under false colours in order to
74 An obvious comparison is the rhetorical contest over the precise description of past rebellions or 
insurrections. For example, the manner in which the Indian Mutiny of 1857 is called the first war of 
independence in India, and the American War of Independence is ordinarily called the American 
Revolution in the US. Once the old order is overthrown, the new order claims its origins.
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escape detection, but according to the rules of naval engagements, a ship that opened 
fire whilst flying false colours would not be accorded the right of surrender, instead 
being treated as a mere pirate.
There are of course endless other rules and conventions, but they would only serve to 
reinforce the notion that war was, and continues to be fought in particular ways, some 
legal, some definitely illegal. The partisan falls somewhere between the two, or to put it 
another way, he falls outside the context in which legality can be determined. The 
Hague convention in 1907 describes the partisan as outside the basic classification of 
regular troops, declaring him a criminal, subject to summary execution. In 1949, the
Geneva convention widened the definition of combatants who are accorded the
*1(%equivalent status of regular troops and given protection. This debate has a strong 
contemporary element in the discussions surrounding the exact legal status of the 
prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba by the US military, but reveals a perpetual 
problem surrounding the difficulties of recognising the legitimacy of particular actors 
during wartime.
Historically partisans were not considered legal combatants until recognised as having a 
degree of legality in the Geneva Convention of 1949. This of course places the partisans 
in the Napoleonic era, the Russian revolution, the Spanish civil war and most 
definitively the Second World War, all outside the conventions of international law. 
That international law has had to be progressively altered to take account of the 
continual re-emergence of partisan fighters requires an understanding of the partisan 
without particular reference to international law. But it should also be noted that the 
basis upon which the partisan is included as a legitimate actor with the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 is the universalist norm that all people need protection of one sort 
or another,77 and that all people have some degree of human rights. Prior to this, the 
partisan was specifically excluded from any form of protection because he was 
considered automatically in breach of the very laws that would eventually extend to his 
defence, coming full circle to the problem of the partisan, and the ‘power and
75 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan, p 25.
76 Ibid., although Schmitt goes to some lengths to stipulate that the Geneva Conventions still preserve the 
shadow of the former conception of war being a legitimate activity between states, even if it confuses the 
problem considerably, p 32.
Ibid., according to Schmitt an ‘admirable’ ‘humanitarian development’ in that the enemy is given 
‘humanity’ and ‘justice in the sense of recognition’, p 32.
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significance of the regularity that he challenges’ -  the broader nomos of European order
*70
-  in order ‘to recognise the power and significance of his irregularity’.
The Partisan in defence of territory
When Schmitt wrote his Theory o f the Partisan, it was in response to a challenge he had 
been set by Rolf Schroers, who openly declared that his own text had been written for 
Carl Schmitt.79 In response, Schmitt outlined his own theory of the partisan lest he 
should be misunderstood. He outlined six basic qualities that characterise a partisan, 
beginning with the simple idea that he is an irregular combatant whose target is the 
enemy in uniform. This is followed by the intensity of the political commitment, which 
in the case of the partisan is total. He has a heightened degree of mobility, particularly 
in relation to an occupying force and, he has a ultimately telluric character. 
Penultimately, a partisan acts not only at risk of losing his life, but also of putting 
himself outside law and honour. Finally, Schmitt determined that partisans were to a 
large degree dependent on regular forces of one kind or another.
This chapter has not focussed exclusively on what Schmitt actually wrote about the 
partisan, but has instead attempted to clarify the importance of the partisan for the 
understanding of International Relations. In this sense it is only possible to see the full 
relevance of Schmitt’s theory when set against the broader context of his conceptual and 
historical interpretations. Accordingly there are two general reasons why Schmitt was 
drawn to set down his thoughts on the partisan; on the one hand, to clarify his critique 
of contemporary political trends and to comment on some prevailing post-colonial 
struggles, and on the other hand quite simply because the partisan is a figure that -  for 
Schmitt -  emerges in a context in which stable norms of international relations between 
recognised states break down. Thus Schmitt’s partisan is quite different to the Marxist 
revolutionary, and his emergence signals the collapse of meaning at the level of the 
international. A partisan exists in a context of normative relativism, but by rejecting the 
legitimacy of alternative claims that render him subject to them, he sets out a normative 
context, a claim on the norm, and in doing so, asserts a sovereign decision.
78 Schmitt, Theory o f the Partisan, p 3.
79 Ralf Schroers, Der Partisan: Ein Beitrag zur politischen anthropologie, (Koln: Kiepenheuer und 
Witsch, 1961). MUller, A Dangerous Mind, p 145.
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It is worth taking some time to clarify the six qualities of the partisan; the first is a 
statement of habit perhaps, but not of outright fact. Clearly the target of the partisan is 
likely to be the regular soldier of the identifiable enemy, but this definition could easily 
be stretched to include police forces, political figures and any representative or 
representation of the authority and legitimacy of the enemy. So Schmitt was being a 
little restrictive in his definition, but was nonetheless identifying what he would have 
termed the carriers of ‘legitimate violence’. The intensity of the political commitment is 
determined by the ease and clarity with which the partisan can identify ‘the enemy’, so 
is strongly linked to the Schmitt’s thoughts on legitimacy and the concept of the 
political. Mobility is consequent upon the partisan’s knowledge of the terrain and the 
popular legitimacy that he possesses, so ties together a few important concepts. The 
fourth characteristic is that of the partisans ‘telluric’ character. This is fundamentally 
rooted in the concrete space the partisan conceptually inhabits, coupled with the tactical 
advantage he wields over his enemy through especial knowledge of this space. The fifth 
quality revolves around the heroic and sacrificial character of the partisan. He cares not 
for his own life, but risks living outside honour. Clearly partisans can conduct military 
operations that would seem dishonourable to the regular soldier, but he relies upon a 
different form of legitimacy than would establish his acts as criminal, so in the event of 
victory, his acts would be validated by success. The risk, therefore, of living without 
honour, could only be meaningful in a context with which the partisan would not 
concern himself, he earns honour by first asserting the terms by which that honour 
might be earned. The last point Schmitt makes can be read as a Maoist axiom, however, 
the emergence of regular forces -  according to Schmittian theory -  would be the key to 
establishing a concrete order, or norm, in which the partisan may emerge victorious.
It would be impossible for Schmitt to contemplate the idea of perpetual partisanship as 
the partisan can only possess a temporally constrained legitimacy claim. There must, 
according to one reading of Schmittian theory, come a time when a partisan becomes a 
mere bandit. Legitimacy does not derive from a claim, but from a capacity to 
distinguish between friend and enemy and establish a norm by which the emergent 
exception can be constrained. Failure to establish a norm must eventually de-legitimise 
a partisan. But in the event that no wider context emerges that can act as a normative 
framework of recognition -  a nomos -  then partisan war is the perpetual corollary. Thus 
when he theorised the partisan, it was against a background of a collapsed nomos9 and
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an ongoing process of world revolution and decolonisation. In effect, Schmitt’s Theory 
o f the Partisan is a statement of ongoing disquiet at the lack of a meaningful nomos 
against which to judge the legitimacy of acts of violence.
Fundamentally, Schmitt’s notion of the partisan reveals one crucial aspect of his 
thinking; the fact that he privileged space above all other things as the mediator of 
political violence. The old nomos of the Westphalian system was based upon a division 
of territory, between European states, and more importantly between Europe and non- 
Europe. Chapter 4 demonstrated the manner in which the conditioning discourse of 
space was overwhelmed by the discourse of humanity, but by linking the partisan with 
territory, and by eulogising his ‘telluric’ character, Schmitt revealed his unyielding 
commitment to the division of space as the means of ordering international relations. 
This, I believe, represents a limitation in Schmitt’s way of thinking, rather than a 
conceptual truth.80 Nevertheless, Schmitt’s theory of the partisan is entirely bound up 
with his understanding of nomos, of sovereignty, and in the continuing undulations of 
international order that characterise his counter-progressive historical commentaries.
Conclusion
Each of Schmitt’s theoretical manoeuvres had a concrete problem to which they were 
addressed. As Jan Wemer Muller makes clear;
Schmitt himself claimed that concepts could only be understood if one 
knew who they were aimed against.81
Schmitt approached the figure of the ‘partisan’ at a time when it provided him with 
some means of resistance to the prevailing global political context. Interestingly, in 
Schmitt’s hands, the ‘partisan’ becomes an embodiment of several Schmittian concepts, 
thus enabling a neat explication of Schmitt’s thought. Furthermore, in clarifying the 
existential nature of ‘the partisan’ Schmitt helps to cut through many of the conceptual 
ambiguities surrounding irregular warfare, ‘the guerrilla’, and ‘the world revolutionary’. 
Consideration of ‘the partisan’ once again reveals Schmitt’s commitment to a specific 
and ineluctable relationship between space, manifested as ‘territory’, and the slippery 
notion of ‘legitimacy’, presenting them as twin concepts, if not precisely identical, then
80 In this I am in agreement with Rob Walker, see footnote 68, Chapter 3.
81 Miiller, Dangerous Mind, p 24
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at least mutually presuppositive, particularly in the context of European modernity. And 
once again, this exposes the extent to which Schmitt was unprepared to abandon the 
concept of territory as a mediating element upon which to build legal and normative 
frameworks for the discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate violence. In the 
post-Nietzschean world, the context of last instance was -  for Schmitt -  territory, and 
mankind’s identity as a ‘groundling’. However, as elaborated in Chapter 4, Schmitt’s 
reluctance to accept the notion of humanity as a political concept, should not be taken as 
a conceptual prescription, but instead as a limitation in his thought.
This chapter has attempted to reconsider Schmitt’s thinking in relation to the partisan in 
order to illuminate a number of key Schmittian concepts. It is clear that in constructing 
his theory of the partisan, Schmitt identified the most important and most fundamental 
terrain of conflict, which is the conceptual terrain. Soldiers require some justifying 
rationale that legitimises their actions, otherwise they become mere criminals. Irregular 
soldiers, partisans and guerrillas are no different in an absolute sense. They require a 
political context in which killing is condoned rather than condemned. The conceptual 
terrain requires a legitimacy that stems from the recognition of friend and enemy 
through the political decision that establishes a norm. This norm is thus the source of 
legitimacy that equips its defenders with the crucial meaning from which they derive the 
clarity of purpose required when risking their own and other’s lives. It represents a 
cause that motivates its partisans. Partisan war is not simply a form of war, but a type of 
warfare. More importantly it is the primary, irreducible type of warfare, from which all 
other types of warfare gain meaning. All political struggle reduces to the possibility of 
partisan struggle in defence of a particular norm.
Understanding war as conflict between competing legitimacy claims introduces the 
sense that in war, not all legitimacy claims are contested. In other words, where warfare 
does not reduce to an existential partisan struggle, it is because there is some common 
agreement between the parties on what constitutes a legitimate type of war, therefore 
there exists a prior established and uncontested sphere of legitimacy that neither party 
wishes to challenge, or can justify challenging according to their own lights. Thus 
Clausewitz was right in declaring that the Napoleonic age ushered in a period of
82 Schmitt, Land and Sea, p 1.
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‘people’s warfare’ -  although for Clausewitz a people’s war was a war in which the 
whole of a national population was bound up, rather than a constitutive moment for a 
people -  but the reestablishment of the jus publicum Europaeum at the Congress of 
Vienna deferred the full realisation of his prediction for about a century, when the 
humanistic spirit of 1789 finally laid waste to the spatial and territorial imprint of 1648.
Fundamentally, this chapter has sought to refute the value that Schmitt’s Theory o f the 
Partisan has for contemporary reflections on global terrorism for two reasons. In the 
first place, Schmitt’s central problematic -  that of the collapse of the nomos -  is no 
longer the central problem in IR, and in order for Schmitt’s reflections to be relevant 
today, it is necessary to accept that the entire 20th Century has seen no progress on the 
underlying question of international order. In other words, it is an anachronism. 
Equally, Schmitt’s resistance to the emergence of the concept of humanity as a political 
concept can only be thought of as lamentation for a bygone age and not something that 
can be addressed by simply reconstructing a non-humanistic system of global spatial 
ordering, and Schmitt’s reflections on the partisan merely reinforce this point. But of 
more importance in Schmitt’s reflections on the partisan is the manner in which they 
bring his consideration of Marxism full circle, and thus clarify once again his own 
philosophically idealist inclinations.
For Marxist theorists -  Lenin, Mao and Debray -  the guerrilla represented the tendrils 
of world history, feeling his way to an emancipated socialist future. Mao worked with 
the partisan by investing him with a territorial legitimacy, writing a manual for the 
effective overthrow of the existing order. Debray and Guevara took these ideas to their 
logical conclusion and tested the limits of historical inevitability with their foco theory 
of guerrilla warfare, only to become lost in the tangle of the Bolivian jungle. Schmitt 
identified the strength of Mao’s theory as residing in his patience, and his determination 
to construct the legitimacy of the guerrilla’s political claims by a series of self- 
conscious provocations and exclusive territorial claims. In doing this, Schmitt returned 
all the way to his early characterisation of Marxism as a grand and powerful form of 
idealism, one based on an entirely contingent friend / enemy distinction and burdened 
with the force of historical inevitability.
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This shows how the partisan serves as more than a straightforward metaphor. On the 
one hand it expresses Schmitt’s normative commitment to the territorial mediation of 
the political, but at a deeper level the word is etymologically linked to the basic 
Schmittian notion of friend / enemy, deriving as it does from an Italian expression 
meaning ‘to take party’ or in simpler terms ‘to take sides’. A Partisan is someone who 
takes sides, which in an environment that elevates consensus can seem a pejorative, but 
in a Schmittian world, is a necessary condition of interaction. Everyone, at some level, 
takes sides according to Schmitt, even -  and perhaps particularly -  the contemporary 
Marxist. Where the liberal invokes humanity, and thus aggressively constructs sets of 
normative conditions on human behaviour, the Marxist divides the world up into socio­
economic categories, and seeks to anoint history with infallible patterns of progress and 
reaction. Although a Marxist guerrilla rides in the vanguard of history, a Schmittian 
partisan exists in the world without a nomos, an absolute anomie in which there is no 
framework for interpreting anything, without first taking sides.
Consideration of the work of Schmitt commences with his reduction of the political to 
the friend / enemy distinction -  a warning for a collapsing liberal state -  and ends with 
the partisan; a metaphoric figure and existential embodiment of Schmitt’s first condition 
of politics. Schmitt’s insistence on the telluric -  or territorial -  character of the partisan 
is rooted in his own admiration for the stability and conceptual clarity provided by the 
old Westphalian nomos, but as explained in Chapter 4, Schmitt misidentified the 
collapse of the old spatial order, with a collapse in the idea of a spatial order. It is this 
that makes the key distinction of a partisan as the taking of sides. As is well known, 
Schmitt never struggled to take sides, and suggested that all theory has a polemical 
component, thus the question of the partisan turns full circle into a matter of 
identification. In a world with a stable normative ordering framework, a partisan is 
someone who stands outside of it. But in a world without a nomos, everyone becomes a 
partisan.
202
Section III: Meta-theoretical Investigations
Introduction
Section II concentrated on making a series Schmittian critiques of the main traditions of 
International Relations; Liberalism, Realism, and Marxism. This was done in order to 
clarify and accentuate his critique of liberalism, to refute the interpretation that Schmitt 
conforms to realist assumptions, and provide content and context to his critique of 
Marxist ideas. Although his critique of liberalism is one of the best known Schmittian 
themes, it is often neglected that he made a distinction between the more classical 
liberal arguments Benjamin, Constant and Mill, and a more contemporary universalist 
strand. Furthermore, his philosophical disposition was that of an idealist -  focussing on 
concepts and interpretations, rather than material or ‘mind independent’ facts -  and in 
this his thought is troubling to liberals simply because he shares many of their 
assumptions. He is, so to speak, within the idealist ‘paradigm’, and therefore he 
criticises liberals not so much for their error, as for the danger of their universalist 
propositions, along with the somewhat hidden subtext of humanism. Similarly Marxists, 
whom Schmitt disagreed with in terms of their teleology, but not the power of their 
appeal to a grand friend / enemy distinction based on class. Once again, he imagined 
that this would spark a final and unending war for humanity, and not prefigure 
emancipation. Finally Realism; despite outward similarities -  particularly with EH Carr 
-  and a direct influence on Morgenthau, the basic assumptions of the realist tradition of 
IR are incompatible with Schmitt’s existential, even proto-constructivist, tendencies. 
Williams has shown that it is possible to read Morgenthau, Hobbes, and Rousseau as 
much richer and more complex thinkers than Realism ordinarily allows, but in order to 
do this, Williams has to recast Realism in distinctly idealist terms. Furthermore, the 
most famous element of Realism -  that it is concerned with the ‘real world’ and against 
‘wishful thinking’ is once again directly contrary to Schmitt’s theories, which 
presuppose that the world only makes sense in respect of its ideational framing. 
However, with this accomplished, it is necessary to sketch out some guidelines for an 
interpretation of Schmitt as an IR theorist, and for this the next section considers first 
the English School, and then goes on to speculate on the recent rise in interest in the
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work of Carl Schmitt within IR. As will be shown, this reveals as much about the state 
of International Relations as it does about Carl Schmitt.
The final section of this thesis draws together the failings encountered in attempting to 
align Schmitt with one of the main traditions in IR theory exposed by Section II. 
Building on the insights presented so far; Schmitt’s communitarian existentialism, his 
attempts to apply a grand conceptual order to history and to the conditions of crisis that 
followed the First World War -  finding their most potent distillation in the German 
historical experience over the next thirty years -  and the pregnant silence that befell the 
period between his later works and the end of the Cold War; the next two chapters 
resolve the questions outlined in the introduction. First of all, the case is made for a 
productive engagement between Carl Schmitt and the English School in which Schmitt 
is offered as a theoretician of considerable insight that English School scholars would 
do well to acquaint themselves with. Then following this, and wrapped up within an 
investigation of the rise in interest in the work of Carl Schmitt -  and what this reveals 
about the discipline of International Relations -  the entire thesis is offered as an 
approximate template for interpreting theorists more generally as theorists of 
International Relations in their own right rather than derivatively through political 
theory or philosophy. In the final analysis theorists are defined by their works -  not 
abstracted debates about which discipline has the best claim on them -  and their works 
are organised around problems. And it is through a deeper reflection on the problems 
that unite IR theorists that it becomes possible to see where Schmitt ‘fits’ within the 
discipline.
The effect of both of these chapters is to invite a greater sense of self awareness of what 
International Relations ‘is’, and supports the interpretation that IR should be understood 
as a varied and multi layered inquiry into particular kinds of relatively persistent 
problems. It is distinct from other disciplines -  and most specifically from the other 
social sciences -  because it is preoccupied with problems that are usually ignored 
elsewhere. Political Science -  or Political Theory -  is mostly concerned with structures 
of authority, systems of legitimation, relationships of obligation between individuals 
and states, and ultimately theories of the ‘good life’. The international dimension 
represents little more than interference for any of these broader inquiries, a distant zone
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of anarchy or exception, a borderland of uncertainty where conditions of political 
consensus and legitimation are contested or break down.
In contrast, although International Relations can no longer be based upon an assumed 
division between the domestic and the international, nor can it ignore these different 
dimensions. Ultimately IR established itself as a discipline at a time when the 
distinction between the domestic and the international was both stable, and taken for 
granted, and has only latterly come to terms with their co-constitution. Unfortunately, to 
accept that the domestic and the international are co-constituted is either to expel 
International Relations to a separate -  relatively unsophisticated -  realm of problem 
solving, or to downplay it all together in favour of political theory more generally. What 
Schmitt offers is a way through this problem, for Schmitt gives a full conceptual 
account of the co-constitution of the domestic and international -  the inside / outside, 
the friend / enemy -  in which the international takes centre stage as the condition of 
possibility for the domestic. The principle insight his texts offer is that nothing can 
happen domestically without reference to the particular form of the international. It is 
the exception that gives meaning to the norm, the international that gives meaning to the 
domestic, regardless of its precise institutional form. Thus, as the next two chapters 
attempt to demonstrate, Schmitt not only offers insights to the discipline of IR, but also 
goes beyond the simple distinction between the domestic and the international and 
offers firmer conceptual foundations for the idea of IR as a discipline in its own right, 
united by a distinct set of problems surrounding collective identification and legitimate 
violence, questions that relate to the limit conditions of political community.
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Chapter 7 -  Carl Schmitt and the English School
All interpretation, all psychology, all attempts to make things comprehensible, require 
the medium o f theories, mythologies and lies ... I f  I  say ‘above’ or ‘below’, that is 
already a statement that requires explanation, since an above and a below exist only in 
thought, only as abstractions. The world itself knows nothing o f above and below.
From the ‘Treatise on the Steppenwolf, in Hermann Hesse’s Steppenwolf.
Introduction
This chapter seeks to build on the last section by offering a more constructive view 
concerning how Schmitt fits within the spacious discipline of International Relations. 
Must of the thesis has so far dealt with the selective manner in which his thought has 
been elaborated by theorists of various persuasions, and unpicked the implicit 
periodisation of his work caused by nervousness concerning his political 
accommodation with Nazism. Of course his contribution can be counted in many ways, 
but a holistic encounter with his works invites speculation as to which self conscious 
subfields of IR would find an engagement with his theories productive. This depends 
very largely on what is meant by a subfield of IR, and Schmitt cannot simply be 
introduced as an authority on anything other than his own reflections, but there are 
recognised areas of International Relations theory that would be able to engage 
productively with his theories -  both for their formulation, and for the manner of their 
articulation -  in such a way as it would be possible to describe him as an ‘insider’ or a 
‘fellow traveller’, rather than simply a critic. If the notion -  advanced in this thesis -  is 
accepted that Schmitt can be best understood when his works are treated as an evolving 
set of reflections on the problems of collective identification, order and its existential, 
ideational production, then the English School comes into focus as a field of intellectual 
endeavour with a parallel set of concerns. Most importantly, the English School is 
understood as having its origins in a self-consciously meta-theoretical investigation into 
the different ways of theorising IR,1 and as such is automatically better able to 
accommodate a theorist who does not line up as a realist or a liberal or a Marxist.
1 Wight’s famous distinction between Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism, from Martin Wight, 
International Theory, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), p 7.
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The argument begins by establishing a shared assumption concerning the importance of 
norms -  although crucially not historically or universally transcendent norms -  and 
suggests that this commitment be made a more explicit component of English School 
theories in order that they should not be regarded merely as ‘realism in drag’.2 Then the 
intellectual habits of English School thinkers and Carl Schmitt are compared and 
contrasted, in order to illuminate important parallels of approach to the problems at 
hand, particularly their general interest in frameworks of order along with scepticism 
towards the idea of progress in history. Finally, the English School is examined and 
refracted through a Schmittian lens to see what elements of English School theory come 
into much sharper focus, and which fall away.
The concluding contentions are that Schmitt’s formulation of the friend / enemy 
distinction as the source of political community describes a process that can only take 
place in a societal context, which is co-constitutive of both the political community and 
the International Society in which it is necessarily embedded. Furthermore, that any 
articulation of an International Society is inhabited by normative presuppositions that 
condition and necessitate a wider World Society in which any International Society can 
be clearly understood as such. Building on Schmitt’s post-Nietzschean reflections, this 
English School vocabulary can be reinterpreted in a way that respects the rich 
background in classical theory from which the English School sprang, and yet 
reformulates the relationship between the various terms in a way that evokes the harsh 
ideational dualism of Schmitt’s friend / enemy distinction. The English School 
therefore, while not necessarily needing to make space for Schmitt as a member, might 
usefully begin to see him as a sort of fellow traveller in IR, even if one with something 
like a criminal record. The central concerns of the English School are recognisably 
similar to Schmitt’s own preoccupations, and English School terminology is susceptible 
to a kind of Schmittian critique that goes beyond mere refutation. Lastly it is because 
the English School emerges from a wider intellectual context influenced by 
philosophical idealism, and tends to be expressed in ideational terms while preserving 
an ambivalence toward the concept of progress in history, that the comparison comes 
properly into focus. In other words, it is because of the place that the English School 
occupies within the wider discipline of IR, that the comparison becomes productive.
2 Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History o f the English School, (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 1998), p 4.
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Framing the English School
If a comparison is to be made between Carl Schmitt and the English School, much of it 
will turn on how we understand the English School (ES). Furthermore, given that the 
ES is in part known for what it is not (i.e. American), this presents problems. On the 
one hand, the ES can be thought of in terms of a particular set of theorists including -  
but not limited to -  Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, Charles Manning, 
Adam Watson, R.J. Vincent, Barry Buzan etc.; but this makes is difficult to clarify any 
theoretical consistency between them.3 On the other hand, the ES can be understood as 
a set of ideas, which would in turn not do justice to the theoretical plurality that 
characterises the actual group of theorists. A better way to describe the ES would be as 
a coherent and self aware exchange of arguments around a particular set of problems.4 
In this way, the idea of the ES as a set of prominent theorists -  whose work forms 
something like a ‘canon’ within the ES -  gives way to a more productive relationship 
between theorists, ideas and problems, rather than a strict methodology or exclusive 
conceptual tendencies. Partly this is because the origins of the ES can be found in a self 
conscious attempt to rethink the whole problem of International Relations or 
International Politics, and because each of the early theorists had the opportunity to 
contribute both to definition of the central problems and frame their own response to 
them. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics was formed very 
explicitly because of a dissatisfaction with the traditional ways of theorising 
International Relations,5 divided as it was between Realism -  which was becoming 
increasingly dominated by the attempt to turn International Relations into a more formal 
science -  and the sort of discredited idealism of the pre-war years.6 Therefore, the ES, 
can be understood in terms of a set of explicit meta-theoretical arguments concerning an 
interconnected range of dilemmas thrown up by a preoccupation with the notions of
3 Brunello Vigezzi, The British Committee on the Theory o f International Politics (1945-1985): The 
Rediscovery o f History, (Milan: Edizioni Unicopoli, 2005).
4 Andrew Hurrell refers to a wider set of questions in ‘Keeping history, law and political philosophy 
firmly within the English School’ in Review o f International Studies (2001) Volume 27, p 489-494. 
Furthermore, Christian Reus-Smit’s -  ‘The Constructivist Challenge’, in Alex J. Bellamy (ed), 
International Society and its Critics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) -  argument is particularly 
interesting in that he suggest the English School and Constructivism share a common approach to ‘the 
most pressing research questions facing our field’, p 94.
5 Vigezzi’s book, The British Committee on the Theory o f International Politics, makes much of the 
English School’s oscillation between history and theory, a problem which can be seen reflected in the 
conclusions of this thesis.
6 Dunne, Inventing International Society, p 16.
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order and justice; their origins and persistence in the international sphere, along with a 
critical posture toward both the growing scientism of Realism, and the unguarded 
utopianism of the early idealists.
Furthermore, although much use is made of the term ‘normative’ in the text -  which is 
often taken to be related to a discoverable bedrock of universal moral values -  the 
meaning herein is restricted to association with ordering ideas. A norm can be equated 
with an ‘ought’ rather than an ‘is’, a concept rather than an object, and in Schmitt’s 
post-Nietzschean, anti-foundationalist world, a normative framework can only extend to 
describing an encompassing ideational context, rather than an identifiably progressive 
political aspiration. Nevertheless, the ES has always been strongly concerned with 
norms, from simple conditioning ideas to socially constructed normative frameworks, 
all the way to the progressive and universal aspirations behind certain ideas of World 
Society. Tim Dunne usefully captures this tendency when he suggests that the ES can be 
organised around three basic assumptions;
the realisation that theory-building must take place in a formal institutional 
setting, drawing from a shared body of knowledge and ideas; the invention 
of an interpretive approach to the history of ideas about International 
Relations; and the recognition that the society of states embodies rules and 
norms which must be the subject of academic scrutiny and critical 
judgement.7
The focus on ideas and norms and the idea that the ‘society of states embodies rules and 
norms’ (my italics) looks very similar to Schmitt’s conceptual focus and his rendering 
of the jus publicum Europeaum. Furthermore, both Dunne and Vigezzi make clear that 
the early discussions of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics -
o
even the prior discussions concerning the constitution of the committee -  were 
deliberately open about what it was that was under discussion. The Committee was after 
all, pulled together due to a general dissatisfaction with the manner in which the subject 
of International Relations or International Politics had been approached up to that time, 
and the explicit focus of the Committee was to carve out a distinctive way of looking at 
the problem of International Relations. To quote Dunne again; ‘academics who identify 
with the ES today are interested in ... normative questions relating to culture,
7 Ibid., p 16. Vigezzi, The British Committee, p 109.
8 EH Carr was deliberately not invited due to his status as a ‘great power in the region’, Ibid., p 93.
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community and identity.’ And again ‘the English School ... operates with a 
constructivist meta-theory ... [and] its understanding of theory is normative all the way 
down.’9 Dunne’s view of the ES can be contrasted with that provided by Ian Manners, 
who tries to outline the need for a ‘fourth tradition’ within the ES.10 The argument I am 
making -  which I believe is implicitly supported by Dunne -  concerns the place of the 
ES as a ‘fourth tradition’ within IR Theory in its own right. To outline briefly in 
advance of the conclusion to this chapter, I believe the ES -  as distinct from the other 
traditions -  is best understood in terms of its general philosophical idealism, and its 
mistrust of the idea of progress in history. Manners himself usefully quotes Rob Walker 
and Ole Wasver making largely this point; ‘Both R.B.J. Walker and OleWasver have 
pointed out that the ES could be interpreted as ‘a via media between the supposed 
extremes of realism and revolutionism’.11 The critical question concerns the form that 
the via media must take, but Manners conception of the ES as comprised of ‘four 
traditions’ makes for a highly pluralistic via media that encompasses two of the 
traditions between which it is supposed to act as a via media. I agree with Manners on 
the need for a ‘fourth tradition’ but instead suggest that the ES -  formed around 
Dunne’s basic shared assumptions and corresponding to Wight’s Rationalism -  loosely 
comprises it.12
A brief examination of the concept of power, from both a Schmittian and an ES 
perspective helps to draw out the underlying similarities of their approaches. It has so 
far been outlined in this thesis that Schmitt’s work is best understood as a coherent 
whole, that throughout his life he was engaged in a perennial search for answers to a 
surprisingly narrow set of questions. And the manner in which his evolving responses 
are inflected by the migrating sentiments of their times should enable one to read 
through his main texts towards a critical engagement with the central problem at the 
heart of much of his writing; that of order. Principally he was concerned to point out 
that order does not simply exist, and cannot be taken for granted. This may seem a fatal
9 Ibid, p 185.
10 Ian Manners, ‘The Missing Tradition of the ES: Including Nietzschean Relativism and World 
Imagination in Extranational Studies’, in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 32, Issue 
2,2003.
11 Ibid., p 248.
12 And of course, as shown in Chapter 5 ,1 think other theorists have also reached for this basic 
philosophical and historical conjunction, not least of which Michael C. Williams’ Wilful Realism, but 
also ‘thick constructivism’ and even post-modem theories that insist upon the contingency of ontological 
claims and are mistrustful of narratives of progress and englightenment.
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truism, but reveals also a critical disposition towards those who look for the roots of 
order in nature, or God, or indeed simple power. The ES theorists clearly shared this 
fundamental frustration.
Nature has its own dynamics, which can be understood as a kind of order, and this in 
turn can be extrapolated to comment on the rise and fall of nations, states, and whole
1 'Xcivilisations, as in the work of Oswald Spengler. However, this reduces intellectual 
enquiry to little more than reflection on the inevitable prospect of decline. It finds its 
greatest exponents among thinkers who refer to the metaphors and allegories of ancient 
Greece, favoured among which are obviously ‘hubris’ and ‘nemesis’.14 Similarly, God, 
or a divine source of authority has little to offer in terms of explaining social order, 
except of course by invoking mystery. Lastly power, although universally invoked as an 
explanation for events, is a slippery notion. Martin Wight describes power in line with 
his three traditions; Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism. The revolutionist, for 
Wight, must have a ‘ground for action’, and ‘a right of moral judgement’, in order to 
justify the overthrow and redistribution of power, whereas realists contend that power is 
‘self-justifying’.15 Rationalists -  and by extension the ES -  on the other hand, frame 
their interest in power in terms of its justification, and thus it must be ‘transformed into 
authority’, which is a strong match for both the points made by Michael Oakeshott,16 
and more importantly for the manner in which Schmitt discusses power in Political 
Theology}1 Thus the ES contains a strong critique of realist and revolutionist 
conceptions of power. Wight even went so far as to say that revolutionists ‘resembled
1 Rrealists in their practice’ precisely on this point.
Power itself can be described in a variety of ways, and it has a long association with 
material notions of capability; the size of armed forces for instance, are a measure of 
power, as is the productive capacity of factories and farms. But even in these measures, 
there are qualitative factors, such as the style and effectiveness of armaments and
13 Oswald Spengler, The Decline o f the West: Volume II, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1928). Referenced 
also by Martin Wight, International Theory, p 105.
14 Morgenthau’s lifelong obsession with power is a case in point, and Richard Ned Lebow has written 
eloquently on these themes more recently, in The Tragic Vision o f Politics: Ethics, Interests and Order.
15 Wight, International Theory, p 105.
16 Oakeshott, ‘Talking Politics’, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, p 447.
17 Discussed briefly at the beginning of Chapter 5.
18 Wight, International Theory, p 105.
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training etc., that make these material determinants somewhat unstable as predictive 
indicators, and in any event, norms are built into the assumptions concerning the actors 
who wield power, and their respective intentions. In other words, referring back to the 
discussion of power in Chapter 5, power needs a stable ontological framework in order 
to operate as an independent variable. Thus, following Wight, another reason for the 
comparable importance of power to realists and revolutionists, is their joint 
philosophical disposition towards an ontologically secure external world, in which 
power can operate as an independent variable; for revolutionists, as a means to an 
justified end, and for realists as a end in itself.
Turning back to Carl Schmitt, as noted in Chapter 5, power very rarely appears in his 
analysis; it is too blunt a term. His investigations of order are always accompanied by 
an analysis of prevailing sources of authority. His work on ‘the political’ and the 
constitution of a political community inevitably involves a point of ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘decision’. However, crucially, he makes a clear case for the reciprocity of authority.19 
He explicitly repudiates the notion that the institutional sovereign is necessarily the true
onsovereign, which for Schmitt is revealed as ‘he who decides on the exception’, not 
merely he who is institutionally authorised to make a decision, for the institutions 
themselves may have become detached from the protean political dimension which both 
enacts and destroys them. This renders power as a condition of reflexive social
91interaction, much more akin to Foucault, for whom power exists m relays.
When power is broken down like this into a tense, interdependent relationship between 
order and authority, it becomes an entirely inter-subjective and normative matter, with 
the strict vocabulary of material power fading into the background. This is not to say 
that material power is of no relevance, but simply that ideas come before any 
interpretation of material power for the simple reason that material power always 
follows the contours of some deeper ideational frameworks. All the ships and tanks in
19 There are extensive references earlier in the thesis to Schmitt’s dictum ‘Sovereign is he who decides on 
the exception’, briefly summarised, this phrase works two ways. Both as a description of the powers of a 
sovereign, and a litmus test for identifying exactly where sovereignty lies in a context of competing 
authority claims. Compare Shakespeare’s ‘uneasy lies the head wears the crown’ -  from Henry IVPart II, 
which performs the double function of signifying the wearer of the crown as the sovereign, but also 
reveals the attraction for those who would be sovereign, to wear the crown, the simple point being that the 
principle of sovereignty is distinct from the person who claims to bear it.
Schmitt, Political Theology, p 1.
21 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p 29.
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the world are useless if you have no one to man them, or if they refuse to follow orders. 
Therefore, behind all facades of material power, there are norms to sustain and organise 
them in relation to their purpose. There are codes of behaviour which always boil down 
to an ought behind an is. And this focus on norms, their origins, evolution and 
persistence, brings Schmitt neatly alongside ES rationalists with their implicit focus on 
the normative firmament in which material forms of power are expressed, conditioned 
and authorised. It might be added that Schmitt puts more stress on norms than the ES, 
but the direction of his thinking is directly compatible. Where ES thinkers have tended 
to focus on stressing the importance of norms -  as opposed to power -  in any 
explanation for the persistence of order, Schmitt situates norms as prior to any system of 
order and that which give rise to observable patterns of order. It is not simply that norms 
assist in the preservation of a materially constructed order, but that order is itself a 
normative proposition, which produces, organises and directs material resources as it 
emerges. Once again, this is not to say that material power is unimportant, but instead 
obliges some clarification of the relationship between material and ideational power. 
Material power reflects an underlying relationship between order and authority, and 
survives intact only so long as it continues to reinforce this highly mutable conjunction.
If power is viewed as having an underlying normative dynamic, then it ceases to be an 
independent analytical variable. Instead, the normative composition of prevailing 
structures of power come into focus, which represent themselves in terms of measurable 
power, but necessarily draw on deeper normative frameworks. Material power is 
therefore an epiphenomenon, which leads the way to thinking about deeper problems, 
but does not in itself offer anything of interpretive value, it merely acts as a signpost to 
the ordering norms that make aggregations of material power visible. Of course, this 
says nothing about historical contexts in which aggregations of material power exist, 
and are directed toward the defence of particular ideational frameworks, but in a sense 
this is precisely what makes the particular ideational frameworks durable, and gives rise 
to the persistence of systems of order. And more importantly, makes the study of the 
conditions of emergence for particular systems of order so important. Thus IR is
iL
preoccupied, not simply with contemporary dates like Sept 11 2001 or 1989, but also 
with 1648, and why Schmitt was preoccupied with explaining the normative lineaments 
of modernity which both enacted and sustained the nomos of the Westphalian system 
through the legitimate exercise of European state power. Which is remarkably close to
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the early preoccupations of the British Committee on the Theory of International 
Politics.22
This in turn reveals the analytical value of norms. And when the ES asserts that ‘norms 
matter’ when seeking to understand the persistence of order in the world, they are doing 
more than simply adding a variable to materialist and realist accounts of order. They are 
instead revealing the underlying dynamics of a world in which Realism appears to have 
some explanatory potential, but rather than expanding the value of Realism, they are 
explaining its purely positional relevance and its reliance on a pre-ordained and 
ahistorical structure rooted in an account of human nature or reflexive systems theory. 
And this is a crucial difference between Realism and the ES. The introduction of norms 
-  considered crucial to an understanding of the ES -  inevitably does more than produce 
a kind of ‘Realism in drag’23 but instead places norms in competition with materialist 
accounts of structure, in effect prioritising a normative analysis over a materialist 
analysis, and in turn forcing an examination of the ideational context that makes the 
material world intelligible. Norms matter therefore, not as an adjunct to a materialist 
worldview, but as the means by which it can be deciphered, and deciphering the 
material world requires constructing normative mechanisms that govern our interaction 
with it. In other words, the ES is predisposed to the interpretive and hermeneutical 
tendencies of philosophical idealism, as opposed to realism.
This explains a number of things. Firstly, it offers an account of why Realism is 
constantly outflanked by migrating definitions of power, driven by technology and the 
changing appeal of both radical groups and global opinion. It explains to some extent 
the ahistorical and static dimension of realism, and how the introduction of norms 
produces the historicism of the ES.24 Lastly, it answers one of Emanuel Adler’s 
criticisms of Buzan’s text From International to World Society??5 Adler suggests that
22 Dunne, Inventing International Society, p 98. Vigezzi, The British Committee, p 149.
23 Ibid, p 162.
24 Roger D. Spegele, ‘Traditional Political Realism’, in Alex Bellamy (ed), International Society and its 
Critics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Spegele makes the important point that norms form a 
key dimension of both Classical Realism and ES approaches to history. I have to add that I find Spegele’s 
argument about an ‘internalist teleology’ in the work of Butterfield, little more than an identification of its 
idealist aspects, and to some extent a misuse -  even perhaps a refutation -  of the conventional use of the 
word ‘teleology’.
25 Emmanuel Adler, ‘Barry Buzan’s Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct the English School: “Not All 
the Way Down’” , in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 34, Issue 1,2005.
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the absence of power in Buzan’s book is a significant omission, but by focussing on the 
normative dimension, and considering the ES’s focus on order, an explicit consideration 
of power as a distinct element is entirely superfluous. Power is not independent of the 
norms that comprise its possibility, therefore an analysis of the normative frameworks 
that underlie order is an analysis of that which produces durable normative frameworks 
that contain and mobilise observable material power. In a similar vein, a study of the 
manufacturing process that produces cars, takes the cars themselves for granted; a study 
of power requires an assumption about the actors that wield it, a study of order on the 
other hand is an analysis of the structures that condition the possibilities for exercising 
power. A study of power requires a ‘given thaf -  or an ontologically secure conception 
of the external world -statement about the social structure prior to any analysis, whereas 
a study of order is an attempt to understand what social structure is given at any point in 
time. From an ES, or Schmittian, or indeed just a philosophically idealist perspective, 
order is therefore prior to power, particularly when examining the norms that comprise 
the international order rather than the behaviour of states. For just as norms matter in 
understanding how states relate to one another, they also constitute the ideational sinews 
of international order itself -  in which states as actors are normatively permitted to use 
power according to certain agreed terms -  and therefore matter a very great deal indeed.
Lastly, the implication behind the prioritisation of order and norms within the ES is 
strongly suggestive that it has general characteristics that conform to an idealist 
analysis. This does not mean that all ES thinkers are idealists, far from it, but it does 
suggest that the kind of meta-theoretical analysis offered by even the most materialist 
theorists of the ES -  as opposed to realists -  is amenable to examination from an 
idealist frame. Moreover, in many ES texts, it is not difficult to identify philosophical 
commitments that have to be counted as idealist. Therefore the whole field is fertile 
ground for a comparison that concentrates on concepts and conceptual formulations, 
rather than firm, ascertainable characteristics of the external world.
26 Hedley Bull was well known as a ‘philosophical realist’, Nick Rengger, ‘Serpents and Doves in 
Classical International Theory’, in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Volume 17, Issue 2, 
1988, p 217.
27 For example, Charles Manning calls his own version of Realism ‘Sophisticated Realism’ which, rather 
like Michael C. Williams’ ‘Wilful Realism’ relies heavily on ideas, norms, and ways of framing the 
problem of IR, in other words, idealism with a realist face. However, any focus on ‘normative questions 
relating to culture, community and identity,’ -  Dunne, Inventing International Society, p 185. -  has to be 
counted a part of the interpretive, hermeneutical side of the philosophical realism / idealism divide.
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World Society
Although the key contribution of the ES is usually thought to be the idea of 
International Society,28 it is actually World Society that provides an better initial point 
of comparison. This is so for two reasons; on the one hand, it is the most abstract and 
tentative of the ES triad of concepts -  although I would suggest that it is, along with 
World System, a limit concept, and limit concepts are an inevitable consideration for 
any norm based theory -  and secondly because it again exposes the crucial difference 
between philosophical idealism and philosophical realism, in that a philosophically 
realist World Society looks quite different to an idealist World Society. In fact, I would 
suggest that one of the main reasons why there is so much confusion and debate about 
this concept is precisely because the ES -  as a body of theorists -  has rarely addressed 
the underlying philosophical differences between its contributors. Furthermore, the 
concept of World Society needs to be reassessed in terms of Schmitt’s friend / enemy 
distinction, for the simple reason that in a Schmittian world of friends and enemies, 
World Society would appear to have no basis in theory. If there is always a constitutive 
friend / enemy distinction, there is no position from which to observe the universal or 
universalised norms ordinarily associated with World Society. However, this would be 
either to misunderstand the nature of the friend / enemy distinction, or to commit to a 
philosophically realist interpretation of World Society.
Simply put, the friend / enemy distinction imposes an existential commitment on 
participants of political struggle; and in constructing opposing coalitions of hostile 
confreres, the terms of their hostility are established, which, although they may change, 
nevertheless set parameters on immediate political decisions by framing them in relation 
to the established terms of hostility. In this way, normative conditions are established 
that regulate conduct between friends, and -  crucially -  between friends and enemies, if 
only by virtue of the idea of mutual -  and potentially absolute -  hostility. Therefore, 
every individual participant in political struggle carries with them conditioning terms of 
interaction that can be applied to all outsiders, or enemies. And even if a new, 
previously un-encountered group -  or member thereof -  emerges, by virtue of their not
28 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society ?: English School Theory and the Social Structure o f  
Globalisation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p 1.
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being a friend, they will be treated according to terms already established for the 
treatment of enemies -  guided by a more or less reserved violence.
This comes more clearly into focus when examining the idea of World Society, which is 
posited as a framework of universal norms, either extant, or realised through divine 
inspiration, or established by virtue of common agreement.29 Setting aside the 
possibility that universal norms might be commonly agreed, the first two ideas 
concerning the origins of World Society look remarkably like the tradition of natural 
law or Kelsenian positivism discussed earlier in the thesis. And even the idea of 
establishing a common framework of norms could come to resemble a Hobbesian legal 
positivist framework under certain conditions. The central point is simply this; World 
society, if posited as a characteristic of the external world -  nature, divine providence, 
or merely the common assertion of really existing people -  has metaphysically realist 
entailments. And as will be clear by now this poses problems for a Schmittian analysis 
beyond the very clear reservations he articulated concerning the tradition of natural law 
or Kelsenian positivism.
Thinking about World Society from a philosophically idealist frame -  in contrast to a 
naive idealist perspective -  universal values cannot merely be discovered, nor can they 
merely exist as an asserted component of an external reality, but instead can only be 
understood as an artefact of comprehension, of which the ‘world knows nothing’, to 
follow Hermann Hesse. Therefore the concept of World Society, and the debate over its 
form, can only be understood as a part of the process by which it is constructed and 
universalised. In other words, World Society can only be the grand extrapolation of the 
values and norms with which the individual navigates his own interaction with the 
external world. From a Schmittian frame, these interactions are mediated by the friend / 
enemy distinction, therefore every friend / enemy distinction always contains and 
articulates a version of what might otherwise be called World Society, a set of 
normative parameters that regulate interactions with others, be they friends or enemies. 
Accordingly, assumptions about World Society grow out of particular friend / enemy 
distinctions.
29 Buzan, From International To World Society?, p 27. Buzan usefully discusses the range of ideas about 
World Society from both within and without die English School.
30 Particularly the pure account of how Hobbes’ Leviathan has no natural limit, offered in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis.
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For philosophical realists -  like Hedley Bull31 -  World Society is treated with caution, 
but can nevertheless be entertained as a testable component of a mind-independent 
reality, or an artefact, corollary or merely an aspiration, of a universal human 
community. Whereas for idealists, World Society is comparable to a set of normative 
conditions that act as a philosophical precondition for attempts to theorise the external 
world as an aspect of interacting with it. This difference can be clarified by examining 
the attitude of two more ES thinkers in respect of World Society. Martin Wight was 
constantly troubled by the idea of World Society, but as Buzan shows, Wight’s 
comment that ‘in the last analysis, international society is a society of the whole human 
race’ demonstrates that his view of World Society was incompletely distinguished from 
his view of International Society.32 Wight apparently reconciled his doubts about World 
Society by reference to his ‘devout, if pessimistic, Christianity. Compare this to 
Manning, for whom ‘[w]ithin, beneath, alongside, behind and transcending, the notional 
society of states, there exists, and for some purposes fairly effectively, the nascent 
society of all mankind.’34 Oddly enough, Manning slips fairly directly into a radical 
idealist characterisation; first because of his persistent use of the term ‘notional’ to 
describe the ‘society of states’, but more subtly with his suggestion that any ‘notional 
society of states’ is bound up with some notion of World Society, in other words, that 
World Society is detached from a universally valid proposition and instead posed as a 
necessary complement to a set of ideas about the society of states.
The problem that arises from this idealist reading of World Society is the implication of 
a multiplicity of World Societies, after all, if there are many friend / enemy distinctions, 
there are many embedded versions of World Society floating about. This obliges an 
examination of specific and particular conflicts or alliances as wider incompatibilities 
and reconciliations between evolving and contested ideas of World Society, each of
31 Rengger, ‘Serpents and Doves in Classical International Theory’, p 217.
32 Buzan, From International To World Society?, p 34.
33 Renger, ‘Serpents and Doves in Classical International Theory’, op.cit., p 224, fh 13.
34 Ibid., p 31., From C. A. W. Manning, The Nature o f International Society, (London: Bell and Sons Ltd, 
1962), p 177.
35 Nick Rengger, confirms this interpretation of Manning and Wight as broadly speaking idealists with 
their focus on ‘historical interpretation’ and ‘phenomenological hermeneutics’, in ‘Serpents and Doves in 
Classical International Theory’, op.cit., p 217. Furthermore, any examination of his principle work 
reveals his constant preoccupation with the radical uncertainty of ‘social knowledge’, Manning, The 
Nature o f International Society.
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which acts as a legitimating discourse for some forms of human interaction. 
Furthermore, the complex ethical wagers that feature in discussions about the existence 
-  or not -  of World Society, from the philosophically realist perspective, are precisely 
the points at which different, philosophically idealist, conceptions of World Society are 
contested. For example, contestation over the limits of torture, the legitimacy of 
‘national resistance’, and the political nature of terroristic violence represent points of 
cleavage between different ideationally framed versions of World Society, and not 
challenges to the realistically framed existence thereof. After all, torture may be widely 
condemned and posited as evidence for the absence of World Society -  except perhaps 
in the universality of its condemnation -  but wherever there is an instance of torture, 
there will also be a justification for it, which will necessarily appeal to a universal 
register of values, even if in the Machiavellian sense, as interpreted by Susan 
Stebbing.36
It is because the terms of interaction that condition the relations between friends and 
enemies are ideational in character and cannot but be universalised, that the idea of 
World Society is so problematic for a philosophical realist, and yet so essential for an 
idealist. A realist is concerned with whether a single World Society actually exists, 
whereas an idealist cannot help but express a version of it, even if -  and indeed partly 
because -  others may regard it as degraded version of World Society. World Society has 
no necessary content, and it is contestation over its content that forms a subtext of the 
ideational and polemical conflict over the very conceptual dilemmas that cohere IR.
Lastly, if an idealist conception of World Society corresponds to the normative 
frameworks applied to the task of interacting with the ‘real’ world, then a conception of 
World Society becomes necessary prior to any further speculation concerning 
International Society or even International System. For a philosophical realist, an 
analysis of the world usually commences with International System, then builds up to 
International Society, then -  and only then -  does it become possible to trace out the 
fragile connective tissue of a World Society. Whereas for a philosophical idealist,
36 See Chapter 5. For Stebbing’s Machiavelli, in order to advocate and justify the Prince doing ‘evil’, 
there had to be a notion of the ‘good’ against which to measure it.
37 Bull outlines this basic hierarchy in The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
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World Society is implied in the very attempt to make sense of the world in the first 
place.
This may seem counter-intuitive, yet it is surprisingly revealing if extended to a 
Schmittian explanation of both International Society and International System. 
International Society resembles Schmitt’s notion of the jus publicum Europaeum, i.e. a 
comprehensive set of agreed norms and laws that regulate the conduct and behaviour of 
particular European states in respect of each other, built upon the nomos of a prior 
exclusion of the non-European realm to a condition of normative subjugation. The 
World Society elements of this particular International Society are the appropriative 
nomos of shared norms concerning the supremacy of the European mode of civilisation 
upon which a version of normative equality -  and bracketed war -  between European
states was built. This might also correspond to Ian Manners’ notion of a World
* 20
Imagination. The idea of International System is more difficult, but traditionally 
resides in the conceptual effacement of all normative conditions of equality between 
states and instead measures them in respect of their material capabilities and actions 
alone. Not only should this be reassessed in relation to relative rarity of such relations, 
but from an idealist perspective this particular category makes little sense. For 
International Relations to be understood in systemic terms would require nothing less 
than the refusal to examine relations in anything other than simple material terms, 
dependent upon an ontologically secure framework for the comparison of power as an 
independent variable. It can be done, as realists have shown, but it is a dissatisfaction 
with this kind reductive analysis that marked out the ES in the first place. Furthermore, 
to consider states as independent actors is a judgement loaded with normative features 
concerning the proper characteristics of states. Thus for states to behave in ways that 
truly resembled an International System would rely on surprising commonalities 
between the normative conditions of interaction between them. In other words, for 
states to behave according to sheer power political considerations would require a tacit
38 Manners, ‘The Missing Tradition of the ES’, op.cit.
39 Buzan, From International To World Society?, p 100, although Buzan’s analysis is also realist in form, 
in that he downgrades the utility of the idea of International System because it does not genuinely exist, 
rather than because it would have to be a extraordinarily delicate normative construction.
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agreement to construct this highly abstracted form of anarchy; or a World Society of 
anarchical inclinations.40
Fundamentally, Schmitt -  simply by virtue of his focus on concepts over objects -  
provokes a recasting of the ES vocabulary. He reorders the ES triad of International 
System, International Society and World Society into a dyad of interdependent 
International and World Societies, in which International System can only be viewed as 
merely one -  highly abstracted and entirely constructed -  version of a pluralistic 
International Society. And although this may be considered an irreconcilable distinction 
between Schmitt and some types of ES theorising, the comparisons do not end there.
The English School and Conceptual History
Where Schmitt and the English School bear further comparison, is in style of academic 
argument. The ES is heavily represented by writers with a strong historical background. 
Butterfield, who originally convened The British Committee on the Theory of 
International Politics, was a professor of history -  and is counted among the family of 
Conceptual Historians which includes Quentin Skinner and Rheinhart Koselleck -  and 
most of the others have a clear engagement with the broad subject matter of history 41 
This insight extends further than the mere invocation of historical events, and is instead 
better understood in terms of the general ‘historicist’ disposition of the ES.42 Although 
‘classical’ realist thinkers often provide sophisticated commentary on specific historical 
episodes like the ancient Greek states, and the Italian city-states of the renaissance, the 
approach to history is quite different from that of the ES. Realism is generally posited as 
a set of methodological propositions concerning the application of universal truths about 
Man and power -  order being an epiphenomenon of power dynamics -  and how this 
produces certain inevitable and recurring patterns of interrelationships 43 ES thinkers, on 
the other hand, do not seek to mine history for proof of a priori assumptions about
40 An implication of Wendt’s famous appeal for constructivism ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, in 
International Organization, Volume 46, Issue 2,1992, foreshadowing a prolonged debate concerning the 
relationship between the English School and Constructivism.
41 Carr and Butterfield were historians, Bull, Wight and Manning, all refer to history as a source of 
contingency rather than repetition.
42 Buzan, Barry “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR” in Review o f International 
Studies (2001) Volume 27, pp 471-488. Vigezzi also places great store in the English Schools ‘recovery 
of history’, The British Committee.
43 Richard Little, ‘The English School and World History’, in Bellamy (ed), International Society and its 
Critics. Little states that ‘the prevailing tendency [for the use of World Histoiy in the wider discipline of 
IR] has been to draw on the past to provide evidence of continuity, rather than change’, p 46.
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human nature, but instead examine particular historical contexts in which durable 
patterns of order can be observed, then attempt understand their contextual emergence -  
and even coexistence -  from a diffuse set of influences, rather than produce an 
ahistorical theory of the interaction of universal laws.44
Realists, in a sense, tend towards an analysis that sees cyclical repetitions of power 
producing order in response to shifts in technological and social realities, believing 
nevertheless that it is possible to directly compare different historical periods and see 
the same underlying logics at play. This encourages a positivist approach to history as a 
series of events that form a historical record and can be understood in terms of causal 
dynamics. Identify the power -  in economics, technology, leadership etc., and the same 
historical patterns can be observed. ES theorists do not necessarily dispense with a 
positivistic outlook,45 but they open up the question of history by examining the 
particularities of different historical periods. A focus on the emergence of order can 
either reflect a belief that order has a tendency to exist as a result of underlying truths 
that form its foundations, or that order merely reflects our capacity to perceive patterns 
in an otherwise chaotic dispersion of information. Which leaves the field open for the 
more historicist pursuit of interlocking and evolving systems of order characteristic of 
ES investigations. This is not to say that the ES refutes the notion of a true apprehension 
of the causal dynamics of history, merely that they set aside questions of underlying 
truth in order to apprehend a greater range of variables. Their approach is interpretive 
and corresponds to a more narrativised and meta-theoretical form of history than the 
study of repetitions observable in some of the less sophisticated realist texts. The ES 
also avoids the methodological aversion displayed by Kenneth Waltz when asked to 
explain anything but the operation of his mechanistic, though sophisticated, framework 
of neo-realism46 Whereas ES thinkers, by virtue of their openness to complex 
renderings of the interactions between law, theology, philosophy, and their tendency to 
broaden out historical accounts, are almost obliged to offer an explanation for even 
tangentially related processes or events. In simplistic terms, Realists tend to the view
44 Ibid., p 52.
45 Specifically, the philosophical realist Hedley Bull, but also perhaps Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 
International Systems in World History : Remaking the Study o f International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).
46 Dunne refers to Waltz’s complimentary remarks about Bull and Wight, but that he also said that ‘they 
did theory in a sense not recognized as theory by philosophers of science’, Dunne, Inventing International 
Society, p 16.
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that power produces order, whereas ES theorists are open to the opposite possibility; 
that norms inform order, and order produces displays of power.
In recent years there has been a move beyond the pinched methodology of neo-realism 
towards a deeper engagement with so called ‘classical realism’ as a more historically 
informed approach to theorising. And although this makes for more interesting reading, 
it does not overcome the central problem outlined here. A theorist’s approach to history 
is conditioning by the intentions of his analysis. This has been outlined in other parts of 
this thesis, but bears repeating here. Classical and Neo-Classical Realist accounts of IR 
are rooted in assumptions about the eternal truth of human nature, and therefore become 
centred on the ahistorical principles revealed in the series of events they choose to 
describe. They use history to demonstrate truth, and from this truth construct models of 
human behaviour from which it is possible to determine an appropriate course of action. 
The accounts themselves are varied and draw on different degrees of assumed 
complexity in the motivations and appetites of Man, but they nevertheless share a 
disposition towards the observability of ‘truth’ in the historical record, which is not 
necessarily shared by ES thinkers.
Herbert Butterfield made the relationship between History and IR a central focus of his 
work and Ian Hall makes reference to the annotations he made in a variety of works by 
American social scientists.47 He lists them as Kaplan, Kelman, Deutsch, Schelling, 
Morgenthau, Wolfers and Hoffman. Hall summaries a variety of Butterfield’s thoughts 
as a suspicion of ‘geometrical’ thinking which could lead to ‘prescriptions or pressing 
pieces of advice’, which could in turn fatally ‘encourage ‘statesmen’ to bring the ‘real
Aftworld ... as close as possible to the ‘geometry’” . Aside from this critique of 
scientism, Butterfield was also deeply critical of utopianism, and even the idea of 
progress in history. His vocabulary is that of Oakeshott -  with his talk of ‘predicaments’ 
and ‘experience’ -  and therefore philosophical idealism, but his approach to history was 
towards narrative history rather than grand teleological themes.49
47 Hall, Ian ‘History, Christianity and diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and international relations’ in 
Review o f International Studies (2002) Volume 28, p 732.
48 Ibid., p 733.
49 Despite Spegele’s notion of an ‘internalist telelogy’ in his work, Spegele, ‘Traditional Political 
Realism’, op. cit.
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For the ES, history becomes both the test and the content of particular and temporally 
localised accounts of order, detailing the manner in which certain institutions and social 
forces sustain or challenge prevailing norms. An account of the contemporary world 
may find all sorts of origins and normative principles established in the Treaty of 
Westphalia for example, and may broaden this out to account for the prevailing 
normative dynamics that produced the Treaty of Westphalia. But unlike a realist, few 
ES theorists would suggest that the same underlying principle observable in the Treaty 
of Westphalia remains as true, and as apparent today as it was in Ancient Greece.
It would be possible to further distinguish between realist and ES approaches to history 
-  particularly by exploring neo-realist accounts more thoroughly -  but for the purpose 
of this analysis little more needs to be said, save one important reflection. The 
difference between the ahistorical priorities of Realism and the contextual historicism of 
ES thinkers has been established, but there is a further distinction that separates thinkers 
of both persuasions. On the one hand, neo-realists adopt a behaviourist approach to 
theories that is ambivalent about historical proof, contrasted with the Classical and Neo- 
Classical Realists who enrich their theoretical formulations with selected evidence from 
the past. On the other hand, Tim Dunne makes a distinction between analytically 
oriented ES thinkers and those who engage more directly with historical accounts.50 
However, if one follows Oakeshott and makes a distinction between the ‘historical past’ 
and the ‘practical past’,51 in which the former is revealed only by the utterly 
dispassionate investigation of historical detail, and the latter by the direct relationship 
between observed or recorded phenomena and the observer’s lebenwelt or ‘life-world’, 
IR, by virtue of its purpose, forecloses the possibility of referencing the ‘historical past’, 
being restricted entirely to the ‘practical past’. There is no way in which any theories or 
accounts can be developed within the disciplinary parameters of IR without the 
perspective of the present through which they gain interpretive salience.
Although IR can be sensitive to history, this is only insofar as the reason for the actual 
sensitivity reveals itself in the relevance of the analysis to the present. History, in order 
to be pure history, must divest itself of any trace of the ‘mode of practice’ in order to
50 Tim Dunne, ‘System, State and Society; How does it all hang together?’, in Millennium: Journal o f 
International Studies, Volume 34, Issue 1,2005.
51 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Three Essays on History’, in On History and other essays, (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1999), p 38.
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emerge fully as history.52 This might be regarded as impossible, but nevertheless 
informs the careful and deliberate development of sophisticated tools of historical 
method, and although IR scholars can avail themselves of these methods, it is the 
purpose of their enquiry which undermines any claim they may make towards historical 
rigour. Therefore History and IR remain fundamentally opposed in terms of the 
Oakeshottian mode of thought they rely upon. Which in turn places into question the 
historical sensitivity of any IR theory, and collapses the distinction that Dunne makes 
by rendering even the most historically situated accounts of order emerging from the 
ES, back into the analytical category that he so carefully separates out. There may still 
be some heuristic value in the distinction he makes, but not one informed by an actual 
theoretical disjuncture between them. More history or less history in IR does nothing to 
push any IR theory from the ‘practical past’ into the elusive ‘historical past’; it is all 
ultimately rooted in the practical, and therefore forms an entirely ‘present centred’ 
analysis, perfectly rephrasing Schmitt’s invocation of Hegel, ‘all history is present 
history’.53
Carl Schmitt’s historicism has already been outlined in the earlier parts of the thesis and 
places him emphatically on the ES side of this division. His training as a lawyer, his 
facility with history, philosophy, philology, theology and with the subtlety and precision 
of his approach to the history of ideas, makes it unavoidable to place him alongside ES 
thinkers, and observe the similarities of approach. Seen this way, further cleavages 
between Schmitt’s approach and Hans Morgenthau’s -  who, for all the sophistication of 
his analysis, was concerned to establish some working truths for the contemporary 
practice of international relations -  become apparent, for Morgenthau is explicitly 
seeking to portray history as a series of unambiguous lessons for the present, as opposed 
to using it as a relief upon which to cast an understanding of the present.
Thus far Schmitt’s elaborate focus on norms has been explored, which exceeds even 
that of the ES, for whom ‘norms matter’ as part of any proper explanation, whereas for 
Schmitt -  and I would argue for most members of the ES -  norms are central even to 
the idea of explanation itself. Beyond this we can place Schmitt’s historicism alongside 
the ES mode of enquiry, finding that his works are attempts to synthesise a wide range
52 Ibid., p 39.
53 Carl Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’, op. cit.
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of insights from a variety of disciplinary origins. His work, as with the ES is resolutely 
open to the infusion of any body of thought that casts light on the evolution and origins 
of normative frameworks of order. He does not dismiss underlying truths of human 
nature, but rarely invokes them as explanatory motifs, instead committing himself to the 
tracing of historical context insofar as it appears in different prevailing norms 
concerning the precise and appropriate relationship between order and authority at any 
specific point in place and time. His work on The Concept o f the Political and The 
Nomos o f the Earth, posit order as the centrepiece of investigation, and the condition of 
possibility for judgment. And although Butterfield does not precisely mimic Schmitt, 
Ian Hall references Martin Wight’s notes concerning Butterfield’s comments on Hedley 
Bull’s paper ‘Order vs Justice’ as follows;
International order is the precondition of justice 
Order is the condition of all values 
Order and justice are not alternatives54
which without labouring the point, conforms almost perfectly to a Schmittian outlook. 
Society vs System
Returning to the concept of International Society; which is the signal contribution of the 
ES. The term is taken to mean a more complex level of engagement between political 
communities than described by the phrase ‘International System’ which -  from the 
perspective of the ES -  is not a very thorough, or even accurate depiction of the 
relations between states for much of history.55 From the inception of the British 
Committee on the Theory of International Politics,56 ES scholars developed the idea of a 
more complex level of interaction between states as a way of explaining the persistence 
of order through the establishment of norms governing state behaviour, following 
which, each International Society had its own normative dynamics. This includes 
International Law -  which for many realists is subordinate to the struggle for power -  
but also many other formal and informal codes governing interaction. Therefore, 
according to Barry Buzan, and others, International Society presupposes the existence 
of an International System, although not the other way around.57 Some ES thinkers take
54 Hall, ‘History, Christianity and diplomacy’, op. cit., p 734.
55 Buzan, From International To World Society?, p 100.
56 Dunne, Inventing International Society, p 99.
57 Buzan, From International to World Society? p 7. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p 13.
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the analysis further and posit culture as an intervening variable governing the likelihood
fO
of the emergence of linkages that fit societal criteria over systemic. The suggestion 
being that an International Society can only exist where there exists a shared culture, as 
this provides a pre-existing normative context in which norms can be shared and 
negotiated. Obviously these two terms -  International System and International Society 
-  are not exact, but they do at least provide a heuristic framework in which to cast 
problems of International Relations.
Schmitt does not use the language of International Society, which obliges some work to 
make the connection, but the contention of this chapter goes beyond the focus on norms 
and the shared openness to the contributions of wider traditions of thought that have 
been discussed so far. Put simply, an analysis of the manner in which Schmitt navigates 
the problem of order, from its existential foundations in the allegorical state of nature, 
all the way through its different metaphorical and historical expressions in the problems 
of sovereignty, community, decision and eventually nomos at the global level, is 
normative and societal at every level.
Stefano Guzzini comments suggestively that Buzan’s invitation to re-engage with the 
ES59 might lead one to question the very idea of International Society, a process that he 
imagines will undermine the value of the ES itself.60 However, according to the 
argument in this chapter, it is through this reconceptualisation of International Society 
and its relationship to an idealist conception of World Society that the ES emerges with 
greater clarity in the distinctiveness of its assumptions within IR. For where Guzzini 
takes a constructivist line to consider the fragility of a distinction between system and 
society, the task of reconceptualising International Society does not entail redefining it 
in any way, but instead consists in breaking it away from its systemic underlay, and 
thinking instead about International Society as a normative framework that conditions 
relationships, prior to their casting in systemic terms.
58 Jacinta O’Hagan, ‘The Question of Culture’, in Bellamy (ed), International Society and its Critics, p 
215.
59 Buzan, ‘The English School, An Underexploited Resource in IR’, in Review o f International Studies, 
Volume 27,2001.
60 Stefano Guzzini, ‘Calling for a less ‘brandish’ and less ‘grand’ reconvention’ in Review o f 
International Studies, Volume 27,2001.
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International System is indelibly linked to a realist mode of analysis. It is based upon an 
‘ontology of states’61 and operates according to the familiar logic of the billiard table. 
Realists focus on the acquisition of ‘power’ as the fundamental and unrelenting feature 
of human appetites, which gives rise, after Hobbes, to political entities, each attempting 
to secure for themselves the greatest independence of action according to the material 
resources available. However, the well known features of the realist landscape can be 
thrown into some doubt by examining Schmitt’s implied reading of Hobbes.63 Schmitt’s 
focus on the public dimension over the private inflects his reading of Hobbes, and 
presents the dynamics by which a political collective comes to understand itself in 
opposition to another as co-constitutive of a plurality -  or in a simple sense a duality -  
of political collectives.64 The political community is constituted in the very process by 
which it is organised conflictually against another. Therefore instead of extrapolating 
from the individual to the collective and applying the same Hobbesian state of nature to 
each, the Schmittian inflection posits the very moment when the collective can be 
understood as a distinct and separate community, as also the moment when the norms 
conditioning its hostile relationship with its ‘enemy’ emerge. This refers back to the 
‘twisted square’ diagram in Chapter 1. In other words, as this hostile relationship is the 
medium through which norms of interaction are established, the relationship is -  from 
its inception -  a norm bound set of conditions governing the need for and appropriate 
extent of collective violence that in turn regulates the interactions of the two collectives 
along collective lines. In plain language, the first interactions which a political 
collective has, are with an enemy which is well known to it -  as it is through the 
identification of an enemy that it comes to know itself. All actors, individual or 
collective become framed by this friend / enemy distinction in respect of the existential 
commitments of both sides, which although rooted in a mythical ‘decision’ -  which is 
in turn maintained by sovereign husbandry -  is normative in character.
What this means is simply that the first relations which a collective entity has, and 
which are constitutive of itself, are societal, not systemic. The analogy of billiard balls 
in an international system is therefore not an appropriate Schmittian analogy to describe 
relations between two states in a hostile disposition towards each other. Unless, that is,
61 Buzan, From International To World Society?, p 7.
62 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p 4.
63 See Chapter 1 in this thesis.
64 Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political, p 28.
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we remember that even a game of billiards has extensive rules governing the conditions 
under which balls are propelled against one another, and the conditioning context of a 
precisely dimensioned baize covered surface on which these collisions are negotiated. 
In order to properly develop a Schmittian framework, it is necessary to dispense with 
the idea of freely acting units in an asocial context and instead understand the 
constitutive normative bonds through which political entities regulate their interactions.
This constitutive inside / outside mechanism ensures the point at which the collective 
articulates itself through the friend / enemy distinction, and marks out a point of 
inversion in which the inside is umbilically linked to the outside, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, even the capacity to make war as a collectivity is conditioned by a clear 
sense of political community formed in opposition to another, and this would be gained 
by a very precise and historically particular set of reasons for the emergence of a 
political fracture, which implies that each collectivity will have a highly constructed 
notion of the appropriate conditions under which collective violence is justified. The 
very essence of the constitutive dispute is framed in normative terms and positions the 
two original collectives in a relationship of intimate hostility that has an absolutely 
normative and ideational expression.
Hedley Bull’s opening discussion of the problem of order is a nuanced reflection on the 
origins of the need for order, which he locates in problems of distribution; scarce 
resources or unchecked egotism.65 At the end of this preliminary discussion he 
comments on the universal nature of the drive to order, concluding that people value the 
predictable behaviour of others, and that order is ultimately constituted in the rules 
governing individual behaviour precisely because they allow others to predict that 
behaviour, thus satisfying that basic social need and making the predictable behaviour 
of others a matter of value to each social participant. This analysis could be generalised 
and conclusions drawn from it, but the point here is merely to make a distinction 
between rules and order; rules come about as a result of the universal drive for order, 
but order exists as a normative demand prior to the existence of the rules that allow it to 
emerge as an observable social phenomenon.
65 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p 5.
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However, when Bull proceeds to discuss the interaction of states by comparison to the 
Hobbesian state of nature, he repeats the important realist contention that Hobbes’ ‘state 
of nature’ can be simply extrapolated from considering the individual as unit, to 
considering the political community as unit. Hobbes himself makes this assumption,66 
but in keeping with a Schmittian focus, this particular problem in Bull’s analysis must 
be unpicked by moving away from a unit/system model and the level of analysis 
problem that accompanies it. What this does is bring into question Buzan’s assertion 
that International Society is -  along with International System -  based on an ‘ontology 
of states’.67 For while an International System is the logical offshoot of an ‘ontology of 
states’,68 when International Society follows a Schmittian form, it could only produce 
an ontology of states, not be based on one. The significance of this is simply that if the 
friend / enemy distinction takes on a normative character, and the social character of 
hostile relations is established, systemic relations could only ever be a rarefied form of 
social relations, framed by prior normative commitments built into the terms of hostility 
expressed in the original friend / enemy distinction. Thus the ‘ontology of states’, or the 
assumption that states are given units within an international system, is no longer a 
secure ontological context, but a series of interpretive reference points, derivative of the 
friend / enemy distinction that gave rise to the initial plurality of collective actors, and 
the normative terms of their continuing interactions. However, because an ontology of 
states encourages an ahistorical or systemic perspective in International Relations, 
stripping the ES of ontological claims concerning the prior existence of states and 
system also buttresses ES claims to a historicist disposition, which is shared by 
Schmitt’s analysis. The state form is for Schmitt -  as outlined in earlier parts of the 
thesis -  a contingent historically situated form of political organisation, and although 
Bull widens out his consideration from states to include political communities,69 this 
implicitly acknowledges a weakness in his analysis in that Bull also accepts that the 
state is a contingent entity, repudiating the idea of an ‘ontology of states’, casting it 
instead in self-consciously epistemological terms, as if the ontological form of states are 
contingent upon their conceptual expression.
66 Hobbes, Leviathan, p 224.
67 Buzan, From International to World Society?, p 7,23.
68 Ibid., p 7.
69 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p 9.
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Starting from a Schmittian position, a political community becomes aware of itself in a 
relationship of intimate hostility with another, and therefore societal relations are 
implicit within the idea of political community from the beginning. Any further 
theoretical formulations describing the relations between political communities are 
therefore derivative of this prior set of established norms governing the interaction of 
particular political communities. On a very small scale this can be used to describe the 
hostile relationships between primitive tribal bands for whom war and conflict are 
highly ritualised and share normative attachment to certain practices particular to 
context. On a much larger scale the same can be observed of the relationships between 
Westphalian European states as similarly ritualised and conducted through highly 
developed normative restraints. Each of these contexts could be better described as an 
International Society rather than an International System. Therefore the implications of 
dispensing with the ‘ontology of states’, works through the constitutive relationship 
between unit and system (or society), leaving a much more flexible theoretical 
instrument in the form of a de-ontologised International Society, capable of application 
across a range of historical periods and differentiated cultural contexts. International 
Society should not therefore be thought of as derived from a deeper level of interaction 
called International System, but should be thought of as prior to it.
Schmitt and International Society
Beyond Schmitt’s reformulation of Hobbes’ state of nature, we find in his theory of 
nomos, a sophisticated account of European modernity cast in familiar terms. European 
states had close relationships in which war was a legitimate practice and conducted 
according to very specific rules and logics. These shared conceptions concerning the 
place of organised violence he terms ‘bracketed war’ and were made possible by a 
constitutive exclusion of the whole of Europe from the rest of the world. What this 
meant in practice was that the whole world was legally and normatively ‘appropriated’ 
by Europe, and that European states recognised their mutual superiority within a 
European legal order that rendered the rest of the world a field of unrestrained 
competition for European states. On the one hand, this describes very precisely an 
International Society in so far as it operated in Westphalian Europe where there were 
agreed norms concerning European states’ relations with each other. On the other hand, 
it also provided no effective place for non-European states (or political communities) to
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represent themselves on an equal footing. It was a normative framework that 
underpinned the claims of European Imperial competition and regulated the relations 
between European states across the world, even to the extent of creating territorial zones 
in which absolute competition was permitted without affecting the peace in Europe. 
Chris Brown has brought into question the extent to which Schmitt’s notion of
7ftEuropean order ever really described the reality, but nevertheless it is a coherent 
theoretical framework which contains important insights, particularly the distinction 
between Europe and non Europe. If it was not true in all respects it at least formed a 
sufficient reflection of particular attitudes within Europe. Non-European territory and 
peoples formed little more than a cultural relief and resource for competitive, polemical
71European narratives of national and imperial progress.
What this leads back to is the reflections on World Society offered in the earlier parts of 
this chapter, and which become implicit in Schmitt’s formulation of nomos, which sets 
the normative conceptual foundations for International Society of the jus publicum 
Europaeum . The European legal order of the jus publicum Europaeum depended upon 
the legal and normative separation between Europe and the rest of the World, and where 
European states behaved according to certain rules, these rules had little to say 
concerning the treatment of indigenous populations. Individual states did press the 
claims of certain indigenous people, but these were generally woven into broader 
strategies for the exclusion of other European powers from particular regions. For 
example Anglo French competition in North America produced some alliances with 
particular bands of native Americans, but this in no way accorded these people an equal 
legal status to Europeans. In terms of how International Society relates to World 
Society, what this indicates is that the International Society of the European legal order 
was set in the broader context of a World Society rooted in a witch’s brew of 
civilisational hierarchy and a racist view of humanity. In other words, everyone had a 
place in the discursive firmament of the accompanying World Society to the prevailing 
European International Society, although not necessarily a place they might have 
chosen for themselves.
70 Brown, ‘From humanized war to humanitarian intervention’, op.cit.
71 Matching Ed Keene’s interpretation of the hierarchical nature of the Westphalian System, in Beyond 
the Anarchical Society.
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This also clarifies the usefulness of the idea of an International Society that is not based 
on an ontology of states, and further aligns Carl Schmitt’s analysis with the theoretical 
instruments of the ES. When Schmitt writes that the International Society of the 
European legal order collapsed in 1917, it follows that the entire state system also 
collapsed for Schmitt. Which in turn explains the impulse he had to try to theorise 
political developments in a post-state age -  at a time when states were still very much 
alive, well and functioning -  and why he came up with the theory of Groffraum and his 
conceptualisation of nomos. He did not -  it should be added -  retreat to a version of 
systemic relations between states. Much of this has already been discussed in other parts 
of the thesis, so needs little more elaboration here, but it clarifies the usefulness of an 
ES vocabulary when examining the works of Carl Schmitt, and further illustrates the 
usefulness of Carl Schmitt to the ES.
Societal Relations in Historical Context
The interpretation of the relationship between system and society offered in this chapter 
represents something of an inversion, and therefore it is worth applying the logic in 
order to reinforce the point, and this can be done by theorising interactions that would 
ordinarily be thought of in systemic terms, such as a European state’s historical 
encounter with a far distant political entity. For the sake of argument I shall make 
reference to the Kingdom of Siam, for reasons that will become apparent during the 
explanation. On the face of it, early British or French interactions with Siam simply do 
not qualify under the rubric of International Society. They can only be thought of as 
purely systemic in that neither Britain nor France had significant contact with Siam 
prior to 17th Century, and during the 18th and 19th Century, when contact increased, 
there was no shared culture, no common interests, nothing that would allow the 
description of the relationship as societal. So the temptation is to refer to these contacts 
as systemic, in that Britain and Siam’s relationship was conducted merely with 
reference to each other’s existence as actors and not according to any shared norms.72 
Same for Franco-Siamese relations. However, the skill with which the Siamese kings 
played Britain and France off against one another in order to maintain their 
independence, deserves closer scrutiny and a different kind of explanation. Although the 
contact was clearly systemic at one level, it would be better described as a systemic
72 Following Buzan’s definition, in From International to World Society?, p 7.
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level confrontation between Siam, and the European International Society, rather than 
any individual representatives of it. In other words, this encounter was an encounter not 
simply between Siam and Britain or Siam and France, but Siam and European 
International Society. The reason this is important is quite simply that the Siamese were 
perfectly able to understand and exploit a set of pre-existing tensions between Britain 
and France in order to maintain a high degree of independence. So although Siamese 
interactions with Europe were arguably systemic at one level, they were quite capable 
of operating within the framework of European International Society, and therefore 
harnessing a range of complex interrelationships between Britain and France that are 
properly characterised as societal rather than systemic. Furthermore, the degree to 
which the relations between Siam and European states can be viewed as systemic, must 
equally be informed by the normative exclusion of any mutual obligations they might 
have had towards one another by virtue of Buddhist or Christian law -  presuming that 
these normative frameworks were essentially ignored by both the Europeans and the 
Siamese, which is by no means a safe assumption.
The position of Siam in the international realm was largely contingent upon what Siam 
meant to France and Britain (or Europe more generally). So Siam had a place within 
European International Society, even if they were accorded rights only insofar the 
tension between two European powers allowed. Against this context, the question of 
whether Siamese relations with Britain or France can be counted systemic or not, pays 
no attention to the International Society dynamics already at play. Members of 
particular International Societies, do not escape it merely by interacting with political 
communities that exist outside of it, instead they represent it, and confront the distant 
political community with a given set of norms conditioning the manner of the 
interaction itself. France or Britain in the 19th Century, did not invent new ways of 
interacting with distant states as they came across them, they merely deployed an 
existing set of norms, most particularly that these ‘states’ were not European states, and 
were thus open for claim, conquest, or protection. This was International Society at 
work, even if the detail of the interaction was apparently systemic, these systemic 
interactions were already conditioned by a wider overlap of International Society 
norms.
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This analysis can be stretched a little further if begun from a slightly different 
perspective. As outlined above, International Society has a much wider application once 
injected with Schmittian insights concerning the societal origins of political 
communities, and that relationships previously considered as systemic can be 
reappraised from the perspective that even systemic interactions are conditioned by 
societal norms; the English and French did not feast on Siamese flesh, for example. It 
follows that the only truly systemic interactions could be between political communities 
who had no prior interaction, but even here, there are many examples of encounters that 
do not simply reduce to naked systemic power plays. On the contrary, most examples of 
early encounters were informed very considerably by curiosity and inquiry, and even 
initial contact was invariably conducted according some pre-existing norms, even if 
these norms were not shared between the two communities. The variety of 
interpretations of the death of Captain Cook in Hawaii -  in which his status was 
ritualised and incorporated within Hawaiian narratives, even to the extent of dying ‘a 
truly Polynesian death’ -  forms one example, as does Christopher Columbus landing 
on Hispaniola. In each case the two communities appraised each other in terms of their 
own normative traditions, or social dynamics. The widely held view that the Spanish 
appeared as returning gods to the Aztecs is uncertain, but Cortes clearly seemed like a 
potential ally for the subject populations of the Aztecs, and thus was incorporated 
within pre-existing social relations.74 Furthermore, Iver Neumann has made reference to 
early Scandinavian encounters with the Sami, and notes that interactions were guided 
and conditioned by accounts of legendary encounters with giants.
The list goes on; early European slave trading was justified not merely in terms of a pre­
existing market, but by reference to biblical verses concerning the divine punishment of 
perpetual servitude for the blackened descendents of Ham, son of Noah. More important 
than this though, there were considerable debates concerning the legal status of the 
native inhabitants of the Americas, which in turn -  through Vittoria -  inform the 
development of European jurisprudence and International Law. For Schmitt, even 
outright conquest, necessitates a normative context in which it can be justified, which
73 Marshall Sahlins, Islands o f History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p 134.
74 Tvetan Todorov, The Conquest o f America: The Question o f the Other, (New York: Harper & Row, 
1984), p 58.
75 Iver B. Neumann, ‘Naturalizing Geography: Harry Potter and the Realms of Muggles, Magic Folks and 
Giants’, in Daniel Nexon and Iver B. Neumann (eds), Harry Potter and International Relations, (London: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p 174.
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freights even the most basic and systemic interactions with all sorts of ideas concerning 
the appropriate form these interactions might take. As a last consideration, the European 
attitude towards the non-European world was so uniformly organised around the 
superiority of the European, that all attempts to recognise non-Europeans as equal to 
Europeans were fiercely resisted by an organised consensus between European states. 
So there was even society in the uniformity of the applied system of European 
domination, otherwise, these systemic interactions might have taken a variety of 
different forms and directions, evidence for which is hard to come by. After all, no 
European country fought to liberate any subject people, only to make them differently 
subject.
The final act of European Empires was the process of decolonisation, in which 
previously colonised regions were recognised as states within the framework of the 
United Nations. These states then presumably could be counted as actors in the wider 
International System, and according to a Bullian analysis, might go on to build societal 
networks with regional counterparts. However, this in effect provides fairly compelling 
evidence for the priority of society over system. The entire debate concerning whether a 
state has de jure or de facto sovereignty,76 the institutional hierarchy between developed 
and developing countries, the entire North / South discourse and the pre-emptive 
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, all count towards a broad critique of the idea of 
International System as an analytically worthwhile template. Most ES scholars would 
accept the value of International Society over International System, and Buzan goes to 
great lengths to downplay the importance of International System by developing a wider 
taxonomy of International Society.77 However, where this chapter deviates from 
Buzan’s desire for a subtler array of notions of International Society to replace 
International System, is quite simply that any understanding of International System is 
already conditioned by societal norms, which -  for Schmitt -  are ultimately rooted in 
the existential dimension of the friend / enemy distinction, expressed as normative 
parameters of interaction, and in their most generalised sense corresponding to a 
philosophically idealist version of World Society.
76 Robert Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, ‘Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the 
Juridical in Statehood’, in World Politics, Volume 35, Issue 1, 1982.
77 Buzan, From International to World Society?, p 100.
236
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to do broadly three things. First of all, to establish the 
importance of norms as ideational conditioners to both Schmitt’s and the ES’s accounts 
of order. Secondly to compare Carl Schmitt’s approach to theorising to that of the main 
strands of the ES, and finally to examine the ES from a Schmittian perspective.
The question of norms places Schmitt beyond most ES thinkers in that his theories exist 
in an entirely normative dimension. His worldview is embedded in the world of ideas 
and rests upon the construction of ideational or normative frameworks as a way of 
ordering the world. However the ES, if viewed with a mind to the importance of the 
distinction between concepts and objects emerges not as simply an elevated form of 
Realism, but a similarly norm biased attempt to excavate the conceptual foundations of 
order. In respect of the second aim, much more could be said about a greater range of 
scholars, and about other general characteristics of ES thinking such as ‘methodological 
pluralism’, which I would suggest is a misnomer stemming from the broadly meta- 
theoretical and idealist disposition of the ES. Furthermore, although many of the key 
theorists of the ES -  Bull, Butterfield, Manning etc. -  would share Schmitt’s mistrust of 
the idea of progress in history, others -  Wight, Vincent, Linklater etc. -  are more open 
to its appearance. However it is hoped that a sufficient comparison has been made to see 
some fairly robust parallels of intellectual approach, particularly a shared historicism, 
and a desire to draw on many intellectual traditions in order to come up with highly 
enriched accounts of order in the International realm, but equally in the shared openness 
to philosophical idealism, if not the constrained utopianism of ES solidarists. Both the 
ES and Carl Schmitt can be seen eschewing a search for simple explanatory 
mechanisms and instead develop historically sensitive explanatory narratives built upon 
and in respect of the evolving history of ideas; holding concepts generally prior to 
objects. It is this conjunction of basic philosophical idealism and mistrust of historical 
progress that carves out a space between ‘classical realism’ and ‘utopianism’ that has 
long be the central axis of the ES, and thus can it be viewed as a ‘fourth tradition’, if a 
little frayed around the edges.
Lastly, the most important contribution of this chapter has been to use Schmitt as a 
guide to interpreting the ES triad of concepts -  International System, International
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Society and World Society -  in terms of how they relate to one another rather than 
stressing precise definitional distinctions between the three. What this does to the ES 
when we introduce Schmitt as a contrast and place it under the analytical x-ray is to 
identify an umbilical, reflexive relationship between political communities and the 
International Societies that make them possible, and accompanying each International 
Society is a coherent set of normative implications concerning the normative ordering 
of an encompassing World Society. Therefore the question of whether World Society 
exists is set aside, to be replaced by reflection on what World Society necessarily looks 
like from behind the normative form of each and every friend / enemy curtain. 
Following which, war and conflict can be considered in two different ways, on the one 
hand, as rule bound activity between mutually recognising societal actors, and -  when 
the ordering normative framework of a nomos, or International Society, breaks down -  
hugely destructive conflict between the normative tendrils of competing versions of 
World Society, bringing to mind another quote by Butterfield which further cements the 
productivity of the comparison between Schmitt and the ES.
The greatest menace to our civilization is the conflict between giant 
organized systems of self-righteousness - each only too delighted to find 
that the other is wicked - each only too glad that the sins of the other give it 
pretext for still deeper hatred.78
Which for Schmitt -  although by no means only Schmitt -  would have accurately
thdescribed much of the 20 Century. Whether or not the English School remains the 
English School if warped and interpreted this way is a matter for further discussion -  for 
the record, I think Dunne’s ‘family of assumptions’ a better way to frame the ES than 
Manners and his ‘four traditions’ -  but the vocabulary of the ES clearly provides for a 
fertile comparison with the ideas of Carl Schmitt, and Carl Schmitt seems to cast an 
interesting and productive perspective on the ES. So at least a case is made that Carl 
Schmitt and the ES share territory -  so to speak -  in the manner in which they approach 
the task of interpreting and answering the central dilemmas of International Relations; 
questions concerning collective identification and legitimate violence. At the very least, 
Schmitt and the ES occupy similar philosophically and historically inflected terrain, and 
therefore produce similar attempts to frame an understanding of IR; through law, norms 
and ideational constructs. Of course this might not be the most comfortable admission
78 Herbert Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, (London: Epworth, 1953), p 40.
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for members of the ES, but Schmitt’s dark associations should at least suggest that the 
normative commitments that many ES theorists display, are not a necessary part of the 
basic mistrust of historical progress, and the conceptual predisposition that form an 
organising logic for the English School.
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Chapter 8 -  Carl Schmitt and IR Theory: Re-posing the 
Question
I. A Fast-Fish belongs to the party fast to it.
II. A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it.
What was America in 1492 but a Loose-Fish, in which Colombus struck the Spanish 
standard by way o f waiflng it for his royal master and mistress? What was Poland to 
the Czar? What Greece to the Turk? What India to England? What at last will Mexico 
be to the United States? All Loose-Fish.
What are the Rights o f Man and the Liberties o f the World but Loose-Fish? What all 
men ’s minds and opinions but Loose-Fish? What is the principle o f religious belief in 
them but a Loose-Fish? What to the ostentatious smuggling verbalists are the thoughts 
o f thinkers but Loose-Fish? What is the great globe itself but a Loose-Fish? And what 
are you, reader, but a Loose-Fish and a Fast-Fish, too?
Ishmael, the Narrator of Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick or, The Whale.
Introduction
The last chapter of this thesis acts as a round-up and a summarised conclusion. It 
reprises arguments that have been made more extensively in each of the three chapters 
covering the main traditions within IR, followed by the chapter on the English School, 
presenting them all as part of a more concise argument concerning the discipline of IR 
as a whole. Throughout the thesis it has become increasingly clear that when exploring 
the relationship between a theorist -  in this case Carl Schmitt -  and International 
Relations, the resolution turns upon two variables; the theorist in question, and IR 
theory more generally. In other words, what is required is not merely an understanding 
of the specific contribution one theorist can make to the discipline, but also the manner 
in which the problems that animate the discipline itself must be posed or re-posed in 
order to allow for a constructive engagement, rather than merely a radical critique. One 
of the problems this reveals is that IR as a discipline -  though comprised of a great deal 
of theory -  is relatively un-theorised as a whole. There are the three traditions, and the 
various methodologies that emerge from IR, along with principles like ‘isomorphism’ 
and the ‘balance of power’. Then there are the repeated ‘turns’ that characterised the 
discipline in the 1990s. Finally, there is the preoccupation with ‘the state’ and the 
domestic / international divide, leaving ER somewhat fragmented.
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From the beginning of the thesis I have followed the idea that IR best organises itself 
around a set of relatively persistent though somewhat unstated questions. The reason the 
questions are persistent is that concerns over collective identification -  and all the 
constitutive and exclusionary logics this entails -  and legitimate violence, can be 
observed historically and remain matters of some importance. If a functioning world 
state existed, then perhaps International Relations would be a less important arena of 
reflection -  or more by some logics -  but nevertheless, the one reasonably consistent 
feature of human history is the absence of any universal government, or even ordering 
principles. The reason the questions are largely unstated is simply that the manner in 
which the questions are phrased reflects the philosophical and historical disposition of 
the theorist attempting to provide answers for them. However, if the discipline is framed 
as a series of differently inflected, theory-political responses to some common 
underlying questions, then it becomes possible to make an attempt at an organisational 
schematic for the discipline as a whole, by simply clarifying the character of the 
philosophical and historical inflections. Thus the traditions in IR -  which in the past 
have been extended, reinterpreted, critiqued and declared off-limits to others as zones of 
incommensurability -  can be reframed as theory-political interventions on a nexus of 
interrelated questions that pull them all together into a disciplinary whole. And it is 
from these perspectives that attempts are made to explain the whole series of events -  
ordinarily classed as international relations -  coherently. I have attempted to represent 
these broad distinctions graphically in order to clarify the argument, but it should bear 
repeating that these underlying distinctions between philosophical realism and idealism, 
and between progressive and cyclical accounts of history, constitute distinctions -  or in 
the words of Michael Williams ‘polarities’ -  that I regard to be the productive tensions 
of the discipline of IR. In other words, it is not for IR scholars to contest these 
distinctions, merely to acknowledge them in order to see them more clearly. The 
schematic appears overleaf, and is followed by some summarised explanations drawn 
from the individual chapters that comprise the rest of the thesis. The graph comprises 
something like a route map for the discipline of IR and is premised upon a high degree 
of associative flexibility.
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The Quasi-Orbital Schematic of IR Theory.
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IR Theory as a Unifying Curiosity
Throughout this thesis, continual reference has been made to the idea that the discipline 
of International Relations is unified by a set of underlying questions, yet these questions 
have not been written down except allusively in respect of ‘concerns’ related to ‘order’, 
‘collective identity’ and ‘legitimate violence’. There are two reasons for this: first, the 
difficulty of concisely phrasing questions that everyone working within IR would 
recognise as interesting questions, and secondly the manner in which the questions 
might be phrased would inevitably encode certain philosophical and historical 
assumptions. This is hardly surprising, and provides a reminder of John Austin’s Speech 
Act Theory, How to do Things with Words,1 in which he describes a ‘speech act’ as
1 John Austin, How to do things with words, (London: Oxford University Press, 1976).
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having ‘illocutionary’ and ‘perlocutionary’ aspects; the former being the direct meaning 
of the words, and the latter meaning the normative assumptions -  or ‘facilitating 
conditions’ -  revealed and reinforced by the same words. However, it does oblige 
further explanation concerning how questions that cannot be written down can 
nevertheless cohere an entire discipline without regard to methodology. To do this I 
would like to invoke two Schmittian themes; the idea of the ‘neutral centre’ from 
Schmitt’s ‘The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’, and the ‘friend / enemy 
distinction’ from his The Concept o f the Political. Although these should be understood 
only as explanatory metaphors for the purpose of argument.
The ‘neutral centre’ was how Schmitt characterised the arena of intellectual contestation 
concerning the neutral terms of interaction between European powers, moving through 
historical phases, from a theological centre -  where Europeans were united by the 
centrality of a unifying set of theological arguments -  to a metaphysical centre, to a 
humanitarian centre, then an economic centre. What this ultimately boils down to is the 
relatively simple prescription that throughout the period of European modernity, Europe 
was united by the idea of its unity, and the intellectual and historical progress of Europe 
can be understood in respect of the determined and polemical contestation which took 
place over the ‘neutral centre’, or the terms of interaction that were recognized -  and 
therefore authorised -  as neutral.
The friend / enemy distinction is invoked for its existential logic; the manner in which 
only participants within a friend / enemy distinction can recognise its limits and logic. 
The IR theorist does not need to agree on the exact phrasing of a theoretical or research 
question to know the extent to which it has a bearing on their own research. Thus the 
unifying questions can remain signified by the general formula of ‘concerning collective 
identity and legitimate violence’ for theorists in themselves to be quite clear concerning 
their own relationship to the broader intellectual pursuit -  and their polemical opponents 
-  yet nevertheless able to frame the terms of their own engagement.
With these two Schmittian metaphors in mind, the discipline of IR can be conceptually 
constructed as an orbital schematic. The neutral centre of the unifying questions -  
shown on the chart in the centre -  exert a centripetal force, pulling differently inflected 
responses towards them, which in turn represent attempts to shift the neutral centre
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towards a particular philosophical and historical inflection within which to cast the 
questions. Participants within theoretical debates about International Relations -  even 
those most critically disposed towards the main traditions -  are drawn to frame the 
central questions in a manner that permits them to reflect their own philosophically and 
historically inflected answers in such a way as to implicitly lay a claim concerning the 
precise coordinates of the neutral centre -  and therefore the best and most authoritative 
manner of resolving the underlying questions. So when a theorist -  for example a realist 
-  attempts to frame a contribution to IR, he or she is doing two things: On the one hand, 
explaining the phenomenon or event under examination, and on the other hand 
supporting the philosophical and historical inflections that characterise Realism as the 
authoritative way to frame response to the general questions that unite IR. Therefore 
the neutral centre of the unifying questions is suspended and given life by the strength 
and intensity of the theoretical contestation it endures. Each of the main traditions -  and 
indeed every theorist, insofar as they have anything to say about IR -  exist within the 
broader orbit of the unifying questions, merely taking their position from the 
philosophical and historical assumptions they bring to bear on the questions. Therefore 
the traditions, although they may fray at the edges, appear as reasonably coherent sites 
of common historical and philosophical commitments, from which it is possible both to 
explain the particular events and phenomena that relate to the underlying questions, and 
to stake a claim for the most appropriate and informative manner of addressing the 
underlying questions more generally.
Necessarily this involves the IR theorist in an ongoing polemical tug-of-war, but I 
would suggest that this is a better way to understand the interactions between differently 
inflected theories and theorists, than the alternative of paradigmatic 
incommensurability, or ‘critical’ and ‘mainstream’ splits. Particularly so because it 
preserves a vision of a living discipline, united in a common endeavour -  rather than 
divided by methodological divisions -  and capable of better disciplinary self-assertion 
against the regular incursions by sociologists, historians, political theorists and others. 
By attempting explanations from differently inflected conjunctions of historical and 
philosophical disposition, the traditions also serve to legitimise the very decisions they 
lend themselves to recommend. Explicitly or implicitly every analysis of world politics 
or international relations serves as the foundations for a series of polemical responses to 
the problems examined, and it is worth summarising what this Schmittian critique of the
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three traditions -  and the putative ‘fourth tradition’ of the ES -  provides by way of 
organising principles for a reframing of the discipline of IR.
Liberalism
The First World War -  according to Schmitt -  had seen the final shattering of the nomos 
of the jus publicum Europaeum, which laid the foundations for the broader international 
crisis that followed. This crisis was in part addressed by the establishment of the new 
discipline of International Relations, but also by the sweeping rise of the discourse of 
liberalism and liberal humanism, along with the establishment of the League of Nations. 
This is part of the DNA of the discipline of IR, but one relatively overlooked dimension 
is that this liberalism lacked disciplinary or methodological precision. Schmitt’s critique 
of liberalism was very precisely directed at its expression in terms of universal norms. 
Where liberal theorists treated the maxim ‘war to end all wars’ as something like a 
foundational irony, for Schmitt it was astonishingly close to the truth. For liberals, the 
First World War was the logical end point of classical ‘balance of power’ diplomacy, 
and was the final proof of a need to abolish and criminalise war through the 
institutionalisation of diplomacy. For Schmitt, the First World War was the 
consequence of the slow triumph of liberal humanism over the latter half of the 19th 
Century and the earth shattering collapse of the old order, giving rise to a context of 
profound normative uncertainty, in which ‘bracketed conflict’ yielded to wars of 
absolute destruction. In Chapter 4 I make the case that Schmitt implicitly points to the 
rise of the discourse of humanity behind this ultimately intellectual and conceptual 
process, and I therefore isolate these progressive and universalised humanistic norms as 
the real focus of his critique, rather than the more sedate sentiments of interstate 
cooperation and domestic democracy or free trade. With this in mind it becomes 
possible to differentiate between the many different forms of liberalism that have 
expanded the tradition of Liberalism in IR, suggesting that ‘compensatory liberalism’ 
and ‘liberal institutionalism’ edge away from the central humanistic elements of 
liberalism, moving them slightly outside the target zone of Schmitt’s original critique. 
Liberalism therefore -  along with Hegel himself -  appears on the lower right hand 
comer of the chart, indicating a profound acceptance of the idea of progress in history, 
and a philosophically idealist attitude towards the priority of concepts over objects.
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Furthermore, Schmitt’s general suspicion of the concept of progress in history is 
reinforced by Schmitt’s critique of Hegelian dialectics, and his opposition to Kelsenian 
positivism in the legal sphere. However, one area where Schmitt was not ultimately 
critical of the early liberal theorists was in their general commitment to an ‘ought’ over 
an ‘is’. Schmitt was critical of the idea of there being a general or universal ‘ought’ 
from which all other ‘oughts’ drew meaning, but the friend / enemy distinction is an 
attempt to frame the origins of prevailing ‘oughts’ in non-universalised terms. In other 
words, he remained committed to the precedence of concept over object. His whole 
world view and his casting of history has a Hegelian spirit about it, counter progressive, 
certainly, but nevertheless philosophically idealist in form. This explains in part why 
liberals find Schmitt a more worthy theoretical opponent than they do realists, and 
perhaps why his critique of liberalism is still regarded as uniquely powerful, for the 
simple reason that he offers an ideationally complete conceptualisation of order built 
with contextually normative elements. This -  for liberals -  presents a much greater 
conceptual challenge than one built upon a series of contestable ontological claims 
concerning the ‘real world’ or ‘human nature’.
Lastly, Schmitt’s critique of liberalism indicts it as polemical in nature, in that behind 
all the institutions, the analysis, and the appeals to reason, there hides -  although not 
very shyly -  the normative commitment to parameters of universal human equality and 
the idea of progress in history. The underlying pathos of early Liberalism in IR was 
that everyone on the planet had a natural right for peace and security sufficient to allow 
them to pursue a life appropriate to their needs and culture. This can either be taken as 
fact, or understood as a normative commitment made prior to any attempt to answer 
persistent dilemmas concerning collective identification and legitimate violence. 
Obviously this thesis takes the latter view.
Realism
The origins of Realism are most often located in a general critique of the ‘utopianism’ 
inherent in the establishment of the League of Nations and the attempt to abolish war. 
This ‘realist reaction’ is best expressed by EH Carr and Hans Morgenthau, but is not
21 chose the word ‘parameters’ deliberately in place of ‘principles’ for the simple reason that different 
theorists have different ideas of what equality means, all the way from legal equality, to economic 
equality, via expressions of cultural respect.
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limited to these two. The fundamental claim by realists that they attempt to describe the 
world ‘as it is’, rather than as they ‘would like it to be’ captures a series of frustrations 
with the way that politicians were simply not -  at the time -  reading from the liberal 
script. All very well to have new institutions for the preservation of the peace and the 
settlement of international disputes, but when some states simply ignore it, and others 
turn a blind eye, it represents only a triumph of self delusion over hard facts. What is 
interesting is that whereas liberal visionaries had based their thinking upon a belief in 
progress and the perfectibility of man, early realists merely asserted their pessimism 
concerning man’s nature alongside the ineradicability of war as a recurrent phenomenon 
of a static or cyclical view of history. Much has been said in Chapter 5 about Realism 
and some of its subsequent forms, but the manner in which interwar realists 
characterised the idealism of the prevailing liberal ethos is what necessitated the 
distinction made earlier in this thesis -  between philosophical idealism and utopian 
idealism within IR. A philosophical realist tends to start from the suggestion that the 
world has an essential set of characteristics external to the observation of them -  
whereas a philosophical idealist accepts that the conceptualisation of the external world 
is necessarily prior to an appreciation of how it is constituted. Indeed, it is in its 
conceptualisation, that it is constituted. Simply put, realists prioritise objects over 
concepts, whereas idealists prioritise concepts over objects.
Although Schmitt is often cast as a realist, his critique of liberalism does not look like a 
realist critique of liberalism. For Schmitt, the liberal world order was not dangerous due 
to its weakness, or lack of ‘realism’, but due to the destructiveness of its polemical 
content. The humanist and progressive injunctions of liberalism -  for Schmitt -  served 
to destroy a carefully constructed European world order expressed in the jus publicum 
Europaeum. To this extent liberalism had already done its conceptual damage by the 
time Schmitt began to write about it. His contempt for it was built upon a fear of it, not 
a disappointment with its failures.
Schmitt does, however, share the realist estimation of progress in history. His is a 
deeply conservative view of delicate and vulnerable structures of normative order. The 
notion of progress in history casts the decline of the present in a positive light. Realists 
are generally committed to a greater trust in inherited traditions and a mistrust of 
revolutionary schemes for emancipation. To this extent Schmitt can be called a realist.
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However, Realism must be more than simply a mistrust of progress and a love of 
tradition and order, over justice and emancipation. This is best captured in the 
conceptual realm, and Nick Rengger makes it clear when he says that realism is ‘of the 
world’, when outlining Oakeshott’s critique of Morgenthau’s mobilisation of the 
concept of tragedy.3 Fundamentally, realists start from the philosophical proposition 
that the world is ‘out there’, independent of its observation, and that its laws are 
objective, and that any attempt to change the world must be based on a correct 
estimation of either its nature, or human nature. There are a few realists that might aver 
from these conditions, notably Michael C. Williams,4 but I suggest that it is better to 
understand Realism in terms of the deep philosophical and historical claims made on its 
behalf prior to addressing the uniting questions of IR. And in this respect, Realism 
carries with it a commitment to principles of philosophical realism -  the priority of the 
object over concept -  and marries this with a hostility to the idea of progress in history. 
Realism therefore, appears on the upper left hand comer of the quasi-orbital schematic 
sketched out above.
Marxism
Schmitt’s critique of Marxism reveals a number of important insights concerning his 
own thought. His reduction of Marx to a polemicist, articulating a highly effective -  and 
crucially universal -  friend / enemy distinction on an ontological estimation of ‘class’ 
repeats Schmitt’s similar mistrust of the dangers of liberalism. He does not merely 
dismiss Marx as mistaken -  as do many realists -  but instead attacks his elevation of 
Hegel’s ‘educative dictatorship’ into an ‘iron law’, which alters the role of the 
philosopher from one merely content to observe and identify the progressive dynamics 
of history, to an agent in its transformation. When Marx overturns Hegel’s idealism in 
order to outline his materialist and determinist philosophy of history, he crosses the 
philosophical realist / idealist divide, yet maintains Hegel’s progressive logic. Thus if 
Hegel was a progressive idealist, and Schmitt a counter-progressive idealist, Marx 
completes the opposition by articulating a progressive materialism, immaculately 
opposed to the terms by which Schmitt interacted conceptually with the world. Hence,
3 Nicholas Rengger, ‘Realism, tragedy, and the anti-Pelagian imagination in International political 
thought’, in Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered.
4 Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits o f International Relations, however, Williams is engaged 
in a self-conscious attempt to re-imagine Realism in terms that remove the ontological framing of 
International Relations in terms of given actors.
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Marx and the tradition that bears his name can be found in the lower left hand comer of 
the quasi-orbital schematic.
However, Schmitt’s critique of Marx does draw attention to his framing of the 
polemical nature of theorising, returning to the role of the theorist as that of answering a 
persistent spread of questions concerning collective identification and legitimate 
violence. Marx certainly had answers for these kinds of questions, but had to repose the 
questions -  through his philosophy of history -  in order to provide them. In this sense 
Schmitt regarded him as a deeply worthy conceptual adversary. Equally, the early 
Frankfurt School theorists are known to have engaged directly with Schmitt in framing 
questions concerning order, divine -  and therefore supra-legitimate -  violence, and 
collective identification. More contemporary Critical Theorists have moved away from 
Marx’s determinism, but remain rhetorically committed to a materialist view of the 
world, which ensures their conceptual feet stay on the side of the philosophical realists, 
even if their methods stretch over to the intersubjective and interpretive side of the 
conceptual divide. Nevertheless, they remain committed to the idea of progress in 
history and the privileged status of the enlightenment and modernity, against the more 
sceptical post-modems, for whom -  with Schmitt -  progress is mere ideology.
Lastly, Schmitt’s critique of the Marxist theory of the partisan, reinforces the idea that 
the theorist is not neutral, either in respect of the questions he is asked, or the manner in 
which he answers them. In the last instance, everyone ‘takes party’. This further 
distinguishes him from his normal realist appellation, but also provides conceptual 
support for the presentation of the discipline of IR as a polemical playing field, in which 
differently inflected theorists attempt both to answer the uniting questions, and buttress 
an implicit conceptual claim concerning the most authoritative manner of doing this.
The English School
The above three traditions occupy the introductory ground of IR as it is taught to 
newcomers. However, the way the discipline is framed in this thesis leaves a large 
missing space on the diagram. If Realism occupies the philosophically realist, 
ontologically biased, counter-progressive comer; Marxism the philosophically realist, 
ontologically biased, progressive comer; and Liberalism the philosophically idealist,
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epistemological biased, progressive comer; then the last remaining comer of the graph 
is the philosophically idealist, epistemologically biased, counter-progressive comer, and 
I suggest this comer is occupied by -  among others -  Carl Schmitt, and the English 
School.
To accept Tim Dunne’s three family resemblances of ‘shared ideas’, ‘interpretivism’ 
and ‘normative’ character, is to impose restrictions on the ES as a coherent perspective 
from which to offer theory-political interventions to the underlying questions that unite 
IR theory. There are many ES theorists that stretch these limits somewhat -  from Bull’s 
philosophical realism, to RJ Vincent’s normative progressivism -  which makes the 
English School an uneasy fit as a coherent whole. But this stems in part from the 
dispersed and self-consciously meta-theoretical origins of the ES in the British 
Committee. However, the purpose of the Committee was to try to establish some middle 
ground between the increasing scientism of Realism, and the progressive utopianism of 
pre-war liberalism. This thesis suggests that there has always been space within a better 
framed understanding of the discipline of IR -  as four discreet perspectives from which 
to frame and respond to a persistent set of uniting questions -  for the English School, 
and it is a Schmittian critique of Liberalism, Marxism and Realism that reveals it. It is 
because Schmitt does not belong within any of the three introductory traditions of IR 
theory, that a different way of theorising the origins and persistence of the main 
traditions becomes necessary. Partly as a way of situating Carl Schmitt, but also -  
although perhaps only suggestively -  as a way of re-theorising IR Theory in a manner 
that sidesteps the image of the ‘tired old traditions’ vs ‘the endless critical turns’, each 
informed by a new and more exotic theorist -  Carl Schmitt among them.
The whole quasi-orbital schematic of IR theory can therefore be understood as an 
attempt to graphically illustrate the family relations between the various approaches to 
theorising IR; the underlying questions occupying the neutral sphere in the centre of the 
chart and acting as a centripetal force, drawing in the different theoretical responses in a 
polemical attempt to dominate the neutral sphere. The philosophical approach divides 
the chart from left to right between those of a realist or materialist disposition -  who 
tend to frame their theories around ontological claims concerning the subject matter, be 
it ‘states’ ‘class’ or ‘human nature’ -  and those of an idealist disposition who frame 
their theories in more epistemological terms concerning the effects and entailments of
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different knowledge claims in constituting or reshaping the world. Then the matter of 
whether history is viewed as generally progressive or generally static and cyclical 
divides the chart from top to bottom.
Finally, the above chart offers an explanation for the persistence of the main traditions 
within IR, and along with mapping their conceptual inter-relationships, it allows for a 
useful way of recasting the discipline as a variegated set of conceptual assumptions each 
of which can be coherently and holistically applied to a series of underlying political 
problems and give rise to different possible resolutions. The traditions can then be seen 
not as coherent bodies of theory stretching back to Grotius or Thucydides, but instead 
shared arenas of philosophical and conceptual commitments, which in turn find fellow 
travellers in the long distant past, and the highly contemporary present: A past 
dominated by continuing attempts to resolve the problems of collective identification 
and legitimate violence in a world in which human subjectivity refuses a conclusive 
definition, and a present dominated by the ceaseless invocation of new and ‘critical’ 
approaches to IR. Critique after all -  following Koselleck -  leads to crisis, and crisis 
leads to reinvention.
Conclusion
This chapter commenced by suggesting that to understand the place Schmitt inhabits 
within IR requires first some exploration of what is meant by IR. The various traditions 
of IR were critiqued from a Schmittian perspective in Section II, following which the 
commonalities of philosophical disposition and conceptual preoccupation between 
Schmitt and the English School were outlined in some detail in Chapter 7. This last 
Chapter has attempted to wrap this up into a coherent whole and has offered a way of 
understanding the persistence of the three traditions of thinking within IR as differently 
inflected responses to the same underlying questions that distinguish IR as a discipline; 
the problems of collective identification matched with expressions of legitimate 
violence. In any event, consideration of the relationship between Carl Schmitt and 
International Relations Theory ends here with a re-examination of IR Theory. 
Furthermore, the common perception of the discipline as divided between old-fashioned 
traditions, or a ‘mainstream’, and a variety of critical entrepreneurs that draw inspiration 
from Derrida, Foucault, Bhaskar, Freud or even Carl Schmitt himself, is disrupted by
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the suggestion that the discipline is united by a persistent set of concerns, rather than an 
exclusive membership or methodology. The extent to which any theorist can provide 
specific insights for the framing or resolution of these underlying questions is the 
measure of their value for IR Theory, but in every case they are either mobilised in 
support of, or directly implicated within, a polemical attempt to respond to the persistent 
dilemmas, and a claim concerning the most appropriate or authoritative way of doing 
so. To this extent, Schmitt is no exception. It is not because Schmitt was ‘right’ about 
anything that makes him interesting -  least of all his life-choices -  but instead because 
he forces a re-examination of what it means to theorise IR, and a recognition of the 
polemical entailments and obligations of doing so.
To a large extent, the shifting perspective within this thesis -  and its ultimate structure -  
is a function of how the research unfolded. When I began writing, my faltering attempts 
to answer the inevitable question concerning its subject matter would usually revolve 
around my thoughts concerning the works of Carl Schmitt. As time passed and the 
research progressed, I modified this to ‘Carl Schmitt and International Relations’ as a 
way of capturing my growing awareness of the contingent and fragmentary nature of IR 
theory more generally. Now that the thesis is at an approximate end, it feels easier 
simply to say that it ‘concerns International Relations’. There are two obvious problems 
with this; first of all, Carl Schmitt appears at the beginning, middle and end of the text, 
and forms its organising singularity. And secondly -  and far more importantly -  
International Relations is a vast field of research which can in no way be encapsulated 
by one relatively thin thesis. But this is to some extent beside the point. If IR exists as a 
discipline, then it must be possible to say something about it as a whole. It must be 
possible, for example to discuss what it is that unites the discipline, what curiosity 
animates it, and how to organise an understanding of the various approaches to it. To 
this extent, IR can be seen as a persistent curiosity, rather than an institutionalised 
framework of inquiry with its assumptions, shibboleths and prohibitions. And if the 
Archimedean maxim -  ‘Give me but one firm spot on which to stand, and I shall move 
the Earth!’ -  is adapted and applied to this thesis, it is possible to compare IR to ‘the 
Earth’, Carl Schmitt to the ‘firm spot’, and the implied long lever to the 100,000 words 
of this text. Therefore, although no thesis can say much about the entire field of IR, it is 
nevertheless possible to say something about IR as an entire field, if one has a stable 
footing from which to approach the task. All argument proceeds from a perspective, and
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although this thesis has not attempted to provide an unchallengeable or final rendering 
of Schmitt’s perspective -  such a task would require overcoming his own contradictions
-  nevertheless, reflecting on his work and understanding the underlying questions that 
inhabit and inform it, permits consideration of IR -  similarly -  in terms of the apparent 
persistence of certain dilemmas and predicaments concerning the relationship between 
collective identification and legitimate violence.
More specifically, the conclusions or contributions contained within this thesis can be 
summarised in four broad ways:
First of all -  following insights offered in this thesis -  a Schmittian approach to IR 
theory can be understood as fundamentally concerned with resolving questions of order 
in a world without certain or observable normative foundations. Furthermore, resolving 
the problem of order is -  for Schmitt -  always an entrepreneurial act of historical 
interpretation combined with an attempt to codify a selection of reconciling concepts 
within structures of norms or law, bound by recognisable principles of authority. In this 
sense Schmitt can be seen as an emblematic theorist of IR. Not only does he develop an 
account of the International as a product of underlying social processes concerned with 
establishing the conditions of predictability and order -  a norm opposed to an exception
-  but he also theorised this as separate and distinct from -  although constitutive of -  the 
consequent political contestation within both the domestic sphere, and between 
recognised participants within the normatively framed international order that ensues. In 
other words, his conceptualisation of the political as the distinction between friend and 
enemy makes him an IR theorist from first principles, not bound by assumptions 
concerning the particular forms that collective association might take.
Secondly, Schmitt offers a conceptual toolkit useful for critiquing the main traditions of 
IR theory by clarifying -  not resolving -  the philosophical realist / idealist dilemma, and 
permitting this to be contrasted against a view of history as either progressive and 
teleological or static and cyclical. With this comparison, it becomes possible to use 
Schmitt as a lens through which to look at the various different schools of IR, exposing 
some of their underlying assumptions and therefore the problems they seem designed to 
avoid. Ultimately this serves to remind IR scholars of both the importance and attendant 
irresolvability of certain key philosophical dilemmas, leaving behind the sense that
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whatever the philosophical disposition, it is the productive tension created by differently 
inflected attempts to resolve the uniting questions of IR that makes IR an important -  
because it is polemically implicated -  intellectual pursuit.
Thirdly, this same conceptual toolkit offers an interesting and productive examination 
of the English School as a separate and distinct line of enquiry into the same centripetal 
curiosity that unites International Relations. The English School emerges within this 
thesis as a distinct perspective within International Relations theory, one broadly 
informed by philosophical idealism -  and therefore possessed of a tendency towards 
epistemologically contingent attempts to frame and answer these uniting dilemmas -  
and an ambivalence towards the idea of progress in history. Not only does this permit 
the characterisation of the English School as more than simply ‘realism plus norms’ or 
even an ‘underutilised resource within IR’ but as something more like a missing link 
within IR, or a ‘fourth tradition’, informed by much greater sensitivity to the structuring 
power of norms and ideas, yet without the crusading implications of most forms of 
liberalism, exactly fulfilling the original intentions of the British Committee; by finding 
space between the increasingly scientistic realism, and the naive utopianism that 
represented the then prevailing poles of IR theory..
Fourthly, this thesis offers the rough outlines of a template by which to interpret any 
theorist from the restrained perspective of a unified underlying curiosity that gives life 
to their reflections. Each and every theorist who has ever lived offers insights on a large 
range of subjects -  Schmitt even wrote literary criticism comparing the dramatic pathos 
of Hamlet to that of Hekuba -  but the extent to which any one of them is useful or 
interesting within a context of IR theorising is subject to the particular form their 
reflections take. Hobbes, for example, long regarded as a canonical thinker within IR, 
actually said rather little about the relations between collective entities. He was more 
concerned with relations between sovereign and subject, and any entailing obligations 
this produced. However, he has been held up within IR as theorising a particular kind of 
asocial relations between states in a context of anarchy, as if his state of nature 
transposed directly to the international realm. If IR is thought of as rooted in an 
underlying curiosity concerning the relations between collective identification and 
legitimate violence, then Hobbes has less of interest to that specific curiosity than he is 
ordinarily credited with, despite Oakeshott’s undoubtedly true verdict on Hobbes as the
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author of ‘perhaps the sole masterpiece of political philosophy written in the English 
language’.5 Viewing the discipline of IR Theory as united by an underlying curiosity 
offers the opportunity of interpreting theorists in terms of what they offer that same 
curiosity. As Schmitt was principally concerned with the relations between collective 
identification and legitimate violence, this thesis once again reasserts the importance of 
Schmitt for IR Theory.
The importance of Carl Schmitt as a theorist of IR is therefore not to be found simply in 
his durable formulation of the political, nor in his obsessive defence of territory as a via 
media to peace, nor even in his construction of a system of ideas by which international 
relations are or should be regulated. Instead the value of Carl Schmitt for IR Theory is 
the nature of his curiosity, which in turn reminds scholars of a few central problems that 
characterise contemporary dilemmas. His life’s work was a prolonged engagement with 
the constitutive nature of violence in constructing the identity and self awareness of 
particular human societies, a perpetual process, necessarily ephemeral in effect, but no 
less important for that. His work stands as testimony to the enduring dilemmas by 
which human societies navigate and narrate their accounts of collective experience; 
dilemmas which remain dilemmas, and must always remain dilemmas, but dilemmas 
that require constant resolution and re-resolution. The evolution of the manner in which 
the dilemmatic relationship between violence and identity -  and the necessarily violent 
and exclusionary character of identity -  is perpetually re-resolved, and forms the 
polemical subtext of the discipline of International Relations; its disciplinary raison 
d ’etre. And Schmitt therefore, by virtue of his conceptual reflections that theorise the 
necessity of a plurality of political communities, and his further speculations concerning 
the specificity of particular forms of normative international order, must be considered 
an emblematic theorist of International Relations in spite of his troubling acquiescence 
in the face of Nazi usurpation.
Schmitt, therefore, by recasting the central political dilemma of what constitutes right 
behaviour in terms of the exclusive dynamics of community formation, reverses the 
traditional hierarchy between domestic and international, and situates the central 
preoccupations of IR Theory as prior to other forms of social and political theory, rather
5 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Introduction to Leviathan’, in Rationalism in Politics and other essays, p 223.
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than a marginal affect of high politics. Therefore Carl Schmitt offers IR Theory one 
invaluable thing; not a specific conceptual formulation nor theoretical insight, but a 
clearly expressed perspective on the problems of collective identity and legitimate 
violence from a context of radical indeterminacy, and from this stable and coherent 
perspective it becomes possible to say something about the discipline of International 
Relations as a whole. In the last instance, the political thought of Carl Schmitt does not 
provide IR Theory with an unchallengeable or authoritative toolkit of conceptual 
formulations, but instead provokes a deeper reflection on what it means to theorise IR 
today.
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